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GYMNASIUM

SIVE

SYMBOLA CRITICA.

INTENDED TO ASSIST

THE CLASSICAL STUDENT

IN HIS ENDEAVOURS TO ATTAIN A CORRECT

LATIN PROSE STYLE.

BY THE REV. ALEXANDER CROMBIE, A

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“ Audieram etiam quæ de orationis ipsius ornamentis traderentur, in quæ præcipitur primum, ut pure et Latine loquamur; deinde, ut plane et dilucide, tum, ut ornate; post, ad rerum dignitatem apte, et quasi decore; singularumque rerum præcepta cognoveram.”
Cic.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

THE FIFTH EDITION, CORRECTED AND ENLARGED.

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PREFACE

TO THE FIRST EDITION.

IT will not be questioned by those, who are conversant in the study of philology, that the most successful means of acquiring a correct and critical acquaintance with a dead language, is to employ it, either in composition or translation, under the direction of a skilful master. Nor will it be doubted, that a capacity to express our own, or the sentiments of others, in a foreign tongue, with accuracy and elegance, is the most unequivocal proof of a perfect acquaintance with its grammar, its idiom, and its purest phraseology. A knowledge of the vocabulary, combined with a slender proficiency in the etymology and syntax, aided by a tolerably acute judgment, will enable a person to translate a foreign language into his own, with considerable correctness. Where a critical knowledge of the principles fails him, the context will frequently direct him to the meaning of the author; and, what the scientific translator executes by his critical skill, the other frequently is able to accomplish by the aid of sagacity, and an acquaintance with the subject. But the converse operation is a more arduous task. In translating into a foreign lan-

guage, or employing it as the vehicle of our own thoughts, neither intuitive sagacity of intellect, nor the most intimate acquaintance with the subject will avail, without a perfect knowledge of the grammar, the idiom, and the elegancies of the language. Hence we find many capable of translating a Greek or a Roman classic, with considerable facility and correctness, into their vernacular tongue, who are confessedly unable to render, with tolerable accuracy, a few sentences of their own language into Greek or Latin. To clothe Cicero or Virgil in an English dress is an office, to which many may be fully competent; but to render a correct translation of these into Virgilian hexameter, or Ciceronian prose, would surpass the powers of the most accomplished classical scholar.

To facilitate the attainment of a correct Latin prose style, as far as it is acquirable by us moderns, is the principal aim of the following pages. How mortifying soever it may be to our national pride, the charge alleged against us by some foreign critics, that the Latin prose, which has lately issued from the British press, is, with a few exceptions, glaringly disfigured with poetical idioms, palpable inaccuracies, and solecistic phraseology, is unquestionably an imputation, which, without the blindest partiality to ourselves, cannot be pronounced to be entirely groundless. Whether this impurity of diction be ascribable to a premature initiation into the practice of versification, or to an excessive attention devoted to this exercise, while Latin prose is comparatively neglected, the author

does not presume to determine.—Thus much is certain, that there is a freedom of diction permitted to the poet, which is denied to the prose writer ; and that, when this licence has been early and habitually indulged, it requires more than common vigilance in the translator, to prevent its insinuation into a species of style, from which it ought to be most carefully excluded. The poet, it is to be observed, adopts a vocabulary, which, either in respect to the words themselves, or the sense in which he employs them, may be justly regarded as peculiarly his own. His diction possesses more of elevation and magnificence, than is suited to the grave and simple style of the philosopher, or the historian ; and, when he condescends to employ, or is by necessity compelled to use, the humbler vocabulary of prose, he invests his words with a figurative meaning.—His language is the expression of ardent feeling, vehement passion, or fervid imagination. The cause he denotes by its effect, the genus by the species, the whole by a part, and conversely ; substituting also one symbol of thought, or perception, for the sign of another, if the subjects are related by resemblance, or contrariety. Fettered also by the metrical laws of his art, he assumes a licence to deviate from certain syntactical rules, to which the prose writer is strictly confined.

Such are the idiomatic licences of the poet ; and, when the scholar has been early and much habituated to these, it is not to be wondered, if he transfer them into a species of composition, in which they can be regarded in no other

light, than as palpable incongruities, or meretricious embellishments. In this way, perhaps, we may account for that grotesque commixture of poetic and prosaic idioms, which disfigures the diction of many of our modern writers of Latin prose.

By these observations, however, the author would not be understood to signify, that the study of prosody, or the practice of versification, is either useless, or unnecessary. Though, in estimating the merit of prosodical science, either by the talents necessary to acquire it, or by its tendency to improve the intellectual powers, or by its general comparative utility, the mere prosodian may, perhaps, be regarded as occupying a subordinate rank in the literary scale, yet surely no person can be entitled to the appellation of "classic scholar," who has neglected the study of this science. To the skill of the prosodian we are indebted for many valuable emendations of the ancient poets; and he who reads Horace without a correct acquaintance with his metres, tastes but imperfectly the beauties of the poet. And, though a knowledge of *quantity*, and the rules of prosody in general, may doubtless be acquired by other means, than the practice of versification, it must be admitted that this exercise is not devoid of utility, having a direct tendency to invigorate the imagination, and to improve the taste. But still, if we consider, that the principal advantages, resulting from this practice, are attainable by other means, and if we reflect, how few there are, who are by nature qualified to become poets, and how rarely

occasion presents itself for exhibiting a skill in the composition of Latin or Greek poetry, we cannot help regarding the art of versification, in its most classic style, as comparatively of secondary importance. Though Latin prose has now ceased to be the general medium of communication in the literary world, to write it with correctness is surely an accomplishment, which every classical scholar should be ambitious to attain. In translating a Greek author, and in critical annotations on a Roman classic, Latin prose is almost universally employed. And nothing, it is conceived, can be less consistent with propriety, or less creditable to the writer, in a work professedly critical on some ancient classic, or in a translation of some Greek author, than for the critic, or the translator, to betray, in every page, an ignorance of that language, in which he undertakes to exhibit his own sentiments, or to express the meaning of his original. Yet this is no uncommon fact. To produce examples would be invidious. The object of the author is not to offend, but to admonish.

In the execution of this work, the author has endeavoured to accommodate his observations, as far as possible, to the capacity of the junior scholar, for whom chiefly this work is intended. In his selection of exercises, he has exemplified the several species of style, the colloquial, the epistolary, the historical, and the oratorical.—He thinks it necessary, at the same time, to observe, that, though the exercises are chiefly extracted from the Latin classics,

they are not to be regarded as mere translations. He has abridged the original, wherever it was necessary, in order to adapt the length of the exercise to the capacity of the scholar; and he has, on the contrary, occasionally introduced passages, which might serve to illustrate the critical observations. If, in the syntactical remarks, a few repetitions occur, he trusts the attentive and judicious reader will perceive, that they are found chiefly in those cases, in which, as the experienced teacher well knows, the young pupil is most prone to err.

In the explanation of synonymes, two different modes present themselves to our choice. The one is to exhibit the primary idea annexed to the word, and then to evolve the accessory conceptions, with which it is associated. This very often necessarily requires a detailed explanation. The other is to display, and to contrast with each other, the two principal subordinate conceptions. Each of these two modes possesses peculiar advantages. The latter recommends itself by an epigrammatic conciseness, which seizes the attention, and assists the memory. But it is liable to this great objection, that, when the term involves more than one accessory idea, this mode of distinguishing is necessarily defective; for it is an error to imagine, that, in all cases, there is only one subordinate conception attached to a word. Were this the fact, it cannot be questioned, that the epigrammatic mode of distinction, if it may be so denominated, would be far the preferable one, and would be in all cases perfectly comprehensive. But, when along

with the primary conception, the word includes several secondary ideas, it is evident, that the complete evolution of these is to be effected only by specific explanation.—Each of these modes the author has adopted, as the case required. And, if he has occasionally differed from some learned philologists and critics in this, as well as in other parts of his work, he hopes the candid reader will not ascribe it to the arrogance of presumption, or to an overweening confidence of the author in his own judgment. Where there is so much scope for diversity of opinion, and so great room for misconception, concurrence among critics is not to be expected, and error may reasonably claim forgiveness.

GREENWICH,
12 June, 1821.

PREFACE

TO THE FIFTH EDITION.

THE present edition is offered to the attention of the classical student, considerably enlarged, and it is hoped, in the same degree improved. Several of the easier Exercises have been omitted, and others, which have been translated from the originals with more freedom, and on subjects more difficult, have been substituted in their room.

A work, intended to exhibit a correct theory of the subjunctive mood, to solve the difficulties, with which the subject has been surrounded, and “to embody under one all the rules, given in the ‘GYMNASIUM’ for the government of *qui*,” has recently been published by the Rev. R. Bathurst Greenlaw. This work, the author of the *Gymnasium* perused with attention ; he trusts, also, with candour, and a mind open to conviction. This he felt to be his duty ; and, as it is always desirable, that learning and industry should be rewarded by the discovery of truth, it would be gratifying to him, if he could add, that Mr. Greenlaw’s attempt has been accompanied with success. Such,

however, he must frankly declare, is not his opinion. To have dismissed the work with a disapprobation of the theory as false, and of the rule, as not only vague, but also sometimes difficult, and often doubtful, in its application, without specifying some at least of the reasons, on which this judgment is founded, would have been unjust to its author, and unsatisfactory to the reader. On the other hand, to have entered into a minute examination of Mr. Greenlaw's doctrine, and the numerous examples which he has adduced in its support, would have extended this work beyond all reasonable limits. He has therefore adopted a middle course; and has selected a few of those objections, which oppose the theory of Mr. Greenlaw, and which appear to the author of the *Gymnasium* to be insuperable and conclusive. Of the validity, however, of these objections the learned reader will judge for himself. Thus much is certain, that, if a theory, which professes to unfold and establish a universal principle, be found irreconcilable with numerous and incontestable facts, the theory, if not wholly false, can be only partially true. And it then becomes a question, whether the theory is to be received, as even the true explanation of those facts, with which it is consistent, —or whether their mutual concordance be not purely accidental, and another principle be not still required, which will serve satisfactorily to explain the whole.

GYMNASIUM

SIVE

SYMBOLA CRITICA.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

LANGUAGE is the medium, by which we communicate our thoughts, one to another ; its chief excellence, therefore, is perspicuity. If our words are obscure, the impression on the hearer must be indistinct ; if they are ambiguous, they are liable to misconception ; if they are unintelligible, we speak to no purpose. Elegance, vivacity, animation*, harmony, and strength, are, therefore, in comparison with perspicuity, subordinate excellencies.—These qualities, however, though confessedly of inferior importance, are not to be disregarded as destitute of value. They please the imagination, they gratify the taste, and by exhibiting the object in a more attractive and striking light, they render it more impressive, and thus heighten the effect.—Regarded, therefore, as beauties, they contribute to our pleasure, and demand a portion of our praise ; and as subservient, though not essential, to the great purpose of speech, they possess a still higher claim to our approbation.

* Vivacity and animation are not identical qualities: by the former, resemblance is attained ; by the latter, life, feeling, and energy are communicated.

The several excellencies of style, whether principal or subordinate, result from a combination of the three following requisites.—1st. A judicious selection of words. 2dly. A natural and lucid arrangement. 3dly. An observance of those grammatical relations among the words themselves, which reputable and general usage may have established. Of the common syntactical rules, it is presumed, the reader has already acquired a competent knowledge. To assist him in the selection of words, and the arrangement of them in clauses and sentences, the following preliminary observations may be useful.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE CHOICE OF WORDS.

IN the first place ; in choosing words, it is above all things indispensably necessary, that barbarisms be avoided ; for these are especially hostile to perspicuity.

A *barbarism* consists in the use of a word, which has become antiquated, or which, by reason of its novelty, or confined circulation, is not generally intelligible. When the accident, or inflexion, not the word itself, is either obsolete or novel, it may be regarded as an offence against etymology ; as *Tumultuis* for *Tumultûs*, *Duint* for *Dent*, *Amasso* for *Amavero*, *Amassere* for *Amaturum esse*, *Jugos* for *Juga*.

Or it may offend against lexicography, either when the word itself is obsolete, as *Bitere* for *Ire*; or when the term is novel, and not yet sanctioned by general usage, as was the noun *Monopolium*, in the time of Nero. When the term or the inflexion is obsolete, the error is a species of *Archaismus*; when the word, or its accident, is novel, it is denominated *Neoterismus*.

To distinguish a barbarism in English, or in any living language, we have only to appeal to present and general usage, referring both to oral and written authority. If the word in question, by reason of long disuse, or very recent introduction, be generally unintelligible, it may be warrantably pronounced a barbarism. And if a rule for governing our decisions on such questions were necessary, that which has been proposed by a learned and ingenious critic*, may be safely adopted as correct. In his judgment, every word, which has been disused for a period, equal to the life of man, should be deemed a barbarism; it being fairly presumable, that the word then ceases to be generally understood. For the same reason, a novel, or newly invented word, whose use is yet confined to a small portion of the people, must be pronounced a barbarism. Of the former species, the words *Acception*, *Addulce*, *Bursten*; and of the latter *Fabricable*, *Miserism*, *Petitory*—may, in English, serve as examples. Whether the first three may

* See “Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric.”

not be revived, or the last three be yet admitted into general use, we have no means of determining. Their admission, or exclusion, depends on circumstances which we cannot anticipate, and over which we possess little, or no controul. Fashion, which usurps no common influence even over our opinions and modes of thinking, exercises a sovereign authority over all matters respecting language. By her decree, words once in general estimation sink into disrepute, and are consigned to oblivion; while others start into existence, and under her patronage being introduced into general notice, establish a claim to be admitted as kindred of the common stock.

“ Multa renascentur, quæ jam cecidere, cadentque
Quæ nunc sunt in honore vocabula, si volet usus,
Quem penes arbitrium est, et jus, et norma loquendi.”

Hor. De Art. Poët.

In a dead language, the case is considerably different. Here the value of the words is fixed, and their character unalterable. Here also we have no oral usage, to which we can appeal.—Scriptory language is the sole authority, to which we have access. Now, it will not be denied, that the practice of good speakers constitutes in every language a respectable tribunal, to which we may refer; nor will it be disputed, that many orations were delivered in the Roman senate, which, had they fortunately been transmitted to us, would have been received as productions of high classical authority, and admitted as evidence

of classical diction. And, though it would be folly to maintain, that scriptory language furnishes no criterion whatever, by which to decide, what was, or was not, sanctioned by colloquial authority, it would argue equal fatuity to affirm, that, from the rare occurrence of any word in written language, we may, in all cases, legitimately infer its infrequent use in reputable colloquial practice. These circumstances, peculiar to a dead language, namely, immutability in respect to the character of its words, and the absence of that authority, which is derived from oral usage, constitute, therefore, an important difference between it and a living language.

Hence a difficulty arises in determining in the former, with strict precision, the character of a barbarism, and in drawing a line, which shall correctly separate between barbarous and classic usage. Is every word, for example, to be pronounced a barbarism, which was not used by Cicero? This, though the opinion of some critics, would circumscribe the province of classical authority within much too narrow limits. To exclude Cæsar, Livy, Nepos, and Sallust, with several other writers of the Augustan age, would argue a species of hypercritical fastidiousness, for which it would be difficult to imagine even a plausible argument. Should it be objected, that in each of these authors are found words confessedly barbarous, or at least unsanctioned by the other classics of the Augustan age, it may be answered, that, if this objection were admitted, we

apprehend, that Cicero himself must resign his authority.

Is every word then, it may be asked, which is not sanctioned by the most reputable prose writers of the Augustan age, to be deemed a barbarism? To this query we are inclined to answer likewise in the negative. Though Cicero, with the authors now mentioned, must ever be esteemed the purest models of Latin style; yet to pronounce every word a barbarism, which was introduced and adopted by eminent writers of the succeeding period, would, in our apprehension, argue no common share of critical temerity and presumption.

In the age of Quintilian, it is true, the Latin language began to decline; but we have only to peruse the pages of that learned rhetorician (not to mention several of his contemporaries) to be fully satisfied, that the Latin language, in his time, presented no unfaithful copy of the purity, elegance, and beauty of the Augustan age.

It may now be asked, What then is to be accounted a barbarism, and what is to be deemed reputable authority? By what criterion, or what standard, is the junior student, who must rely chiefly on his dictionary, to estimate the value of those authorities, to which the lexicographer may refer him? To these queries, it is hoped, the following observations will furnish answers as precise, as the subject will admit. In questions of this nature, it

needs scarcely to be remarked, that strict accuracy, or logical precision, is not attainable.

Latin authors are generally distributed under four different periods, named, “the golden”, “the silver”, “the brazen”, and “the iron, ages”. Distributions of this kind, it must be acknowledged, are, in some degree, necessarily incorrect. They designate, with sufficient precision, the relative characters of the several classes; but the denomination assigned to each class is not always appropriate to every individual of that class, or descriptive of his style. The distribution before us resembles the division of the year into four seasons, each of which, considered generally, is distinguished by a certain temperature. But in a changeable climate, the character of a single day, in respect to heat and cold, is not always accordant with the general temperature of the season, to which it belongs; and the exceptions may, therefore, be properly transferred to either the preceding, or the subsequent season. In like manner, the age, in which an author flourished, furnishes no certain criterion of his merit as a writer. In the silver age there were several authors superior, in point of diction, to some of the golden age; and the brazen age produced a few, equal to some of the preceding period. But, with a few exceptions, the four general divisions, which have been usually adopted, may be received as sufficiently correct, for marking the characters of the authors, who lived in these several periods.

The golden age is commonly computed from the

year of the city 536, to the year 14 after the birth of Christ. But though this period has been thus honourably distinguished, it is not to be hence inferred, that the style of every writer, who lived in it, deserves to be imitated, or even that there is nothing unworthy of imitation in the best writers of this period. Several of them, in respect to diction, are much inferior to many authors of the silver age, their productions being disfigured by words, and expressions, completely antiquated in the time of Cicero. In fact, the Latin language did not begin to acquire any considerable degree of elegance, till the year of the city 560. Of the writers of this period, Terence, Nepos, Sallust, Livy, Cæsar, and Cicero, exhibit the best models, for our imitation. The first, indeed, is chargeable with a few *archaisms*, as *Sient* for *Sint*, *Aperibo* for *Aperiam*; and to Sallust has been imputed affectation in his style, while he has been censured also for borrowing a few obsolescent words from the “*Origines*” of Cato. Cæsar and Cicero cannot be too strongly recommended to the imitation of every classical student—and to these Livy may, without dispute, be ranked as next*.

* It may assist the junior reader to understand some relics of ancient Latin, if we furnish him with a few specimens of the successive changes, which took place, in the orthography of the language. A law of Romulus and Tatius, as recorded by Festus, was thus written:—

SEI . NURUS . PARENTEM . VERBERIT . AST . OLE . PLORASIT .
SACRA . DIVEIS . FARENTUM . ESTOD .

A similar

The silver age is commonly reckoned from the year 14, to the year 117 after Christ. Though the language of the Augustan period is always to be re-

A similar law of Servius was thus worded:

SEI . PUER . PARENTEM . VERBERIT . AST . OLE . PLORASSIT .
PUER . DIVEIS . PARENTUM . SACER . ESTOD .

Scaliger has combined the two in this form :

SEI . PARENTEM . PUER . VERBERIT . AST . OLOE .
PLORASSINT . PUER . DIVEIS . PARENTUM . SACER . ESTO .
SEI . NURUS . SACRA . DIVEIS . PARENTUM . ESTO .

i. e. Si parentem puer verberet, ast illi parentes clamarint, puer divis parentum sacer sit; si nurus, sacra divis parentum sit.

One of the Tribunitian laws, enacted in the year of the city 261, ran thus :

SEI . QUIS . ALIUTA . FAXSIT . CUM . PEQUNIA . FAMI-
LIAQUE . SACER . ESTO . SEI . QUIS . EM . OCCISIT . PARI-
CEIDA . NEC . ESTO .

i. e. Si quis aliter fecerit, cum pecunia et familia sua sacer sit; siquis eum occiderit, parricida ne sit.

The first law in the Twelve Tables (anno 304) was thus expressed:

SEI . IN . IOUS . VOCAT . NEI . EAT . STATIM . ENCA-
PITO . ANTESTARIER ... SEI . CALUITOR . PEDEMUE . STRUIT .
MANOM . ENDO . JACITO ... SEI . IN . IOUS . VOCATO . MORBOS .
ÆTITASUE . VITIOM . ESCIT . QUEI . IN . IOUS . VOCASIT .
IUMENTOM . DATO ... SEI . NOLET . ARCEREM . NEI .
STERNITO .

i. e. Si in jus vocat, ni (vocatus) eat, statim incipito testem appellare. Si calviter (ab obs. *calvi*, *i. e.* *decipere*, *frustrari*) pedemve struit, (*i. e.* *fugit*) manum in jacito. Si in jus vocato morbus ætasve vitium erit, qui in jus vocat, jumentum det. Si nolet arcerem (lecticam) ne ei sternito.

garded as our purest model, and though its diction is in all cases to be preferred, yet we are not to reject as barbarisms, words introduced by reputable

In the 494th year of the city, the following inscription was engraved in honour of L. Scipio :

HOINC . OINO . PLOIRUME . CONSENTIONT . R .
 DVONORO . OPTVMO . FUISE . VIRO .
 LUCIOM . SCIPIONE . FILEOS . BARBATI .
 CONSOL . CENSOR . AIDILIS . HIC . FUETA .
 HEC . CEPIT . CORSICA . ALERIAQUE . VRBE .
 DEDET . TEMPESTATEBUS . AIDE . MERETO .

i. e. Hunc unum plurimi consentiunt Romæ, bonorum optimum fuisse virum Lucium Scipionem. Filius Barbati, consul, censor, ædilis hic fuit. Hic cepit Corsicam, Aleriamque urbem. Dedit tempestatibus ædem merito.

This period is said to have concluded the infancy of the Latin language.

The two following lines are taken from Nævius, who wrote a chronicle of the first Punic war, in Iambic verse, about the year of the city 540 :

“ Quei terrai Latini hemones tuserunt
 Vires fraudesque Poinicas fabor.”

i. e. Qui terræ Latiae homines tuderunt
 Vires fraudesque Punicas fabor.

A few years afterwards, Ennius wrote on the same subject, and also several dramatic works. The following lines taken from his “ Fragments,” will furnish a specimen of the orthography of his time.

“ Quanquam multa manus ad coilei coirula templa.”
i. e. Quanquam multa manus ad cœli cœrula templa.

“ Ostia moenita est, idem loca navibo’ polcreis.”
i. e. Ostia munita est, item loca navibus pulchris.

“ Tum

writers of the silver age, and adopted by their successors. They must be considered as terms of inferior value; but are by no means to be discarded as barbarous, or impure. Thus Quintilian and Seneca used *Irrationalis* for *Rationis experts*; Tacitus and Justin, *Restaurare* for *Instaurare*; Pliny and Suetonius, *Breviarium* for *Summarium*, though it was censured by Seneca. The wanton introduction, indeed, of any new word, is always reprehensible; and on this principle, to create the terms *Restaurare*, *Breviarium* and *Irrationalis*, when the language was already furnished with words sufficiently expressive of the same meaning, was a superfluous, and blameable innovation. But, when a new term is once introduced, and is sanctioned by general and reputable usage, it cannot with propriety, be repudiated as a barbarism. The critic may remonstrate against its reception; but if the suffrages of the pub-

“ Tum clupei resonunt, et ferrei stridet acumen.”

i. e. Tum clypei resonant, et ferri stridet acumen.

“ Heic est illi situs, quoi nemo ceivei' neque hostis
Quibit pro factis reddere operæ pretium.”

i. e. Hic est illi situs cui nemo civis neque hostis
Quibit pro factis reddere operæ pretium.

From the time of Plautus, who flourished about 560 years after the building of the city, and to whom the Latin language owed many improvements, a more uniform and permanent orthography was introduced. Some archaisms he retained, as *med* for *me*, before a vowel, *quoi* for *cui*, *quoius* for *cujus*, *servos* for *servus*, with a few others, found also in some posterior writers.

lic be expressed in its favour, he and the grammarian must bow with submission.

The authors of this period, whose authority is most valuable, are Quintilian, Tacitus, Curtius, Justin, Val. Maximus, to whom, but with inferior estimation, may be added, Aulus Gellius, and Pliny the younger. Quintilian, though his works exhibit several indications of a declining language, and the introduction of a false taste, may, in respect to purity of words, be safely followed. His style wants the ease and simplicity of good prose, and is, in many instances, better adapted to the poet, or the orator, than to the philosopher, the critic, or the rhetorician; but the terms, which he uses, may be regarded as classical. The style of Curtius, Justin, and Val. Maximus, is much more uniform, and is free from barbarism; but they are guilty of a few occasional deviations from the syntactical usage of the Augustan period, to which we shall afterwards have occasion to advert. Tacitus, though chargeable with a few poetical idioms, and other violations of the syntactical rules observed in the Augustan age, and likewise Pliny the younger, may be also safely followed, as free from barbarism.

Aulus Gellius, who lived at the close of this period, cannot, in respect to purity, be esteemed a correct model, his language betraying some of those deprivations, which characterized the succeeding age. No term, however, which was invented by any writer of this period, and adopted by his successors, is to be

stigmatised as barbarous, though it may be justly pronounced to be of inferior authority.

The brazen age commenced in the year 117, and continued till the year 410, when Rome was taken by the Goths. During this period, the Latin language underwent a very considerable change, its purity being contaminated by the introduction of a multitude of new terms, invented by theologians, physicians, and jurisprudentialists. Some of them, indeed, might be justified by the plea of necessity; but the far greater part can be regarded in no other light, than as wanton innovations. Still, however, they bore the semblance of classical terms; and manifested themselves to be either of Grecian origin, or derived immediately from the parent stock. The few following examples may be produced as a specimen.—*Recenter* for *Recens*, used by Apicius and Macer. *Profunditas* for *Profundum*, by Macrobius and Vopiscus. *Invisibilis* for *Cæcus*, by Arnobius and Lactantius. *Unigenitus* for *Unicus*, *Gratitudo* for *Gratus animus*, *Incurabilis* for *Immedicabilis*, to which, perhaps, may be added, as originating in this age, *Octodecim* for *Duodeviginti*, or *Decem et Octo*, and *Novemdecim* for *Undeviginti*. Of this period, no writer can be safely followed as free from semi-barbarisms. Eutropius, Aurelius Victor, and Jerom, may, in respect to diction, be deemed the most reputable. Every new word introduced during this period, though sanctioned by the usage of this, and the succeeding age, may be pronounced a semi-barbarism.

After the fall of Rome, commenced the iron age, during which the Latin language was wretchedly corrupted by an inundation of barbarous terms. Of these, the following examples will furnish a sufficient specimen :—*Modernus*, “ Modern,”—*Sclavus*, “ A slave,”—*Holmagium*, “ Homage,”—*Halla*, “ A hall,”—*Riderus*, “ A rider,”—*Lista*, “ A list,”—*Misfacere*, “ To do amiss.”

From these observations, the reader will learn, who are the most reputable prose writers in the several periods, under which classic authors are usually distributed. He will perceive also, that the brazen age may be aptly enough denominated, the age of semi-barbarism; and that, though the words introduced during this period are carefully to be rejected by the student of classic diction, they are, at the same time, not to be condemned with the same severity, as the barbarisms of the succeeding age.

But, though the preceding observations may suffice to shew the reader the distinctive character of the four periods, and the writers in each, who are most worthy of imitation, they may not be sufficiently precise to direct his practice, and govern his choice of words in every particular instance. It is desirable, therefore, to establish, if possible, a determinate rule, by which his selection of words may be regulated.

A barbarism has been defined to be a word, which, either from its novelty, and confined circulation, or by reason of long desuetude, is not generally intelligible. Agreeably to this definition, the term has evidently a

relative import, and must be supposed to refer to some precise and definite period. For, in a living language, as has been already observed, a word now barbarous may, hereafter, be introduced into general use; and a term once reputable, and sanctioned by national usage, may, in process of time, become obsolete and barbarous. Change and vicissitude are indelibly imprinted on language, as on all human things.

“ Ut silvæ foliis pronos mutantur in annos
Prima cadunt ; ita verborum vetus interit ætas,
Et juvenum ritu florent modo nata vigentque.

* * * * *

—Mortalia facta peribunt ;

Nedum sermonum stet honos, et gratia vivax.”

Hor. De Art. Poët. 60.

In determining a barbarism in our own, or in any modern language, we naturally refer to present usage; but in deciding the character of a word in a dead language, where there is no similar tribunal, to which we can appeal, it becomes necessary to establish some standard, to which we may refer, and to fix some principle, by which our decisions may be regulated. This, it must be owned, is a task, which is accompanied with considerable difficulty, and involves a question, on which it would be vain to expect identity of opinion. While some are disposed to confine the period of classic purity within the narrow space of one hundred and seventy years, and to condemn as barbarous every word, not employed by any writer from the age of Terence to that of Livy ; others contend for

a more extended term, and include the whole of the silver age. Now, it will not be questioned, that the former of these periods comprises the most brilliant æra of the Latin language, and that the style of the writers, who flourished in it, may be justly accounted the standard of classic *excellence*. But classic *purity*, we apprehend, admits a wider range. This is a quality, which may belong to diction, where there is neither elegance, simplicity, perspicuity, nor precision. The term, applied to a single word, denotes merely that it belongs to the language, as being generally intelligible, and employed by writers of acknowledged reputation. This usage constitutes its authority, and rescues it from the opprobrious appellation of barbarism. While a language, therefore, though declining, retains much of its pristine elegance and beauty, and while works of superlative excellence continue to be exhibited in that language, the united authorities of reputable writers, in such circumstances, may be warrantably esteemed a standard of appeal, as far as mere purity of words is concerned. In consistency with this view of the subject, we are inclined to extend the period of classic purity in respect to words, exclusively of inflexion, from the age of Terence to that of Tacitus, including a space of about two hundred and fifty years. Within this period, the student of classic purity ought rigidly to confine his selection of words, careful, at the same time, to prefer the language of the Augustan, to that of the succeeding age.

Is then, it may be inquired, every word, which is found in any reputable writer within this æra to be esteemed a word of classic purity? Is the authority of any single writer sufficient to entitle any word to the designation of a classical term? If more authorities are required, what is the number necessary? Is it two, or three, or four? or what number will suffice? And, after we pass the limits here prescribed, do we enter immediately on the field of barbarism? Is every word, introduced by a writer, later than Tacitus, to be stigmatised as impure?

I am well aware, that in answering these questions, as in attempting to fix a precise standard of classic purity, no reply can be offered, no decision proposed, which shall preclude objections. When no distinct and incontestable boundary is either prescribed by nature, imposed by necessity, or established by compact, room is necessarily left for diversity of opinion. To draw a precise line, which shall, without controversy, determine where purity ends, and barbarism begins, we believe to be impossible. From the classic diction of Cicero, to the gross barbarisms of the dark ages, the gradations proceed with shades of difference so imperceptible, that, though the extremes are palpably dissimilar, it is difficult to fix with precision the limit, between barbarism on the one hand, and classic purity on the other. For, wherever the line of demarcation may be drawn, the proximate terms on each side of it, though distinguished by contrary appellations, must necessarily differ extremely

little in point of value. Nor will the adoption of the middle designation of *semi-barbarism*, entirely smooth the transition, or remove the objection. All, therefore, that can be accomplished in a subject of this nature, is to approximate, as near as possible, to an accurate and just distinction. Whether that, which is here briefly offered, merit this character, must be submitted to the judgement of the learned reader.

A barbarism is an offence against perspicuity.—The term, in its original import, denotes, that the word, to which it is applied, is foreign to the language, and hence being not generally understood, is, therefore, not to be employed. National, reputable, and present usage, and this only, can constitute the purity of any word. Hence it follows; that no single authority, how respectable soever, can rescue a word from the appellation of barbarism. It will not be maintained, that either Addison, or Pope, or Swift, or Johnson, could have naturalized, if we may use the term, any word which he might have been pleased to frame in the English language. The word must be adopted by other writers, and introduced into general use, otherwise it must still be pronounced a barbarism. What the authority of the best English author cannot effect, Cicero himself singly was equally incapable of accomplishing. So fully sensible of this truth, and so scrupulously careful to avoid barbarisms was this admirable classic, that, when he takes the liberty to employ a new, or uncommon word, he introduces it generally with an apology for adopting it, or with the

expression of a doubt, whether the word be admissible.

It is of importance, then, to bear in mind, that in no language, whether ancient or modern, can any word be esteemed, as of pure and classical authority, which is not sanctioned by reputable and general usage, or which, we have not reason to regard as generally intelligible.

In applying, however, this observation to the practice of the Roman classics, it is necessary to bear in mind the three following particulars : — 1st. The works of these celebrated writers have descended to us, with many corruptions, and imperfections. Some have been mutilated by time and accident ; and all of them have been more or less defaced, by the negligence and ignorance of copyists and editors. In justice, therefore, to these admirable writers, it is incumbent upon us to exercise great caution in charging them with barbarism, lest we should impute to the author the inadvertence of the transcriber, or the ignorance of the editor.

2dly. Several of the ancient classics are entirely lost, and the works of others have been only partly preserved. We are deprived, therefore, of the means of ascertaining with accuracy, what degree of currency certain words may have obtained. For aught we know, a word, which is found only in one reputable classic, and, perhaps, in him only once or twice, may have been employed by those, his contemporaries and successors, whose productions have perished.

3dly. Though it may be admitted, as a general truth, that from the rare occurrence of any word in written language, we may reasonably infer the infrequency of its use in common conversation, yet it would be extravagant to maintain, that this deduction must be universally just, especially in respect to those languages, in which the writers are comparatively few. The colloquial diction, and the written language of the Jews, for example, formed a vocabulary, we have reason to suppose, much more copious, than the latter singly, which is the only one transmitted to us, and is extremely scanty. In judging, therefore, of any Latin word, whose purity is questionable, not having it in our power to appeal to colloquial, or, to speak more generally, oral usage, we have no means of ascertaining, how far that word was, or was not, justified by this species of authority.

These circumstances constitute an important distinction between a dead and a living language,—a distinction, which claims particular attention, when we examine the diction of classic writers. In English, or in any other living language, no sooner is a new word introduced, than it is detected, and pronounced a barbarism, from whatever respectable authority it may proceed. It may in time be naturalised; but till then, it must be rejected as an alien. Here we have the whole evidence before us. We know the date of the word; we probably know its author; we know, that its use is confined to one or a few individuals, and we can, therefore, decide its

character. But can we with equal certainty determine the quality of a word in a dead language, which occurs, perhaps, in only one author? Can we with equal certainty decide, that the word *anterior* used by Cæsar, or *mulierositas* by Cicero, were not used by any other writer, or speaker, either of their own, or the succeeding age? Or shall we affirm, without evidence, that they were never employed by any of those reputable authors, whose productions have perished? Here we have only partial evidence. And, though it must be admitted, that by this, and this evidence only, we have the means of distinguishing classical from barbarous diction, it should at the same time be recollected, that we have not the whole of the evidence before us.

I am well aware, that, as no modern writer is wholly free from inaccuracies in diction, so partly from the natural oscitancy of the human mind, and partly from the conceits or fancies, inseparable, perhaps, from the wisest men, the best of the ancients may have had their inadvertencies and errors. But, when we find the style of an author almost uniformly distinguished by correctness and elegance; when we perceive that he has paid the strictest attention to the purity of his language; especially when we hear him professing, that the improvement of his native tongue has been his constant study *, and when we see

* “Cum autem ex Sicilia me recepissem, jam videbatur, in me

him sparingly, and not without apology, adopting a new term*, great caution is necessary, in imputing to him a barbarism, where he himself has not noted its character.

These remarks are submitted to the reader in order to show, that, without relinquishing the principle, by which a barbarism is determined in any modern tongue, the application of that principle may be warrantably less rigid in a dead, than in a living language, where the evidence is completely and easily accessible.

If the preceding observations be correct, the following rules may be proposed for the direction of the scholar in his choice of words.

1st. Words in current use from the age of Terence to the end of the Augustan period, are uniformly to be preferred.

2dly. Any word occurring only in Cicero once or twice, we should deem to be a word of doubtful authority, as *Mulierositas*, *Munitare*, *Noctuabundus*, *Minuritio*.

3dly. A word, occurring in only one of these writers, Cæsar, Livy, Nepos, or Sallust, we should consider to be of still more doubtful authority; as *Anterior*, (for which some critics read *exterior*,) *Antemissus*, *Detrimentosus*, *Ambactus*. (*Cæs.*) *Vis*

quicquid esset, esse perfectum, et habere quandam maturitatem suam." *Cic. Brut.*

* " Ut in singulis essent bona media, vix enim audeo dicere medietates; sed, quasi ita dixerim, ita intelligam." *Cic. de Univ.*

(acc. pl.) for *Vires*; *Famæ, arum, as.* (*Sall.*)*
Mora, for *Cohors.* (*Nepos.*)

4thly. A word, not known in the golden age, but found in Quintilian, or any reputable writer of the silver age, and adopted by his contemporaries and successors, may be deemed a word of classical, but inferior authority.

5thly. A word, found in only one or two reputable writers of the silver age, we should deem to be a word of the lowest classical authority. If found only in one, especially if a writer of inferior name, and living towards the close of the period, we may be justified in pronouncing it semibarbarous, even though adopted by writers of the succeeding period.

6thly. All words introduced in the brazen age, whatever authorities they can plead in their favour, should be accounted *semibarbarisms*.

7thly. All words invented in the iron age, must be rejected as *barbarous*.

I am fully sensible, that these rules are not wholly unobjectionable, and that they do not comprehend every case, which may occur; but, when we consider the difficulty of defining with precision a barbarism in a dead language, of determining the precise point, where purity of diction ends, and impurity begins, and of finding appropriate appellations to distinguish the various degrees of value and of baseness, which we cannot fail to perceive between the diction of the

* Ennius uses *ambactus*—and Solinus, *antemittere*; but their authority can have no weight.

Augustan, and the barbarism introduced in the iron age, the candid reader, it is hoped, will be inclined to pardon any imperfection or inaccuracy, with which the rules here proposed, may be chargeable.

If it should be asked, whether a barbarism be in no case admissible, it is answered, that sometimes a barbarism is justified by necessity. New discoveries in art or science, new inventions, new offices, political or religious, new coins, new weights and measures, frequently require new names. In such cases, it is often impossible to avoid a barbarism, without descending to a tedious and languid circumlocution, more offensive than the evil, which it is intended to avoid. Who, for example, would not admit the word *Transubstantiatio*, now that it is generally understood, rather than *Corporis Christi conversio in panem et vinum*, even if the latter, as is not the case, precisely expressed, what is denoted by the former? Who would not adopt *Abbas* for an “Abbot”, *Parochus* for “A parish priest”, *Coronatus* for a “Crown piece”, rather than resort to so drawling a periphrasis, as would be necessary to express the full import of the terms? A barbarism, therefore, is in certain cases admissible.

II. In regard to the selection of words, I would observe, that no Latin term should be used in a barbarous or foreign sense. Of the numerous stock of words, which we have borrowed from the Latin language, many have been transferred in nearly their primitive signification. Thus, we have “To invite”, from *Invitare*, “To reject”, from

Rejicere, “an Hour”, from *Hora*, “Manifest”, from *Manifestus*, “Splendid”, from *Splendidus*. Many have their primitive meaning modified, or in some respect altered, as “Difficult”, from *Difficilis*, “Petulance”, from *Petulantia*, “Inveterate”, from *Inveteratus*, “Candid”, from *Candidus*. Some have been transferred in a sense totally different from their original acceptation. We have, for example, a “Vote”, from *Votum*, a “Vow;” “To personate” or “to represent fictitiously”, from *Personare*, “to sound through”, or “to bawl;” “To intercede”, or “interpose in behalf of”, from *Intercedere*, “to interpose against;” “To construe”, or “translate”, from *Construere*, “to build”, or “heap together;” “Discreet”, or “prudent”, from *Discretus*, “separated”, or “distinguished;” “A copy”, from *Copia*, “plenty;” “Indolence”, from *Indolentia*, “freedom from pain.” To employ any of these Latin terms in the sense which we annex to the analogous English words, is barbarously to pervert their meaning. Yet how often do we find this error committed! In modern Latin we meet with *Præcise*, “Briefly”, used to denote “Accurately”, “Correctly;” “*Dispensare*, “To distribute”, or “To manage as a steward”, used for “To grant a dispensation from penance, or punishment;” *Unitas*, “Union”, or “conjunction”, for “Unity”, or the number “One;” *Compilare*, “To rob”, or “rifle”, for *Colligere*, “To compile.” These are errors, which the young student of classical literature is naturally, from the similarity of the terms, prone to

commit. And if he be obliged by his professional studies, to peruse our modern productions in Latin, it will require no common vigilance to enable him to avoid them.

III. Words purely poetical ought to be rejected, that is, such words as occur in no good prose writer. Nothing is so offensive to a classical and correct taste, as that want of uniformity, which is frequently observable in the style of our modern Latin writers.—To see the language of “Paradise Lost,” and the diction of “The Spectator” blended together, either in the narrative of the historian, or in the grave discussion of the philosopher, would excite the risibility of a common reader; and to a person of taste and discernment, such a grotesque commixture of prose and poetical phraseology, could not fail to produce disgust. In every language, indeed, which is furnished with two distinct vocabularies, one adapted to prose, and the other to poetry, a mixture of both in the same composition, betrays in the author either culpable negligence, or extreme want of taste. It is indispensably necessary, therefore, that all terms, purely poetical, should be excluded, such as, *Nubigenus*, *Edurus*, *Reboare*, *Evans*, *Feratus*.—It is equally necessary, for the sake of perspicuity, that no prose word shall be employed in a poetical sense, as *Axis*, for the “Earth,” *Marmor*, for the “Sea,” or *Meditari*, for to “Play on an instrument.” Phrases and idioms, purely poetical in respect to syntax, should likewise be avoided.

IV. Not only should all words and phrases, peculiarly belonging to poetry, be excluded from prose, but likewise all those modes of expression, which are adapted, and generally appropriated, to one species of prose, should be repudiated in every other. Dialogue, history, oratory, epistolary correspondence, and philosophical discussion, have each a style suited to its character. To mix two or more of these different styles in the same composition, is to present the reader with an exhibition, not unlike to Harlequin in his party-coloured garb. A jumble of incoherent images does not appear more ridiculous, than a mixture of heterogeneous phraseologies. Yet some modern Latin writers translate and compose, as if it were quite superfluous to adapt the language to the subject; and as if the simple, but dignified style of history, the colloquial and quaint phrases of comedy, the bold and high-toned diction of the orator, with the elegant plainness of epistolary writing, might all harmoniously commingle in the same paragraph, nay, in the same sentence. If they find, what they conceive to be a beautiful, or elegant expression in any author, they fondly conclude, that it must be a beauty every where; and as if eager to exhibit the gem which they have discovered, fail not to display it on every occasion, forgetting the observation of Horace, *Nunc non erat his locus*; forgetting also, that the propriety always, and the beauty generally, of every expression is entirely relative. Like the *purpureus pannus* of the above mentioned critic, though splendid in

itself, an elegance thus misplaced violates the uniformity of the texture, and produces a species of patch-work highly offensive and disgusting. The classical student therefore, who is desirous to write Latin with correctness and propriety, must study uniformity of style. While he suits the diction to the subject, he must cautiously avoid all words and phrases appropriated to a different species of composition.

“Singula quæque locum teneant sortita decenter.”

Hor. De Art. Poët.

In colloquial language, Terence is the only sure guide; in history, Livy should be his model; in oratory, epistolary writing, and philosophical discussion, Cicero will furnish him with the most finished patterns. Cæsar, in detailing the operations of war, and in the description of countries, customs and manners, exhibits a style eminently distinguished by simplicity, elegance, and perspicuity. It is the language of an accomplished scholar—of one, who composed with ease, because he was perfectly master of the language, in which he wrote*.

* “Sed tamen Brute, inquit Atticus, de Cæsare et ipse ita judico, et de hoc hujus generis acerrimo existimatore sæpissime audio, illum omnium fere oratorum Latine loqui elegantissime.”
Cic. Brut.

“Cæsar autem rationem adhibens consuetudinem vitiosam et corruptam pura et incorrupta consuetudine emendat.” *Ib.*

“C. vero Cæsar, si foro tantum vacasset, non alius ex nostris contra Ciceronem nominaretur.” *Quint. lib. x. cap. 1.*

V. Equivocal words, wherever ambiguity is to be apprehended, ought carefully to be avoided. If I say, *Heri filius ad me venit*, the reader, or hearer, cannot possibly ascertain, whether I mean, “Yesterday my son came to me,” or “My master’s son came to me.” If the latter be the meaning intended, the ambiguity would be avoided by saying, *Herilis filius*. When Cicero says, “A quo cum quæreretur, quid maxime in re familiari expediret,” (*Cic. Off. lib. ii.*) nothing but the context can inform us, whether he meant to say, “And when he was asked,” or “And when he asked.”

In no way is the learner more prone to err against this rule, than by using the neuter gender of adjectives of the first and second declension, instead of the feminine with *res*, employing, for example, *Multorum*, for *Multarum rerum*—*Ex quo*, for *Ex qua re*—*Hoc*, for *Hac re*. When an author writes, *Victorum arma in ipsos converterunt*, it may be impossible to discover, whether *Victorum* be the genitive plural of *Victus*, or of *Victor*. So far in respect to that ambiguity which is created by the use of the equivocal words. Syntactical ambiguity will be noticed afterwards.

Having offered these observations for the direction of the reader, in selecting words, I proceed to submit to him a few general rules for their proper arrangement.

CHAPTER II.

ON ARRANGEMENT.

SECT. I.

On Comparative Arrangement.

THE superiority, which a transpositive language possesses over one, which is analogous in respect to the collocation of words, it can hardly be necessary to evince even to the junior student of classic literature. He must have remarked, that in Latin the arrangement of words in a clause may be varied at pleasure, whereas in English we are frequently confined to one order. Whether we say *Hannibalem vicit Scipio*, or *Scipio vicit Hannibalem*, or *Scipio Hannibalem vicit*, the meaning is the same. But if we say, "Scipio conquered Hannibal," we state the fact. If we alter the order and say, "Hannibal conquered Scipio," we affirm the reverse; and if we say, "Scipio Hannibal conquered," or "Hannibal Scipio conquered," we state an ambiguous proposition.

When I say, that the meaning is the same, in whatever order the Latin words may be arranged, I would not be understood to signify, that the three forms may in all cases be indiscriminately adopted,

without in the least degree hurting the sentiment, or that in all instances they are equally apposite.—My observation regards solely the expression of the primary sentiment. To illustrate the difference, let us take the following example,—*Ad Arbela Darium vicit Alexander*. If the question were, “Who conquered Darius?” the answer should be, *Alexander ad Arbela Darium vicit*. If the question were, “Whom did Alexander conquer?” it should be answered, *Darium ad Arbela Alexander vicit*. If it were inquired, “Where did Alexander conquer Darius?” the answer should be, *Ad Arbela Alexander Darium vicit*. If the question were, “Did Alexander take, or did he conquer Darius?” the answer would be, *Vicit Darium Alexander*. The natural anxiety of the speaker to satisfy the curiosity of the inquirer would, in these several circumstances, dictate the correspondent arrangement.

Our collocation, in English, generally considered, has been aptly enough denominated, the order of intellect. The arrangement in Latin is more adapted to imagination and feeling. The language of the Romans consists of periods; ours is composed of sentences. Hence the English has more simplicity; the Latin greater strength. We begin with the agent, from him we proceed to the act, and from it to the person, or thing acted upon.—This may be called the metaphysical order; it is the order of time, and to this arrangement we are generally confined. The flexibility of the Latin language enabled the speaker

or writer to adopt any collocation, which the subject prescribed, or which he deemed conducive to the attainment of his purpose. If the subject was familiar, and the language colloquial, it approached pretty nearly to the English arrangement. Thus,

“ Continuo ad te properans, percurro ad forum, ut dicam tibi hæc :

Ubi te non invenio, ibi ascendo in quendam excelsum locum :
Circumspicio ; nusquam. Forte ibi hujus video Byrrhiam ;
Rogo ; negat vidisse.” *Ter. And. ii. 2, 19.*

If the style be didactic, or the subject historical, it is, according to our conceptions of natural order, more inverted. Thus, “Ubi eo ventum est, quacun- que incedit, armata multitudo pavorem ac tumultum facit ; rursus ubi anteire primores civitatis vident, quicquid sit, haud temere esse rentur. Nec minorem motum animorum Romæ tam atrox res facit, quam Collatiæ fecerat. Ergo ex omnibus locis urbis in forum curritur.” *Liv. i. 59.*

If the language be addressed to the feelings, or the imagination chiefly, the arrangement is nearly the reverse of ours. Here the Latin order possesses a most decided superiority. The most conspicuous words in every sentence, it is to be observed, are the first and the last. By the former, our attention is excited ; and on the latter it rests.

Hence, if the speaker were reasoning on his arrangement, he might conclude it to be a matter of indifference, whether he placed the chief image, which

to present to his auditory, in the very beginning, or at the very end of the sentence. But under the influence of vehement passion, his ardent mind stops not to reason. The object, be it what it may, which most forcibly affects his feelings, or seizes his imagination, that he first presents to his auditory. The following passage from Cicero, while it exemplifies this observation, will serve also to illustrate the difference between the Latin and English arrangement in oratorical language.—“*Rempublicam, Quirites, vitamque omnium vestrûm, bona, fortunas, conjuges, liberosque vestros, atque hoc domicilium clarissimi imperii fortunatissimam pulcherrimamque urbem, hodierno die, deorum immortalium summo erga vos amore, laboribus, consiliis, periculisque meis, ex flamma atque ferro, ac pæne ex faucibus fati ereptam, et vobis conservatam ac restitutam, videtis.*” *Orat. in Cat.* It is impossible to conceive a period more perspicuously, more beautifully, more impressively constructed than the preceding. Not a clause can be transposed, not a word displaced without violence to the beauty, the strength, or the harmony of the period. He first seizes the attention by presenting an image, above all others interesting to a Roman auditory—*Rempublicam*. He then proceeds to enumerate a series of objects, calculated in succession to awaken in the breasts of his hearers the most lively emotions.—“*Vitam,*” “*bona,*” “*fortunas,*” “*conjuges,*” “*liberosque.*” Then he completes the group, by exhibiting an object endeared to them all by a thousand

ties—"the city of Rome," "the capital of the empire," "the mistress of nations." Still suspending the interest of his auditory, and postponing the statement of the important and interesting fact, he proceeds to specify the means, by which it was accomplished. Then, after directing their attention to the benign interposition of the immortal gods, as the great authors of the event, he finishes the picture by exhibiting the whole, as rescued that day from conflagration, and impending destruction.—Let the reader now compare the original with the translation. "To-day, Romans, you behold the commonwealth, your lives, estates, fortunes, your wives and children, the seat of this most renowned empire, this most fair and flourishing city, preserved and restored to you from fire and sword, and almost snatched from the jaws of fate, by the distinguished love of the immortal gods towards you, and by my toils, counsels, and dangers."

It has been matter of controversy, whether the arrangement, which obtains in transpositive, or that which is found in analogous languages, should be deemed the natural order. The Abbé Batteux*, who is in this followed by another eminent French critic, contends, that the order in French, and consequently in all analogous languages, is the inverted order; and that the arrangement of words in Latin, and, therefore, in all transpositive languages, is the natural arrangement. In this doctrine, as very gene-

* See "Principes de la Littérature," par M. l'Abbé Batteux, vol. iv. p. 10.

rally correct, I am inclined to concur ; and if we are careful to distinguish between the effect of habit, and the dictates of pure nature, the subject, it is presumed, can scarcely admit dispute.

If by “ natural order ” be understood, that order, which is consentaneous with our habits and constant associations, the question is purely relative ; and that order must be conceived to be the most natural, to which we have been most habituated.—The Hebrew, the Latin, the English, and the French, all differ in respect to arrangement ; yet we may be assured, that the order in the two languages first mentioned, appeared as natural to the Jews and Romans, as the arrangement in English appears to us. This position, it is presumed, is too evident to require proof, as it is too plain to need illustration.

But if the term “ natural ” be taken absolutely, without any reference to the usage of this or that country, it is of importance to determine the criterion, by which we may decide, which of the two arrangements is, in truth, the more natural.

There are not, perhaps, any two languages, which precisely agree one with the other, in respect to the collocation of words. Various, however, as the modes of arrangement are found to be, we believe they may be comprehended under one, or other, of the five following denominations. 1st. The grammatical : 2dly. The metaphysical : 3dly. The oratorical : 4thly. The conventional : and, 5thly. The idiomatical. These simple modes of arrangement, however, may be vari-

ously modified and combined. According to the grammatical arrangement, the governing word should precede, and the word governed by it should follow, the thing determining naturally going before the thing determined. It is this collocation which obtains chiefly in the English language. It may be illustrated by the following example.—“Alexander, the son of Philip, conquered Darius, a brave man, and king of the Persians,” *Alexander, filius Philippi, vicit Darium strenuum virum, et regem Persarum.*

While the grammarian considers the dependance of one word upon another, in respect to concord and government, the metaphysician regards the relation, which the objects themselves, and not their signs, bear to each other. He contemplates them as connected by the relation of cause and effect, substance and mode, action and passion. Agreeably, therefore, to the metaphysical arrangement, the agent or efficient cause of the action, as necessarily existing before its effect, is first mentioned; then the action itself, as necessarily antecedent to its effect, is next expressed; and then the effect produced, or the person acted upon, concludes the sentence. Agreeably to this arrangement, the sentiment would be thus exhibited,—*Alexander, Philippi filius, vicit Darium virum strenuum, et Persarum regem.* These two modes of collocation, the reader will perceive, are nearly coincident with each other; they have, therefore, been comprehended by several critics, under one general denomination, being termed by some the “metaphy-

sical arrangement," and by others, the "order of intellect." The principle of their affinity, did our limits permit, it would be easy to explain.

The oratorical arrangement is governed by principles entirely dissimilar. It respects neither the metaphysical relations subsisting among the objects of perception, nor the grammatical dependance of their signs on one another. It neither proceeds from the intellect, nor does it aim at instruction.—It is dictated solely by the imagination, and by the feelings, the passions, the appetites of our nature. From them it proceeds, and to them it is addressed. Its purpose is, not merely to present to the mind certain objects of contemplation, but to exhibit them in the most attractive and impressive light.—The painter, while he presents a group of figures to the eye, is careful to impart to each a degree of prominence, suited to his conception of its comparative importance. The orator, in like manner, when he presents an assemblage of ideas to the imagination, assigns to each image that rank in the sentence, which its relative character demands, as subservient to the production of the intended effect. This mode of arrangement has been already exemplified in our quotation from Cicero's third oration against Catiline.

The 4th mode of arrangement has been termed the conventional. This variety of collocation is not dictated by any regard to syntactical construction, nor is it derived from any principles in our mental constitution. It is founded in usage, and general consent.

Examples of this arrangement are to be found in almost every language, with which we are acquainted. In English, for instance, we generally place the adjective before the substantive. This usage is purely conventional. The French, on the contrary, frequently place the adjective after its noun. We say, for example, “A rich man”; they say, *Un homme riche*: we say, “The Roman empire”; they say, *L’Empire Romain*.

The 5th mode of arrangement may be named the idiomatical, as necessarily resulting from the peculiar structure of the language. It obtains chiefly, if not solely, in those languages, whose nouns and verbs admit few or no inflections. In English, for example, the nominative and the objective case of all our substantives, are identically the same; it is, therefore, by the collocation only, that we can distinguish the agent from the patient, the cause from the effect. If the collocation is inverted, the sentiment is reversed. “Isaac begat Jacob”, and “Jacob begat Isaac”, express two contrary propositions. Our arrangement, therefore, is here indiscretionary and unalterable; it arises from the peculiar structure of the language. The adjective also, in like manner, uniformly, and the relative pronoun frequently, the former being wholly inflexible, and the latter admitting only four changes of termination, must be placed as near as possible to the substantive, to which they belong. This collocation is essential to perspicuity.

Of these modes of arrangement, it is obvious, that

the metaphysical and the oratorical are the only two, which bear any relation to the subject in question. The others, originating evidently either in convention, usage, or the idiomatical structure of the language, appear to have no connection, either immediate or remote, with any innate principle, in the constitution of the human mind.

Now, it will not be disputed, that, if man were purely an intellectual being, the metaphysical arrangement would be that, which his words would most probably assume ; for, though in his philosophical investigations, he must ascend from effects to causes, yet as following the order of his perceptions, which is the order of the phenomena around him, he would naturally first express the cause, as being necessarily antecedent to its effect. But pure intelligence is not the character of man. He is endowed with imagination, with appetites also, and passions too prone to seize, with heedless avidity, whatever object is conceived to be subservient to their gratification. And is it not proved by experience, nay, has it not grown into a common adage, that whatever the heart most eagerly covets, the tongue is always most impatient to express ? “ *Arma, viri, ferte arma* ”, was the language of *Æneas* in a moment of peril. “ *A horse, a horse, a kingdom for a horse* ”, was the exclamation of Richard the Third, in the instant of alarm. This is the language of passion.

Imagination is, likewise, in most minds a powerful, and in some a predominant, faculty. When a

group of ideas are presented to its view, it uniformly seizes the most interesting object, and whatever forcibly fixes its attention, it prompts the tongue instantaneously to utter. We are informed, that the Emperor Domitian was wont to amuse himself with causing a boy to stand at some distance from him, with his hand lifted up, the palm opened, and the fingers distended, and with shooting arrows between the fingers of the boy, thus placed as a mark.—Now, in picturing to ourselves this scene, which is the more interesting object? The tyrant, or the boy? The latter unquestionably. It is this object, accordingly, which the historian first presents to the imagination of his reader. “In pueri procul stantis, præbentisque pro scopulo dispansam dextræ manus palmam, sagittas tanta arte direxit, ut omnes per intervalla digitorum innocue evaderent.” *Suet. in Domit. cap. 19.* The grammatical and metaphysical modes of collocation, here, as in most other cases pretty nearly coincident, would be the very reverse of that order, which the biographer has, in this instance, very appositely adopted.

Now, it is to be observed, that each of the two contrary arrangements, the metaphysical, and the oratorical, has its appropriate place; each is in certain circumstances preferable to the other. When we express the calm dictates of reason, and when we utter the vehement language of the heart, we naturally adopt different words, and a different collocation. The starving wretch, beholding a piece of bread,

would not say, *Da mihi panem*, but *Panem mihi da*. This is the natural order—the order, in fact, which, if the language permitted, the feelings of every man would irresistibly prescribe. When Nisus, in his impatient eagerness to save the life of his friend, exclaimed,

“ Me, me, adsum qui feci, in me convertite ferrum.”

Virg. Æn. ix. 427.

he spoke a language, consentaneous to his feelings in a moment of the most agonizing apprehension. Nay, any other arrangement of his words would have been less natural, because less accordant with that paroxysm of terror, which he felt for the safety of his bosom friend, Euryalus. Place him in calmer circumstances, and he might have said, “ Ego adsum, qui feci; convertite ferrum in me.” Each of these arrangements, therefore, may be said to be natural, each being adapted to certain states of mind, and accommodated to the operation of certain principles, clearly inseparable from the constitution of our nature. It is the latter of these, to which the English language is almost wholly confined. Inversion, as we term it, is among us but rarely practicable. In Latin, on the contrary, the variety of termination in nouns and verbs, enables the writer or speaker to place the words in whatever order, his reason, his feelings, or his imagination may suggest. Its flexibility, therefore, adapting itself either to the calm dictates of reason, or to the bent of a fervid imagination, or to the vehement feelings of

passion and appetite, the order, which obtains in Latin, may properly be denominated the natural arrangement.

Having now presented the reader with a brief illustration of the general principles, by which the arrangement in Latin and in English is regulated, I proceed to offer a few rules for Latin collocation.

SECT. II.

On Latin Arrangement.

“ Collocationis est componere et struere verba sic, ut neve asper eorum concursus, neve hiulus sit, sed quodammodo coagmentatus, et lævis.”
Cic. de Orat. Lib. iii.

I. In historical narration, and didactic composition of every kind, the subject is generally put before the verb—as, *Deus mundum gubernat*.

Exc. 1. When the subject is closely connected with the succeeding clause, and is by it either limited or explained, it follows the verb. “ In duobus tum exercitibus erant trigemini fratres, nec ætate, nec viribus dispares.” *Liv. i. 24.* “ Erant omnino itinera duo, quibus itineribus domo exire possent.” *Cæs. B. G. i.*

Exc. 2. When the author wishes the attention of the reader to rest on the subject, the nominative then follows the verb, and generally concludes the sentence, or clause. This exception will be particularly illustrated hereafter,

II. Agreeably to the general principle of Latin arrangement, by which the subject precedes the predicate, the adjective ought to follow the substantive. But, with a few exceptions, and all of these not universally observed, the place of the adjective and participle is entirely arbitrary. “Hæc victoria in luxuriam vertit.” *Liv.* iii. 64. “Mortuo Tullo.” *Id.* i. 32. “Devictis Sabinis.” *Id.* i. 31. “Castris receptis.” *Id.* iii. 29. “Hoc et insequente anno.” *Id.* iv. 11. “Tuas jam literas Brutus expectabat.” *Cic. Att.* xvi. 15. “Patrem tuum plurimum feci.” *Cic. Att.* xvi. 19. In the following cases, the adjective is generally put before the substantive.

1st. When the adjective is any of the following words—*Primus, Medius, Ultimus, Extremus, Summus, Infimus, Imus, Supremus, Reliquus, Cæterus*, denoting *Prima pars, Media pars, &c.* it is generally put before the substantive. “Summus mons.” *Cæs.* “Extremo libro.” *Cic. Off.* iii. 3.

2dly. When the substantive governs another in the genitive, the adjective generally precedes both; as “Propria veri inquisitio.” *Cic. Off.* i. 4. “Duo Platonis præcepta.” *Cic. Off.* i. 25. “Vera autem animi magnitudo.” *Cic.*

3dly. When the substantive is governed by a preposition, the adjective is frequently put before the substantive; as, “Hac in quæstione.” *Cic.* “Magna ex parte.” *Id.* “Quam ad spem.” *Cæs.*

4thly. For the sake of euphony,—as “Qui adipisci veram gloriam volet,” *Cic. Off.* ii. 13, rather than “gloriam veram volet.”

5thly. The pronouns, *Is, Ille, Hic, Iste*, are very generally placed before the substantive, and if used substantively, are placed before the participle. This arrangement not only renders the reference more pointed, but also increases the strength, and generally improves the melody of the clause. We therefore say, “Hoc tempore.” *Cic.* “Ea tempestate.” *Sall.* “Hac re.” *Cæs.* “Eo regnante.” *Liv.*

III. The relative generally follows the antecedent, and should be placed as near to it as possible. “Ex quatuor autem locis, in quos honesti naturam vimque divisimus, primus ille, qui in veri cognitione consistit.” *Cic. Off.* i. 6.

IV. Agreeably to the preceding rule, the relative is generally the first word of its own clause; and when it is taken for *Et ille, Et hic, Et is*, or for these pronouns singly, its place is uniformly the first. The reference is thus more clearly marked; and accordingly this arrangement is favourable to perspicuity and strength. “Quod ubi Cæsar rescit.” *Cæs. B. G.* i. 28. “Qui si jussissent.” *Cæs. B. G.* i. 26. “Qui cum eum in itinere convenissent,” *Cæs. B. G.* i. 28, equivalent to *Et cum illi eum in itinere convenissent*. So also with the relative adverb, “Quo cum pervenissent.” *Liv.*

Scheller observes, that when instead of referring to a preceding word, it refers to one following, the relative is properly put in the second or third place of its own clause; as *Deum qui colit, is felix est*. That the relative is often so placed, is unquestionably true; but the examples of a contrary order are so

numerous, that Scheller's observation, if we are to understand it as amounting to a general rule, cannot be admitted as correct. "Qui se metui volent, a quibus metuentur, eosdem metuant ipsi necesse est." *Cic. Off.* ii. 7. "Qui aliter fecerit, eum contra rem publicam et salutem omnium facturum." *Sall. in Or. Cæs.* "Qui proprio nomine perduellis esset, is hostis vocaretur." *Cic. Off.* i. 12. "Quod igitur latissime patet—id amplectamur." *Cic. Off.* ii. 7.

V. The governing word is generally placed after its regimen, as *Carthaginensium dux—Laudis avidus—Romanorum ditissimus—Hostem fudit—Discere volo*. "Tantam me inimicorum multitudinem suscepisse video." *Cic. Orat. in Cat.* 4. Here after the word *me*, which is the accusative before *suscepisse*, every word is under the government of that, which immediately follows it. Prepositions, as the name imports, generally precede their regimen; they are, therefore, exceptions from this rule.

VI. The verb generally closes the sentence. "Verbo, sensum claudere," says Quintilian, "multo, si compositio patiat, optimum est. In verbis enim sermonis vis inest. At si id asperum erit, cedat hæc ratio numeris." *Orat.* ix. 4.

VII. Adverbs are generally placed immediately before the word which they are intended to modify, as "Leviter ægrotantes, leniter curant." *Cic. Off.* i. 24.

VIII. Conjunctions generally introduce the clause, to which they belong. "At si dares hanc vim." *Cic.* "Sed profecto in omni re fortuna dominatur." *Sall.*

Exc. 1. The enclitic conjunctions *Que*, *Ve*, *Ne*, are always suffixed, the first two to the latter of the two words, which they serve to couple—as “*Albus aterve.*” *Cic. Boni malique*;—and the last, to the subject, which the question chiefly regards—thus, *Loquarne?* “*Shall I speak?*” *Egone loquar?* “*Shall I speak?*”

Exc. 2. The conjunctions *Autem*, *Enim*, *Vero*, *Quoque*, *Quidem*, are always placed after the introductory word of the clause, generally in the second place, and sometimes in the third—as *Ille autem*, *Ego enim*, *Qui vero*—not *Autem ille*, *Enim ego*, *Vero qui*. These are, therefore, called postpositive conjunctions.—*Etiam*, *Igitur*, and *Tamen*, are more frequently assigned to the second or third place, than the first. Of these, indeed, *Igitur* is uniformly, I believe, by Cicero, used as a postpositive conjunction. “*Hæ disciplinæ igitur.*” *Cic. Off. i. 2.* “*Placet igitur.*” *Cic. Off. i. 2.* “*Quoniam igitur.*” *Ib. i. 9.* Tacitus, Nepos, and Sallust have, in one or two passages, used it prepositively. *Etiam* also is much more frequently used as a postpositive, than as a prepositive conjunction. “*Atque etiam.*” *Cic. Delectant etiam.*” *Cic. Tamē* frequently introduces a clause, though it more generally is placed in the second or third place, and sometimes even at the very end of a sentence.

IX. Words connected in sense should be as close as possible to each other : and the words of one clause should never be mixed with those of another.

When Horace says, *Terrarum dominos evehit ad deos*, it is impossible to ascertain, whether *Terrarum dominos* refer to the Romans, or to the gods. If we say, *Vidistin' hominem malum qui hoc mihi dedit ?* punctuation only can determine whether we mean, "Did you see the wicked man, who gave me this?" or "Did you see the man, who did me this mischief?" And it is surely unnecessary to observe, that no sentence should be so constructed, that its meaning shall depend on punctuation only. If the former of the two senses be intended, we should say, *Hominem malum vidistin', qui hoc mihi dedit ?* If the latter, *Hominem vidistin' qui hoc malum mihi dedit ?* "Vidi ego qui juvenem seros desisset amores." *Tibull. i. 5, 47.* Here the word *Juvenem*, which belongs to the primary and antecedent clause, is improperly thrust into the relative clause. The syntactical arrangement is *Ego vidi juvenem, qui desisset seros amores.*

If the words of one clause are kept distinct from those of another, they may be interchanged among themselves, as the writer may think fit. Thus, *Juvenem ego vidi, qui seros amores desisset*, or *Ego juvenem vidi, qui seros desisset amores*, or *Vidi juvenem ego, qui desisset seros amores.* But care must be taken that the words of one clause shall not be mixed with those of another ; for this never fails to confuse and perplex the reader.

X. Circumstances, that is, the "cause," the "manner," the "instrument," the "time," the "place," are expressed before the predicate. "Eum ferro oc-

credi. Ego te ob egregiam virtutem semper amavi.”
Nep. “Quum Brundisium venissem.” *Cic.*

XI. An aggregate of particulars, to which any addition is to be expressed, or from which any exception is to be signified, generally precedes the addition, or the exception. “Ego, præter cæteras tuas virtutes, humanitatem tuam admiror.” *Cic.* In the following sentence, Cicero has departed from this arrangement, in order to place the relative as near as possible to its antecedent. “Omnium civitatum totius Siciliae legationes adsunt præter duas civitates, quarum duarum duo crimina vel maxima minuerentur.” *Cic. Or. in Q. Cæc.*

XII. The proper name should precede the name of the rank, or profession—as *Cicero orator*, *Annibal dux*.

XIII. The vocative, as a mark of distinction, should either introduce the sentence, or be placed among the first words. “Credo, vos, iudices.” *Cic.* “Si tibi, frater, ista contigissent.” *Cic.*

XIV. Where there is an antithesis, the words chiefly opposed to each other, should be as close together as possible.—“Appetis pecuniam, virtutem abjicis. In provinciam profectus es pauper, dives Romam rediisti.” *Cic.* “Excludor ego, ille recipitur.” *Ter. Eun. i. 2. 79.*

XV. It is a general rule, that sentences, especially in the higher departments of prose, should be so constructed, that, while in each clause and member we proceed successively from shorter to longer words,

the several clauses and members shall gradually increase in length, as we advance towards the close of the sentence. “Augeri enim,” says Quintilian, “debent sententiæ et insurgere.” *Inst. lib. ix. cap. 4.* The same rule is delivered by Diomedes. “In verbis observandum est, ne a majoribus ad minora descendat oratio; melius enim dicitur, *Vir est optimus*, quam, *Vir optimus est.*” (*Diom. de Struct. perf. Orat. lib. ii.*) To this rule, both as it respects the length of single words, as well as that of clauses and members, no writer was ever more attentive than Cicero. Whenever the dignity of the subject requires a certain elevation of style, this gradual swell, as we approach the close of the period, imparts dignity and strength to the sentence, and, if skilfully managed, renders its cadence flowing and harmonious. In other circumstances, however, this studied and artificial structure would be highly unsuitable. Plain and familiar subjects require a diction simple and easy. “Parvum parva decent,” (*Hor.*) is a maxim equally applicable to the garb of sentiment, as to the apparel of the body. Nay, even in cases, where this structure is adapted to the subject, its constant recurrence would render the style too stately and affected, while it would fatigue the ear by a monotonous uniformity *. Continued elaboration is unnatural and tiresome.

* “Virtutes enim ipsæ tædium pariunt, nisi gratia varietatis adjunctæ.—Orationis compositio nisi varia est, et offendit similitudine, et affectatione deprehenditur.” *Quint. Inst. lib. ix. cap. 4.*
 “In universum autem, si sit necesse, duram potius et asperam

XV. As a corollary to this rule, it follows, that a sentence ought not to conclude with a monosyllable. If, instead of saying, “Capitibus involutis, se in Tiberim præcipitaverant,” *Liv. iv. 12*, we say, *In Tiberim præcipitaverant se* ; or instead of “Patricii soluti legum magistratuumque verecundia per se quoque tribuniciam potestatem agerent,” *Liv. iv. 56*, we say, “Agerent per se,” we render the cadences harsh and abrupt. Nothing is more unpleasant, because nothing is less natural, than rapid transitions, or sudden breaks. We are delighted with the gradually expiring tones of the Eolian lute, or the soft cadence of the summer breeze, which die slowly on the ear, and leave behind them an agreeable impression. On the contrary, every ear is sensible of a kind of shock, when, during the progress of an interesting melody, the instrument suddenly stops. In like manner, by a round, full, and soft cadence, the ear is gratified and delighted ; by an abrupt and violent termination of a sentence, it feels a sort of shock, or concussion, as if from the crash of a sudden fall, or the noise of an unexpected explosion*.

But though it be a general, it is by no means a universal rule, that a sentence shall not be concluded with a monosyllable. The following cases furnish a few exceptions.

compositionem malim esse, quam effeminatam et enervem.”
Quint. Inst. lib. ix. cap. 4. ad finem.

* See some judicious observations on this subject, by the Rev. Richard Lyne, in his “Latin Primer.”

1st. When by *ecthlipsis*, the final *m*, with its vowel, in the word immediately preceding the monosyllable, is cut off. “In Asia continenter vixisse laudandum est.” *Cic. Orat. pro Muræn.*—“Hodierno die vobis judicandum est.” *Cic. Orat. 4 in Cat.*

2dly. When by a *synalæpha* the final vowel, in the word immediately preceding the monosyllable, is elided. “Atque homine libero est.” *Cic. Orat. pro Rab.* “Interfectum jure concedas necesse est.” *Id. pro Rab.* For as Quintilian observes, “*Synalæpha facit, ut ultimæ syllabæ pro una sonent.*” *Lib. ix. cap. 4.*

3dly. When the monosyllable is an auxiliary verb, as “Domi suæ condemnatus est.” *Cic. Orat. pro Rab.* “Internecone civium dijudicatæ sint.” *Cic. Orat. in Cat. 3.* And sometimes, though seldom, when the substantive verb is not auxiliary.—Both these cadences, however, as they are somewhat harsh, should be sparingly used.

4thly. When the subject sinks, or proceeds from greater to less, the words may gradually decrease in length, and the sentence end in a monosyllable.—Thus, in the following passage from Horace,

“Parturiunt montes; nascetur ridiculus mus.”

De Art. Poët.

an *anticlimax* is intended, and the structure of the verse must be regarded as a beauty.

It has been already observed, that language, in order to answer the purpose for which it is intended,

ought to be clear, and easily intelligible.—If to perspicuity be superadded, beauty, elegance, harmony, vivacity, and strength, they promote its utility as a vehicle of thought, and materially enhance its value. Still, however, it is to be remembered, that these latter qualities are of inferior importance. They are useful, but not essential. Perspicuity, on the contrary, is absolutely indispensable. If, therefore, the observance of any of the preceding rules for arrangement should, in any case, seem likely to create ambiguity, or obscurity, the rule must be sacrificed to clearness and precision. No excellence can atone for the want of perspicuity.—“*Oratio vero,*” says Quintilian, “*cujus summa virtus est perspicuitas, quam sit vitiosa, si egeat interprete ?*” *Inst. lib. i. cap. 7.*

Euphony also frequently requires a deviation from several of these rules. Though a good ear is far the best monitor for guarding against either a harsh, or an excessively smooth diction, it may not be unuseful, if we offer a few brief admonitions on the subject of euphony. The *numbers* of prose, or more particularly harmony of cadence, will become the subject of future consideration.

1st. Then, euphony forbids the concurrence of vowels, when they produce a disagreeable *hiatus*, or mouthing. That the structure of the Latin language is such, as to render it impossible to avoid the concurrence of vowels, is a fact too obvious to require illustration. The Latins seem, indeed, in many cases, to have preferred this concurrence, even when they might,

in perfect consistence with analogy, have easily avoided it. Thus, we have *Abiit, Transierit, Desiisset*, for *Abivit, Transiverit, Desivisset*. On the other hand, we remark a desire, in some instances, to prevent the concurrence of vowels. We find, for example, *d* inserted after *pro*, in compound words, when the word, with which the preposition is compounded, begins with a vowel—thus, *Prodes, Prodeo, Prodi*. We find, also, comparatives from adjectives in *ius* rejected, as *Piior*.—We find likewise, *A* and *E* used before consonants, *Ab* and *Ex* before vowels.

But, though we observe these evidences of a desire to avoid the concurrence of vowels, we find a much greater number of instances, in which they paid no regard whatever to this principle. The rules, therefore, which have been delivered by ancient writers on this subject must be understood, in a qualified sense, if we wish to reconcile them, either with the structure of the language, or the practice even of the writers themselves. Quintilian says, “*Tum vocalium concursus, qui cum accidit, hiat et intersistit, et quasi laborat oratio.*” *Inst. lib. ix. cap. 4.* The vowels, of which especially he censures the concurrence, are those, which are pronounced with the roundest and widest opening of the mouth. The offence, he observes, is less, when a short vowel follows a long one; still less when a long follows a short; and least of all when both vowels are short, and pronounced with nearly the same opening of the mouth. The same general rule is given by the author of the four books

of Rhetoric, addressed to Herennius, with this difference, however, that the rule is with propriety limited, the prohibition being confined to the frequent concurrence of vowel sounds. “Ea conservabitur, si fugiemus crebras vocalium concursiones, quæ vastam atque hiantem orationem reddunt.” *Auctor ad Heren.* lib. iv.

The opinion of Cicero on this subject, has been involved in some obscurity. He says, in one passage, “Habet enim ille tanquam hiatus concursu vocalium molle quiddam, et quod indicet non ingratham negligentiam de re hominis, magis quam de verbis, laborantis.” *Cic. Orat.* In another place, “Nam, ut in legendo oculus, sic animus in dicendo prospiciet, quid sequatur; nec extremorum verborum cum insequentibus primis concursus, aut hiulcas voces, efficiat, aut asperas. Quamvis enim suaves gravesque sententiæ, tamen, si incondite positis verbis efferuntur, offendent aures, quarum est judicium subtilissimum. Quod quidem Latina lingua sic observat, nemo ut tam rusticus sit, quin vocales nolit conjungere.” *Ib.* In the former passage, he asserts, that there is a degree of softness in the concurrence of vowels, and that, though it betrays negligence in the author, it is a negligence by no means offensive. In the latter he observes, that no man is so rustic as not to be averse to the conjunction of vowels. On this ground, Scheller charges him with inconsistency. Ernesti, indeed, reads *Qui* for *Quin*, in the latter passage, which reverses its meaning. This lection reconciles the passage with

the preceding observation of Cicero, respecting the softness of concurrent vowels, and also with an observation, which immediately follows* : “ Sed Græci viderint ; nobis, ne si cupiamus quidem, distrahere vocales conceditur.”

Without entering, however, into an examination, which of the two readings is the more correct, we may warrantably, it is presumed, interpret the words of Cicero in the following sense. He admits that there is a degree of smoothness in concurrent vowels. He admits also, that this concurrence is a proof of

* The reading given by this excellent critic, in which he has followed Aldus and Junta, reconciles the orator with himself, and on this ground we prefer it. Victorius, he observes, defends *quin nolit*, but produces examples foreign to the question, not one of them containing *quin* with a negative. If by this remark we are to understand, that *quin* is never followed by a negative, we apprehend the observation to be incorrect. “ Non dubium est,” says Simo, “ quin uxorem nolit filius.” *Ter. And.* i. 2, 1. “ Non quod dubitarem, quin nihil jure esset actum.” *Cic.* But we believe, there is no example of *quin* followed by a negative, when *quin* is used for *qui non*, the subject in the antecedent, and that in the relative clause being identical, as in the passage before us, where *Nemo est quin* is equivalent to *quisque*.

May not Cicero here refer to the practice, completely antiquated in his time, of separating a final from an initial vowel by the letter *d* ? Thus we have in Plautus, “ Nec nobis præter *med* alius.” *Amph.* i. 1, 244. “ Per Jovem juro *med* esse.” *Amph.* i. 2, 279. “ Abs *ted* accipiat.” *Asin.* iv. 1, 27. “ Vacuum esse istac *ted* ætate iis decebat noxiis.” *Merc.* v. 4, 23. If this conjecture be admitted, the lection of Ernesti must be deemed the correct reading ; and Cicero’s meaning will be, “ There is no person now so barbarous, as to be unwilling to join vowels.”

negligence in the writer, though it be rather of an agreeable than offensive kind. But can he be understood to affirm, that every example of concurrent vowels is a proof of negligence? Does he mean to assert, that, in every instance, where a word ends with a vowel, the succeeding word should begin with a consonant?—If this be his meaning, he himself is chargeable with innumerable violations of his own rule. Or can he be understood as affirming, that such concurrences can be prevented? By no means. On the contrary, he tells us, that though Demosthenes, and some other Greek writers avoided the frequent concurrence of vowels as faulty, such was the structure of the Latin Language, that the Romans could not, even if they wished it, exclude concurrent vowels. We may, therefore, it is conceived, warrantably infer, that Cicero's prohibition, like that of *Auctor ad Herennium*, extends only to the too frequent concurrence of vowels, and that by the expression “*hiulcas voces*”, he means only such a coition of vowels as occasions an offensive *hiatus*, or gaping.

When it is delivered, therefore, as a general rule, to avoid the concurrence of vowels, the extent of the rule must be limited, not by its practicability only, for this must limit every rule, but by its expediency. For constant attention to such a rule would so fetter a writer, that beauty, elegance, vivacity, and strength, would be sacrificed to a principle, at best only partially practicable; a principle, which the ancients themselves, even when they could practise it, fre-

quently omitted to observe.—All, therefore, which the rule, generally given on this subject, can be justly understood to imply, is this, that the too frequent concurrence of vowels should be prevented, and that we should uniformly avoid such coitions as are difficult to be pronounced distinctly, and are offensive to the ear. Of the latter, the following passage from an ancient writer will furnish an example. “Bacæ Eoæ amœnissimæ impendebant.”

2dly. A concurrence of harsh consonants should be avoided. “Consonantes quoque, eæque præcipue, quæ sunt asperiores, in commissura verborum rixantur, et *s* ultima, cum *x* proxima, quarum tristior etiam si binæ collidantur, stridor est, ut *ars studiorum*.” *Quint.* ix. 4. The harsher articulations are those of *D*, *K*, *C*, and *G**, *Q*, *R*, *S*, *T*. A conformity to this rule will naturally be dictated by the ear itself, and the difficulty of pronunciation, when several harsh consonants concur. Thus, for example, it requires a strong, and almost painful effort, to pronounce *Vix strepitus*, *Post stragem*, *Trans stramineum*; and the harshness of the articulations seems a sufficient admonition to avoid them.

3dly. Several monosyllables in succession should be avoided. “Etiam monosyllaba, si plura sint, male continuabuntur; quia necesse est, compositio multis clausulis concisa subsultet.” *Quint.* ix. 4.—One of the annotators on this passage has given the following

* We read Latin as we read English, giving *C* and *G* sometimes the hard and sometimes the soft sound. The former only was employed by the Romans.

example,—“ Do quod vis, et me victus volensque remitto.” *Virg. Æn.* xii. 833. Here are no fewer than five monosyllables, which produce a subsultory and unpleasant effect. The verse seems to hop or start, rather than move smoothly and gracefully along.

4thly. A continuation of too long words should also be avoided. “ Afferunt enim”, says Quintilian, “ dicendi tarditatem.” They fatigue the reader, and make the sentence drag.

5thly. A continued repetition of the same letter, whether it be initial, middle, or final, should be avoided. Nothing scarcely can be conceived more offensive to the ear, than the following passage, quoted by *Auctor ad Herennium*, from an ancient poet, “ O Tite, tute Tati, tibi tanta tyranne tulisti.” *lib.* iv. The following clause from Cicero is, on this ground, somewhat objectionable, “ Privato illo judicio transacto, aut delato.” *Cic. in Verr.*

6thly. A repetition of the same syllable or syllables in close succession, or at short intervals, should be avoided—as *Monet, et hortatur*. “ Per perbreve tempus. O fortunatam natam me consule Romam!” *Cic.* “ Plenior ore.” *Cic. Off.* i. 18. “ Negligens est gens.” *Liv.* v. 46. “ Quæ præterea præviderim, prætereo.” *Cic. Ep. Fam.* vi. 6.

7thly. It is advisable, likewise, to prevent the same close from returning several times in the same sentence. “ Quem posteaquam inanem locum offenderunt, et prætorem commovisse ex eo loco castra senserunt, statim sine ullo metu in portum ipsum penetrare cœperunt.” *Cic. in Verr.*

8thly. Verse ought not to be intermixed with prose. “Versum fugimus in oratione,” is the remark of Cicero. A sentence concluding like an hexameter is particularly faulty—as “Veteres fidosque clientes.” *Sall. B. C.* “Forsan multi vincerent, si vincere posse putarent.” In the beginning of a sentence it is less striking, and therefore more pardonable. “Facturusne operæ pretium sim.” *Liv. Præf.* This, indeed, is not an error against euphony; but it savours of affectation, and betrays a want of taste.

Before dismissing this part of our subject, it may be necessary, for the sake of the junior reader, to remark, that we find offences against several of these rules in the best classic writers, and that Cicero himself, as some of the examples evince, is not entirely free from them. It is necessary, also, that the reader should bear in mind, that without sacrificing strength, precision, and perspicuity, it is in many cases impossible to avoid transgressing several of these rules. To catch at the shadow, and lose the substance, is an argument of folly.

Having offered these general rules for the selection of words, and also for their arrangement, it may be useful, if we subjoin a few directions for assisting the junior scholar in the exercise of translation.

CHAPTER III.

OF TRANSLATION.

A GOOD translation has, by some critics, been sup-

posed to consist, in such an exhibition of the sense and spirit of the original, as the author himself would give, were he as correctly acquainted with the language, into which the work is rendered, as with that, in which it was originally composed.—This definition, it is conceived, allows the translator a greater liberty, than, in his proper character, he is permitted to assume. For, if the original were composed in a language, the scanty vocabulary of which did not furnish him with words, sufficiently expressive of his meaning, it is to be presumed, that, in exhibiting his sentiments in a more copious language, he would naturally avail himself of its superior capacity of expression, and, instead of employing words precisely equivalent to those in the original, he would select such as correctly expressed the sense he intended. In adopting, however, this procedure, it is obvious, that he blends the author with the translator ; and, though the translation may be esteemed more valuable than the original, as more faithful to the author's sentiments and manner, yet it cannot be justly regarded as purely a translation. It may be a more correct exhibition of the conceptions of the author, but it cannot be deemed an accurate delineation of his sense and manner, as they appear in the original.—It may be a faithful portrait of the author ; but not an accurate copy of his work

A good translation has been defined by others to be that, which a translator would give, who is studious of fidelity, and is perfectly acquainted with the language of the original, and of that also, in which he undertakes to exhibit it.

The perfection of any work of art is to be estimated by its subserviency to the end, which it aims at attaining; and the rules of the art itself are deducible from the purpose, which it is intended to answer. We may regard the abilities of those, who are conversant in it, as a criterion of the degree of perfection, at which it may have arrived; and we may state, that certain qualifications are necessary to success; but when we speak of “abilities,” and “qualifications,” we have evidently in view the ultimate object, which it is the professed purpose of the art to attain. I prefer, therefore, the following definition given by a critic of great taste and discernment, as more directly referring to the great end, which all translation is intended to answer*. “A good translation,” says he, “I would describe to be *That in which the merit of the original work is so completely transfused into another language, as to be distinctly apprehended and as strongly felt, by a native of the country, to which that language belongs, as it is by those, who speak the language of the original work.*”

This description of a good translation is substantially correct, though it involves, I apprehend, a verbal inaccuracy. It is not surely the *merit* of the work, which should be completely transfused into another language, or which should be equally apprehended by the speakers of both languages; but the sentiments, the spirit, the manner of the author. The great aim

* See an “Essay on the Principles of Translation,” by Mr. Tytler, second edition.

of the translator is, not to enable his reader to appreciate the *merit* of the original, but to exhibit its sense, its spirit, its whole character with fidelity. The author continues—

“Now, supposing this description to be a just one, which I think it is, let us examine what are the laws of translation, which may be deduced from it.” It will follow,

1st. “That the translation should give a complete transcript of the ideas of the original work.”

2dly. “That the style and manner of writing should be of the same character, with that of the original.”

3dly. “That the translation should have all the ease of original composition.”

This is a concise, as well as a conspicuous and correct statement of what constitutes the excellence of any translation. According to this description, the character of a good translation consists in strict fidelity. Not an idea more or less, whether primary, or secondary, is to be expressed in the translation, than the original contains. A “complete transfusion of the ideas” excludes whatever is more or less than complete; and an equally distinct apprehension of these by natives of the two countries, in which the languages are severally spoken, implies a faithful and perfect exhibition of the original. When the learned critic, therefore, admits (as he does afterwards) the superaddition of accessory ideas, if they have a necessary connection with the original thought, and increase

its force ; and when he allows the retrenchment of an accessory idea, if it does not weaken or impair the thought*, he admits a licence, which is apprehended to be incompatible with his own description. A transcript implies a copy ; a complete transcript implies a perfect copy : but that copy cannot be perfect or correct, in which there is either more or less, than the subject to be transcribed.

If there were two languages, which perfectly harmonized one with the other in general structure, and individual idiom, having the same capacity of expression, and mutually correspondent vocabularies of respectively equivalent terms, in short, constituting perfect counterparts to each other, then, it will not be disputed, that a perfect translation might be made from one language into the other. And, if such a translation were executed, why should we distinguish it by the epithet “ perfect,” but because it delineates, with strict and perfect fidelity, not merely the general image, but every feature and lineament of the author—the precise sense, spirit, and manner of his work, with all the natural freedom, and fluency, of an original composition. If this, then, be unquestionably a perfect translation, is not every deviation from this a

* It is difficult, indeed, to conceive how an accessory idea can be excluded without impairing the thought. The very supposition appears to involve a contradiction. What is less than the whole thought cannot possibly be the whole. To suppose that any deduction can be made, without impairing the integrity of the subject, involves an absurdity.

character of imperfection? And is not the introduction, or suppression, of an accessory idea, which either increases or diminishes the force of the original, a deviation from the original? Is not the imperfection of the translation more or less great, in proportion as it departs from the exemplar before it, whether this departure arise from the intractability and inadequacy of the language, or from the incompetency of the translator himself?

I am well aware, that there are not any two languages, which so harmoniously accord, as to render so faithful a translation practicable; but let it be observed, that it is one thing to be compelled by the inadequacy of the language, to adopt a term of more or less strength, of greater or less beauty, or a term implying more or less than the original—I say, it is one thing to be compelled to adopt this by the necessity of the case, and quite another thing to exercise a licence to that effect, where the language furnishes apposite, and precisely equivalent expressions. Nay, the learned critic does not confine this licence to the admission, or the exclusion of secondary ideas only; he even admits, in certain cases, the insertion of clauses. This, I conceive, is directly repugnant to his own principles; nor can I imagine any thing which has a greater tendency to shake the reader's confidence, in the fidelity of all translation, than the suspicion, that he does not see the author precisely as he is, or, at least, as correctly as the medium can possibly exhibit him. The translator may, indeed,

improve the original ; but it is the author, and the author only, that the reader desires to see, and not the translator.

A greater latitude must, doubtless, be allowed to the poetical, than to the prose translator. The former has not only, in common with the latter, to contend with the mutual repugnancy of the two languages, but is likewise fettered by the laws of versification ; the other has to encounter only the reciprocal incongruity of the language of the original, and that of the translation. As far, therefore, as this repugnance will permit, it is his duty to adhere to the strict sense, and spirit, and manner, of the author. All sentiments, all primary conceptions, how natural soever, should be excluded, nor should a secondary idea be admitted, if the capacity of the language will enable the translator to reject it*.

* Since the preceding observations were written, the author has perused a treatise by M. Huet, the learned bishop of Avranches, *De optimo genere interpretandi*, and is gratified to find, that the doctrine, which that ingenious and able writer there endeavours to establish, is, in almost every point, coincident with that, which is here proposed for the direction of the reader.

After defining translation, he says, “Optimum illum esse interpretandi modum, quum auctoris sententiæ primùm, deinde ipsis etiam, si ita fert utriusque linguæ facultas, verbis arctissime adhæret interpres, et nativum postremo auctoris characterem, quoad ejus fieri potest, adumbrat ; idque unum studet, ut nulla eum detractatione imminutum, nullo additamento auctum, sed integrum, suique omni ex parte simillimum perquam fideliter exhibeat.—Cum enim nihil aliud esse videatur interpretatio, quam

CHAPTER IV.

TRANSLATION DIFFICULT, AND SOMETIMES
IMPRACTICABLE.

To be qualified for translating with precision and fidelity, humble as the office, and easy as the task, may to some persons appear, requires a more than ordinary share of correct taste, sound judgment, and philological acumen.

The two following requisites, among the numerous qualifications of a good translator, are *indispensably* necessary. 1st. A critical acquaintance with the words, the structure, and the genius, of the original: and 2dly. A perfect knowledge of the language in which the translator undertakes to exhibit his author*.

expressa auctoris imago, et effigies, ea autem optima imago habenda sit, quæ lineamenta oris, colorem, oculos, totum denique vultûs filum, et corporis habitum ita refert, ut absens coram adesse videatur ; inepta vero ea figura sit, quæ rem aliter effingit, atque est, pulchriorem illam licet, et aspectu jucundiores exprimat : id profecto efficitur, eam demum præstabiliorem esse interpretationem, non quæ auctoris luxuriam depascit, vel jejunitatem expleat, vel obscuritatem illustret, vel menda corrigat, vel perversum ordinem digerat, sed quæ totum auctorem ob oculos sistat, nativis adumbratum coloribus, et vel suis virtutibus laudandum, vel, si ita meritis sit, propriis deridendum vitiis propinet." *Lib. i.*

* Though the two qualifications here mentioned may be regarded as the most indispensable, they are far from constituting

The latter of these, though it may to some persons appear to be of easy attainment, requires no mean powers of intellect, no ordinary penetration, and no common share of attention and industry. If it be true, as it demonstrably is, that there are not to be found, in any language, two words precisely equivalent, it may naturally be inferred by those, at least, who are conversant in philological inquiries, that to determine with precision the nice, and, in some cases, almost evanescent distinctions, subsisting between words apparently synonymous, is a task, which demands the most rigid attention, and most laborious research, combined with no vulgar share of intuitive sagacity, and logical discrimination.

In the common interchange of sentiment, it is generally a matter of indifference, whether of two synonymes, this or that be employed. The purposes of speech are sufficiently answered, without an observance of those nice distinctions, which belong to the province of the critic and philologist. The human mind, in all subjects familiar to its contemplation, is perspicacious enough, to discern the sentiment of the speaker, though loosely, and even ambiguously expressed. But in scientific disquisition, the utmost

a good translator. A discriminating and sound intellect, a correct taste, a knowledge of the usages, laws, religion, and polity of the people, by whom the language was spoken, an acquaintance with the subject, of which the author treats, to which may be added, a mind congenial to his, are all, though in different degrees, necessary to form a good translator.

precision is indispensably requisite. Besides, it is to be remembered, that it is required of the translator, not loosely and vaguely to exhibit the sentiments of his author, so that the reader shall apprehend merely the leading ideas, or form an imperfect conception of the meaning ; but, like a faithful mirror, to reflect every image with clearness and with truth, precisely as the author himself has presented it. We require of him not a general resemblance, but a correct portrait of his original, as far as his materials are capable of furnishing it.

The second requisite is a critical acquaintance with the language of the original. And here I would not be understood to allude to that knowledge, which consists in a correct acquaintance with its grammatical principles, though this unquestionably is indispensable, but to that critical knowledge of the precise import of the words individually, whose meaning he undertakes to exhibit in his translation. Devoid of this essential qualification, he may, indeed, sketch a rude likeness of his author, but must be utterly incapable of portraying, with effect, those finer lineaments, and nicer characters, which are indispensable to a correct and precise delineation of the original. And, if to ascertain the distinction between synonymous words, and to apprehend the precise import of the terms, which we are daily in the practice of speaking, reading, or hearing, requires a more than ordinary share of philological sagacity ; it surely needs no argument to prove, that the difficulty of the

task must be incomparably greater, when the words of a foreign and dead language form the subjects of investigation.—Yet the classical translator, in order to be qualified for his office, must be critically acquainted with the precise import of every word in his original, while he is perfectly master of that language, in which he undertakes to exhibit the author to his reader. These qualifications, evidently require extensive reading, rigid attention, penetrating genius, and laborious research *.

* Though a correct and critical acquaintance with the language of the original, and with that also, into which it is to be rendered, may be justly deemed the principal qualification in a translator, it is far from constituting the sole requisite. There are, besides this, various other qualifications, which, though of subordinate importance, are, notwithstanding, indispensably necessary to a clear and perfect delineation of the author. The consideration of these, however, belongs rather to the province of the rhetorician, than the philologist. But it is not to be imagined, that, because precision is the chief excellence, if the translator attain this object, he has, therefore, arrived at the perfection of his art. It is incumbent on him not only to exhibit the precise conceptions of his author, but to present them also in the same light, assigning to each its just importance. In a historical painting, the figures severally may be correct resemblances of the objects they represent ; but one may be too prominent, another too retired ; one may have too much, another too little shade. In like manner, in translation, an idea, to which the author has assigned a pre-eminent rank, may be thrown by the translator into a subordinate and obscure place ; and, on the contrary, a sentiment, comparatively unimportant, and incidentally suggested, may, in the hands of the translator, assume a consequence, which it possesses not in the original, and with which the author

But with these attainments, there remains still another difficulty, which the translator has to encounter, a difficulty, the more formidable, as no labour, no ingenuity, on his part, is, in all cases, capable of removing it. For with the most correct and extensive acquaintance with both languages, it frequently occurs, that the translator cannot possibly find words

himself never intended to invest it. This is a common error; and though it offends not against the rules of mere precision, it materially affects the character of that impression, which the sentiment in the original is calculated to produce. The truth of this observation, it would be easy to illustrate by a variety of examples, did our limits permit. I shall only remark, that in no case, perhaps, is the young translator more prone to err in this respect, than by turning the verb into a participle, and an independent into a relative clause. He is informed, as is the fact, that conciseness and elegance are frequently consulted by this mode of constructing a sentence; and hence, without a discriminating judgment to direct his practice, while he aspires to excellence, he is sometimes seduced into the commission of error.

It is necessary also, that the translator, as far as the language will admit, should transfuse into his version the spirit of his author. It is a mistake to imagine, that this may be effected by precision in translating. Two versions may be, in every respect, substantially the same; in neither may a single conception be either omitted, or superadded; and yet the one shall be consentaneous, and the other repugnant, to the spirit of the original. The manner also of the author must be correctly copied, by whatever character it may be distinguished, whether it be grave or gay, uniform or varied, easy or formal. In short, to constitute the translator, there must be combined with a correct acquaintance with the two languages, an intuitive and correct perception of beauty, dignity, and sublimity; a delicate and well-cultivated taste, joined to a sound and discriminating judgment.

to express, with strict precision, the sentiments of his original.—Hence translation is, in some instances, not merely difficult, but absolutely impracticable. To those, who have devoted any considerable portion of time and attention to philological researches, and have been critically conversant in the practice of translation, this assertion will not require either example to illustrate, or argument to evince its truth. For the sake, however, of the junior reader, it may be useful, if we endeavour to explain the causes, which render translation in some instances imperfect, and in others impracticable.

In every language there are certain complex terms, to which two ideas are annexed, a primary, and a secondary. Two words therefore may concur, in expressing the same primary conception, while the secondary ideas suggested by them are materially different. *Taberna** and *Officina* agree in denoting a shop, or a place where manufactured goods are to be found; but the latter signifies the place where they are made, the former, that where they are made or sold. *Falsehood* and *Lie* agree in expressing the same primary idea, namely, a deviation from truth; but they differ in this; the former denotes a violation of physical, the latter of moral truth. The former, therefore, does not necessarily imply an intention to

* *Tabernæ*, by *metathesis* for *trabena* was a shed or booth constructed of boards (ex trabe) and denoted any erection, constructed of these materials. Thus we find it sometimes denoting “a hovel” or “cottage.” See *Hor. Car.* 1.4. 13.

deceive ; the latter denotes a wilful breach of veracity, and is a term of reproach. *Clergyman* and *Parson* denote each a minister of religion : but the secondary ideas are materially different, the former appellation being respectful, the latter rather contemptuous. If we say, “ Cæsar was killed in the Senate-house,” we signify merely, that some violence or other deprived him of life. It may have been the stroke of an enemy, or even the blow of a friend ; it may have been designed, or unintentional ; or his death may have been occasioned by some physical accident. The term “ killed ” is generical. If we say “ He was butchered,” we express the same primary idea, but along with it, we denote also, that his death was effected by human agency. We signify likewise, that the act was perpetrated with some degree of cruelty, and that the body was disfigured with wounds. If we say “ He was murdered,” we express the deprivation of life by violent means, and by human hands ; we signify also the criminality of the action.

These examples will suffice to shew, that two or more words may agree, in expressing the same primary idea, while the secondary ideas annexed to them are materially different. They will also serve to exemplify the importance of the accessory idea, as constituting in some cases an essential part of the sentiment intended.

Now, it is the duty of a translator to express neither more nor less, than the strict sense of the original. He is bound to present his reader with a clear and

correct transcript of his author. His translation should be a faithful copy not only of his sentiments, but even of his manner. If either expressly, or by implication, he convey to his reader more or less than the sense of the original, he is chargeable, if not with incompetency, or negligence, with what is much less pardonable, deliberate infidelity.

I am aware, indeed, that where there is neither ignorance, nor negligence, nor studied misstatement imputable to the translator, prejudices in favour of certain theories and doctrines seduce him, unconsciously, into a misrepresentation of his author. These are universally hostile to accuracy and truth; nor can their intrusion be too scrupulously watched, or too rigorously opposed. How many errors, ascribable to this cause, have disgraced the page of the translator? And such is the imperceptible influence of preconceived opinions, that, while we flatter ourselves that we are superior to prejudice, we at that moment betray our subjection to its dominion. In evidence of this truth, how often do we find two translators, of unimpeachable fidelity, assigning to the same passage two different interpretations. Nay, in historical translation, when mere facts are involved, while the author relates the simple transaction, the translator expresses also his opinion of its character. *Carolus primus, Angliæ rex, necatus est*, would be differently rendered according to the political sentiments of the translator. It is by employing terms expressive of their own opinions, that historians become parties in

those very transactions, which they profess to delineate with candour and impartiality; and that translators in like manner pervert the sense of their authors, attributing to them such sentiments, as accord with their own favourite opinions and theories. But to return to the subject more immediately before us.

It has been observed, that in all languages, are to be found certain complex terms, to which are annexed two ideas, a primary and a secondary; and it has been shewn, that the latter of these sometimes materially affects the complexion of the sentiment. A secondary idea, therefore, can neither be omitted, nor altered, nor superadded without mutilating, or distorting, or violating, in some shape or other, the sense of the original*. Now, if there subsisted a

* But though it may be truly affirmed, that no idea can be superadded, or cancelled, without impairing the correctness of the translation, it must at the same time be admitted, that there are not any two languages, which so harmoniously accord, that in all cases, terms precisely equivalent shall be found in each. To express, therefore, the full meaning of the original word, might frequently require an enunciation so tedious, tiresome, and languid, that the translator, studious to preserve the spirit of his work, is often compelled to drop the accessory idea. It is, on the other hand, equally evident, that the word in the original may be so general, that the translator must either recur to a qualification of the term, an expedient confessedly awkward, and offensive, or express somewhat more than the author intended. This, however, is the fault of the materials, and not of the artist. In such cases, approximation to the meaning of the original, as far as the capacity of the language, with a due regard to simplicity and spirit, will permit, is all that is attainable. Let it be remembered, however, that these involuntary deviations

precise and perfect coincidence between the correspondent terms of the two languages, in which the translator is conversant, the task of translation from the one into the other, would be comparatively easy. But such perfect equivalence does not exist; nor, if we investigate the principles on which the association of the secondary idea depends, can it be expected to exist. Minutely to explain these principles, and to illustrate them individually by examples, would occupy more space than our limits will permit.—We must, therefore, confine ourselves to a few general observations.

The “primitive idea”, annexed to any word, is the idea, which originally belonged to it, and it is opposed to that, which is “derived” or “acquired.” The “primary idea” is that, which the word chiefly implies, and is opposed to “secondary.” The primary conception, though frequently, is not universally, the same with the primitive import of the word, the latter sometimes gradually sinking into a mere secondary conception, and sometimes being entirely repudiated. This dissolution of the original connection between the sign and the thing signified takes place, most frequently in those cases, in which the word has acquired a figurative meaning. The primitive import of the words *Nuptus*, *Animus*, *Hostis*, and of *Curb*, *Belong*, *Edify*, is now entirely supplanted by the figurative acceptance. In general, however, we find the primitive from the established principles of his art furnish no argument whatever against the principles themselves.

tive meaning, if it does not continue to constitute the principal import of the term, entering as a component part of the complex idea which it denotes. Thus, in the words *Moliri*, *Crinis*, *Cernere*, and *Prevent*, *Farthing*, *Cheap*, *Epistle*, the primitive meaning of each, though not the primary idea, implied by it, still constitutes part of its signification.

The secondary idea depends on a variety of circumstances. It is sometimes associated, because the term, in its etymological signification, implies it. Thus, *asinus*, denotes “an ass”; *onager* (*ex ovos et aypos*) “a wild ass”; *balneum*, “a bath of any kind”; *thermæ* (ἀ θερμαι,) “warm baths”; *anteire*, “To go before, at any distance”; *præire* (*ex præ* (παραι) *et ire*), “To go immediately before”, implying propinquity; *exercitus*, “an army”; or “men trained for warfare”, *exerciti*; *agmen* from *agere*, αγειν, “a body of men on march”, or “in motion.” Sometimes its association is determined by the moral and physical circumstances, in which the people are placed. An object, which in one country may be regarded with respect, may in another be viewed with contempt; what is here agreeable, may be there offensive—what awakens in one people the emotion of love, may in another excite the sentiment of hatred.—And whatever emotion or feeling the object creates, with the same emotion is its name very generally associated. In one language, also, we find a subject named from its form, in another from its matter; in one from its place, in another from its office; in one from its colour, in

another from its use ; in one from its chief property, or quality, in another from an accidental circumstance belonging to it. All these diversities, more or less, affect the secondary ideas attached to words in different languages, though they express one and the same subject, and denote one and the same primary conception.

It is to be observed also, that the secondary idea is, like the primary, liable to change. Of this it would be easy to produce a variety of examples. The words *Parson*, *Dame*, *Lawyer*, once terms of respect, have, the two first especially, been degraded to the implication of something contemptible. Sometimes a fastidious delicacy, for the origin of which it is not always easy to account, rejects a term once reputable, annexing to it an idea of vulgarity, or indecency, not originally belonging to it, nor attached to the correspondent term in any other language. Were a modern fastidious translator to render the curse pronounced on the serpent, *In ventrem ambulabis*, it would not be surprising if he cautiously avoided saying, “ You shall walk on your belly.”

The secondary idea is not only liable to change, but in many cases, especially where the *etymon*, to which it was attached, has become obsolete, or where the affinity between the root and the derivative ceases to be known, is entirely dismissed. The word *Clock*, for example, no longer suggests the idea of clicking, though from this accident belonging to it, this piece of mechanism derived its name.

It is an opinion, delivered by Mr. Tooke, that “a regard to the individual etymology of a word will conduct us to its intrinsic meaning, and the cause of its application.” We cannot suppose, that by “intrinsic meaning,” the author intended to signify *the primitive, or etymological signification*; for his proposition would thus be purely identical, as far at least as that signification is concerned. If by *intrinsic meaning*, be understood the real, inherent, and inseparable meaning, we apprehend, that his doctrine is founded in error. That the primitive sense of every word is to be learned by investigating its etymological import, is a self-evident truth; but the primitive sense, and its present acceptation, may be so different, as not to bear to each other the most remote resemblance; and a knowledge of merely the etymological meaning, may be incapable of conducting us to the cause of its real and current signification. *Κωμικος* and *paganus* may be considered as originally synonymous; yet no ideas can be more different than those suggested by *comic* and *pagan*. Nor should we have been able either to deduce the meaning of the word *pagan* from that of its etymon, or to explain the cause of its signification, had we not been informed, that when Christianity became the established religion of the Roman empire, the Christians preferred living in cities and towns, while unbelievers inhabited the country, or provincial villages *. Who by

* Brotier has assigned a different origin for the derived meaning of *paganus*. See *Tac. Hist.* 1. 53. not. “Paganī di-

consulting etymology or analogy would imagine, that the verbs *to tie* and *to loose* have contrary meanings, and that *to untie* and *unloose*, have the same significations? Nor would *Kadash*, in Hebrew (sanctificavit) ever lead us to conclude, that *kedeshah* signified “a harlot.” *

Instead therefore of saying, that a regard to etymology will conduct us to the intrinsic meaning of any word, and the *cause of its application*, it would be more correct to say, that the circumstances of the subject, at the time of the application, explain the cause, why the term, in its primitive import, was applied to it; but that without an acquaintance with these circumstances, the cause of the application can only be conjectured, but not perfectly ascertained. The doctrine of Mr. Tooke can be admitted to be true in those cases only, in which a connection necessarily or universally exists between the primitive meaning of the word, and the distinguishing or prominent character of the subject, to which it is applied. But, where this connection is not necessary or universal, but casual, temporary, or local, the cause of the application is not to be learned from the mere etymological import. *Paganus* means *a villager*. Does a knowledge simply of this fact explain the cause, why the word *Pagan* means *a heathen*? I apprehend

cuntur ii, qui non militant ita paganos dicimus, qui Deo non militant.” The fact, stated in the text above, affords a sufficient, and far more natural, explanation.

* See *Campbell's Preliminary Dissertations*, p. 116.

not ; unless it could be shown that there exists a necessary connection between *heathenism*, and a rural or provincial life.

But, if etymology were an infallible guide not only to the primitive, but also to the derivative and now perhaps primary meaning of any term, still it could determine nothing concerning the accessory idea or ideas, which usage may have associated with that term. As the habits of a people are changed, and as their sentiments, moral, political, and religious, vary, the ideas, conjoined with many words, must undergo a correspondent alteration. And, as almost all the words in every language are complex in their signification, or, in the language of logicians, express complex ideas, it is not surprising if we find few, if any, of these words, denoting precisely the same assemblage of conceptions. Of these combinations one may express more, and another fewer ideas, while each denote the same principal notion. The things signified may agree in use, and differ in form, and conversely ; as *pillar* and *column*, *chamber* and *room*. They may agree in denoting the same act ; but the one may imply indifference, and the other criminality, as to *kill*, and to *murder*. The one may signify the emotion simply, and the other the expression also of that emotion, as *joy*, *gladness*. They may agree in denoting the same act, as arising from the same impulse, and yet differ in expressing its degree, as *detraction*, *defamation*. They may agree in signifying the same profession, but with different powers, as

Deacon, Priest. They may agree in expressing the same temper, but the one may signify it to be natural, and the other artificial, as *gentle, tame*; the one as temporary, the other habitual, as *angry, passionate*. In short, when we consider the infinite modifications of which human thought is susceptible, and how variously ideas are combined or grouped under different names, though perhaps in each combination the leading notions are the same; when we consider also the changes, to which all living languages are liable, we need not be surprised, that there should be few, if any, synonymous words in any language; and that the primitive and primary, as well as the acquired and accessory ideas, annexed to words, are liable to alteration.

These general observations may suffice to shew, that the secondary ideas attached to complex terms, expressive of the same primary sense, originate from a variety of different causes; and that the associations must be as various, as arbitrary usage, with the physical and moral circumstances of the people, may necessarily render them. Hence nothing is more common, than to find two correspondent terms in two different languages, agreeing in their primary, and differing in their secondary ideas; or one perhaps denoting the principal idea only, the other annexing to it a subordinate conception. Hence arises the difficulty of the translator; hence also the imperfection of all translation. For, if the language, which the translator employs, fails to furnish him with words precisely equivalent to those in the original, he is

compelled either to content himself with general terms, and to exhibit merely the leading ideas of the original, or to express more than his author intended. Thus, either his translation is necessarily defective, presenting only the prominent features of his author; or, if he employ a special for a general term, his translation is censurable, not merely as imperfect, but as erroneous and false.—The Latins, for example, had *Pœna* and *Supplicium*, the former to denote any kind of punishment, whether mild or severe, whether public or private; the latter to express punishment inflicted by law, and therefore implying a degree of severity. We have only the generic term Punishment to denote both. In translating, therefore, the special term *Supplicium* by Punishment, we omit the expression of the secondary idea. If we render “*Ostentat cicatrices suas,*” *Ter. Eun.* iii. 2, 29, by the generic term “Shews,” we suppress a prominent feature in the character of Thraso, an ostentatious display being implied in the original. On the other hand we find, that there are numberless words in English, which are incapable of a precise Latin translation. If we attempt, for example, to render into Latin the English words, *Cower, Squat, Queer, Lumber, Boggy, Signal*, and many others, which might be specified, we shall find words significant of the primary idea, but none, which express the secondary also. Every Englishman understands the difference between “He made a *sign*,” and “He made a *signal*,” but the Latins have only one expression to denote both, “*Signum*

dedit." *Servitus*, and "Servitude," agree in denoting a state of subjection to the will of a master ; but the former denotes a slavish and involuntary subjection, the latter, what may be termed a "willing bondage." The complex idea implied by *Servitude*, the Latins had no term to express.

Before we quit this part of the subject, it may be observed, as it has been already hinted, that there are certain words in every language, to which are attached ideas of vulgarity, indelicacy, obscenity, meanness, and contempt, while the correspondent terms in another language, are associated with no similar conception*. Hence, if we translate any term of the former character, by the correspondent term of the latter, we strip the expression of its secondary idea ; and in cases, where the author intended to be satirical, or to excite disgust in the mind of his reader, we defeat the purpose, for which the term is employed. If, on the other hand, we translate one of the latter by the correspondent word of the former character, we degrade the expression, and do injustice to the author, by conveying an offensive idea, which he did not intend to express. Should we render, as I have heard it rendered, "Patrem absentem extimesco," *Ter.* "I fear my absent dad," we should express a sentiment of contempt not warranted by the original : on the other hand, the English word is incapable of being

* "Sed cum idem frequentissime plura significant, quod συωνυμια vocatur, jam sunt aliis alia honestiora, sublimiora, nitidiora, jucundiora." *Quint. Inst. lib. viii. cap. 3.*

correctly translated into Latin, the term *Pater* being a respectful appellation. Were we to attempt to render the line of Spenser,

“ And the rude *wench* her answer'd nought at all,”

we should find no term in Latin expressive of the subject, with the idea of contempt denoted by the English appellation. In vain also, should we search for terms precisely equivalent to the words *Prog*, *Pat*, *Pellmell*, *Flam*, *Pother*, *Brainpan*, and many others of a similar cast, admissible in burlesque and low comedy, the Latin words *Cibaria*, *Aptus*, *Confertim*, *Fraus*, or *Fabulæ*, *Turba*, *Cranium*, having nothing of that vulgarity, which belongs to the English terms.

Having now briefly endeavoured to explain the causes, which render it impossible, in many cases, for the translator to express the precise meaning of the author, I proceed next to consider whence it is, that translation is, in some instances, not merely imperfect, but impracticable.

The language of every people is necessarily adapted to their wants and conveniences. Keeping pace with their moral and intellectual improvement, it is more or less copious, as their stock of ideas is more or less enlarged.—Whatever idea they have occasion to communicate, they must have a name to express it; whatever has not been perceived or imagined, cannot become an object of thought, or require a sign to denote it. The visible objects around us,

of which we have occasion to speak, are some natural, others artificial, some common to every nation, others peculiar to one, or a few.

The great productions of nature are open to the observation of all men ; and in every language, therefore, there are names to express them. And, though different nations may entertain different conceptions of their qualities and properties, their various names may be justly regarded as precisely synonymous.— Thus ἥλιος, *Sol*, “ Sun,” are equivalent words. So also, ποταμός. *Fluvius*, and “ River.” — δένδρον, *Arbor*, and “ Tree.” The names of the most obvious productions of nature have probably been coeval with the very infancy of speech ; and they are correctly translateable from one language into any other.

There are some productions of nature, not common to every country ; but peculiar to one, or a few places. The people, among whom they exist, have names to denote them ; but among other nations, by whom their existence is not known, no correspondent appellations can obtain. Their names, therefore, are not always translateable. When a knowledge of any one of these is first introduced into any nation, it is usual for the people to adopt the same name, as has been assigned to it by those, among whom it exists, or through whose medium its existence has been first communicated ; thus, ελεφας, *Elephas*, “ Elephant.” The term, in process of time, becomes naturalized, and is justly considered as precisely equivalent to the original name.

Works of art, and mechanical productions, are various in different countries. The Greeks had their *Clepsydræ*; the Romans their *Balistæ*, and *Catapultæ*. We have nothing which resembles these; their names, therefore, are not translatable into our language; nor, as we have rarely occasion to mention them, have the original terms been naturalized. On the other hand, the clocks, watches, and artillery, of modern times were entirely unknown to the ancient nations; and there are, therefore, no names equivalent to these in any of the languages of antiquity.—Those artificial productions, which are common to two countries, have names in the language of each, which are either precisely, or nearly equivalent, as, *Domus*, *Navis*, *Plaustrum*, *Mensa*, “House,” “Ship,” “Waggon,” “Table.” Though the correspondent Latin and English terms do not express precisely the same combination of ideas; yet the difference is so immaterial, while the respective purposes of the things themselves are strictly identical, that the terms may with propriety, be regarded as respectively equivalent.

But in all languages there are not only complex terms, to denote those combinations of ideas, which are copies of real existences, but there are also complex names, to express complex ideas, purely of the mind's own combination. These associations are determined by the conveniences, the necessities, the modes of thinking and acting, or briefly, by the moral and intellectual habits of the people. Hence it seldom happens, that these names, some of which belong to

what have been termed simple modes, and others to mixed modes, can be correctly translated from one language into another. Nay, the celebrated Mr. Locke affirms, that not one in ten of the names of mixed modes can be truly rendered into a foreign language. To the names of these modes belong the names of offices, ranks, laws, crimes, weights, coins and measures, usages and forms of government, civil and religious. The names of these denote certain assemblages of ideas, which a people have occasion to conceive, and to express. The simple ideas have no natural connection among themselves. The mind, for the purpose of convenience, combines them; and the name, as Mr. Locke observes, gives them an artificial connection, and knits them together. The idea of Father, for example, and that of Murder have no natural connection. The Romans, however, combined them, and formed the word *Parricidium*, to express that combination. We have adopted the same combination, and transferred into our language the original name. There subsists no natural connection among the several ideas of consuls, conquered kings, arches, music, soldiers, chariots, captives, and solemn marching; yet the Romans combined these ideas, and several others equally unconnected, into one complex idea, knitting them together by the word *Triumphus*, significant of the whole. We have also adopted the term, and have the combination in idea, though not the spectacle in reality. On the other hand, many combinations exist among us, to which

they were entire strangers; such are those, implied by the terms, *Burglary, Sacrament, Sanctification, Absolution.*

In some cases, the combination is entirely peculiar to one people, nothing among any other, in the least degree resembling it. In such instances, the name is incapable of translation, and a barbarism must necessarily be adopted, unless a short periphrasis can be found to express it. When a resemblance, approaching to identity, subsists between two complex ideas, as obtaining in two different nations, the names, though not precisely equivalent, may be rendered by each other: the translation, however, cannot be regarded as perfectly correct. Where there is a less degree of resemblance, it becomes frequently a question of considerable difficulty, whether the name should be translated, or transferred. These observations it may be necessary to illustrate by a few examples.

It has been remarked, that the names of arbitrary combinations of simple ideas, and the names of mixed modes, are not translatable, unless they happen to be common to the two nations, whose languages are in question.—In vain should we search for English words equivalent to *Terminalia, Nonæ, Idus, Consul, Tribunus, Talentum, Denarius, Triumphus.* We have no festivals, no divisions of time, no offices, no coins, no processions, which bear the least resemblance to these; and, therefore, there are no single words, proper to our language, expressive of

the same meaning with the words here adduced. In such cases, one or other of these alternatives is presented to our choice, either to transfer into our language the Latin terms as they stand in the original, assigning them, perhaps, an English termination, or to admit a periphrasis descriptive of the things themselves. The former of these expedients is very generally, and, indeed, very properly adopted. Accordingly we have admitted into our language the words *Consul, Tribune, Nones, Ides, Talent, Denarius, Triumph.*

In like manner we should inquire in vain, for single words in Latin expressive of many usages, arts, coins, measures, and institutions, which obtain in this country, as “Easter,” “Michaelmas,” “Clergyman,” “Chancellor,” “Monday,” “Shilling,” “Guinea.” The things denoted by these names had no existence among the Romans, and they had therefore no words to express them. In such cases we have the choice of latinizing the English word, or adopting a periphrasis descriptive of the thing signified.

In cases, as it has been already observed, where there subsists a pretty close resemblance between any office, observance, usage, or institution, in one country and that of another, the names in the two languages may not improperly be mutually translated. The only difficulty is to determine with precision, what degree of resemblance is necessary, to justify the translator, in designating the one, by the name of the other. Thus, though the following offices and insti-

tutions do not precisely correspond, yet there subsists perhaps a sufficient degree of resemblance, to justify us in rendering “Treasurer” by *Quæstor*; “A member of Parliament” by *Senator*, “Parliament” itself by *Senatus*, “A Beadle” or “Sergeant” by *Lictor*, or *Apparitor*. By this procedure we avoid the introduction of barbarisms; but this evil is perhaps more than balanced, by the risk of seducing our reader into a conclusion, that the subjects are precisely identical, because the names are employed as mutually equivalent. Hence many translators, preferring barbarism and obscurity to pure Latin diction, when it is likely to produce a misconception of the subject, have not scrupled to latinize the English names, giving, for example, *Parliamentum* for “Parliament,” *Bedellus* for a “Beadle,” *Baronetus* for a “Baronet,” *Acra* for an “Acre.” Neither of these modes is wholly unobjectionable, and it is sometimes difficult to decide, which should be preferred, it being impossible to establish any correct and precise rule, for determining that degree of likeness or disparity, which shall justify either a translation, or a retention of the original word. In respect to names of offices, a very learned and ingenious critic* recommends, that, when “the resemblances preponderate,” the name should be translated; but, when “the peculiarities preponderate,” the original name should be retained. This rule must be acknowledged to be precise; but, as the learned

* Campbell’s Preliminary Dissertations.

author himself confesses, it is not at all times easy to be applied, it being impossible in many cases to decide, whether the resemblances, or the peculiarities, be the more numerous, or the more important. Besides, I must acknowledge, it appears to me somewhat doubtful, whether a bare preponderance of similarity should justify translation; for in many instances, the peculiarities, though in weight somewhat inferior to the resemblances, may notwithstanding be of such magnitude, that a translation of the name might lead the reader into considerable error. In such instances, it appears to me much better to retain the original name. At the same time, I am perfectly aware, that this practice is liable to one great objection, namely, that to a person, unacquainted with the observances and institutions of that people, to whose language the original term belongs, the barbarism is wholly unintelligible. But is it not better, that the reader should remain ignorant of the signification of the word, or should be obliged to inquire into its meaning, than that he should be led into a misconception of the subject, while he flatters himself he correctly apprehends its nature? An inquisitive reader will naturally seek for information; and if there be others, who will not take the trouble to inquire, still it must be acknowledged, that ignorance is always preferable to error.

I am also aware, that barbarisms, especially those of that class, to which the present question refers, vitiate the purity of a language, and give a translation a motley and semibarbarous appearance. Even, when

assimilated by termination to the language, into which we are translating, they have still, it must be owned, somewhat of an unseemly and exotic aspect. Familiarity, however, serves to reconcile us to them ; and there are numberless words in our language transferred from the Greek and Latin, which have long ceased to be regarded as barbarisms. In many cases, indeed, there can be no question, because the translator has no alternative, but to retain the original term. What office, for example, amongst us, bears even the most remote analogy to the *Augur*, the *Pul-larius*, the *Dictator* amongst the Romans ? In such cases, translation by an equivalent term is absolutely impracticable. And even in those instances, as it has been already observed, in which we find some office, usage, or institution, which bears a resemblance to that, which is denoted by the Latin word, if we employ the terms as equivalent, we incur the risk of leading the reader into a misconception of the subject. Were we, for example, to render *Tribunus Plebis* by “a city deputy”, we should convey a very imperfect, and, in some respects, a false idea of the office. In some instances, indeed, the error may be of considerable consequence. We render the Latin term *Jug-erum*, by the English word “Acre.” It will not be doubted, however, that when we translate the Licinian or Agrarian law, “Nequis plus quingenta jugera agri possideret”, *Liv.* vi. 35. “That no person should possess more than fifty acres of land”, an Englishman and a Roman would form different estimates of the

quantity, when it is considered, that thirty-one English acres are nearly equal to fifty Roman, taking the Roman foot at 11. 6 of our inches. Hence, as I have remarked, some translators have ventured to employ the word *Acra*, to denote an English acre.

Again. If we recur to a periphrasis, we not only impair the strength and the vivacity of the expression, but also perplex the reader by a multiplicity of words. Who would not prefer *Dictator*, to “A person chosen in cases of imminent danger, in whom, for a limited time, was vested the sovereign authority of the state”? Can any barbarism be so offensive, as would be the constant repetition of this periphrasis? Who, for the same reason, would not prefer *Parochus* for a “Parish priest”, rather than adopt the tedious periphrasis, which would be necessary to express it in Latin, and which, after all, would fail to convey to a Roman a correct idea of the office?

But periphrasis is in general not only hostile to strength, to vivacity, and frequently even to perspicuity itself; but it likewise often leads an ordinary reader into erroneous conceptions. Were we to render the following passage, “*Præmium, libero impunitatem ejus rei et sestertia ducenta decrevere*”, (*Sall. B. C. Cap. 31.*) “They decreed as a reward, one thousand six hundred and fourteen pounds eleven shillings and eight pence”; it might impress the mere English reader with a belief, that the Romans were wonderfully scrupulous and exact, in estimating the merit of public services, since they descended in their

rewards to the accuracy of pence ; or that there was something very peculiar in the present case, which required this extraordinary minuteness, in specifying the sum. On the other hand, were we to attempt to render English money by Roman coins, we should find it, in some cases, impracticable, if perfect accuracy were required ; and in most instances the translation would, by reason of the fractional parts, be insufferably awkward. I observe, at the same time, that, where perfect accuracy is not requisite, and where the given sum, or quantity in English, corresponds pretty nearly to a certain number of Roman coins, weights or measures, translation may then be properly adopted. “ Three acres”, for example, may, with a very trifling error, be rendered by *Quinque jugera*.

In the preceding account of untranslatable terms, I omitted to mention certain names of relationship. We have in our language the generic term, *Relative* or *Relation*, to denote relationship either by consanguinity or by affinity : but we have no specific names for *Agnatus*, “ a relation by the paternal line” ; *Cognatus*, “ a relation by the maternal line”, and *Affinis*, “ a relation by marriage.” We have the terms, “ *Uncle*” and “ *Aunt*”, to express, the one “ a father’s” or “ a mother’s brother”, the other “ a father’s” or “ a mother’s sister.” The Romans, however, had a distinct name for each. “ An Uncle” or “ Father’s brother” was called *Patruus*, “ A mother’s brother” *Avunculus*, “ An Aunt” the father’s sister *Amita*, “ An Aunt” the mother’s sister *Matertera*.

Our term *cousin* denotes either the son or daughter of an uncle, or the son or daughter of an aunt. The son or daughter of a father's brother, the Romans expressed by *patrueelis*, when it was necessary to distinguish the sexes, by *frater patrueelis* and *soror patrueelis*. *Consobrinus* and *matrueelis* denoted the son of a mother's sister. They likewise had distinct names for the degrees of lineal consanguinity, to a greater extent, both ascending and descending, than we have; thus, they had the terms *Pater*, *Avus*, *Proavus*, *Abavus*, *Atavus*, and *Tritavus*, in retrograde succession; and counting forwards, they had *Filius*, *Nepos*, *Pronepos*, *Abnepos*, *Trinepos*. We have "Father", "Grandfather", "Son", "Grandson." On the other hand, there are certain degrees of relationship among us, for which the Romans had no correspondent distinct names. The English terms, therefore, are not translatable into the Latin language, but by periphrasis. To express "a brother's or a sister's son", we say, "nephew"; "a brother's or sister's daughter" we call "niece." The former they expressed by *Fratri filius*, *Sororis filius*; the latter by *Fratri filia*, *Sororis filia*.

From the preceding observations, it must be sufficiently manifest, that, as the combinations of ideas are as various, as the moral and physical circumstances, in which we are placed, and as this diversity must necessarily affect the language which we speak, giving birth to terms in one country, to which there are none, in any degree correspondent, or none precisely equivalent in another, all translation must be in

some measure imperfect, and in certain cases impracticable. Hence may appear the difficulty of the translator, whose duty it is to exhibit a correct and faithful transcript of his author. When the language, which he employs, fails in furnishing him with equivalent expressions, the selection of such terms, as are nearest to the sense and spirit of the original, requires no common share of critical sagacity.

In connection with the principles, which we have endeavoured to explain, it may be further observed, that not only do languages differ, one from another, in regard to individual terms, but that there is also a diversity in their general character, each exhibiting the national habits and intellectual condition of the people, by whom it is spoken.

Words are signs of thought; they are the exponents of our feelings, our perceptions, our ideas. They take their character, therefore, from the minds, whose sentiments they indicate. All those terms, which we employ, to denote the characters of style, strictly belong to thinking and its modes. Whatever affects the mind, or its intellectual habits, has a correspondent influence over our modes of expression. Our feelings, our sentiments, our associations, and habits of thought are, in a great degree, governed by conversation, by reading, and by the prevailing cast of mind in the people, among whom we live. Hence chiefly arises national character.—Similar habits of thinking among a whole people lay the foundation of national style; and so necessary is the connection be-

tween them, that we may reason from our knowledge of the latter, to the character of the former, with moral certainty. There is no person conversant in the languages of the Greeks and Romans, if he possess a moderate share of penetration, who cannot read in the style of each the intellectual and moral habits of the two nations. Every country has a language suited to its wants, and conveniences; it has also a peculiarity of diction, originating in its peculiar temper and genius. One language is familiar, another is stately; one breathes a spirit of submission, another assumes the tone of boldness and independence; one abounds in expressions of compliment, another is remarkable for honest simplicity; one is the language of war, another of love; one is harsh and rugged, another soft and harmonious. This diversity, in the genius of different languages, creates a correspondent difficulty, in rendering a sentiment from one tongue into another, so as to preserve the tone and manner of its author, and the character of the garb, in which he has clothed it. Had Terence himself left behind him a translation of Aristophanes's "Plutus," his version would have been deficient in the ease, the freedom, and the familiarity of the original. The stateliness of the Roman language, ill adapted to comic sentiment, could not possibly, in the hands of any master, have been made to bend, so as to assume the pliability, and easy freedom, which characterize the style of the Grecian dramatist. And, though the compli-

mentary phraseologies, common among us, and peculiarly characteristic of the French language, may be regarded as mere forms of civility, and certainly not to be literally understood, yet, considered as mere expressions of politeness and condescension, they are incapable of translation into the languages of antiquity. Nothing certainly can be less controvertible, than that the Greeks and Romans were utter strangers to that servility of spirit, which originally dictated these modish and complimentary phrases.

But, though an identity in laws, manners, and general habits of thinking, must produce a correspondent similarity in modes of expression, and though these causes have a uniform and universal influence, yet they are partially counteracted by the particular cast of mind, and the peculiar circumstances, in which different individuals are placed.—Hence arises that diversity of style, which we cannot fail to observe, in different authors of one and the same country. And as there are marked and predominant features, which distinguish the style of one country from that of another; so, on the contrary, we find, that similar peculiarities of genius, and mental constitution, exist in different individuals of different nations, and give birth to a very perceptible similarity in their modes of expression. And, when two congenial minds in different countries attempt the task of mutual translation, it is in such cases, that the nearest approach to a perfect delineation of the author may be expected, the sentiment,

the spirit, and the manner of the original being preserved, as far as the languages can be made to harmonize.

To this principle, as is justly observed by an ingenious writer, may be ascribed the excellence of Rowe's translation of Lucan, and several of Swift's imitations of Horace*. But the prosecution of this subject would occupy more space, than our limits will admit. Suffice it to observe, that there is a national style, or mode of expression, created by national habits of thought, which it is impossible to copy with perfect precision into the language of a people of different moral and intellectual character.

Having offered these general observations on the nature and the difficulty of translation, that the reader may clearly perceive, what is denied him, and what permitted him to accomplish, I shall conclude with suggesting a few plain and general rules, adapted to the capacity of the junior reader, and regarding rather the mechanism, than the philosophy, of translation.

CHAPTER V.

OF ANGLO-LATIN TRANSLATION.

It has been already recommended to the reader, carefully to avoid all barbarisms. He has also been ad-

* Dr. Burrowes. See *Transactions of the R. I. Academy*, vol. v.

monished not to employ any Latin word, in a sense foreign to classic usage. This error frequently occurs in modern Latin. We have *Communiter*, for example, used for *Vulgo*, *Asserere* for *Affirmare*, and *Iterum* for *Vicissim*.

The first admonition I would now offer, is carefully to avoid transferring into Latin any idiomatical expression in his own language. We say, in English, for example, "To supply any one with any thing," but he must not say, *Suppeditare aliquem aliqua re*—but *aliquid alicui*. In English, we say, "To communicate any thing to any one," but the Latins said, *Communicare aliquid cum aliquo*. We say, "All of you are," the Latins said, *Vos omnes estis*. We say, "Was it you?" they said, *Tun' eras?* We say, "What a glorious day!" they said, *Quam pulchra dies!* "Some young fellows of us met," *Aliquot adolescentuli coimus*. "How many are there of you?" *Quot estis*. "Who is here?"—"It is Chremes," *Sum Chremes*.

2dly. He should translate phrases into phrases, and not literally. We say, for example, "I take it in good part." This must not be rendered, *In bona parte capio*, but *Boni consulo*—"On purpose," not *In proposito*, but *De industria*—"He betook himself to his heels," not *Se in calces recepit*, but *In pedes se conjecit*.—"It is worth your while," not *Tempore dignum est*, or *Temporis pretium est*, but *Operæ pretium est*.—"Go to the gallows," not *Vade ad patibulum*, but *Abi in malam crucem*.

“ To give judgment in a cause,” not *dare judicium*, which means “ to grant a trial,” but *sententiam ferre*. The reader must almost intuitively perceive the necessity of observing this rule. He would smile, were he to hear a Roman translate, *Rem acu tetigisti*, “ You have touched the thing with the needle,” instead of “ You have hit the nail on the head.” Nor would his risibility be less excited, if he should hear him translate *Scapulas perdidisti*, “ I have lost my shoulder blades,” or *Feci stipendium*, “ I made pay.” It is possible, indeed, the Roman might, in the true spirit of some modern critics, attempt to justify these translations. He might tell us, perhaps, that *Perdere* generally signifies to “ Lose,” and that the English verb frequently denotes not absolute loss, but harm or injury sustained, as when we say of a person smitten with love, “ He lost his heart,” and, therefore, by analogy we may say of a person, whose back was smitten with a rod, that “ He lost his shoulder blades.” He might, perhaps, tell us also, that as we say, “ To make a fortune,” it is allowable also to say, “ He made pay.” Such an argument as this might appear to him sufficiently conclusive ; but, addressed to an Englishman, it could only produce a smile. It is to be remembered, then, that we are guilty of a similar error, if we translate a vernacular phrase into a foreign language, word for word. Hence it follows—

3dly. That we ought not to employ any phrase in Latin, unless positively sanctioned by classic au-

thority. We find analogy sometimes pleaded in favour of phrases, which do not occur in any good Latin writer. But analogy, it is to be remembered, is always an uncertain and dangerous guide. We have no evidence, by which to ascertain, what was, and what was not, deemed by the Romans good Latin, but classic usage; and any phrase, how agreeable soever to analogy, if not found in a classic writer, we have reason to reject. Nothing but the express authority of a Latin author, who uses the identical phrase, can justify us in employing it. Cicero says, (in Verrem,) *ad dextram sedere*, “to sit at the right hand,” but it would be an erroneous conclusion to infer, that we can say *ad mensam sedere*, “to sit at table.”—What should we think of a foreigner, who should say, “He made hatred to the lady,” and contend that it was good English, being strictly agreeable to analogy, because it is allowable to say, “He made love to the lady.” Would such an argument serve to prove, that the expression is English? Surely not.—Much less would it convince a native of this country, that it belonged to the language, which he was daily in the habit of reading, and hearing.

4thly. When we use a Latin phrase, it is indispensably necessary, that we attend to the strict and literal meaning of the terms, of which the phrase is composed. A constant regard to this rule will secure the Latin writer from many errors and inaccuracies, which he would be otherwise prone to commit. In illustration of this rule, let us take the

following example—*Dare pœnas*, means “To suffer punishment.” A superficial attention to the meaning of the terms, might incline the translator to imagine, that the phrase signifies “To give punishment,” or “To punish.” The very reverse, however, is the fact. The expression strictly denotes, “to give satisfaction,” “to give, or make, an atonement.” *Dedit patri criminis pœnas*, means “He made an atonement,” or “gave satisfaction to his father for the crime;” that is, “He was punished by his father.” Agreeably to this construction of the terms, *Petere pœnas*, means “To demand satisfaction,” “to require an atonement,” or “to inflict punishment.” Hence it is evident, that, if the translator, from inattention to the literal signification of the terms, and misled by the English phraseology, were to render “He received the punishment due to his crime,” by *Pœnas meritas accepit*, instead of *Pœnas meritas dedit*, he would be guilty of an egregious error; and, as far as his own expression were admissible, would denote the very reverse of that, which he intended to signify.

5thly. In translating, it is necessary to observe, that tropes and figures cannot always be transferred from one language into another; in other words, the figurative terms cannot, in every instance, be literally translated. For example, the Latins said, *Ferro occisus est*, to denote, “He was slain by a sword”; but we cannot transfer the synecdoche, and say, in English, “He was slain by iron.” To explain the

origin of tropes and figures, as partly created by necessity, partly adopted from convenience, and partly introduced as subservient to beauty, elegance, vivacity, and strength, would lead us too far from our present purpose. Suffice it to observe, that tropes and figures being founded in the relation which one object of thought bears to another, and the laws of mental association being the same in all men, a very close resemblance exists between different languages, in respect to the figurative employment of words. Hence a term, figuratively used in one language, frequently admits a literal translation into another, without violating the figure. Of this fact, it would be easy to adduce a great variety of examples. We shall content ourselves, however, with the few following:—

We say, in English, “The pillar of the family,” denoting, by metaphor, the person by whom the family is supported. “I have read Virgil,” where *Virgil* by metonymy is put for “the works of Virgil.” “He drank the cup,” where, by the same figure, the *Cup* is put for the liquor, which it contained. “War-like Rome;” where, by metonymy also, the city is put for its inhabitants. “The keel plows the sea,” the *keel*, a part of the ship, being used by synecdoche to express the whole. “Hannibal was conquered,” where *Hannibal* is put for the Carthaginian army. “They drink the Tigris,” the whole, by the same figure, being taken for a part.—We say also, “The angry sea,” “The tide rages,” “A tenacious memory,” “A fruitful genius.”—These expressions all admit a

literal translation into Latin, the correspondent terms having, in both languages, the same literal and figurative acceptation; thus, “*Columen familiæ.*” *Ter.* “*Virgilium legi.*” “*Poculum bibit.*” *Tibul.* “*Ferox Roma.*” *Hor.* “*Carina sulcat.*” *Virg.* “*Hannibal victus est.*” *Liv.* “*Tigrim bibunt.*” *Virg.* “*Iratum mare.*” *Hor.* “*Æstus furit.*” *Virg.* “*Tenax memoria.*” *Quint.* “*Ingenium ferax.*” *Cic.*

In these, and numberless other examples, which might be adduced, the two languages concur in respect to the literal, and the figurative, acceptation of the terms. But this coincidence does not universally obtain. Were we, for example, to render *Obtusa pectora*, “Blunt breasts.” *Acutum caput*, “A sharp head.” *Ferro flammaque*, “With iron and flame.” *Calix fœcundus*, “A fruitful cup;” our translations would be obscure, if not completely unintelligible. On the other hand, a figurative expression, in English, will not always admit a literal translation into the Latin language. We say of a person, endued with great affection and benevolence, “He has a warm heart;” but were we to render this by *Calidum cor*, we should convey a very different idea from that, which the original expresses. The word *sail*, in English, is, by synecdoche, frequently employed to denote the whole ship—and we say in our language, “I perceive two sail,” or “three sail.” But can this be rendered in Latin by *Duo vela*, *Tria vela*? Certainly not. The term *velum* denotes simply the “sail,” or “canvass,” and is never figuratively em-

ployed to signify the whole ship. Or, to borrow another illustration from sea language, we may say, in English, "All hands were on board," where the term *Hands* is by a synecdoche put for *Mariners*; but in Latin we must render it by *Omnes nautæ*, and not *Omnes manus*.

6thly. Ambiguities in construction should be carefully avoided. If we say, *Mihi persuadendum est tuo fratri*, it is impossible to ascertain, whether the meaning be, "I must persuade your brother," or "Your brother must persuade me." When Phormio says, "Quot homines me deverberasse censes?" *Ter. Ph. ii. 1, 13*, the context only can explain, whether he means, that he had been the agent, or the person, who suffered. The former ambiguity might be removed, by saying, *Mihi tuum fratrem persuadere oportet*, or *Me tuo fratri persuadere oportet*, according to the sense intended. Ambiguities of the latter kind are generally prevented by turning the verb into the passive voice—thus, *Ab hominibus me deverberatum esse*, or *Homines a me deverberatos esse censes?* The latter is the meaning intended by Phormio.

7thly. In English, there is a vast number of words, which we have transferred from the Latin language, or some, perhaps, more immediately from the French, assigning them an English termination. Thus, *Virtue, Vice, Temperance, Fortitude, Piety*, are evidently of Latin extraction. That these are precisely equivalent to the terms *Virtus, Vitium, Temperan-*

tia, *Fortitudo*, *Pietas*, the young scholar is very naturally apt to conclude. This is an error, against which it is necessary most particularly to caution him. These words are not respectively equivalent, the Latin terms having all of them a more extensive signification than the correspondent English words. *Temperantia*, for example, includes *Continentia*, *Clementia*, *Modestia*, whereas the word *Temperance* is confined to the government of appetite. See *Cic. de Invent. lib. ii.* *Indolentia* in Latin means "freedom from pain," *doloris vacuitas*. *Indolence* denotes inactivity, or listlessness. In the Latin acceptation it is now obsolete. The reader, therefore, should bear in mind, that, though a term may be transferred from one language into another, this furnishes no certain evidence that it has been adopted, or is now used, in its primitive import.

8thly. The translator must attend to precision in the choice of his words; employing such as express neither more nor less, than the sentiment intended. If we say, for example, *Iracundus* for *Iratus*, we denote too much; the former indicating an habitual temper, or disposition, the latter a transient state. If we employ *Credere* for *Pro certo habere*, we say too little; the former implying simple belief, on whatever authority it may be founded, the latter a firm conviction, established, as we conceive, on irrefragable evidence. If we use *Combussit* for *Incendit*, we express too much; if we use them conversely, we say too little.

Precise equivalence of expression is indispensably necessary to fidelity of translation. Nor can any excuse justify a translator for employing a word either more or less forcible, more or less comprehensive, than the original term, but the incapacity of the language to furnish an expression precisely equivalent.

GYMNASIUM,
SIVE
SYMBOLA CRITICA.

OBSERVATIONS.

ON the subject of synonymes we would request the attention of the reader to one general preliminary remark. It may be confidently affirmed, that in no language shall we find any two words precisely equivalent. If they agree in expressing the same primary conception, they differ in the accessory ideas, with which it is associated. Even, when the two terms express one simple and familiar object of perception, we find, that the principles of good taste sometimes forbid the use of one, while the other may be employed without offence. A term, also, as has been observed, may be admitted in one species of style, or with one intention on the part of the writer, which, in other circumstances, an author of judgement would be careful to avoid. Vulgarity and meanness are attached to some words, elegance and dignity form the character of others.

But, though no two words are precisely equivalent, it would be an error to infer, that, when no obscurity or misconception is to be apprehended, a writer may not be justified in employing either the one or the other, as the moment may suggest, or his judgement dictate. The acknowledged rules of composition admit this licence, and even sometimes require the adoption of the less appropriate sign. But from this indiscriminate use, it would be an error to conclude, that the words are in every respect precisely synonymous. In English, for example, we may, in many cases, use the terms *design* and *intention*, *value* and *worth*, *small* and *little*, *to suffer* and *permit*, indifferently, without any injury to the sentiment; but it would betray ignorance to maintain, that the words respectively are exactly equivalent. We say indifferently, “a clear sky,” and “a serene sky,” but the adjectives are not synonymous: for we may say “the water is clear,” but we cannot, without great impropriety, say, “the water is serene.” This remark it may be useful to bear in remembrance.

MURUS.

MŒNIA.

PARIES.

Murus has been defined by Pomponius and some other critics to be “Ambitus lapideus urbem cingens.”—The term, however, has certainly a more extended signification, denoting in general a wall for fencing or inclosing. It is chiefly, indeed, applied to a city or a camp; but is sometimes used to denote also the wall of a house—and, according to Dumesnil, the wall

of a garden: “Cingere muris oppida.” *Virg. Ecl.* v. 32. “Urbem latior murus amplecti.” *Hor. De Art. Poët.* 208.—“Nec communione parietum, sed propriis quæque (domus) muris ambirentur.” *Tac. Ann.* xv. 43.—“Hic murus aheneus esto.” *Hor. Epist.* i. 1. 60.

Mœnia, from *Munire*, anciently *Mœnire* (see *Voss. Etym.*) denotes strictly “battlements or fortifications.” “Quum pœne inædificata in *muris* ab exercitu nostro *mœnia* viderentur.” *Cæs. B. C.* ii. 16.—“Ut mœnibus ligneis se munirent.” *Nepos in Them.*—“Dividimus *muros*, et *mœnia* pandimus urbis.” *Virg. Æn.* ii. 234. Hence it signifies “A fortified wall,” including *Murus* with the battlements constructed on it. “Unis circumdatum mœnibus.” *Cic. de Leg. lib.* iii.

Mœnia is sometimes, but very rarely, employed to denote the houses of a city. This meaning has been assigned to it by some critics in the passage just quoted from Virgil. But we are inclined to think, with Facciolati, that such deviation from the usual interpretation is here unnecessary; nor will the passage “fusi per mœnia Teuceri,” as occurring afterwards, suffice to justify this deviation; for in both these the term may refer to the fortifications only. But when we read of the horse, after being drawn into the middle of the city, “Arduus armatos mediis in mœnibus astans Fundit equus,” it may be presumed, that *Mœnia* here means the houses. At the same time, when we consider that it was stationed in

the citadel, the signification even here becomes somewhat doubtful. In the passage quoted from Florus, Salmasius reads, “intermoenia muro amplexus est.” *Lib. i. Cap. 4.* That the word, however, in one or two instances, is more applicable to *houses* than *fortifications* appears from *Plin. vi. 26.* and *Vitruv. viii. 4.*

Murus was intended merely for defence, or to prevent invasion—*Mœnia* served also to annoy the assailants: the former protected solely by its height and stability, the latter by its turrets and battlements.

Paries denotes a wall for upholding or supporting—“Parietes fornicum perfossi urbem patefecerunt.” *Liv. xlv. 11.* Here it denotes the walls sustaining the arches. “Quippe viginti lati parietes sustinent,” *Q. Curt. v. 1,* “the walls upholding the hanging gardens of Babylon.” Hence its most common acceptation, “the wall of a house,” signifying also the partitions, which separate the apartments. “Ut subsidia reprimendis ignibus in propatulo quisque haberet, nec communione parietum, sed propriis quæque muris ambirentur.” *Tac. Ann. xv. 43.* To enable the junior reader to understand this passage, it may be necessary to observe, that by one of the laws of the Twelve Tables it was enacted, in order to promote a free circulation of air, and to prevent the spread of fires, that a space, not less than two feet and a half, should be left vacant between every two houses. This law, in process of time, fell into disuse; the consequence of which was, that the houses being

built contiguous one to another, and without party walls, when a fire took place it spread with the greatest rapidity. To remedy this evil was the purpose of the law, which has been just now quoted. By *Communio parietum* is here signified “A party-wall.” When a house was separated from another by an open space, it was called *insula*. “Claudius proscripsit insulam, et vendidit.” *Cic. Off.* iii. 16. “Exsolutis domuum et insularum pretiis.” *Tac. Ann.* vi. 45.

URBS.

CIVITAS.

The former refers principally to the houses, the latter to the inhabitants. “Notavit Nonius, quod *Urbs* sit ædificia, *Civitas* incolæ.” *Vavassor*. “*Civitas* est hominum, sed *Mænia* dicimus urbem.” *Mancinellus*. “Cum ne vestigium quidem Asiæ *civitatum*, atque *urbium* relinquatur.” *Cic. in Som. Scip.* “Coetus hominum jure sociati, quæ *civitates* appellantur.” *Ib.* “Conventicula hominum, quæ postea *civitates* nominatæ sunt, tum domicilia conjuncta, quas *urbes* dicimus, mœnibus sepserunt.” *Cic. pro Sext.* This distinction, however, is not universally observed. Cicero himself sometimes neglects it. See *Gruter*, vol. iii. p. 423.

The termination *ing*, though generally, is not always a sign of the active voice. The present participle, or, as it should be more properly called, the imperfect participle, in our language, belongs in common to both voices, active and passive. It denotes simply, that the action or state spoken of, is

progressive or imperfect. It refers either to past, present, or future time, signifying, that the action relatively present at any of these times was, is, or will be, incomplete, or proceeding. It should therefore be properly called the imperfect participle, in contradistinction to the participle in *ed*, which denotes the perfection of the state or action spoken of, and is therefore called the perfect participle. The participle in *ing*, therefore, being common to both voices, the reader, in order to ascertain, whether the Latin verb should be put in the active, or the passive voice, ought to inquire whether the nominative to the verb express a subject acting, or suffering. If the nominative to the verb be acting, the Latin verb must be in the active voice ; if the nominative be suffering, or acted upon, the Latin verb must be passive, thus : “ John is building,” *Joannes ædificat*. “ The house is building,” *Domus ædificatur*. The English verb is the same in both examples : but in the former *John* is active, and in the latter, the *house* is passive. The Latin verb, therefore, in the one example is active, and in the other passive. 2dly. When the nominative to the verb is suffering, or acted upon, and the state of suffering is expressed as incomplete, the present or imperfect participle being employed in English, one of the simple passive tenses must be used in Latin. When the state is represented as complete, the perfect participle being employed in English, one or other of the compound tenses, that is, the perfect participle, with the verb *sum*, must be used in Latin,

thus: "The house is building," *Domus ædificatur*. "The house is built," *Domus est ædificata*. "The house was building," *Domus ædificabatur*. "The house was built," *Domus erat ædificata*. "Ea quæ fiunt, et facta sunt." *Cic. Att. xiii. 28*. "Those things, which are doing, and have been done."

As I may not have another opportunity, I would here direct the reader's attention to the difference between expressions by the perfect participle, and those by the infinitive. When Cicero says "*Alios induxit, ut ipsum vinci contemnerent*." *Ep. Fam. xv. 15*. he means, "that others did not mind his being defeated." Had he said *ipsum victum contemnerent*, it might mean, "they despised him after his defeat."

EXERCISE.

The Athenians were building the walls of their city. This thing the Lacedemonians took amiss; but Themistocles deceived them by the following stratagem. He went to Sparta, as an ambassador, and denied to the Lacedemonians that the walls were building. "But," says he, "if you do not believe me, send trusty men, who may inspect the city, and in the mean time do ye detain me." They did so.

OBSERVATIONS.

CLAM.

OCCULTE.

SECRETO.

Occulte latent—*Clam* celant—(*Fronto*)—*Clam*, "Without the knowledge of"—*Occulte* (quasi ab oculo) "Without being seen"—*Secreto* (seorsim cernere) "Apart," "by one's self"—(*Dumesnil*).

The author's fancied connection between *occulte* and *oculus* is wholly inadmissible. The supposition is irreconcilable with every acknowledged principle of analogy*.

Clam denotes "privately, secretly, or without being seen or known by any person." It is opposed to *palam*. Illac per hortum circuit clam, nequis se videret huc ire familiarium. *Plaut. Asin.* iii. 3. 152. Pompeius clam et noctu; Cæsar palam atque interdium omnia faciebat. *Cæs. B. C.*

Occulte, derived from *occulere*, denotes likewise "in a private or hidden manner;" but implies also pains and circumspection, in order to escape observation. In this respect it differs from *clam*, which denotes simply "without the knowledge of." It is opposed to *aperte*. *Secreto*, from *secernere*, means "apart," or "by one's self." "Secreto hoc audi; tecum habeto." *Cic. Fam. Ep. lib. vii.*

In English a future and contingent event is often

* The translator perceiving, it is presumed, the absurdity of this supposition, and believing it perhaps to be a typographical error, represents Dumesnil as saying, "quasi ab *occulo*." But, when he hazarded this alteration, it evidently did not occur to him, that there is a palpable impropriety in saying *occultus* quasi ab *occulo*, both being parts of the same verb, and therefore the same impropriety in saying "*occulte* quasi ab *occulo*." No etymologist would say *amatus* quasi ab *amo*. It must also have escaped his recollection, that Dumesnil expressly derives *occulo*, however erroneously, from *oculus*. In distinguishing *abdere* and *occulere* (Art. 4.) he says, *Occulere (d' oculus) ne pas laisser à la vue*.

expressed as either present or past, the indicative mood being employed, without the note of contingency or futurity. Thus, “*Donec tibi id, quod pollicitus sum, effecero.*” *Ter. Ph.* iv. 1. 24. “Until I do, or have done, that which I promised ;” that is, “shall have done.” “He ordered him not to advance, till he had refreshed his troops.” “*Ne longius progrediretur imperavit, donec copias refecisset ;*” that is, “until he should have refreshed.”

For the general direction of the scholar, it may be useful here to offer this general preliminary remark, that verbs of the following significations govern the dative case. 1st, verbs signifying, “To profit or hurt,” except *Lædo* and *Offendo*, which govern the accusative*. 2d, “To favour or help,” except *Juvo*, which governs the accusative. 3d, “To command, obey, serve, or resist,” but *Jubeo* governs the accusative. 4th, “To threaten, or be angry with.” 5th, “To trust.” 6th, verbs compounded with *satis*, *bene*, and *male*. 7th, compounds of *sum*, except *possum*. Verbs, compounded with these ten prepositions, *ad*, *ante*, *con*, *in*, *inter*, *ob*, *post*, *præ*, *sub*, and *super*, when governing only one case. As this last rule, however, is sometimes at variance with that, by which

* Though grammarians have given this general rule for the government of *offendere*, it should be observed, that it is found governing the dative case of the person hurt or offended with the accusative of some general word, as *aliquid*, *nihil*, *quicquam*. “*Sin quid offenderit, sibi totum, nihil tibi offenderit.*” *Cic. Ep. Fam.* ii. 18.

a preposition governs the same case in composition, as when uncompounded, we would recommend it to the junior scholar, when in doubt, to consult his dictionary.

Some grammarians have called the dative the *acquisitive* case, as being used after any verb, denoting, that any thing is done to, or for, any person ; as “ Non omnibus dormio.” *Cic. Ep. Fam. vii. 24.* “ I do not sleep for all,” or “ to please all.”

In respect to the government of verbs, we would here offer one general observation. If the noun be a mere word, *nuda vox*, it is not grammatically affected by the verb ; thus “ Quid si non familiari solum, sed etiam, in me benefico, auxiliaturus essem ? Adde tali viro talem causam agenti.” *Cic. Att. ix. 4.* Here *adde* is followed by a dative case, and not the accusative, the meaning being, not that such a man was to be added, but the words, as concordant with the dative preceding. *Tali viro* are the terms to be subjoined. They are the sign simply, and not the sign of the thing signified*. “ Catulo et Lucullo alibi reponemus.” *Cic. Att. xiii. 12.* where *Catulo* and *Lucullo* are mere words. In the following exercise, *ut* should be used after *admonere*.

EXERCISE.

Themistocles at the same time secretly despatched a messenger to the Athenians, advising them to detain the

* In the original there are two or three Greek words, which I have taken the liberty, for the sake of the junior reader, to render into Latin.

Lacedemonian inspectors at Athens, by whatever means they could, until they had built their walls, and had recovered him. The Athenians did, as he advised them. Themistocles accordingly was recovered; the Lacedemonian inspectors were restored; and Athens was fortified, against the will of the Lacedemonians.

OBSERVATIONS.

Ut—"That" is used,

1st. After verbs of asking or requesting, as "*Quod ut facias, etiam atque etiam rogo.*" *Cic.* "*Te etiam atque etiam oro, ut suscipias.*" *Cic.*

2dly. After verbs of commanding—except *jubeo*, which, when signifying "to decree," is followed by *ut*, and sometimes, though rarely, when it signifies "to order." "*Lictori, ut sibi appareret, imperavit.*" *Val. Max.* "*Imperat, ut jubeat.*" *Liv.* "*Id præcipiendum fuit, ut eam diligentiam adhibeamus.*" *Cic.* *Impero*, with an infinitive, has been rejected by some critics as inadmissible. A few examples however do occur. "*Animo jam nunc otioso esse impero.*" *Ter. And. v. 2. 1**.

3dly. After verbs of advising—generally, as "*Commonent Græci, ut faciamus judicem.*" *Cic.* "*Hortor, ut te ad nos conferas.*" *Cic.* "*Suadet ut nuptias maturem.*" *Ter.*

* It is not necessary, that the verb should directly express a command or a request; it is sufficient, if they be implied. "*Curio misi, ut medico honos haberetur.*" *Cic. Ep. Fam. xvi. 9.* "I sent to Curius, requesting him to make," or, "that a proper acknowledgement should be made to the physician."

4thly. After verbs of causing, effecting, or happening—as “Effectum est, *ut* infinita pecuniæ cupiditas esset.” *Cic.* “Accidit, *ut* ille subito interiret.” *Cic.* “Fit, *ut* Cæsar prælium committere nolit.” *Cic.*

5thly. After verbs of decreeing, as “Senatus decernit, *ut* consules delectum habeant.” *Sall.*

6thly. The conditions of an agreement or treaty, are expressed by *ut*. “Pacem conditionibus fecerunt, ne (ut non) quis imperator jus ullum in civem Campanum haberet, *ut* suæ legis, sui magistratus Capuæ essent, *ut* trecentos ex Romanis captivis Pœnus daret.” *Liv.*

The preceding rules may be briefly expressed thus : that every request, every command, every advice, every effect, every decree, and the terms of every agreement be expressed by *ut*.

7thly. All intensive words, as *Talis*, “such,” *Ita*, *Adeo*, “so,” *Tantus*, “so great,” *Tot*, “so many,” are followed by *ut*, as, “Aberam *ita* longe, *ut* nihil possem.” *Cic.* “*Adeo* ignarus es, *ut* hæc nescias?” *Cic.* “Amor in nos tantus est, *ut* nihil supra possit.” *Cic.*

8thly. Every purpose or intention may be expressed by *ut* ; in other words, when the English word *that* means “in order that,” “with an intention, that,” “with the view of,” it may be expressed by *ut*, as “I read, that I may learn,” *Lego ut discam*. “He sent his son Marcus to be educated,” *misit filium Marcum, ut institueretur*, i. e. “for the purpose of being educated.”

It is to be observed, also, as a general rule, that

when the verb preceding *ut* is in the present or future tense, the verb following *ut* must be put in the present subjunctive ; and that, when the preceding verb is in any of the preterite tenses, the verb following must be in the imperfect, or perfect subjunctive. This rule will be further explained hereafter.

When *ut* signifies *that*, it is almost always joined to the subjunctive mood. We find it, however, sometimes joined to an infinitive ; thus “ Nihil esse jam reliqui quod ageremus, nisi ut salvos esse.” *Cic. Att. xv. 11.*, for *ut simus*.

It may be necessary to inform the junior reader, that the verbs *possum*, *volo*, *licet*, *oportet*, and *debeo*, express the “ ability, will, leave, obligation, or duty,” as either past or present ; whereas in English these circumstances are always expressed, as either present or past, by the tense of the following verb, or by the same tense of both verbs. Thus “ It can be done,” *Fieri potest*. “ It could have been done,” *Fieri potuit*. “ I may live,” *Mihi vivere licet*. “ I might have lived,” *Mihi vivere licuit*. “ I ought to go,” *Me ire oportet*. “ I ought to have gone,” *Me ire oportuit*. “ He says, that he can read,” *Dicit, se legere posse*. “ He said, that he could read,” *Dixit, se legere posse*. In the two last examples, the ability is conceived as contemporary with the saying, or as relatively present, and is therefore expressed in the present tense of the infinitive mood. “ He says, or said, that he could have read,” *se legere potuisse*. The ability is here conceived as prior to the saying,

and is accordingly expressed in the preterite or pluperfect of the infinitive mood. The following verb (*legere*) is in the present of the infinitive, the reading being necessarily contemporary with the ability, though in English it is expressed in the preterite tense. The difference of the English from the Latin idiom, in these examples, should be carefully attended to.

PETO. ROGO. POSCO. POSTULO.

In the two first editions of this work, relying on the accuracy of a quotation from Cicero, given by Dr. Hill, we expressed our concurrence in his distinction of *poscere* and *postulare*. He considers *poscere* as implying a claim, the validity of which is estimated by the claimant; *postulare* as denoting, that his demand is a matter of universally acknowledged equity. The quotation given by Hill is as follows, “Nemo tam audax qui posceret; nemo tam impudens qui postuleret,” omitting the concluding words of the clause, *ut venderet*. For the correction of this error I am indebted to an anonymous critic, (*See New Edinburgh Review*, No. VI.) who proposes the following distinction—*Postulare* signifies, “To state and ask what is, or is conceived to be, right, reasonable, expedient, usual, or becoming, and differs from *poscere* only in this, that the latter, when the nominative is a person, points emphatically to the earnestness, with which he advances his reasonable, usual, &c. demand.” According to this distinction,

which we are inclined to think is well founded, as far as it goes, *poscere* is *avide, seu instantèr, postulare*. But if no other distinction existed, we should find *poscere* and *postulare* applied to the same objects, the only difference being, that the verbs denote greater or less degrees of earnestness. This however is not the fact. *Postulare* is never used, where remuneration, price, or exchange, is denoted, which clearly shews, that there is at least something more implied in the distinction, than the critic represents. *Petimus* precario, *poscimus* imperiose; *postulamus* jure. (Donatus.) *Peto* precario, gratis; *Posco* jure; *Postulo* caute. (Popma.) From the examples which we shall have occasion to adduce, it will be sufficiently evident, that these distinctions are not correct. Let us first inquire into the difference between *petere* and *rogare*. These verbs agree in denoting “to ask,” but differ in this, that *rogare* signifies “to ask in order to be informed,” and also “in order to obtain”, whereas *petere* is by good writers, for the sake of perspicuity, restricted to the latter meaning. As synonymes they may be thus distinguished. *Petere*, in its primitive import, appears to denote simply “to aim at,” or, in the vulgar phrase, “to go at” in order to reach or hit, and hence “to go” and “to attack.” Accordingly, we find “cornu petere,” (*Virg.*) “to aim at” or “butt with the horn.” *Quid petis?* “what is your aim?” “What is your object?” *Petere pœnas*, “to aim at getting satisfaction.” *Petere malo—lapidibus—ferro*, “to pelt with

stones." "To attack with a sword." *Petere somnum*, "to endeavour after sleep." *Petere aquam*, "to go at, or after, water," "to fetch water."—*Petere locum*, "to go to a place." In all these various examples its primitive meaning is discoverable. Its proper signification, then, seems to be, "to aim at obtaining, or reaching." In this sense, it is joined with an infinitive. Hence, by a natural conception, it comes to denote, "to ask," admitting the various modifications of *suppliciter*, *cupide*, *precibus*, *multis cum lacrimis*, &c.

Rogare denotes, "to request as a favour respectfully, if not submissively." Seneca terms the word *rogo*, "molestum verbum, onerosum et demisso vultu dicendum."* *De Ben.* ii. 2.

"Si non est grave nec nimis molestum
Musæ Parthenium rogate vestrum."

Mart. v. 6.

Quid petitis? "What is your object?" "What do you ask?" said King Latinus to the Trojans. "Diis sedem exiguam patriis littusque rogamus." *Virg. Æn.* vii. 197—229.

—"Nudum et frustra rogantem
Nemo cibo, nemo hospitio, tectoque juvabit."

Juv. iii. 211.

* Dumesnil, in quoting this passage from Seneca, has *modestum* instead of *molestum*; but whether he had any authority for this reading, or whether it be a typographical error, I know not. A lexicographer of some eminence has disputed the justness of Seneca's remark. (See *Martinii Lexicon*.)

“Pulsatus rogat, et pugnis concisus adorat.” *Juv.* iii. 300. “Nec quicquam posthac rogaturus, salutem infelicis filii rogo.” These are the last words of Piso, addressed to Tiberius. In these examples the verb clearly implies, that a favour is requested, and with a certain degree of respect or submission. It is this conception, we are inclined to think, which distinguishes it from *petere*, which signifies simply “to ask.” This distinction is marked in the following passage. “Qui magister equitum fuisse tibi viderere, in proximum annum consulatum *peteres*, vel potius *rogares*; is, per municipia coloniasque Galliæ, a quo nos tum, cum consulatus *petebatur*, non *rogabatur*, *petere* consulatum solebamus, cum Gallicis et lacerna cucurristi.” *Cic. Phil.* ii. *sub. fin.* Duncan has rendered *rogare* in this passage by “demand;” it evidently is here equivalent to *orare*, or, *precari*, and *petere* merely “to stand candidate for,” “to aim at obtaining.”

“*Poscere*,” says Servius, “est, secundum Varonem, quoties aliquid pro merito nostro deprecimur.” Burmann, enlarging the acceptation, says, it is “*Jure aliquid exigere*.” This right may be founded in usage, power, merit, or reciprocity. Usage, as when Martial says:—“Ut poscas, Clyte, munus exigasque;” *Mart.* viii. 64. 1., alluding to a present, on the anniversary of his birth-day. Merit or reciprocity, as—“Meritos poscit honores.” *Ov. Met.* xiii. 594. “Poscere mercedes alieno lassus aratro.” *Juv.* viii. 240.

“Cujus equos pretium pro nocte poposcerat hostis.”
Ov. Met. xiii. 253.

In these examples we apprehend that *postulare* would be inadmissible.

The meaning of this verb (*postulare*), says Faciolati, is universally “ostendere se velle, quocunque modo,” hence *contendere*. “Incerta hæc si tu postules ratione certa facere.” *Ter. Eun.* i. 1. 16. “If you strive, expect, or shew your wish.” The anonymous critic, to whom we have alluded, confines its signification to demands, which either are in fact, or are at least conceived to be, reasonable. In this opinion we cannot concur. “Asiani, qui de Censoribus conduxerunt, questi sunt in senatu, se cupiditate prolapsos nimium magno conduxisse; ut induceretur locatio, postulaverunt.” *Cic. Att.* i. 16. This request Cicero pronounced to be “invidiosa res, et turpis postulatio:” and it can hardly be imagined, that the complaining party could deem a reduction of rent to be, in their case, an equitable demand. The question “Num iniquum postulo?” (*Ter. Ph.* ii. 3. 64.) clearly shews, that the object of *postulare* may be a demand, which is conceived to be unreasonable. We consider *poscere* and *postulare* as each applicable to any claim or demand, whether equitable, or the contrary. The distinction between these two verbs, we conceive, is this; 1st. *Postulare* denotes a less degree of earnestness than *poscere*. Here we agree with the anonymous critic, and to this distinction we mean to

restrict our concurrence in his opinion. “Incipiunt postulare, poscere, minari.” *Cic. in Verr.* 2dly. It differs from *poscere*, as never implying any merit, remuneration, or usage, which, though not uniformly, is very generally signified by the latter verb. 3dly. As applicable to things to be done, positions to be conceded, as well as things to be given. *Poscere*, as far as my observation has extended, seems inapplicable to speculative truths, and scientific concessions.

We shall now dismiss the subject with remarking, as a distinction uniformly observed, that *petere* is still farther distinguished from *poscere* and *postulare*, by its admitting no nominative, but a person; whereas *they* are construed also with inanimate things. “*Petunt soli homines; poscunt et postulant etiam res inanimæ, ut locus, tempus, oratio.*” *Nolt. Lex. Ant.*

As is often necessarily, as well as elegantly, rendered by *pro*. “They gave him his freedom, as a reward,” *Libertatem pro præmio dederunt.*

It is to be observed, that the person, to whom any thing is given or told, is put in the dative, whether the sign of the dative be expressed, or not. “He gave me a book,” *Mihi librum dedit.* “I told you this,” *Hoc tibi dixi.*

EXERCISE.

The father of a family came one day to Aristippus the philosopher, and asked him to undertake the education of his son. The philosopher demanding five hundred drachms as a fee; the father, who was a very covetous man, was frightened at the price, and told the philosopher, that he

could purchase a slave for less money. “Do so,” said Aristippus, “and then you will have two.”

OBSERVATIONS.

To, after a verb or adjective expressing motion, or tendency to motion, or the contrary, is rendered by *ad*. “*Ut veni ad urbem.*” *Cic.* It must be observed, however, that, when the verb is used figuratively, implying, that something is acquired, or given, *to* is expressed by the dative case; thus, *Hæreditas pupillo venit.*” *Cic.* “The inheritance came to the minor.” “*Animus mihi rediit.*” *Ter.* “*Rediit oppidanis concordia.*” *Tac. Ann.* Also, in phrases, where there are two datives, as, *venire auxilio alicui.* “To come to any one’s assistance.” When following a substantive used in an active sense, the genitive is likewise used to express it; thus, *Romanis fuit hostis*, is also rendered by *Romanorum hostis.* “*Cum in Africam venissem, Manio Manilio consuli, ad quartam legionem tribunus militum,*” &c. *Cic. Somn. Scip. ad init.* Here we have a genitive, a dative, and also an accusative with *ad*, expressing different relations. *Tribunus militum* is the designation of the officer, “tribune of; or belonging to, the soldiers:” *tribunus Manilio*, “tribune to, or under, Manilius;” *tribunus ad quartam legionem*, “tribune to, or appointed for, the fourth legion.”

With, synonymous with the expressions “along with,” “*in company with*,” is rendered by *cum*.

Uterque denotes each of two taken individually;

thus, *Uterque vicit*. "Each conquered him," implying, that each did it singly.

Ambo means "the two" (*oī duo*) taken together. "*Utrumque* fecisse dicimus, si et hic, et ille fecerit divisim; ambos fecisse dicimus, si duo conjunctim aliquid fecerint." (Stephan.) This distinction, though generally, is not universally observed.

The English of the perfect participle of a deponent verb is "having;" of a passive verb, "being;" and of a common verb, "having, or being." Thus *Locutus* from *Loquor* is "having spoken," *Lectus* from *Lego*, "being read," *Adeptus* from *Adipiscor*, "having or being obtained." When the English is "having," and the verb deponent, the perfect participle of the Latin verb precisely agrees with the English. Thus, "John having said these things, departed," *Joannes, hæc locutus, abiit*. Here *locutus* agrees with *Joannes*, and the Latin exactly coincides with the English idiom. When the Latin verb is passive, the English word *having*, in order to suit the Latin verb, must be turned into *being*; thus, "John, these things being said, departed;" *Joannes, his dictis, abiit*; in which example the pronoun *hic* being the nominative to no verb, nor the regimen of any word, is put with the participle (*dictis*) in the ablative absolute. If the Latin verb be common, both phraseologies are admitted. Thus, "Having gained a great victory, he proceeded to Babylon." *Magnam victoriam adeptus, Babylonem porrexit*,

or *magna victoria adepta*, “a great victory being obtained.”

It may be necessary to guard the junior reader against an error into which the English idiom, in the use of the verb “To join,” would naturally lead him. If we say, “He joined his friend,” the expression is ambiguous, implying either, that he united himself to his friend, or that he united, or joined his friend, to some other subject. In Latin, the person, or thing, joined, must be put in the accusative after the active verb, and the person, or thing, to whom or which it is joined, must be expressed in the dative. If the former meaning, therefore, be intended, we must say, *Junxit se amico*; if the latter, *Junxit amicum*.

EXERCISE.

Hasdrubal passed over into Italy with a great army; and, if he had been able to join his brother Hannibal, the Roman empire would have been ruined. But Claudius Nero, having left part of his army in his camp, hastened to Hasdrubal with a few chosen troops, and joined his colleague Livius at the river Metaurus. These two together vanquished Hasdrubal.

OBSERVATIONS.

INTERSUM.

ADSUM.

It is remarked by Harris, that prepositions transfuse a portion of their meaning into words, with which they are compounded. If the remark is correct, as

we believe it is, we should be inclined to infer, that *interesse* denotes a closer and more intimate relation, than *adesse*, the latter implying simply presence, and the former a more immediate intercourse, or a consociation in the state or condition of others. “Turnus—urbi improvisus adest.” *Virg. Æn.* ix. 49. “Jam nunciatum est hostes adesse.” *Liv.* *Interesse* in these examples would be inadmissible.

“Mittit . . . mille viros, qui supremum comitentur honorem, intersintque patris lacrimis.” *Virg. Æn.* xi. 59. Here, on the contrary, we presume, *adesse* would be inapposite, “who may be present, and participate in the father’s grief.” “Voluerunt eos in suis rebus ipsos interesse.” *Cic. in Verr.* “Should take a concern in their own affairs.” And, when Cicero says, speaking of Marcus Marcellus, “Qui nunc Ædilis Curulis est, et profecto, nisi ludos nunc faceret, huic nostro sermoni interesset,” (*De Orat. lib.* i.) we apprehend, that more is here implied, than if he had used the verb *adesset*. That the latter, denoting simply, “To be present at,” may by inference signify “being concerned in,” is not to be doubted; but the verbs are not therefore to be considered as synonymous.

By, before a person, denoting the principal agent, is rendered by *a* or *ab*, as “Hector was slain by Achilles,” *Hector ab Achille occisus est*. When *by* denotes subordinate agency, it is rendered by *per*, as “He sent a letter by a slave,” *Literas per servum misit*; passively, *Literæ ab eo per servum missæ*

sunt. By before a thing is expressed in the ablative, without a preposition, and sometimes by *per*. Subordinate agency, indeed, or instrumentality, whether of a person or a thing, may be expressed by *per*, or by the ablative without a preposition, after an active or neuter verb, as “*Per potestatem abstulit,*” *Cic. in Verr.* “*His jacet testibus,*” *Cic. i. e. a testibus prosternitur.* “*Societate nobilissimis obsidum firmata.*” *Tac. Hist. iv. 28.* “The league being strengthened by the prime nobility’s being delivered as hostages.” The preposition *a* would imply, that the hostages were not the means, or instruments, of strengthening, but the principal agents.

No verb is used personally in the passive voice, unless it govern the accusative in the active voice. Thus, *resisto* governs the dative only in the active voice, and therefore has no passive voice, but impersonally. For example, we say *Resisto tibi*, “I resist you,” but we cannot say, *Tu resisteris*, “You are resisted,” but *Resistitur tibi.* *Succedo*, in like manner, governs the dative only in the active voice; *Succedor*, therefore, is not in classic use. “He was succeeded by Tullus Hostilius;” not *Ille successus est a Tullo Hostilio*, but *Huic successit Tullus Hostilius*, that is, “Tullus Hostilius succeeded him.”

The Kalends, *Kalendæ*, from an obsolete verb *Calare*, or *Καλεῖν*, to call over, were on the first day of the moon or month; for Romulus began his months on the first day of the moon. On this day one of the inferior priests used to assemble the people

in the capitol, and proclaim to them, that it was new moon, calling over at the same time the number of days, between the Kalends and the Nones. This was done, because it behoved the people, who lived in the country, to assemble in the city on the Nones of every month, in order to be informed by the “Rex Sacrorum” of the feasts and holidays; and to learn in general, what they had to do, in regard to sacred matters, during that month. The Nones fell on the 5th and the Ides on the 13th; but in four months of the year, namely, March, May, July, and October, the Nones fell on the 7th and the Ides on the 15th.

A point of time is expressed in the ablative; a space of time generally in the accusative. Macrobius remarks, that, in expressing a point of time, the Romans used, in early ages particularly, to distinguish past from future time, by employing the letter *i* instead of the regular termination of the numeral adjective. Thus, if past time was alluded to, they said *die quarto*, if future, *die quarti*, as “Die quinti Romæ in capitolium curabo tibi cœnam coctam.” *Breve* related to past time, *brevi* to future time. The words of the Prætor announcing the *Compitalia* were “Die Noni. Popolo. Romano. Quiritibus. Compitalia. Erunt. Quando. Concepta Fuerint. Nefas.” Aulus Gellius adds “*Die Noni* prætor dicit, non *die nono*; neque prætor solum, sed pleraque omnis vetustas ita locuta est.”

It is to be observed, that the Romans, in computing their time, always included the day *from*

which, and also the day *to* which, they reckoned; thus they called the 1st of January *Kalendæ*, the 31st of December *Pridie Kalendarum*, the 30th, not *secundo*, but *tertio ante Kalendas*.

The preposition *a* is used before consonants, *ab* before vowels, and *abs* before *t* and *q*. The letter *h* is not regarded as a consonant. Khunius, in his animadversions on Vorstius, has adduced two passages from Cæsar, in order to prove, that *abs* is used before *s*; there is reason however to believe, that the readings, to which he appeals, are erroneous. In one of them, several ancient manuscripts give *a*, and in the other *ab*, instead of *abs*.

EXERCISE.

After him Julian obtained the government, and made war on the Parthians, in which expedition I myself was present. He took several towns of the Persians by storm, and received others on surrender. Returning victorious, he was slain by an enemy, on the sixth day before the Calends of July, and in the seventh year of his reign. He was a man of great eloquence, and had a very retentive memory. He was succeeded by Jovian, who was elected Emperor by the army.

OBSERVATIONS.

Will, when it simply denotes futurity, is generally rendered by the future indicative, and sometimes by the present potential; *Would*, in like manner, by the present or imperfect potential, according to the sense. When they denote inclination, they are rendered generally by *volo*. To enable the reader to understand,

when he should employ the one, and when the other form of expression, he should learn to distinguish between the subjunctive, and the potential mood. These two moods have in Latin one form. It is properly called the subjunctive mood, when it is subjoined to some adverb, conjunction or indefinite term, the English being at the same time indicative, naturally suggesting the same form in Latin. Thus, "I read," *Lego*; "Because I read," *Quod legam*. The English is indicative in both examples; but in the latter, the Latin verb is put in the subjunctive mood because it follows *quod*. "All men loved him," *Omnes eum amaverunt*. "He was so benevolent, that all men loved him," *Adeo benevolus erat, ut omnes eum amarent*. Though the English in both examples is indicative ("all men loved"), yet in the latter the verb is put in the subjunctive mood, because it follows *ut*. It is, then, in such examples only, that this mood should be called subjunctive. When it expresses what is contingent, or hypothetical, it is properly named the potential mood. Thus, "I would read, if it were necessary," *Legerem, si necesse esset*. Here *legerem* is employed, not as subjunctive, or subjoined to any word requiring this form of the verb, but because the action is represented as contingent, or dependent. Thus the same form of the verb has two different names, subjunctive and potential. To this distinction Mr. Ruddiman has not sufficiently attended. When he gave *Lego ut discam*, "I read, that I may learn," as an example of *ut* governing the

subjunctive mood, he did not perceive that *discam* is here potential, and not subjunctive ; that the English requires that form of the verb, and that the word *discam* is not affected by the preceding conjunction.

Now the present potential includes the expression of “ may, can, will, and shall,” and the preterite imperfect of “ might, could, would, and should,” implying the verbs *licet*, *possum*, *volo*, and *debeo*. Thus *amem* signifies not only “ I may or can love,” but likewise, in dependent and in interrogative clauses, “ I shall or will love.” Of this numberless examples might be produced ; and the significations of the imperfect naturally lead us to assign the four correspondent meanings to the present tense. Thus “ Non eam ?” *Ter. Eun.* i. 1. 1. “ Shall I not go ?”—“ An potius ita me comparem ?” *Ter. Eun.* i. 1. 2. “ Shall I rather so make up my mind ?”—“ Quisquam Junonis numen adoret ?” *Virg. Æn.* i. 52. “ Will any one adore.”—“ Erunt, qui reprehendant.” *Cic.* “ There will be persons, who will blame.”—“ Nascetur Cæsar, famam qui terminet astris,” *Virg. Æn.* i. 291. “ Cæsar, who shall or will bound.”

That the reader may understand when he should employ the potential mood, and when the full expression by *volo*, *possum*, *licet*, and *debeo*, he ought to observe, that when the sentence, or clause, is absolute and independent, or in general when it is not followed, or preceded, by a subjunctive tense expressing a circumstance, on which the clause in question depends, the periphrasis with *volo*, *licet*, &c. must be employed.

Thus, “ We will go,” *Ire volumus*. “ They will not go,” *Ire nolunt*. “ I may come,” *Mihi venire licet*. “ I can read,” *Legere possum*. “ Thou shouldst read,” *Legere debes*. *Tibi legendum est*. *Te legere oportet*. “ It might have been done” *absolutely* and sometimes *contingently*, *Fieri potuit*.

Thus, “ It might have been done, if he had been taken,” *Si captus esset, fieri potuit*, or *potuisset*. On the other hand, the verbs *possum*, *volo*, *licet*, and *oportet* or *debeo* are suppressed ; in other words, the potential mood is used in the two following cases :

1st. It is frequently employed when the sentence is interrogative, thus, “ Shall I, or should I not go ?” “ Non eam ?” *Ter. Eun. i. 1. 1.*—“ Shall or should the insect Pantilius discompose me ?” “ Men’ moveat cimex Pantilius ?” *Hor. Sat. i. 10.*—“ What could I do ?”—“ Quid facerem ?” *Virg. Ecl. i.* “ Who could bear those men ?” “ Quis istos ferat ?” *Cic. ad Brut.*—“ Why would you go away ?” “ *Cur abires ?*”

2dly. When the clause is conditional, or dependent, as “ I might hold it, if I pleased,” *Tenerem, si vellem.*—“ You would think otherwise, if you were in this situation,” *Si hic sis, aliter sentias.* *Ter. And. ii. 1. 12.* “ He would have done it, if he had tried,” *Fecisset, si tentasset.*—“ He would not have come, if I had not ordered him,” *Non venisset, nisi jussissem.* In these examples, the mood occurs both as potential and subjunctive, the potential being dependent on the subjunctive clause. This rule will suffice at present for the direction of the junior reader.

The subject will be hereafter resumed, when the real character of this form of the verb will be more fully explained.

Tenses of the Infinitive Mood.

Duration is continuous and absolute : time is in its own nature interrupted and relative. It is either present in regard to the past and the future ; or past in regard to the present and the future ; or it is future in regard to the present and the past. Hence tenses, which are general notations of time, express time relatively. This observation, as applicable to the present and preterite tenses of the infinitive mood, it will be useful to illustrate by a few examples :—thus, “ He says, that I write,” *Dicit me scribere*. The leading verb expresses present time, and the following verb, being in the present tense, expresses time present, in relation to the time denoted by the preceding verb.

“ He said, that I wrote,” *Dixit me scribere*. Here the tenses in English and Latin do not mutually accord, the following verb being in the preterite tense in English, and in Latin in the present. The leading verb denotes past time ; and the verb following being intended to express an action contemporaneous with that time, or present in relation to the time of saying, the present tense is, in conformity to that intention, employed in Latin. “ He said, that I wrote at the time he said so.”

“ He says, that I wrote,” *Dicit me scripsisse*.

In the former example, “ I wrote,” was rendered by *scribere* ; and here it is rendered by *scripsisse*. The reason is, the leading verb is present, referring to the present time : “ the writing,” however, was prior to “ the saying,” and is therefore expressed in the preterite tense. The actions here are not contemporaneous, and the priority of “ the writing” is expressed by a preterite tense, denoting a time antecedent to the present.

“ He said, that I had written,” *Dixit me scripsisse*. Here the saying is preterite in respect to the present time, and the writing is prior to the saying ; therefore while the latter is expressed in the preterite or perfect tense, the writing, being antecedent to that, is expressed in the pluperfect. And it is to be observed, that, when the leading verb is in the preterite tense, and the following verb in what is called the perfect or pluperfect of the infinitive, the meaning is always pluperfect, and is to be rendered by *had*. When the governing verb is present, this form of the infinitive denotes simply past time and perfect action ; *Dicit nos audivisse*, “ He says, that we heard.”—*Dixit nos audivisse*, “ He said, that we had heard.”

It may, therefore, be given as a general rule, that, when the following verb denotes an action or state contemporaneous with that of the leading verb, the present of the infinitive must be used, whether the tense of the leading verb be present, or preterite. If the leading verb be present, and the following verb denote

an action prior to that, the following verb, to mark that priority, must be in the preterite tense. And if the leading verb express a past action, and the following verb denote an action antecedent to that, then the following verb must be in the pluperfect of the infinitive, and be translated by *had*. Inattention to this rule has produced such errors as the following: “When Cræsus heard that Solon was in Lydia,” “Cum Cræsus audiret, Solonem in Lydia *fuisse*,” *Adams’s Select*. “The hearing and the being” were contemporaneous circumstances; the verb should, therefore, be in the present of the infinitive. *Fuisse* implies an event antecedent to the hearing, and perfect before the other commenced. “He believed that there is only one God,” *Credidit fuisse tantum unum Deum. Ib.* This expression violates two rules, 1st. The one here given, and 2dly. The rule, that all abstract propositions, or all propositions universally and immutably true, ought to be expressed in the present tense. The author’s Latin rendered into English denotes “He believed, that there had been only one God.”

PRÆTOR.

The name of *Prætor* in the earliest ages of the Roman republic was common to all the magistrates. Even the consuls were designated by this appellation, and the Dictator is called by Livy (*lib. vii. 3.*) *Prætor Maximus*. The duties of office were not divided among the Romans in the infancy of their state, as

they are with us. The same man might, at one and the same time, fill the offices of judge, priest, and commander of the army. The inconvenience of this, however, was soon felt; and in the year 389, the office of Prætor, strictly so called, was instituted, in order that justice might be regularly administered in the city, the consuls, on whom this duty devolved, being frequently absent in the prosecution of foreign wars. In the year 501 another prætor was added; and he, who had the administration of justice among the citizens, was called *Prætor Urbanus*; while the other had the charge of all matters relative to foreigners. The number was still further increased in the year 520, after the conquest of Sicily and Sardinia, two more being added, who should assist the consuls in the government of the provinces. After the conquest of Spain six were annually chosen; Sylla increased them to eight; Julius Cæsar to sixteen, and the second triumvirate to sixty-four.

EXERCISE.

Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, descended from a very noble family, *would not* suffer Scipio Asiaticus, though an enemy, to be carried to prison. The latter, when he was Prætor, subdued Gaul: in his first consulship he conquered Spain, and in his second Sardinia. When he was capitally impeached by the people, Sempronius swore, that he was not deserving of death; and that, if he were banished, he would go into exile along with him. Upon this he was acquitted.

OBSERVATIONS.

FORTE.

FORTASSE.

Tursellinus observes, that these words do not differ from each other in extraction, but in use and signification. *Forte*, he says, is the same as *casu*, denoting “by chance,” or “accidentally.” “We happened accidentally to be at Privernum,” “*Forte* evenit, ut Priverni essemus.” *Cic.* *Fortasse*, *fortassis*, and *forsan*, imply doubt and uncertainty, answering to the English word “perhaps.” “You have a letter longer, perhaps, than you would wish,” “*Habes epistolam verbosiores fortasse, quam velles.*” *Cic. Ep. lib. iii.*

It is to be observed, that casualty or accident is frequently expressed by *forte*, instead of *accidit* or *contingit*; thus, “I happened to be at home,” *Forte domi aderam. Mihi contigit domi esse.*

Forsan, *Forsitan*, are generally joined with the present subjunctive in such expressions as “You will, perhaps, ask,” *Forsitan quærat. Cic.* “Some one, perhaps, will think.” *Aliquis forsitan putet. Ter.* “They will, perhaps, wonder.” “*Forsitan illi mirentur.*” Sometimes with the preterite, as “Some one will, perhaps, say,” *Forsitan quispiam dixerit. Cic.* Rarely with the future indicative, “*Forsan et hæc olim meminisse juvabit.*” *Virg.*

One followed by *another* is rendered by *alius*.

The indicative form in English is often used for the potential; thus, “It was decreed, that whosoever

broke this law, should be put to death." *Decretum est, ut, quicumque hanc legem violasset, necaretur*: that is, "should break," or (*properly*,) "should have broken." This idiom requires particular attention.

It is a general rule, that the adjective be placed after the substantive; and also that the generic term precede the special, and the appellative the proper name: thus, *urbs Roma*, not *Roma urbs*. *Fratres gemini*, "twins," not *gemini fratres*. If *gemini* be put first, the addition of *fratres* is superfluous; so says Quintilian; and the rule, which he gives, is founded in propriety. Cicero, however, says *geminos fratres*, *lib. ii. De Divinat.* Livy also, in the following narrative says, *trigemini fratres*. He has also used *quis* for *uter*, contrary to his usual practice, and to the distinction observed by classic writers generally.

EXERCISE.

A war having arisen between the Romans and Albans, under the conduct of Hostilius and Fufetius, before they came to a battle, it was determined to finish the affair by the combat of a few. There happened to be among the Romans three brothers, born at one birth, by name Horatii, and also three such among the Albans, named Curiatii, equal to them in age and strength. It was agreed, therefore, that these should fight for the mastery, and that the people, to whom the victors belonged, should have the supremacy.

OBSERVATIONS.

SIMULARE.

DISSIMULARE.

Simulare is "to pretend to be what we are not;"

dissimulare, “to dissemble, or conceal what we are.”
 “Simulabat amicitiam, cum interim illi perniciem moliretur.” *Cæs. B. G.* “Si quis est paulo erectior, occultat et dissimulat appetitus voluptatis.” *Cic. de Off.* “Multa *simulavi* invitus; et *dissimulavi* cum dolore.” *Cic. in Ep. Fam.* It is the character of hypocrisy to pretend to virtues, which it has not (*simulare*), and to dissemble the vices, which it has (*dissimulare*). Catiline is described by Sallust, as “Simulator et dissimulator.” Tacitus, I believe, is singular in using *dissimulare* for *omittere* or *negligere*. “Magnarum rerum curam non dissimulatuos, qui animam etiam levissimis adverterent.” *Ann. xiii. 4. 9.*

UNA.

SIMUL.

These words are thus generally distinguished.
 “*Simul* notat conjunctionem respectu temporis; *una* respectu loci et facti. Unde dicuntur *simul* fuisse, qui eodem tempore fuerunt; *una* fuisse, qui in eodem loco fuerunt et facto.” *Nolten. Lex. Ant.* *Simul*, agreeably to this explanation, denoting “at the same time;” and *una* “in the same company,” we may say, “ambos *una* necavit; non tamen *simul* expirarunt.” (*Dumesnil.*) This distinction, however, is not uniformly observed. Cicero frequently uses *simul* for “together,” or in the same company. “Dummodo *simul* simus, omnia facile negligo.” *Cic.* “Propter propinquitatem loci totos dies *simul* eramus.” *Cic. ad Att.* But *una* is never used for *simul*.

It may be here observed, that the poets, and the writers of the silver age, join *simul* with an ablative, *cum* being omitted, as *ἀμα* in Greek is joined with the dative, *συν* being understood.

“Together” is generally expressed by one or other of these adverbs. But in the following exercise, in which the word occurs, it is with more precision rendered by *universi*, denoting “all together.” The termination of the adjective indicates the term, which it is intended to modify; the adverb being inflexible, might leave the subject uncertain, and create ambiguity.

Ut signifying *as*, takes the indicative, unless the meaning may be considered as contingent. In the following exercise, the expression “as their strength permitted” or “did permit,” may also mean “as their strength would permit.”

EXERCISE.

They engaged; and, after many wounds given and received on both sides, two Romans fell, and the three Albans were grievously wounded. The single Horatius, who yet remained untouched, but was not a match for the Albans all together, in order to divide their strength, and attack them singly, pretended flight. They followed him, one after another, as their strength, and the pain of their wounds permitted; and as they came up, he slew them one by one. The Roman was accordingly the victor; and the two states were united under one name.

OBSERVATIONS.

SED.

AUTEM.

Whether the former of these conjunctions be the ancient word *sedum* (ex *se* et *dum*) abbreviated, or a contraction for *se et*, or *se* with *d* suffixed, it is agreed among all philologists, that the original word is the inseparable preposition. Its strict import seems to be, “laying this aside,” “without this,” *hoc dimisso*. Agreeably to this explanation, we find it in early ages, used for *sine*. “Sed frude facere,” *i. e.* “sine fraude.” “It implies”, says Vossius, “separation,” as *atque* or *adque* denotes addition. It may be easy to conceive, how it came hence to imply *antithesis* or contrariety, as “Non video nunc, *sed* vidi modo.” *Plaut.*; or a transition from one subject to another, as “Age, *sed* huc qua gratia te accersi jussi, ausculta.” *Ter. i. e.* “dismissing this subject,” something previously mentioned, as *nisi* waives or excludes something that follows; as also concession, or correction, as “Sed ierit ad bellum; discesserit non a te solum verum etiam a fratribus.” *Cic.* But whence it came to imply addition, in consistency with its primitive signification, and in connection with one or other of these concomitant notions, unless by an ellipsis of *etiam*, it is difficult, perhaps impossible to ascertain. How *ast* (*adsit*) *at*, *adqui*, words nearly synonymous*, but

* I concur with Mr. Tooke in considering *ast*, *at* to be contractions of *adsit*, and not derived from *αταρ*, as some philologists conjecture. It may be remarked, that words often acquire an

with this difference, as Mr. Potter observes*, that *atqui* is the most forcible, denote addition, implying at the same time the derivative meanings of *sed*, is sufficiently obvious.

Autem, *αυταρ*, *αυτε* from *av* rursus, are kindred words, and denote addition, answering primitively to the Saxon *bot* or *add*, now confounded with *but*, or *be out*. Hence it is joined to *porro*, as *porro autem*, “more over,” and also with *sed*, as *sed autem*, “but again.” It states, observes the same critic, another view of the same case, but not like *sed* corrective of the former; nor interruptive, as *at*; or contradictive, as *atqui*. We would here remark, that it is, with peculiar force and elegance, used at the end of a clause or sentence. “Etsi intelligo, quam meum sit scire et curare, quid in republica fiat; fiat autem? imo quid futurum sit.” *Cic. Att.* “Sed ferendus tibi in hoc meus error; ferendus autem?” “To be borne, did I say?” “Imo vero etiam adjuvandus.” *Cic. ad Att.*

It has been already observed, that when the clause implying “will,” “liberty,” “ability,” or “duty,” accessory meaning by *ellipsis*. When we say, “I saw but one,” the sense of the particle cannot be explained either by *bot* or “be out.” The word *none* is understood, i. e. “none, one be out,” or “except one.” “He was generous, but economical.” The particle *bot* or *add* would not mark the contrast of the two epithets; yet seems to be understood. In the same manner *tamen* is sometimes suppressed after *sed* and *at*. When particular emphasis is laid on the clause, it is introduced with *attamen*.

* Essay on “the Means of discovering the Senses of Words.”

is absolute or independent, the verbs *volo*, *licet*, *possum*, *debeo*, and not the potential mood of the principal verb, are to be employed. It sometimes happens, however, that the “inclination,” “liberty,” “ability,” and “duty,” are themselves contingent, or dependent. In such examples, the verbs, expressive of these, must be put in the potential mood: thus, “He said, that the man, who was unwilling to die for his country (or would not die) was unworthy of life,” *qui pro patria mori nollet*, “should be unwilling to die.” Here, “was unwilling” is unobjectionable in English; for in our language the indicative is frequently used to express what is contingent; but in Latin it is inadmissible.

The cardinal numerals, “one,” “two,” “three” *unus*, *duo*, *tres*, are to be distinguished from the distributive, *Singuli*, *Bini*, *Terni*, &c. The cardinal imply that the number spoken of belongs to all collectively, and is the whole amount. The distributives denote, that the number specified belongs to each individual, and is therefore only a part of the whole. Thus, Eutropius, speaking of the government of the senators after the death of Romulus, says, “*Regnaverunt per quinos dies* ;” not, “they reigned five days,” but “five days each.” *In tres incidi mendicos, et dedi ternos asses*. “I gave them three pence each.” *Tres asses* would imply, three pence among them, or a penny each. The number individually distributed is frequently denoted, not simply by the distributive numeral, but also by an individuating term. “Duo-

dena describit in singulos homines jugera." *Cic. in Agr. Leg.*

Ni, nisi, "unless," are elegantly used for *si non*.

"People," or "*Persons*," is rendered by *Homines*. "A people," or "A nation," by *Populus*,—thus "Many people," *Multi homines*. "A great people," *Magnus populus*.

For a comparative estimate of a Roman and an English acre, see "Preliminary Observations," p. xci.

EXERCISE.

Curius Dentatus, having subdued the Samnites, said in an assembly, "I have taken such a quantity of land, that it would have been a desert, if I had not taken such a number of people; moreover, I have taken such a number of people, that they would have perished by famine, if I had not taken such a quantity of land." He divided the fields among the soldiers, giving each between eight and nine acres, and reserved as many for himself; saying, that no man ought to be a general, who *would not* be content with the share of a common soldier.

OBSERVATIONS.

ILLE.

HIC.

When these pronouns are opposed to each other, *Ille*, "That," denotes the one which is the more remote, or "the former;" *Hic*, "This," "the nearer," or "the latter." Thus, "*Ille* bello, *hic* pace, civitatem auxerunt." *Liv. i. 21*. This distinction, however, though subservient to perspicuity, is not uniformly observed by classic writers. "Vidi Hectorem et Achillem, *hunc* Trojanum, *illum* Græcum." *Cic. pro*

Rosc. Here *Ille* means the latter, and *Hic* the former. “Melior tutiorque est certa pax, quam sperata victoria, *hæc* in tua, *illa* in Deorum manu est.” *Liv.* xxx. 30. (See also *Val. Max.* ii. 7. 12. *Id.* iii. 2. 1. *Liv.* xxiii. 29. *Cic. de Fin.* lib. iv.) No authority, however, can sanction an expression, which is either ambiguous or obscure, much less an expression, by which the reader, if unacquainted with the subject, would unavoidably be led into error.

The acute and ingenious critic, to whom I have recently referred, concurs in the general opinion, that *ille* means “the more remote,” and *hic* “the nearer of two subjects;” but he apprehends, that this distinction refers not to their place in the sentence, but only to their real or conceived local relation in the mind of the speaker, or writer. In this view of the subject he conceives, that critics have been too rash, in imputing to some classic writers violations of the general rule. The passage quoted from the speech of Hannibal, “Melior tutiorque est certa pax, quam sperata victoria, *hæc* in tua, *illa* in deorum, manu est,” he thus explains, “This present and immediate advantage, a sure peace, is in your power; that distant and far removed good is in the power of the gods, who may deny it.” The explanation does not appear to me to be quite satisfactory. The author endeavours to reconcile with this notion of the subject, several other passages, in which the objectionable usage is adopted. Now, while we concur with him in thinking, that in two or three instances, classic writers have unjustly incurred the

censure of modern critics, having been guilty of no violation of the common rule, we are still of opinion, that examples do occur, in which the canon has been improperly transgressed. The learned writer needs not to be informed, that to account for an anomaly, and to justify its adoption, are things very different. When the author of an essay on the writings of Pope says, “ I wonder, that such a valiant hero as you should trifle away your time among women,” it may be urged, that the pronoun *your* is here properly used, the conception of the speaker being directed to the person addressed ; but, I believe, that most grammarians will, notwithstanding, pronounce this to be an error, the author having lost sight of the connection between the leading subject and its predicate. Besides, it may in many cases be difficult to ascertain, unless by precision of expression, what is more or less immediately present to the mind of the speaker ; and every speaker, who is desirous not to be misunderstood, will attend to what may be more or less present to the mind of the person addressed, which in this respect may be at variance with his own. Unless, therefore, in cases where misconception is impossible, the general rule, which precludes all ambiguity, should be observed. If we were to infer the meaning from our notion of what passed in the imagination of the author, we should frequently be left in doubt, if not led into error. We take the following passage, as an example, “ Nec vero cum duo Decii, aut duo Scipiones, fortes viri commemorantur, aut cum Fabricius Aristides re

justus nominatur ; aut ab *illis* fortitudinis, aut ab *his* justitiæ tanquam a sapientibus, exemplum petitur.”

Cic. Off. iii. 4. Here the only bond of connection, which could enable us to ascertain, which of the two subjects was more or less immediately present to the writer's imagination, is contiguity in time or place ; and it is evident that, concluding on this principle, with no knowledge of the facts, our inference would be at least doubtful, if not false. Cicero, however, has expressed himself clearly ; and if we construe his words according to the general rule, we cannot possibly misunderstand his meaning.

Where the gender, or the number, of the pronouns clearly points to their respective substantives, we concur with Sanctius in admitting, that the pronouns may be used indiscriminately ; thus in the following passage, “ Quorum nescio, utrum majus dedecus fuerit, quod patria spei, au quod hostis metus nihil in iis reposuerit ; *hæc* pro se, *ille* ne adversus se dimicarent, parvi pendendo.” *V. Max.* ii. 7., the *hæc* clearly points to *patria*, and the *ille* to *hostis*. But in every other case perspicuity requires, that the usual distinction should be observed.

When the three pronouns *hic*, *ille*, and *iste* are used, *hic* refers to the nearest ; *iste* to the middle one, and *ille* to the most remote. “ Tullium, Atticum, et Trebatium vehementer diligo, *hunc* quidem (Trebatium) ob mores festivos ; *istum* (Atticum) ob ingenii liberalitatem ; *illum* (Tullium) propter incredibile dicendi flumen.” (See Noltenius *in hic*.)

Is holds a middle place between *ille* and *hic*, not meaning emphatically either *this* or *that*, but referring to something previously mentioned, or just about to be specified.

Iste has generally some reference to the person, to whom we are speaking, as if the person spoken of were in some way connected with him. Dumesnil and others explain it, *quasi is tuus*. “Veniant igitur isti irrisores hujus orationis.” *Cic. Par.* “Those scoffers of yours.” “Cur non aut hæc isthæc mihi ætas, aut tibi hæc sententia?” *Ter.* “Why have I not that age of yours?” When this sense is intended, *iste* is the proper word; but it often occurs where this conception is not implied. Its real office seems universally to be to mark the subject more forcibly, than *ille*, or *is*.

Quid and its compounds, *Siquid*, *Aliquid*, *Numquid*, &c. are considered by most grammarians as real substantives, because they are joined with a genitive case, as *Quid negotii*, *Aliquid novi*. This seems to me a very insufficient reason; for, by the same rule, we should call *Hoc*, *Illud*, *Id*, and many adjectives, which in the neuter gender are joined to a genitive case, substantive nouns. It is more important, however to determine the difference, in respect to usage, between *Quid* and *Quod*, *Aliquid* and *Aliquod*. In the earliest writers they are used indifferently. “Quid ego facinus audi.” *Plaut. Truc.* ii. 4. 31. “Nisi occupo aliquid mihi consilium.” *Id. Menæch.* v. 2. 94. “Credo cum viro litigium natum esse aliquod.” *Id.*

Menæch. v. 2. 15. In later writers, however, we find *Quid* with its compounds joined with a genitive case, and *Quod* agreeing with its substantive, as *Quod pomum*, *Aliquod vinum*—*Quid negotii*, *Quid causæ*, *Aliquid gratiæ*. It is also more elegant to say, *Optimum quidque*, *Aliquid utile*, *Quiddam subagreste*, than *Quodque*, *Aliquod*, *Quoddam*, the latter being rarely joined with an adjective. (See *Despauter's Comment.*)

It may prevent a difficulty to the junior reader, if we here remark that *aliquid* is sometimes understood “*Mos est civitatibus ultro ac viritim conferre principibus vel armentorum vel frugum, quod pro honore acceptum, etiam necessitatibus obvenit.*” *Tac. Germ. cap. 15. i. e., aliquid, seu nonnihil frugum.*

It may be necessary to guard the junior reader against the error of understanding the word *occasio* to be synonymous with our term “occasion.” The former is never used by any classic of eminence to express “a time,” “an occurrence,” “a casualty” or “occasion,” but is of the same import nearly as the English word *opportunity*, or “convenient time.” “*Occasio*,” says Cicero, “est pars temporis habens in se alicujus rei idoneam faciendi, aut non faciendi, opportunitatem.” *Cic. de Inv. lib. i.* In another passage he defines it thus: “Tempus autem actionis opportunum, Græce *ευκαιρία*, Latine appellatur *occasio*.” *Cic. Off. i. 40.* For the distinction between it and *tempus*, see *Cic. de Inv. lib. i.*

Aliquando means strictly “at one time or other,”

“some time or other,” and is applicable indefinitely to what is past, present, or future.—Referring to a past event, it denotes “once,” or “on one occasion,” without directly pointing to the time. “Veritus sum deesse Pompeii saluti, cum ille aliquando non defuisset meæ.” *Cic. Ep. Fam. vi. 6.* “Since he once had not been wanting.” *Quodam tempore* refers to a precise and definite time.

EXERCISE.

No man was ever milder than Scipio Africanus ; and yet, from an opinion, that some rigour was necessary for establishing military discipline, he was on one occasion cruel to his countrymen. For, after having conquered Carthage, and having reduced under his own power all those, who had gone over to the Carthaginians, he punished the Roman deserters with more severity, than the Latin. The former he crucified as runagates from their country, and the latter he beheaded as perfidious allies.

OBSERVATIONS.

TUM.

INDE.

IGITUR.

Tum, “then,” or “at that time,”—*inde, deinde*, “then,” or “after that,”—*Igitur, itaque*, “then,” or “therefore.” *Tum* is frequently used for *deinde*.

“Ubi tempus tibi erit, sat habet, si *tum* recipitur,” *Ter. Eun. iii. 2. 31.*—“An ego tibi obviam non pro-direm? primum Appio Claudio ; *deinde* Imperatori, *deinde* more majorum, *deinde* (quod caput est) amico ?” *Cic. Ep. lib. iii. 7.* “Fortes *igitur* sunt

habendi, non qui faciunt, sed qui propulsant injuriam." *Cic. Off.* i. 19.—"*Primum* igitur est de honesto, sed dupliciter; *tum* pari ratione de utili; post de comparatione eorum disserendum." *Cic. Off.* i. 4.

It may be here remarked, in passing, that *cum*, *tum*, strictly denoting two contemporaneous events, signify *both, and*; the former being generally applied to the less important of the two, and the words *etiam*, *vero*, *maxime*, *quoque*, *certe*, *denique*, *præcipue* often subjoined to the latter. "*Cum* omnes diligendi sunt, *tum* certe ii." *Cic. ad. Q. Fratrem*, i. 1. "*Cum* spe summa, *tum* etiam majore animo." *Id.*

Cum (*quum*), "when" generally governs the subjunctive mood; thus, "I was reading," *Legebam*.—"When I was reading," *Cum legerem*. The exceptions to this rule will be noticed afterwards.

EXERCISE.

When Porsena, king of the Hetrurians, was endeavouring to re-establish Tarquinius Superbus on his throne, and had taken the Janiculum at the first assault, Horatius Cocles, a man of the greatest courage, posted himself at the extremity of the Sublician bridge, and alone withstood the whole force of the enemy, till the bridge was broken down behind him. He then threw himself into the Tiber, and swam over to his friends, unhurt either by his fall, or the darts of the enemy.

OBSERVATIONS.

RENOVARE. REDINTEGRARE. INSTAURARE.

Renovare is "to renew," or "make new what is

old or disused.”—“*Renovatur* quod jam obsolevit.”—*Redintegrare* is “to make new and complete, what has been impaired.”—*Instaurare* (quasi *instar alterius facere*) “to renew or repeat the copy or impression.” “*Instauratur* id, cujus simile jam existit.” *Dumesnil*.—Macrobius (*Sat. lib. i. cap. 11.*) observes that Varro considers *instaurare* the same as *instanovare*.

Redintegrare implies more than *renovare*. “Ut renovetur, non redintegretur oratio”—*Auctor ad Herennium*.—*Renovare* frequently means nothing more than to revive, to resume any business which has been interrupted; “to begin it again,” (*denuo de novo*,) at the point where we left off.—*Redintegrare* generally means “to renew,” or “repeat from the beginning.”—“*Socii denuo in semet ipsos arma vexerunt.*” “*Sic, quasi ex integro, nova Macedoniae bella nascuntur.*” *Justin. xv. 4.* Here is evidently the same difference between *denuo* (*de novo*) and *ex integro*, as between *renovare* and *redintegrare*. The author qualifies *ex integro* “afresh,” with the modifying term *quasi*. *Denuo*, “anew,” or, “again,” implying merely recommencement, requires no modification. In many cases these verbs may be used indiscriminately, as in the following exercise. *Instaurare, renovare, redintegrare*, “bellum,” pugnam,” frequently occur in classic writers, expressing the same general idea of recommencement, or renewal.

Ne is elegantly used for *ut non*, as *Ne faceret, obsecravi*, “I besought him not to do it.” For *ne*

non, ut is elegantly used. *Cave, ut facias*, equivalent to *cave, ne non facias*. “Take care, that you do it.” We sometimes find both *ut* and *ne*, as “*ut nequis vellet ire.*” *Cic. Ep. Fam. i. 4.*

Suadere, dissuadere, are construed with the dative of the person, and the accusative of the thing. “*Gaudeo, te id mihi suadere.*” *Cic. Ep. ad Att. 15.*

It may be worthy of remark, that classical writers, in detailing speeches or observations, either express them in the words of the speakers themselves, introducing them with the word *inquit*, or in their own words, omitting the formality of the verb *dicere*, thus “Nunciate,” *inquit*, “*regi vestro, regem Romanum deos facere testes.*” *Liv. i. 22.* “*Illi omnium ignari terunt tempus; se invitos, quicquam, quod minus placeat Tullo, ducturos.*” *Liv. i. 22. dicentes* being omitted. As Cicero, however, uses *dicere* to express such observations, and as the formal phraeoslogy occurs in later writers, particularly in Suetonius, it may, without scruple, be adopted.

EXERCISE.

The Greeks, after the victory, determined to sail to the Hellespont, and to demolish the bridge, that the king might not escape. Themistocles dissuaded them from this, saying, that the king, being intercepted, would renew the battle; and that despair sometimes atchieves, what courage cannot. At the same time, he sent a eunuch to the king, acquainting him, that, if he did not escape quickly, the bridge would be demolished. Darius, therefore, fled; and Themistocles thus preserved the victory to the Athenians.

OBSERVATIONS.

Interrogatives, when preceded by such words as *scio*, *nescio*, *quæro*, *dubito*, are said to be taken indefinitely, and are joined to the subjunctive mood.—Thus, *Quid dixisti?* “What did you say?” *Nescio*, *quid dixerim*, “I know not, what I said.” *Ubinam es?* “Where are you?” *Ubinam sim*, *intelligo*. “I understand, where I am.”

TRANQUILLUS.

QUIETUS.

Tranquillus, “calm,” “smooth,” “unruffled.” “It is,” says Dumesnil, “properly applied to the sea; and is generally used, when we speak of things.” *Quietus*, “peaceable,” is applied to persons and things. This distinction of Dumesnil’s is accurate as far as it goes; but it is not sufficiently extensive. *Tranquillus* he has correctly and fully explained as denoting “smooth,” “calm,” “undisturbed”—and as applied to things; thus, “*Mare tranquillum*.” *Cic. pro Cluent.* “*Nox tranquilla*.” *Plin. ix. 27.* “*Locus tranquillus*.” *Plaut. Ep. iii. 4. 8.* His explanation of *quietus* is defective. It agrees with *tranquillus* in denoting “quiet,” “calm,” “undisturbed;” but differs from it in this, that it denotes also “quiet,” or “still,” free from that restlessness, uneasiness, or “desire of change,” which stimulates to motion or action.—*Tranquillus* has a meaning purely passive, denoting that the subject is not disturbed—not acted upon. *Quietus* implies also, that

it is not inclined to act. Hence, while the former applied to things, the latter is applied to persons also. “Epaminondas domi quietus fuit.” *Nepos in Pelop.* “He remained quiet at home.” “He took no concern in the commotions of the state.”—“*Studio partium,*” says Faber, “*et civili tumultu abstinuit.*” *Tranquillus* would denote, that he was tranquil, or not disturbed; but would not imply that “he was not inclined to act.”

—“Inprimis regina quietum
Accipit in Teucros animum, mentemque benignam.”

Virg. Æn. i. 307.

This expression denotes that the mind of the queen was peaceably disposed towards the Trojans, “not inclined to resist or molest them.”—The English word *peaceable* has, in like manner, an active or passive signification.

Again, it has been observed by some critics, that *quietus* is applied to the body only; and *tranquillus* to the mind.—This, as Doletus observes, is a distinction at once ridiculous, and false. *Animi quies*, and *animus quietus*, are expressions sanctioned by the best authority. But it is true, and deserves attention, as constituting another distinction between *quietus* and *tranquillus*, that the latter is never applied to the body, whereas the former is applicable both to body and mind. This distinction, indeed, might be inferred from the primary meaning of the two words, the latter implying “calm,” “unruffled,”

like a smooth sea ; the former “ enjoying a cessation from labour and trouble.”—A metaphorical application of the latter to the “ body ” would, therefore, be an absurdity.—“ *Tranquillo animo et quieto frui.*” *Cic. pro Sylla.*—“ *Vita tranquilla, quieta, et beata.*” *Cic. de Fin. lib. i.*

QUIS.

When *quis* is taken interrogatively, *quid* is more frequently used than *quod*; and when taken indefinitely, *quod* is very rarely employed. Perspicuity is consulted by an attention to this usage.

EXERCISE.

A *certain youth* had, for a long time, frequented the school of Zeno, the philosopher. When he returned home, his father asked him, what he had learned. The son modestly answered, that he would shew him that by his conduct. The father was grievously offended, and beat him. The son remained perfectly composed, and said: “ I have learned to bear a father’s anger with patience.”

OBSERVATIONS.

ITEM.	ITIDEM.	SICUT.	ADEO.
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These words agree in denoting similarity. *Item* means “ so,” “ also,” or “ in like manner,” but *not* denoting exact resemblance ; *itidem* “ exactly in the same way, both referring to what has been done, or said.” *Sicut* “ in such manner, in relation to what follows;” *adeo*, “ so far alike ” in reference

either to past or future, and pointing to the effect. *Quoque* and *etiam* “also” denote “in addition,” with no regard to parity or resemblance; “there-with.”

The adverb *ubi*, “where,” means “at,” or “in what place.” Hence the prepositions *at*, or *in*, before the name of a town, are signs of the question’s being made by *ubi*; and in such examples the name of the town is put in the genitive, unless it be of the third declension, or plural number, in which case it is expressed in the ablative, thus *Romæ*, “at Rome;” *Carthagine*, “at Carthage;” *Athenis*, “at Athens.” This genitive is considered to be under the government of *in urbe* understood; and therefore we cannot say *mortuus est Romæ, urbis nobilis*, which the junior scholar would naturally be inclined to do, but *urbe nobili*. “Ubi Corinthi, Achaiaë urbe, certos nuncios accepit.” *Tac. Hist.* ii. 1. It is to be observed, however, that the prepositions *at*, or *in*, are not always signs of the question *ubi*, or of motion, or rest in the place; and that the idiom of the English, and that of the Latin language do not, in this respect, precisely agree. Thus, we say, “Phaethon fell into the Po *in* Italy.” The Latins, more correctly perhaps, said, “Phaethon fell *into* Italy, into the Po.” *Phaethon præ timore in Padum in Italiam cecidit*. “Domitii filius transiit Formias, currens ad matrem Neapolim.” *Cic. Att.* ix. 3. “To his mother at (to) Naples.”

A similar difference of phraseology obtains, when

motion from a place is signified. Thus, "He removed from his farm at Capua into the island of Sardinia." *Capuâ ex agello in Sardiniam migravit.* That is, "He removed *from* Capua." The expression in English would lead the junior scholar to render it *Capuæ*, or *ad Capuam*, which latter phraseology could only be admitted, when the circumstance is expressed by a distinct clause, as *quem ad Capuam habebat.*

The adjectives, *primus, medius, ultimus, summus, imus, interior, intimus, extremus*, frequently denote, not the relative situation of the subject to which they refer, as either first, middle, last, &c.; but the first, middle, or last, part of the subject itself—thus *Medius mons*, means generally, "the middle part of the hill." *Imus mons*, "the bottom of the hill." *Interior insula*, "the inner part of the island." *Summa rupes*, "the top," or "highest part of the rock."

Amorem contrahere, for "to contract an attachment," occurs in modern Latin: of its accuracy some doubt may be justly entertained. Where the subject of the verb is the object of the affection, the expression is correct. We may say, *sibi invidiam, odium, benevolentiam, &c. contraxit.* Or where the affection, feeling, or habit is mutual, as *consuetudinem, familiaritatem, contrahere.* But, where the subject of the verb is not the object of the affection, or there is no mutual attraction, we question the correctness of the expression.

Inclamare est elata voce vocare.

EXERCISE.

In the reign of Augustus, a dolphin, it is said, contracted an attachment to the son of a poor man, who used to feed him with bits of bread. Every day the dolphin, when called by the boy, swam to the surface of the water; and, after being fed from his hand, carried the boy on his back from the shore at Baïæ to a school at Puteoli, and brought him back in the same manner. The boy having died, the dolphin coming several times to the usual place, and missing him, is said to have also died of grief.

OBSERVATIONS.

PRETER-IMPERFECT SUBJUNCTIVE.

In clauses introduced by *if*, or *as if*, implying a negation of the proposition expressed, present time, in English, is denoted in the conditional clause by the preterite tense, and past time by the pluperfect. When I say, “If I *have* the book, I will send it,” the meaning is clearly dubitative; and the expression implies, that I am uncertain, whether I have it, or have it not. When I say, “If I *had* the book, I would send it,” the meaning is, that I have it not; and the conditional clause, here equivalent to a negation, is expressed in the preterite tense, though the same time be implied, as in the preceding sentence. If past time is to be denoted, I say, “If I *had had* the book, I would have sent it.” Here the pluperfect is employed.

Thus also with “as if.”—“He fights, as if he *contended*,” or “*were contending* for his life.” Pre-

sent time is signified, and the two actions are evidently contemporaneous; yet the former verb is in the present, and the latter in the preterite tense. “He fought, as if he *had contended*,” or “*had been contending* for his life.” Here also the two actions are contemporaneous, and past time is implied; yet the former verb is in the preterite tense, and the latter in the pluperfect. This is not the case in Latin. The first of the two sentences would be rendered thus, *Pugnat, quasi pro vita contendat*. The actions being contemporaneous, are each expressed in the same tense, and time present being meant, the verbs are put in the present tense. The second sentence would be thus rendered, *Pugnavit, quasi contenderet*. Here also the actions are represented as contemporaneous and past, and the verbs are each in the preterite tense. The English idiom would suggest the use of the pluperfect in the latter clause. “*Quasi fundum vendam, meis me ad dicam legibus.*” *Plaut. Cap. i. 2. 78.* “As if I sold.”—“*Ædes confulgebant, quasi essent aureæ.*” *Plaut. Amph. v. 1. 44.* “The house shone, as if it had been of gold.” In Latin, the two circumstances, with a strict attention to the nature of the proposition, are expressed as co-existent, or contemporaneous. In English, the one is expressed, as if prior to the other.

When the actions are not contemporaneous, the prior is expressed in the preterite tense, if the other be expressed in the present; and, if both actions be past, the subsequent action is expressed in the preterite,

and the one preceding it, in the pluperfect. “*Jam nunc times, quasi nunquam adfu-eris, nunquam tute pepereris.*” *Ter. Ad. iii. 1. 3.* “As if you had never been present, as if you yourself had never borne a child.” The circumstances here are not supposed to be contemporary, the “being present,” and “the bearing,” being prior to “the fearing.” Nor, in the following sentence are the actions contemporary; “*Medico (dedisti) tria milla jugerum, quasi te sanasset; rhetori duo, quasi disertum facere potuisset.*” *Cic. Phil. 2. ad fin.* This mode of expression is very generally observed by good writers. It recommends itself, in truth, by its subserviency to perspicuity. Aurelius Victor, from whom the following Exercise is taken, employs the pluperfect after *quasi* *, the two circumstances being considered as contemporary, and the preceding verb being in the pluperfect tense. But, even in such cases as this, the preterimperfect tense is far preferable, as more conducive to perspicuity, and far more common. For *quasi accepisset* might imply, that “the receiving” was prior to “the sitting;” instead of being contemporary with it †.

* Schottus reads *acciperet*.

† The pluperfect tense, whether used indicatively or subjunctively, cannot be employed, consistently with its true and proper character, unless to express an action or event perfected, antecedently to another event, also perfected. The distinction is clearly marked, in English, by *have* and *had*. “I have taught,” or “I taught,” and “I had taught,” are expressions which precisely note the relation between a preterperfect and a preterpluperfect action. When a learned reviewer, therefore, proposes

The verb *Credo* is thus construed. The person to whom credit is given, or who is believed as speaking, is put in the dative : as *Credo tibi*, “ I believe

the following sentence as correct, “ Plataenses ad paludem olim habitasse, noster affirmat ; in locum autem meliorem translatos novæ urbi nomen priscum continuasse, situi licet ab aquis remoto haud diutius competisset.” (*Ed. Rev. No. 28.*) he connects tenses, which are incongruous—tenses, which, neither consistently with their own essential character, nor with the usage of good writers, can possibly harmonise. The reader will observe, that the verb *affirmat* is in the present tense—that the verb *continuasse*, referring to *affirmat*, and expressing its subject, is in the preterite, and not the preterpluperfect tense (“ continued,” not “ had continued,”) and that the “ unsuitableness,” though it, doubtless, existed antecedently to the continuation, is to be here predicated, as contemporaneous with it, and yet not preventing the “ continuation.” This is evidently the fact to be expressed ; and yet the author has represented a prior “ unsuitableness,” and which, according to his expression, had ceased to exist, as a circumstance which might, though it did not, influence the “ continuation.” The tense, as the Oxford critic gives it, should be the preterimperfect subjunctive. Nothing could justify *competisset*, but *affirmavit*, instead of *affirmat*. Then *continuasse* would be preterpluperfect ; and there are not wanting examples, which, in this case, would sanction *competisset*, though even then *competeret* would be more agreeable to general usage. An error of a similar kind is involved in his defence of the expression. He says, “ In an oblique narration, or statement, in the person of one who *had* long ceased to exist, events co-existent with him *are* to be expressed in the imperfect ; and those preceding him in the pluperfect tense subjunctive.” It should evidently be, “ Who has long ceased.” To justify “ had,” congruity of tense would require “ were to be expressed,” which would, contrary to the intention of the writer, convert a general proposition into a particular fact. The principle of this defence, it is apprehended, is

you." The thing believed, or the object of belief, is put in the accusative, as *Credo hanc rem*, "I believe this thing." It is sometimes construed with an accusative and dative. "Auditis si quicquam credimus." *Virg. Æn. viii. 140.* "If we give any credit to what we have heard."

An article of faith is by modern writers expressed with *in*; as *Credo in Deum*, "I believe in God," that is, "in the existence of God."—*Credo in immortalitatem animi*, "I believe in the immortality of the soul." But such phraseology is unclassical, and totally unworthy of imitation.—*Credo esse Deum*—*Credo animum esse immortalem*, are the classical expressions.

It deserves the attention of the junior reader, that the person, who is believed as speaking, cannot be made the nominative to the verb in the passive voice, because put in the dative after the active verb; but the person believed, as spoken of, may become the nominative to the passive verb. Thus, "I (as speaking) am believed," must not be rendered *Ego credor*, but *Mihi creditur*. The former expression would imply, that *ego* is the subject of opinion or belief, not the person to whom credit is given. Thus, *Ille creditur dixisse*, "He is believed to have said."—"Fortunam matris—ut serva natus crederetur, fecisse." *Liv. i. 39.*

erroneous, the subordinate tenses being dependent on that of the principal verb: but, were the rule admitted to be, in every respect correct, it would not justify the expression of the reviewer.

The reader has been already informed, how he ought to render *at*, or *in*, before the name of a town, the question being made by *ubi*; but he must observe, that, when *at* means, not *in*, but *near*, it must be rendered by *ad*.—Thus, *Londini* means “at,” or “in London.” *Ad Londinum*, “at,” or “near London.”

Before, when it precedes a verb, is rendered by *antequam*, *priusquam*; but when it is followed by a noun singly, or a noun with an adjective or participle, it is rendered by *ante*. Thus, “before the city was built.”—*Antequam*, or *Priusquam urbs condita est*—or *Ante urbem conditam*. The same observation is applicable to *post* and *postquam*, thus, “after he came.” *Postquam venit*, or *Post adventum*—*Post advenit* would mean, “He came afterwards,” *post* being here an adverb, and synonymous with *postea*. “After the kings were banished,” *Post reges exactos*, or *Postquam exacti sunt reges**.

* There are two ambiguities in English, occasioned by the improper use of the words *after* and *after that*, against which we take this opportunity of guarding the junior reader. We frequently meet with such expressions as, “A few days after he arrived,” “A few weeks after he died.” These expressions are ambiguous. They may signify either, that he arrived, or that he died, a few days or weeks after some time or event previously mentioned; or that some event took place, a few days or weeks after his arrival, or after his death. If the former meaning be intended, it is usual to make the distinction by a comma, separating *after* from the subsequent clause. This is a very insufficient provision against misconception; the meaning should not be left to depend on punctuation. If the former of the two senses be intended, the substitution of *afterwards* for *after* precludes the ambiguity.

It

EXERCISE.

Publius Scipio, surnamed Africanus from the conquest of Africa, is believed to have been the son of Jupiter. For, before he was conceived, a serpent of huge size appeared in his mother's bed; and, when he was an infant, a snake, having twisted itself round him, did not do him any harm. He never undertook any expedition, till he had sitten for some time in the chair of Jupiter, as if he had been receiving divine counsel. When he was eighteen years of age, he saved the life of his father at Ticinum; and, when he was twenty-four years old, he was sent to Spain in the capacity of prætor, and took Carthage, on the very day, on which he arrived.

OBSERVATIONS.

REPETUNDÆ.

Repetundæ, sciz. *pecuniæ*, denotes "extortion."
—"Clames, te lege repetundarum pecuniarum non

It was common, as we find in several old translations, to render such expressions as *Postquam abiit*, "After that he departed." And we occasionally still meet with a similar ambiguity; the meaning being allowed to depend on a comma. The English expression may, according to the punctuation, be rendered either by *Postquam abiit*, or *Postea abiit*; and in reading, its meaning could be determined only by laying, or omitting, the emphasis on the word *that*.—If his departure was *subsequent* to some circumstance previously mentioned, the word *that* may be retained, or, with more precision, the word *afterwards* substituted. "Afterwards he departed," *Postea abiit*. But if the meaning be the reverse of this, and if it be intended to signify that his departure was *antecedent* to some circumstance afterwards related, the word *that* should be omitted. "After he departed," *Postquam abiit*. The same observations are applicable to *before*, and *before that*. And

teneri." *Cic. pro Cluent.* It is thus defined by a learned critic, "*Repetundæ* fuerunt, quas sive socii, sive cives privati, a magistratibus, aut publicis curatoribus judicio repetiverunt, quas illi aut in provincia, aut in urbe, aut ob jus dicendum, aut ob judicandum, aut ob aliud aliquid publice curandum, cepissent." *Pitisc. Lex. Ant. Rom.* In the latter ages of the Roman state, this crime was punished by exile.

ABSOLUTE CASE *.

The junior reader may require to be informed, that, in English, the absolute case is the nominative,

in reference to this adverb, we may be excused, if we remark in passing, a mode of expression, which sometimes occurs even in reputable English writers, but more frequently in colloquial language, and which seems objectionable, if not absolutely absurd. Thus we hear it said, "He died before he signed his will," "He fell a sacrifice to his valour, before he beheld the fruits of his victory." When two events, or two actions, not simultaneous, are stated, we may properly say, that the one has taken place, or will take place, before the other, it being clearly understood, that each *will be*, or *has been*. Thus, "He decamped, before the enemy arrived." Here are two events, each perfected, a prior and a posterior. But in the former mode of expression an event is signified, as antecedent to a past event, which event never happened. A relation of antecedence and sequence is indicated, where there was no consequent. We should say, "he died without signing," or "not having signed his will."

* *Absolute* is opposed to *relative*. An absolute mode in logic is that, which belongs to its subject, without any reference to any other being; and a case is called *absolute*, which has no syntactical relation to any other word in the sentence. The term, therefore, though confined to an independent substantive with a

and in Latin the ablative. Thus, “ the Romans being conquered by the Carthaginians, Hannibal marched

participle, is, in truth, applicable to any noun or verb having no grammatical connection with any other part of the sentence, and under the government of a word not expressed, but understood. For it is to be carefully observed, that though the word be, in one respect, absolute and independent, because it bears no syntactical relation to any other word in the sentence, it is not, therefore, to be inferred that the word is under no government whatever. Thus, when we say, *Die quarto domum rediit*, *die* is governed by *in* understood. *Multo labore peregit*, that is, *cum labore*. So likewise in respect to the ablative absolute. It is, in fact, governed by some preposition understood, as *ab*, *in*, *sub* ; and, in some cases, we find the preposition expressed. Sanetius, therefore, objects to the term *absolute*, as inapplicable.

Mr. Jones, in his Latin Grammar, reduces the ablative absolute under the general rule, by which the cause is expressed in the ablative. “ Grammarians,” he observes, “ call this form the absolute case—a term which conveys no meaning, or an erroneous meaning ; for, so far from being absolute or independent of the rest of the sentence, the clause is so connected with what goes before, or what comes after, as a cause is with its effect. And the reason why it is put in the ablative is, that the ablative is the case, which expresses the cause or medium, by which an effect is produced.” *Jones’s Latin Grammar*.

When the term *absolute* or *independent* is applied to the ablative case, with a participle joined to it, the term is used, not in a logical, but a grammatical sense ; and the meaning is, not that the idea or sentiment has no relation to the context, but that the word has no syntactical connection, either by concord or government, with any other clause of the sentence. And it is of importance here to observe, that ideas may be logically connected, when their signs have no grammatical relation whatever. From a logical connection, therefore, a grammatical dependence or relation by no means follows as a necessary consequence. But let

to Capua." In English, *the Romans* joined to the participle *being* is in the nominative case; but in

us inquire whether it be true, as the author assumes, that the idea itself is logically reducible under the notion of *Cause*. When Eutropius says, "Quo (Ser. Tullio) regnante, Balthasar imperabat Chaldæis," are we to understand, that the *Quo regnante* was either directly or indirectly the cause of the fact stated in the succeeding member of the sentence? Are we to understand, that Belshazzar reigned at Babylon, because Servius reigned at Rome? or when Livy says, "Anco regnante, Lucumo Romam commigravit," is it to be understood, that the reign of Ancus was, in any sense whatever, the cause of Lucumo's removal, or the medium by which it was effected? Or, if we say, "Cicerone hæc verba faciente, Catilina curiam ingressa est," are we conceived to signify, that Cicero's words were the cause of Catiline's entrance? When Livy says, "Direptis bonis regum, damnati sunt proditores," ii. 5, does he mean to inform us, that the plunder of the king's property was the cause of the traitor's condemnation? I candidly own myself totally ignorant, what is the relation between cause and effect, if any such idea is conveyed in any of the passages, which have been now adduced. In the three first is expressed the *contemporaneity* of two events, and in the last the priority of one event to another; but no other relation whatever is predicated. The resolution of the ablative with its participle, by *cum*, *dum*, and *postquam*, appears incontrovertibly to evince, that its general office cannot possibly be to express the cause, though this may occasionally and inferentially be denoted by it. When it is resolved by *dum*, the noun is under the government of *in* understood, and the expression denotes the relation of contemporaneity. As *Eo ita loquente, frater ingressus est*, that is, *In eo*. When it is resolvable by *Postquam*, the noun is governed by *a* or *ab* understood, and the expression denotes the relation of priority, as "After he had taken the city, he returned home." *Urbe capta domum rediit*, that is, *Ab urbe capta*, equivalent to *Post urbem captam*, *ab* frequently having

Latin would be put in the ablative: and the noun being syntactically independent on any word in the sentence, the Latin case, in which it is put, is called, therefore, the ablative absolute. But, though an independent substantive, joined to a participle, be generally thus rendered in Latin, it is sometimes, with peculiar elegance and precision, put under the government of the verb in the succeeding clause. Thus, "Having taken Regulus prisoner, they sent him to Carthage," *Regulum captum Carthaginem miserunt*. Here *Regulum* is the regimen of *miserunt*. There are not wanting examples to justify another phraseology, namely, *Regulo capto, eum Carthaginem miserunt*. The latter form of expression, however, is much less precise; for it does not so clearly signify, that the person taken, was also the person sent. The pronoun *eum* might refer to some other person. "Comprehensos Volscos Romam duxere." *Liv. ii. 22.*—"Hav-

the meaning of *post*. And, when the participle *existente* is supposed to be understood, the ablative is under the government of *sub* understood, thus, *Cæsare duce*, that is, *Sub Cæsare duce*. The preposition is sometimes expressed, as, "Nullo sub teste canebat." (*Juv. Sat. xv. 26.*)

Milton has used, sometimes the nominative, and sometimes, it would seem, the objective case, as absolute; and Bentley, while he has once corrected him when wrong, has repeatedly censured him when right.

"God from the mount of Sinai, whose gray top
Shall tremble, *He descending.*" *P. L. xii. 227.*

Bentley would erroneously substitute *Him*, with nothing to govern it, either expressed, or understood.

ing seized the Volsci, they carried them to Rome." Here there is much more precision of expression, than if he had said, *Volscis comprehensis, eos Romanam duxere*.

The following expression of Livy is peculiarly precise and elegant. "Puero dormienti, cui Servio Tullio nomen fuit, caput arsisse ferunt." *Liv. i. 39*. If he had said, "Puero dormiente,—ejus caput arsisse ferunt," it would not have been clearly denoted, that *puero* and *ejus* both referred to the same person. If he had said, *pueri dormientis*, it would have less directly conveyed the idea, that the singular circumstance happened to the boy. Examples, however, of a different phraseology occur in reputable authors, thus; "Convocatis suis clientibus, facile incendit." *Cæs. B. G. vii. 4*. "Magno coacto numero, in omnes partes dimittit." *Cæs. B. G. vi. 43*.

Verbs of accusing, condemning, and acquitting, take the ablative, but more frequently the genitive of the crime, or punishment, by an ellipsis of *crimine* or *pœna*. Thus, we say, *damnare mortis, damnare furti, damnare capite*. *Damnare* is sometimes joined to the dative, of what the person or thing is condemned or destined to; but by the poets chiefly. "Phariæ busto damnantur arenæ. *Lucan, ii. 733*. "The sands of Egypt are destined for his grave." When the dative is a person, it means *damnando subjicere—addicere*, thus, "Debitori suo sæpe creditor damnatur." *Sen. de Con. vi. 4*. "The interest of the creditor is sacrificed to the debtor."

When the question is made by *quo*, “whither,” or “to what place,” the name of a town is put in the accusative; thus *Romam*, “to Rome;” *Carthaginem*, “to Carthage.” The sign of this question is *to*. *Domus* and *rus* are construed in the same way as names of towns;—as *domi*, “at home;” *rure* or *ruri*, “in the country;” *domum*, “home,” i. e. “to home;” *rus*, “to the country;” *domo*, *rure*, “from home,” “from the country.” *Domus*, signifying “a house,” is construed like other substantive nouns, and takes the prepositions, significant of motion or rest in the place, motion to the place, and motion from the place. We find it, however, sometimes without a preposition, denoting “a house.” “Cum prima luce Pomponii domum venisse dicitur,” *Cic. Off.* 3. 31. “to the house of Pomponius.” And, when it is joined with any of the possessive pronouns, or *alienus*, it is almost uniformly so construed, as *meæ domi*, “at my house,” *nostram domum*, “to our house,” *aliena domo*, “from another’s house.”

EXERCISE.

A young lady of very great beauty, whom he had taken captive in the war, he forbade to be brought into his presence; and ordered her to be restored to her father and her lover. Having defeated Hasdrubal and Mago, the brothers of Hannibal, he drove them out of Italy, and formed an alliance with Syphax, king of the Mauritians. Having returned home victorious, he was elected consul before he was of the legal age; and, being sent into Africa, he conquered Hannibal, who had been compelled to return to Carthage, for

the defence of his country. Being falsely accused of extortion by Petillius, the tribune, he went into voluntary exile, where he spent the remainder of his days.

OBSERVATIONS.

It has been already remarked, that every purpose, intention, or effect, is expressed by *ut*. It may now be observed, that the purpose is frequently expressed by *ad*, as “Ad sedandos motus.” *Liv.* iii. 50. “For the purpose of quelling the mutiny.” Tacitus frequently employs the dative case, contrary to the practice of the Augustan age. “Tiberius, quasi firmandæ valetudini, in Campaniam concessit.” *Ann.* iii. 31.

The following phraseologies deserve attention. “He sent ambassadors to sue for peace.” *Misit legatos, petere pacem* (male). *Pacem petendæ causa* (mediocriter). *Ad pacem petendum* (melius).—*Pacem petitum* (bene). *Pacis petendæ causa* (admodum bene). *Ad pacem petendam. Qui pacem peterent* (elegant).

The infinitive mood frequently supplies the place of a nominative to a verb in the indicative, or subjunctive mood, and also of an accusative before an infinitive mood; thus, “It is easy to complain.” *Facile est queri*.—Here *queri* is the nominative to *est*—“to complain is easy, or an easy thing.”—“We know, that it is easy to complain.” *Scimus, facile esse queri*—or, “that to complain is easy.”—Here *queri* supplies the place of an accusative before *esse*. When

it stands for a nominative, or an accusative, it admits an adjective, in concord with it. “*Scire tuum nihil est?*” *Pers.* i. 27. “Is your knowledge nothing?” This form of expression, however, is not common in prose.

When the infinitive, as being the nominative to a verb, has a substantive joined with it, and together constituting the subject, or the predicate, the substantive is put in the accusative case. “*Nescire autem, quid antequam natus sis, accidisset, id est semper esse puerum.*” *Cic. de Orat.* *Te nescire* is the nominative and subject before *est*, represented afterwards by *id*; and *te esse puerum*, the nominative and predicate after. The following passage from Tacitus, I cannot, therefore, reconcile with either usage, or analogy. “*Quod ubi auditum, et languescere ira, redire amor, ac, si cunctarentur, propinqua nox, et uxorii cubiculi memoria, timebantur.*”

If “*languescere ira*,” and “*redire amor*,” formed each a sentence, or an independent member of a sentence, by a common ellipsis, the expressions would accord with usage, and the meaning would be, “His anger abated, and his love returned.” But here each expression constitutes a subject to “*timebantur*,” and the sense intended is, “The abatement of his anger, and the return of his love, were feared.” It appears to me, that usage and analogy required, *languescere iram, redire amorem*. *Viderint doctiores.*

In the following Exercise the same idiomatical expression occurs, “as if he had been carrying on,” which has been already explained. (See p. 56.)

In metaphysical strictness, no words expressive of nihility, admit any intensive word, or any word implying degrees to be joined to them, for *nothing* cannot be made either greater, or less. The Latins, however, in order to render the expression stronger, occasionally deviated from this rule. Thus, “*Usque adeo nihil est?*” *Juv.* iii. 84. “Is it of so little value?” Our phraseology is the more correct; theirs the more forcible. “We know, how insignificant he is.” *Scimus, quam nullus sit.*

EXERCISE.

Xerxes, before the naval engagement, in which he was defeated by Themistocles, had sent four thousand armed men to Delphi, to plunder the temple of Apollo; just as if he had been carrying on war, not only with the Greeks, but also with the immortal Gods. This body of men was entirely destroyed by rain and thunder. Historians say, that this was done, in order that he might understand, how insignificant is the strength of men against the immortal Gods. The wicked forget, that to war against Heaven is to court their own destruction.

OBSERVATIONS.

Cum—a Conjunction.

It has been already observed, that Mr. Ruddiman has, in one instance, confounded the subjunctive with

the potential mood. Various other examples might be produced, in which he, and, indeed, most of our grammarians, have committed the same error.

It has been observed also, that this mood has two different names, as it has two distinct uses, potential, and subjunctive. When the meaning is contingent, that is, when the sense requires this form, the mood is then strictly potential, as, *Doceam*, “I may teach.” Here the verb is not affected, as to its mood, by any antecedent word. But if we say, *Quod doceam*, “Because I teach,” the verb is under the government of the conjunction *quod*, and were it not for this conjunction, the English being indicative, the verb would be put in the indicative mood. In this example, therefore, the verb is strictly in the subjunctive mood, this form being used, not because the sense requires it, for the English is indicative, but because it is subjoined to the conjunction *quod*.

A strict attention to this distinction is indispensably necessary in all questions, that regard the modal government of adverbs and conjunctions ; for thus only can it be rightly understood, whether the mood be employed, as being under the government of some preceding particle, or whether the import of the clause require that mood. In the two following sentences, for example, it might be, and, indeed, has been supposed, by no contemptible critic, that the verb in each is in the subjunctive mood, and under the government of *cum*, whereas it is the sense, and not the adverb, by which the mood of the verb is deter-

mined, which is here, therefore, properly called potential. “Versabatur mihi tempus illud ante oculos, cum ille aut lictores dimitteret, aut vi avelleretur ex complexu meo.” *Cic. ad Att.* iii. 9. The meaning of the clause is, “When he *would* either dismiss the lictors, or *would* be torn.”—“Hunc videre sæpe optabamus diem, cum ex te esset aliquis, qui te appellaret patrem.” *Ter. Hec.* iv. 4, 30.—“When there *should* be some one.” In neither of these sentences, is the mood of the verb affected by the preceding particle. The distinction here suggested, I would the more earnestly recommend to the attention of the reader, as few, if any, of our grammarians seem to have perceived it. Ruddiman, whose accuracy is pre-eminent in every question which he discusses, appears, in this instance, not to have exercised his usual sagacity.

Having premised these observations, I proceed to consider when *Cum* ought to be joined to the indicative, and when to the subjunctive mood. Concerning its regimen, as a conjunction, grammarians are pretty nearly agreed.

Cum taken for *quoniam*, or *quandoquidem*, “since,” is very generally joined to the subjunctive mood.—“Cum Athenas *sis* profectus.” *Cic.* “As, or since, you are gone to Athens.”—“Cum *amet* aliam, non est utile hanc illi dari.” *Ter. Ad.* iii. 2, 43. “Cum autem duobus modis, id est, aut vi aut fraude, *fiat* injuria.” *Cic. de Off.* i. 13. “Quod cum ita *sit*.” *Cic. Off.* lib. iii. 3. It is sometimes, though rarely, in this sense joined with the indicative, “Quandoquidem

ipse est ingenio bono, cumque huic *veritus est* optumæ adolescenti facere injuriam." *Ter. And.* iii. 2, 7. Linacer errs, when he asserts, that *cum* for *quoniam* is always joined with the subjunctive mood.

Cum taken for *quod*, "because,"* generally takes the indicative mood. "Ego redigam vos in gratiam hoc fretus, cum e medio *excessit*." *Ter. Phor.* v. 7, 77. Trusting to this circumstance, "that," or "because." "Diis gratias ago, cum tantum literæ meæ potuerunt." *Cic. Fam. Ep.* xiii. 24.

Cum taken for *etsi* "although," is, I believe, uniformly joined with the subjunctive mood. "Cui cum Cato et Caninius intercessissent, tamen est perscripta." *Cic. Ep.* i. 2. "Itaque in vestitu, cum dissimillima *sit* virilis toga tunicæ muliebri, stola pallio, tamen inæqualitatem hanc sequitur nihilominus." *Varro de ling. Lat.* lib. ix. In the following sentence it is used absolutely. "Nec enim ullum hoc frigidius flumen attingi, cum ad multa accesserim." *Cic. de Leg.* lib. ii.

When I express my belief, that *cum*, taken for *etsi*, is uniformly joined with the subjunctive mood, I am aware, that examples occur in some editions of

* *Since* and *because* may, in many cases, be used indiscriminately, without injury to the sense; but they are not words of precisely the same import. "Will you not go, because I have commanded you?" and "Will you not go, since I have commanded you?" (Bible) are by no means equivalent expressions. The former means, "Is my commanding it, your reason for not going?" The latter, "Is not my commanding it a sufficient argument for your going?"

the Classics, in which it is found joined to the indicative mood. The genuineness, however, of those readings, by which the conjunction is thus construed, may be justly suspected; and, by several critics of acknowledged erudition, the subjunctive form has been preferred.

Cum—an Adverb.

Cum, taken as an adverb, says Mr. Ruddiman, is sometimes joined to the indicative, but most commonly with the subjunctive mood. If this rule imply, that *cum* may be construed with the indicative or subjunctive mood indifferently, the rule, if not chargeable with error, justifies a usage inconsistent with the best established phraseology; for *cum*, as an adverb, is in certain cases, by good writers, uniformly joined with the indicative mood. If the rule import, that in some instances it ought to be joined with the indicative, and in others with the subjunctive mood, the rule is correct, but it wants precision. The scholar should be informed, in what cases it should be construed with the one, and not the other, and in what cases with either.

Mr. Ruddiman seems also, in two of his examples, to have mistaken the indicative for the subjunctive mood. “*Cum faciam vitula, pro frugibus, ipse venito.*” *Virg. Ecl. iii.* *Faciam* he considers here to be under the government of *cum*, and in the subjunctive mood; to me it appears rather to be the future of the indicative; and for these reasons: 1st. The event is clearly future; “When I shall sacrifice, or be sacri-

ficings." It may be translated, indeed, "When I am sacrificing"; but this idiom, by which we express a future event by the present tense, though common in English, occurs very rarely in Latin, and chiefly in dramatic writers. Thus, "When I am gone," is expressed in Latin by the future perfect, *Ubi ego abiero*. "When he is come," *Cum ille venerit*. "When I teach, you shall learn," *Cum ego docebo, tu disces*. An inattention to this difference of idiom occasions such inaccuracies as the following: "*Cum moriuntur, habitabunt cum Deo*." Here a future event is improperly expressed in the present tense, connected as it is with another future event. Had the sentiment been given as a general proposition, the present would have been admissible: but the following verb must have been in the same tense.

2dly. It is in such examples, as the passage in question, that the adverb *cum* is, I believe, uniformly joined with the indicative mood. This shall be afterwards shewn by a variety of examples. And I am inclined to think, that, had Virgil intended to express the act of sacrificing in the present tense, he would not have deviated from common usage, by joining *cum*, in the sense in which it is here used, with the subjunctive mood. I conceive, therefore, that *faciam* is in the future tense indicative, and that the example is similar to the following: "*Cum tu horum nihil refelles, vincam scilicet*." *Ter. Ph. i. 2. 81*. "When you disprove, or shall disprove, none of these things."

In the other example, and also in one quoted

from Rhenius, he mistakes an indicative for a subjunctive tense. “Carmina tum mollius, cum *venerit* ipse, canemus.” *Virg. Ecl.* ix. “Vereor ne exeundi potestas non sit, cum Cæsar *venerit*.” *Cic.*—Both these are adduced as examples of *cum* joined with the subjunctive mood. Now it appears to me demonstrable, that the Latins have no future subjunctive, and that its place is, in all cases, supplied by the future participle, and the verb *sum*. The tense, which is commonly called the future subjunctive, belongs, strictly, to the indicative mood. Its signification is purely assertive. No contingency, no conditionality, is denoted by it. Not a single example can be produced, in which this tense occurs as subjunctive. In the passages now quoted, perfect action is clearly implied; and *venero* would be used to denote a future action completed, whether *cum*, or any other particle, had, or had not, preceded it. When Geta says, “Ubi ego hinc abiero,” *Ter. Ph.* i. 2. 93., will it be said, that *abiero* is in the subjunctive mood, and under the government of *ubi*? This surely will not be affirmed; for not one example can be produced in which *ubi*, unless taken indefinitely, or where there is an ellipsis, is joined to the subjunctive mood.—*Venerit*, therefore, is not under the government of *cum*; it is the sense, and not the particle, which requires the tense in question, which, as has been just now remarked, belongs to the indicative mood, and has been very properly characterized by the name of *Futurum Exactum*, or, “Future Perfect.” It bears the same relation to the

future indicative, as the preterpluperfect does to the preterimperfect, and as the preterite, definitely considered, bears to the present. According to this view of the subject, the tenses harmonize one with another, and the closest analogy is observable among them. Thus we have, “I read,” or “am reading,” and “I have read,” *Lego—Legi*; “I was reading,” and “I had read,” *Legebam—Legeram*; “I shall be reading,” and “I shall have read,” *Legam—Legero*. The latter of each pair implies the perfection of the action, and has the same positive and assertive meaning as the former. The proper character, therefore, of this tense, in respect to affirmation, is indicative; in respect to time, future; and in regard to action, perfect. Its distinctive name, therefore, is the future perfect indicative.

Rhenius, Ursinus, and Schmidius, give the three following rules for the government of *cum*.

1st. *Cum*, for “When,” in an absolute sense, takes the present indicative, the future indicative, and the future subjunctive. Had these learned critics perceived, that the future subjunctive is, in fact, an indicative tense, they would have rendered their rule more simple, and more consistent with propriety. For to give as a rule, that *cum*, taken absolutely, is joined with the indicative, and also with the subjunctive, in one and the same sense, though it specifies the tenses of each, is but little calculated to promote precision of idea, or to establish a clear and consistent principle. The fact, however, which these learned

critics state, furnishes a strong presumption, that what is commonly called the future subjunctive is, in truth, an indicative tense.

2dly. That when the adverb *cum* answers to the German words *als*, or *da*, “as,” “when,” or “while,” it governs the subjunctive mood.

3dly. If any mention be made of any time generally or specially, it admits any tense of the indicative mood.

The two last rules are correct; but the first is not sufficiently comprehensive: for *cum*, taken absolutely, admits also the imperfect indicative, as “Cum aliquid videbatur caveri posse, tum id negligi dolebam.” *Cic. Ep. Fam. lib. xxii.* And likewise the preterite, as “Cum vero prope ad manus ventum est, tum jam a propinquo hostis et impetus propulsandus, et clamore terrendus est.” *A. Gell. i. 11.* “Cum patriam amisi, tum me periisse putato.” *Ov. Trist. iii. 3.* It is to be observed also, that these rules, taken as a whole, are defective, *cum* being often joined to the indicative mood, when the sense is not absolute, and when no time is mentioned, either specially or generally. Of *cum* taken for *postquam* the learned critics are silent.

Noltenius more comprehensively gives the following rules: “*Cum* (he observes), for *quando*, *quo tempore*, *quoties*, takes the present, the preterite, and the future indicative; for *postquam*, and *ex quo* the present and preterite of the same mood, or the imperfect and pluperfect subjunctive, rarely the same tenses in-

dicative ; and when any time is noted, either specially or generally, it takes the indicative mood.”*

* Mr. Greenlaw, of whose work on the subjunctive mood I shall have occasion to speak hereafter, delivers it as a rule, “ that, when *cum* is attached to the subject, the indicative mood should be used ; and that the subjunctive is employed, when the conjunction is attached to the predicate. It may be given,” he says, “ also, as a general rule, that the efficient cause, since it expresses something antecedent to the action, is generally to be attached to the subject ; and the final cause, which expresses something, consequent to the action, is always to be attached to the predicate.” That the cause precedes the effect, is an abstract and immutable truth. Now, if this relation be the reason, and as far as it appears, the only reason assigned by the author, why the efficient cause is attached to the subject, and if this relation be universally and necessarily true, it may be asked, why is the author’s rule only generally, and not universally just? In regard to the final cause, he maintains its universality ; why not also in respect to the efficient cause? Either the principle, which he assumes, is false, or his rule in both cases, ought to be universally true ; or he ought to shew, why it is universally true in the one case, and only generally in the other. But let us look at the principle itself, and I apprehend, it will be found gratuitous, and inadmissible. For the predicate surely cannot in the nature of things, be more intimately connected with its effect, than it is with its cause. Why then the conjunctive clause should be attached to the subject in the one case, and to the predicate in the other, I candidly own, I do not comprehend. Farther ; it appears to me, that it is impossible to reconcile the author with himself. I have quoted the following passage from Terence : “ Ego redigam vos in gratiam, hoc fretus, Chreme, cum e medio excessit, unde hæc suscepta est tibi.” “ The clause,” he observes, “ expresses something antecedent, which induced the hope in Demipho’s mind, that he should succeed.” The conjunctive clause, then, expressing the

For the direction of the junior reader in the adverbial use of *cum*, we subjoin the following observations :

1st. *Cum* is joined to the indicative mood, when cause of his attempting, or his hope of success in attempting, to restore Chremes into his wife's favour, the author connects with the subject, and thus accounts for the indicative mood, in consistence with his theory. But how is this to be reconciled with a subsequent position, advanced by the author, namely, that, when *cum* expresses "not simply time, but the cause or occasion of the predicate, it is to be attached to the predicate?" Referring to the passage in Cæsar, "*Cum civitas, ob eam rem incitata, armis jus suum exequi conaretur, Orgetorix mortuus est.*" *B. G. i. 4*, he says, that *cum* here takes the subjunctive mood, because the endeavour of the state to assert its authority was the cause of Dumnorix's death, or at least hastened it. This seems to me to be straining language, in order to subserve a theory. Whatever was the fact, Cæsar says merely, that Dumnorix died. He does not say, that he committed suicide, unless we are unwarrantably to consider the indirect statement of a rumoured suspicion, as equivalent to the assertion of a positive fact. Nay, Cæsar, as if desirous, that the suspicion should not be imputed to him, introduces the protecting clause, "*ut Helvetii arbitrantur.*" The author's construction of the passage appears, therefore, to me to be unwarranted and incorrect. By this construction, however, be it observed, he accounts for the use of the subjunctive mood. But, if we were even to admit the accuracy of this construction, the learned author's consistency comes next into question. How is it, we ask, that *cum* with its clause, here expressing something antecedent, which "induced" Dumnorix's death, is to be attached to the predicate, and have the verb subjunctive; and that *cum* with its clause in the passage from Terence, expressing something antecedent, which "induced" Demipho's hope, should be attached to the subject, and have the verb in the indicative mood? How are these con-

it is taken for *quoties*, or *quandocunque*, “as often as,” or “whenever.”—“Cum prospero ejus flatu utimur, ad exitus pervehimur optatos, et cum reflavit, affligimur.” *Cic. Off.* ii. 6. “Quotidianis præliis cum Germanis contendunt, cum aut suis finibus eos prohibent, aut ipsi in eorum finibus bellum gerunt.” *Cæs. B. G.* i. 1. “Cum audio ad te ire aliquem, literas ad te dare soleo.” *Cic.* “Cum amatore suo cum cœnant, liguriunt.” *Ter. Eun.* v. 4, 14. “Sed cum erit utendum principio, quod plerumque erit, aut ex reo, aut ex adversario, aut ex re, aut ex eis, apud quos agetur, sententias duci decebit.” *Cic. de Orat.*

2dly. *Cum* taken for *quando*, denoting “at the time, when,” or “at which time,” is joined to the indicative mood. “Ne stridorem quidem serræ tunc audiunt, cum acuitur; aut grunnitum cum jugulatur sus.” *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.* lib. v.—“Nam quid est ineptius, quam de dicendo dicere, cum id ipsum dicere nunquam sit non ineptum, nisi cum est necessarium?” *Cic. de Orat.* lib. i. In the last example the word tries to be reconciled? If the author is wrong in his construction of Cæsar, his theory, which he would apply to the passage, is inapplicable. If his construction is correct, his principle, if supported by the one passage, is contradicted by the other. I shall only add, that numberless examples might be adduced, in which the conjunctive clause does not express, either directly or obliquely, the cause, or occasion of the principal action or event, the verb, being at the same time in the subjunctive mood.—Not only then does this rule of Mr. Greenlaw’s appear to me to be incorrect; but, if it were even universally true, it would be at variance with a doctrine, which, in another place, he endeavours to establish.

occurs both as a conjunction, signifying “since,” and also as an adverb. “*Alium alio modo excitare, cum Metellus conspicitur.*” *Sall. B. J. cap. 53.* “*Muro circumdare oppidum parabat, cum Sabinum bellum cœptis intervenit.*” *Liv. i. 36.*—“*Dies haud multi intercesserant, cum oppidani concurrunt.*” *Sall. B. J. cap. 64.*

“*Sollicitudo remanebit, cum intelligetis.*” *Sall. B. J. cap. 53.* “*Veniet tempus, cum graviter gemes.*” *Cic. ad Att. ii. 19.* “*Si valebis, cum recte navigari poterit.*” *Cic.*

The poets also observe the same rule, joining *cum* to the indicative, when it denotes either “when-
ever,” “as often as,” “at the time, when,” or “at
which time.”

“*Non ego, cum scribo, si forte quid aptius exit,*

“*Laudari metuam.*” *Pers. i. 45.*

“*Tunc illa time, cum pocula sumes.*” *Juv. x. 26.*

“*Partibus æquabat justis, aut sorte trahebat,*

“*Cum subito Æneas concursu accedere magno*

“*Anthea Sergestumque videt.*” *Virg. Æn. i. 512.*

3dly. *Cum* is used when we express the point of time at which an action or state commenced, conceived to be continued to the present period. Hence it is joined with a present, or with a preterite tense definite—and is nearly synonymous with *ex quo tempore* “ago that,” or “since,” as dating the commencement of the action or state. When a cardinal numeral is used, it is necessary, in order to reconcile

the Latin with the English idiom in some cases, either to render *cum* by “during which time,” or to convert the Latin negative into a positive term.

“Quia septem menses sunt, cum in hasce ædes pedem nemo intro tetulit.” *Plaut. Most. ii. 2, 39.* “It is seven months since *any one* entered this house,” or “seven months *during which time* no one *hath* entered this house.”—“Jam anni prope quadraginta sunt, cum hoc probatur.” *Cic. de Orat.* “It is now nearly forty years since this *has* been proved,” or “during which time this has been, and still continues to be, proved.”—“Vigesimus annus est, cum omnes scelerati in me unum petunt.” *Cic.* “It is now the twentieth year since all wicked men began, and still continue, to assail me.”—“Permuli anni erant, cum nulla certamina fuerunt.” *Liv.* “It was many years, since there had been any disputes,” or “There were many years, that (during which) there were no disputes.”

4thly. *Cum* for *tametsi* takes the subjunctive mood thus, “Statimque ostendit, sese naves velle conscendere, quum non amplius legionem tironum haberet.” *Hist. B. Afr. cap. i.* “Though at the time he had not.”

5thly. *Cum*, when it signifies “as soon as,” and is emphatically used with *primum*, denoting an action or event in close succession to another, is joined to the indicative mood. “Cum ad nos allatum est de temeritate eorum, graviter commotus sum.” *Cic. Att. iv. 7.* “As soon as we were in-

formed.”—“Cum primum Romam veni.” *Cic.* “As soon as I came to Rome.”—“Cum primum eam agere coepi.” *Ter. Hec. Prol.* 25.

6thly. *Cum*, taken for *postquam*, “after,” denoting simply the posteriority of one event to another, but not implying close succession, is joined to the subjunctive mood.—“Hæc cum animadvertisset, vehementer eos incusavit.” *Cæs. B. G.* i. 40. “Cum finem oppugnandi nox fecisset, nuncios ad eum misit.” *Cæs. B. G.* ii. 6. “Quod cum Aristides audisset, in concionem venit.” *Cic. Off.* iii. 11.—“Cum consul aciem instruxisset—insequi fusos pedes noluit.” *Liv.* ii. 43.

The junior reader should observe, that though *cum* taken for *postquam*, and denoting the posteriority of one action or event to another, is joined with the pluperfect subjunctive, it signifies the contemporaneity of two actions or events, when joined to the pluperfect indicative. Thus, “Expectationem nobis non parvam attuleras, cum scripseras.” *Cic. Att.* iii. 18. *Cum scripsisses* would denote “after you had written;” whereas the actions, though not strictly simultaneous, were in the mind of Cicero, associated as contemporary.

7thly. *Cum*, when joined to a secondary clause, expressing a past action or event, as in progression, to which another action or event, in the primary clause, is expressed as contemporary, is joined with the subjunctive mood. In this sense it is nearly synonymous

with *dum**. “Cum civitas armis jus suum exequi conaretur, Orgetorix mortuus est.” *Cæs. B. G.* cap. 4. “Cum hæc maxime agerent, nuncii ab Tusculo veniunt.” *Liv.* iii. 31. “Cum enim rex Pyrrhus, populo Romano ultro bellum intulisset, cumque de imperio certamen esset, perfuga ab eo venit.” *Cic. Off.* iii. 22. “In Cumano cum essem, venit ad me—Hortensius.” *Cic. Att.* v. 11. “Pridie Nonas Jun. cum essem Brundusii, literas tuas accepi.” *Cic. Ep. Fam.* iii. 4.

It would seem that the rule by which the practice of classic writers was generally regulated, in regard to the adverb *cum*, was to join it to the indicative mood, when they intended emphatically to mark the time of one action, present, past, or future, as coincident with that of another action, or with any time,

* Scheller, with his wonted accuracy, observes, that *cum* should not be confounded with *dum*. “Hoc (*dum*) semper indicat tempus adhuc durans per eam actionem, quæ in illo fit,” e. g. *Dum scribebam venit pater*. “Hic *dum* indicat patrem venisse in media scriptione, ut ita loquar, at *cum scribebam* non accurate hoc indicat.” (*Præcept. Stil. b. Lat.*) The proper meaning of *dum* appears to be “during the time, in which;” and hence it has frequently the signification of “as long as.” Thus, *Dum hominum genus erit*. *Cic.* “During the time that the human race shall exist,” or “As long as the human race shall exist.” While *dum* implies a space of time, through which any action or state extends, *cum* refers to a point of time, at which any action, or state, is either beginning, proceeding, or finished. When it refers to an action, or state, proceeding, being connected with a tense implying progression, and therefore a space of time, it may often be rendered by “while,” and may be considered as nearly synonymous with *dum*.

specially or generally. If no particular stress was laid on the times as coincident, and if the actions themselves, not their co-existence, or their continuity, formed the primary consideration, *cum* was joined to the subjunctive mood. When Pythias says, "Neque cum rogites, quid sit, audet dicere," (*Ter. Eun.* iv. 3. 17,) she does not mean to mark the silence of Pamphilia, as coincident, in time, with the inquiry; she means simply, "If you ask her," "on your asking her." When she says also, "Vide, amabo, si non, cum aspicias, os impudens videtur," (*Eun.* v. 1, 22,) *cum aspicias* does not mean "at the time you look at him," as if the fact were so, only when he was beheld, but merely, "Is he not *in aspect* an impudent fellow?" When Cicero says, "Cum Brutum nostrum convenissem, eumque tardius in Asiam venturum animadverterem, in Asiam redii," (*Ep. Fam.* xii. 14,) he does not intend to say, that *immediately after* his interview with Brutus, and *at the time* of his observing, that he would be late in coming into Asia, he himself returned, but merely, that, *on having had an interview* with Brutus, and *on his observing*, that he would not be soon prepared to march into Asia, he himself returned. "Cum ex captivis quæreret Cæsar, hanc reperiēbat causam." *Cæs. B. G.* lib. 1. cap. 50, means simply, "on Cæsar's inquiring."—"Cum civitas—armis jus suum exequi conaretur, Orgetorix mortuus est." *Cæs. B. G.* lib. 1. cap. 4. When Cæsar uses this expression, he does not intend to fix the date of Orgetorix's death, as referable to the same period

with the preparations of the people to enforce their authority, but to inform his reader of the two facts, without particularly marking their co-existence. The expression denotes simply, “The state was endeavouring to assert its authority; and in the mean time Orgetorix died.” If we say in English, “Orgetorix died at the time, at which the state was preparing to enforce its authority,” and “When the state was preparing—Orgetorix died,”—a little attention will convince the reader, that the expressions are by no means precisely equivalent. The obvious purpose of the former is to identify the time of Orgetorix’s death, with the time of the preparations; in the latter, the two facts constitute the primary objects; their coincidence in time is but a secondary consideration. If we say, *Orgetorix mortuus est, cum civitas conabatur*, (See *Liv. xxxv. 2, Cic. Ep. Fam. i. 10.*) or *Civitas conabatur, cum Orgetorix mortuus est*, we emphatically denote the coincidence of the events; but neither of these is the expression of Cæsar. When Cicero says, in his Fourth Epistle to Lentulus, “A. D. XVI. Cal. Feb. cum in senatu pulcherrime staremus—res ab adversariis nostris extracta est,” he does not mean to fix the period of the question’s being put off, by saying, it happened when he stood well with the senate. *Cum staremus* is not intended to note the date of the postponement, but simply to state incidentally a coincident circumstance. If we substitute *cum stabamus*, we alter the meaning of the expression; for this would refer *his standing well with the senate* to the pre-

ceding date, and signify, “that on the 16th before the Calends of February, at which time he stood well with the senate, the affair was postponed.” Suppose, again, that we say, *Pulcherrime stabamus, cum res extracta est*, this would signify, “on the 16th before the Calends of February, we stood well with the senate, when (*at which time*) the affair was postponed.”

Before we dismiss the subject, it is necessary to observe, that the rules delivered for joining *cum* with the indicative mood, do not take place in the two following cases: 1st. If the clause be oblique—We say, for example, “*Tempus fuit, cum homines vagabantur*,” *Cic.* but, “*Scio tempus fuisse, cum homines vagarentur*.”—“*Scis tempus fuisse*,” says Cicero, “*cum homines existimarent*.” *Ep. Fam. x. 3.* 2dly. When any thing doubtful, contingent, or fortuitous, is implied, the sense requires the potential mood. “*Sed tu omnia consilia differebas in id tempus, cum sciremus*.” *Cic. Att. ii. 14.*, “when we should know.”—“*Sed quando illum diem, cum tu edendam putes?*” *Cic.* “When you will, or may, think, that it ought to be published.” It must be observed also, that though usage be very generally conformable to these rules, it is not universally so. Cicero says, “*Tempus fuit, cum homines vagabantur*.” Varro, in a sentiment precisely similar, says, “*Tempus fuit, cum homines rura colerent*.” *De Re Rust. iii. 1.** “*Tem-*

* Mr. Greenlaw disputes the precise similarity of these examples, and endeavours to reconcile them with his rule. But, as the truth of his theory cannot be materially affected by two ex-

poribus, cum homines vitam agerent." *Varro de Re Rust.* i. 2.

For the direction of the junior reader, it may be given as a general rule, to join *cum* with the indicative mood, when it denotes "at the time when," or "at which time," and with the subjunctive, when it means "while," "during the time, that," or "after," the clause being expressible participially either in Latin, or in English. "Comites græculi (erant) quocunque ibat, etiam cum in castra Etrusca *properabat*." *Cic. pro Mil. ad med.* "Even at a time, when he was hastening." "Cædi vidistis populum Romanum, concionem gladiis disturbari, cum *audiretur* silentio M. Cælius." *Cic. pro Mil. sub fin.* "While they were attentively hearing M. Cælius." Thus, also, "When he had drawn up his army, he waited for battle." *Cum exercitum instruxisset, prælium expectabat*, or *Exercitu instructo*. "Having drawn up his army."—"When he had unexpectedly arrived, they deputed the chief men of the state to wait upon him."—"Cum de improvviso venisset, legatos ad eum primos civitatis miserunt." *Cæs. B. G.* ii. 3. Here the clause connected with *cum* cannot be participially rendered in Latin, the verb *venire* being intransitive, and the Latins having no perfect participle active; but we can say, in English, "He having unexpect-

amples, and as I could not do justice to his, or my own, view of the case, without giving the two contexts at considerable length, I must refer the reader to Mr. Greenlaw's work, and to the two original passages.

edly arrived, they sent," &c. "When the Romans were retreating on that side—M. Valerius put spurs to his horse." *Cum Romani ab ea parte pedem referrent, M. Valerius subdit calcaria equo, or, Romanis pedem referentibus.* "The Romans retreating."—"When he saw that the case was desperate, he said," *Cum rem desperatam esse videret, or Rem desperatam esse videns, dixit.* "When he was clamorously uttering these words, Servilius put him to death," *Cum hæc vociferaretur, or, Eum, hæc vociferantem, Servilius obtruncavit.**

* Mr. Greenlaw observes, that "a very useful rule is given by some grammarians, which *he* considers to be accounted for by his theory." If the verb following *cum* is to be put in the present, or in the preterperfect tense, the indicative mood is to be used; but, if the verb is to be put in the preterimperfect, or preterpluperfect tense, the subjunctive is to be used." In order to illustrate the accordancy of this rule with his doctrine, he adds, "Now, the present, and the preterperfect tenses have both of them a reference to present time, *i. e.* to time relatively present; and the preterimperfect, and the preterpluperfect to time relatively past." It must have escaped the learned author's recollection, when he made this remark, that the preterperfect, taken in an indefinite sense, as *abii*, "I went away," has no reference to present time, and that it is only in a definite sense, as denoting "I have gone away," that it refers to time present. His observation, therefore, thus unqualified, is incorrect. He proceeds to observe, that "the former therefore (namely, the present and preterperfect) will be the tenses to be employed, if the clause is used to mark the time of another action, or event; in other words the clause, in such cases, is properly attached to the subject, and the rule directs the indicative mood to be used." Indeed? How does it follow, as the learned author here con-

In the use of *cum*, whether as a conjunction, adverb, or preposition, it is to be observed, that the

cludes, that because the present, and the preterperfect tenses are employed, and because the clause marks the time of another action, the clause is therefore properly attached to the subject? How this follows, I candidly confess, that I have not sufficient penetration to discover. The premises and the conclusion, as far as I can perceive, have no legitimate—no traceable, connection. The author's position, for I cannot call it deduction, appears to me nothing, but gratuitous assertion.

“ But,” he continues, “ if the clause be used to mark the cause, or reason, as well as a connection in regard to time, (since an event, which causes another is necessarily antecedent to it,) a tense having reference to past time must be used, *i. e.* the præterimperfect, or præterpluperfect. The clause, which expresses the cause of an action, (if the action naturally result from the circumstance mentioned in the clause,) is properly attached to the predicate ; and consequently, I say, the subjunctive mood is used.” The former of these observations seems to me to be unnecessary, irrelevant, and, as a rule, defective. Unnecessary, because it is self-evident, that an event, prior to another, must be expressed as antecedent to it ; irrelevant, because the observation affects not the mood, which is the point in question, but the tense ; and defective, inasmuch as the author does not exclude the preterperfect tense, which having generally no reference to present time, ought not, according to his principle, to have been excluded. In the latter sentence, he seems at variance with himself. At p. 148, he says, that the clause, expressing the efficient cause, is to be generally attached to the subject ; and here (p. 157) he observes, that the causal clause is to be attached to the predicate. It may be here, as in the preceding instance, owing to my want of penetration ; but I am unable to comprehend, either how the author's theory can be reconciled with itself, or how the scholar is to proceed, in his application of it. For to tell him at one time, that the efficient

Romans were generally careful not to place it before a word beginning with the letter *n*. Hence they never said *cum nobis*, but *nobiscum*—not *cum notis hominibus*, but *cum hominibus notis*, thus avoiding an indelicacy, which the other collocation would have produced. See *Cicero de Orat. and Quintil. lib. viii.* And as the letter *m*, in composition, was pronounced as *n*, as *connecto*, *conjungo*, they generally preferred saying *cum paucis*, instead of *cum nonnullis*.

It may be necessary to remind the reader, that the present tense is often used in Latin, where the preterite is employed in English. Thus, “He said that his brother read every day.” *Dixit fratrem quotidie legere.* The *saying* and the *reading* are conceived as contemporaneous. *Legisse* would imply, that the *reading* was prior to the *saying*, and would denote “had read.”

EXERCISE.

Xenophon, the disciple of Socrates, was offering a solemn sacrifice, when he heard that his eldest son was slain at Mantinea. He did not, however, desist; but only laid down his cause is generally to be attached to the subject, and at another time, that the clause, expressing the cause of an action, is properly attached to the predicate, is, I apprehend, not to instruct, but to perplex the reader. It is unfortunate, however, that this “very useful rule,” for which the learned author has endeavoured to account by his theory, is itself false, being opposed by numberless examples of the highest authority. Now, when a theory is offered to account for a false rule, one or other of these alternatives, must be true; either the theory itself is false, or the author has erred in applying it.

crown, and asked, how he had fallen. When he understood, that his son had died in the field of battle, fighting bravely in defence of his country, he calmly replaced the crown upon his head ; calling the gods to witness, that he received more pleasure from the bravery, than pain from the death, of his son.

OBSERVATIONS.

NOSCERE.

SCIRE.

CALLERE.

Noscere is “to know,” or “to be acquainted with any thing, as an object of perception,”—“to have an idea,” or “notion of it, as apprehended by the mind.”—“*Novi ædes.*” *Plaut. Amph. i. 1. 292.* “I know the house.”—“*Novi hominem.*” *Plaut. Ep. iv. 1. 8.* “I know the man.”—“*Noscere vultus eorum potis est.*” *Lucret. iii. 468.* “To know the countenances.”—“*Saporem nosse.*” *Plin. xiii. 4.* “To know the taste.”—“*Novi omnem rem.*” *Plaut.* “I know the whole affair.”—“*Deus, quem mente noscimus.*” *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* “God, whom we apprehend by the intellect,” that is, not by sense.

Novi, the preterite tense of this verb, denotes present knowledge, and past perception. “*Novi ego te.*” *Plaut.* “I know you from previous experience, or acquaintance.”

Scire is to know any thing as a matter of fact, or any truth as an object of conviction ; as “*Scio omnibus esse moriendum.*” “I know that all must die.” “*E servo scis te genitum.*” *Mart. i. 82. 1.* “You know, that you are the son of a slave.”

The following examples, in each of which both

verbs occur, will serve further to illustrate the distinction. “Hominem novi, et dominus qui nunc est, scio.” *Plaut. Rud.* iv. 3. 26. “I know the man personally.”—“I am acquainted with him,” and “I know who his master is.” The latter clause, however, does not necessarily imply any personal knowledge of the master. He might know him only by name. “Non norunt, scio.” *Plaut. Cas. Prol.* “They are not acquainted with the play,” *not having seen it performed*—“*this circumstance I know.*”—“Novi omnes; scio fures esse hic complures.” *Plaut. Aul.* iv. 9. 8. “I have a perfect knowledge of them”—*I am fully acquainted with their persons and dispositions.* “I know (as a matter of fact) that there are several thieves here.” *Ch.* “Phania ille frater meus fuit.” *Si.* “Noram; et scio.” *Ter. And.* v. 4. 32. “I was acquainted with the man, and I know (as matter of fact) that he was your brother.”—“Nam incertiozem nullam bestiam novi.” *Plaut. Stich.* iii. 2. 44. “I know of no beast more uncertain,” or “I am acquainted with none less to be depended upon.” *Scio* would imply, “I know there is none more uncertain,” a proposition materially different from the other. Thus, “Scio, magis curiosam nullam belluam esse.” *Plaut. Aul.* iii. 6. 28.

Scire is used, like *Noscere*, to denote simply the knowledge of any accident, quality, or property, as existing—thus, “Scire sententiam.” *Plaut.* “Ætatem scibat.” *Ter.* “Causam scire.” *Mart.* vii. 85, 6. But it never denotes an acquaintance with any sens-

ible object, or substance in general, as apprehended by the mind ; for though we find such expressions as “ Scio hominem, qui sit,” it is evident, that the expression means no more than “ Scio, qui, *or* quis, sit homo.”

The distinction then between *noscere* and *scire* is briefly this. *Noscere* strictly refers to substance, and its attributes, as objects of perception ; and metaphorically to any other object apprehended by the mind. *Scire* is applied to facts, as known, or truths, as objects of conviction. Hill observes, that ignorance is opposed to *scire*, and indistinct perception to *noscere*. In this remark, however, there seems to be a little inaccuracy ; for *noscere* is opposed not only to indistinct perception, but also to entire unacquaintance with the object. When Geta says, “ Senis nostri, Dave, fratrem majorem Chremem nostin’ ?” *Ter. Ph.* i. 2. 12, if Davus had never seen him, he might with propriety have answered, “ Haud novi.” When Parmeno says, “ Quandoquidem illarum neque te quisquam novit,” *Ter. Eun.* ii. 3. 82, he evidently means, that not one of them knew any thing whatever of the person of Chærea ; for Pythias afterwards declares, “ Hunc oculis suis nostrarum nunquam quisquam vidit.” *Eun.* iv. 4. 11. It seems evident, therefore, that *Haud novi*, is not confined to the sentiment, “ I do not distinctly know the object,” but denotes also “ I have no knowledge of it whatever.”

Scire, being applied to the knowledge of facts and truths, as objects of conviction, denotes also that

knowledge of them, which is the foundation of *scientia*, or “science.”—“De jure civium dicunt Lycurgum aut Solonem scisse melius, quam Hyperidem aut Demosthenem.” *Cic.* And *scientia*, according to the academics, consisted “In animi notionibus et rationibus.” *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.* lib. i.

Before dismissing the subject, it may be proper to observe, that, when that ability is implied, which is the result of knowledge or skill, “Scire” is sometimes used for “Posse”, and “Nescire” frequently for “Non posse.”—Thus we have *scire fidibus*, that is *scire canere*, or *posse canere fidibus*; *scire Latine*—with *loqui* probably understood. And in the well-known observation of Mahèrbal, “Vincere scis, Hannibal; victoria uti nescis.” *Liv.* xxii. 51. Sometimes it denotes ability or possibility simply, “Major animus et natura erat, quam ut reus esse sciret.” *Liv.* lib. xxxviii. cap. 52. “Nescit vox missa reverti.” *Hor. De Art. Poët.* 390.

The Saxon verb *cunnan*, whence came the verb now obsolete in England, but still used in Scotland, “I ken,” or “I know,” and also the verb, “I can,” denoted, in like manner, *scire*, *sapere*, *posse*. *I can* is now used to denote “ability,” or “power,” simply. “Cunning,” or “knowing,” the participle of the verb, is still in use, but has changed its meaning, being employed now, as nearly equivalent to “sly,” or “crafty.” In our translation of the Bible it is, I believe, uniformly used to denote “skilful,” “wise,” “ingenious.”

Callere (from *callus*, or *callum*, denoting that hardness of the skin which is occasioned by much labour) signifies, “to be hard like brawn.” It is metaphorically applied to the mind, to denote that state of it, which is the effect of repeated impressions, or much practice in any subject, to which its attention has been directed. “In illis rebus exercitatus animus callere jam debet.” *Cic. Ep. Fam. iv. 5.* It is thus explained by Perottus: “*Callere à callum*, quòd, sicut pes ex longo viæ labore callum facit, ita mens longa experientia facit habitum quendam rerum, in quibus versatur.” *Callere*, therefore, signifies to “know thoroughly,” “to be well practised in.”

EXERCISE.

M. Aurelius, the Roman emperor, applied to the study of wisdom, and attended the lectures of Sextus the philosopher for that purpose. When he was going out of the palace one day, Lucius the philosopher, who had lately come to Rome, met him; and asked him, whither he was going, and on what business. Marcus answered, “It is becoming even for an old man to learn; and I am going to Sextus to learn those things, which I do not yet know.” Lucius raising his hands to heaven, exclaimed, “O Jupiter, a Roman emperor, now in his old age, goes to school like a boy!”

OBSERVATIONS.

Memini, for *recordor*, “I remember,” governs the accusative or genitive; but for *mentionem facio*, the genitive only.

In the use of this verb there is an ambiguity of which it may be useful, to apprise the junior reader. *Meminisse* refers either to a past event, as an object of remembrance, which is strictly its signification, or to an action to be done as desired, or commanded. In the latter acceptation, it is nearly equivalent to *fac* “see,” “take care.” Thus *memento ferre*, means either, “remember that you brought,” or “remember to bring.” “Memento suppetias . . . mihi ferre.” *Plaut. Ep. v. 1. 52.* “Remember to bring,” “see that you bring.” There is a similar ambiguity in the verb *oblivisci*. “Lucernam forte oblitus fueram extinguere.” *Plaut. ii. 2. 56.* “I had forgotten to put out the lamp.” “Si scribere oblitus es.” *Cic. Ep. Fam. vii. 14,* not “you forgot to write,” but, “you forgot how to write.”

Qui is frequently, with great elegance, omitted, as, “Socrates, who was the wisest of all the ancients, was condemned to die,” *Socrates (qui erat) omnium veterum sapientissimus, mortis damnatus est.* “The city, which he had thus taken, he levelled with the ground,” *Urbem (quam ita ceperat) ita captam solo æquavit.*

Partitives, Comparatives, Superlatives, Interrogatives, and Numerals govern the genitive plural, and this genitive may be resolved into the accusative with *inter*, or the ablative with *de, e, ex*, as; *Doctissimus Romanorum, inter Romanos, or de, e, ex, Romanis.*—*Pulcherrima sororum, or de, e, ex, sororibus.* In such expressions, the adjective is generally

of the same gender with that of the substantive, which it governs; and which is, in fact, understood, as its subject of concord—thus, “One of the muses,” *Una musarum*. “One muse of the muses.” *Amplissimum templorum*, that is, *Amplissimum templum templorum*, “The most spacious temple of temples.” Sometimes, however, it agrees with the preceding substantive—1st. When the genitive is a collective noun, as *Præstantissimus nostræ civitatis*, “The most excellent man of our state.” Here the genitive singular is equivalent to a genitive plural. 2dly. In heteroclites, as *Infimum cœlorum lunam continet*. 3dly. When the adjective may refer to a preceding word, as, “The Indus is the greatest of rivers,” *Indus est fluminum maximus*, where *maximus* agrees with *Indus*, and not with *flumen*, understood. “Est genus hominum, qui se primos omnium rerum esse volunt.” *Ter. Eun.* “Quid agis, dulcissime rerum?” *Hor.* Here the superlative agrees with *O tu*, or *O vir*, understood. 4thly. When in the word governed there is a *syllipsis generum*, or the comprehension of two or more genders under one; then one of the words, if not two, must be of a different gender from that of the substantive or pronoun, which it governs. “Propter summam et doctoris auctoritatem et urbis, quorum alter te scientia augere potest, altera exemplis.” *Cic. Off. i. 1.* Here *doctor* and *urbis* are of different genders. By a *syllipsis* the relative is put in the masculine gender, but the second subject *altera*, referring to *urbis*, in the feminine. 5thly. When the subjects

are indefinite, as “*Alia ex rebus infaustis.*” *Tac. Ann.* xv. 15. “Other unfortunate circumstances.”

Despauter observes, that Terence, when he says, “*Nec quisquam nostrarum novit,*” *Eun.* iv. 4, 11, is not to be imitated, because, though *quis* was originally masculine and feminine, it came afterwards to be confined to the masculine gender. The observation is correct; *quis* and *qui* were used by Plautus and Terence, as both masculine and feminine. “*An ita tu es animata, ut qui expers matris imperii sies?*” *Plaut. Asin.* iii. 1, 1. This, however, may, in some cases, admit a different explanation, for it is no uncommon thing in Greek and Latin *, to use the masculine gender for the feminine, when distinction of sex is not particularly to be regarded, and the subjects are considered under the general notion of persons.

The superlative being joined to the genitive plural, and this genitive being resolvable into the ablative with *ex*, or the accusative with *inter*, it is evident, that the two subjects of comparison must belong to one class. Such expressions, therefore, as the following, in which two subjects of different classes are compared, as if they belonged to one, should be studiously avoided, “*Age, Servi, non solum adolescentum, qui tibi æquævi sunt, sed senum quoque omnium doctissimus.*” *Macrob. Sat.* This, as Despauter observes, is the same as if he had said, “*Servius adolescens est om-*

* “*Deum esse indignam credidi.*” *Plaut. Pæn.* ii. 1, 10. “That the Deity (Venus) was angry.” “*Ἀλλά μ' αἱ Δίος γ' ἀλκιμα θεοῖς.*” *Soph. Aj.* 401. Here *θεοῖς* refers to Diana.

nium senum doctissimus," by which Servius is made to be at once a young, and an old man. It should have been *omnibus senibus doctior*, "More learned than all the old men."

It may preclude a difficulty to the junior reader, if we here remark, that when an adjective refers to one or other indefinitely of two persons, of different sexes, the masculine gender is preferred. Cæsar, speaking of husband and wife, says, "*Uter* eorum vita superaret." *B. G.* vi. 19.

It is commonly given as a rule, that *dum* and *donec* signifying "while," should be joined to the indicative, and denoting "until," with the subjunctive mood. The rule is incorrect; and the inaccuracy has arisen from confounding the subjunctive with the potential mood, the distinction between which will afterwards be fully explained. It is more correct to say, that these adverbs are joined to the indicative mood, when no uncertainty or contingency is implied; and with the subjunctive, when futurity or contingency is denoted. "*Dum hæc aguntur, Cassander incidit in Abderitas.*" *Justin.* xv. 2. While these things are doing, Cassander falls in with the Abderites: "*Donec armati confertique abibant, peditem labor in persequendo fuit.*" *Liv.* vi. 13. "*Ibi manebat dum hostes flumen trajiciebant,*" or, "*donec hostes flumen trajecerant.*" "While the enemy were crossing," or "till the enemy had crossed." "*Ejus pontis, dum ipse abesset, custodes reliquit.*" *Nep. Milt.* "While he himself should be absent." *Dum aberat*

would imply, that the appointment of guards was made in his absence.

It is worthy of attention, that when the name of any person, or thing, is given, in such examples as the following, the proper name does not agree by apposition with the generic term *Nomen*; but elegantly with the individual spoken of—thus, “My name is John,” *Mihi nomen est Joanni*, where *Joanni* agrees with *Mihi* more elegantly, than with *Nomen*. “*Man-sit Silviis postea omnibus cognomen, qui Albæ regnarunt.*” *Liv. i. 3.* Here also *Silviis* agrees with *Omnibus*. “*Cui Servio Tullio nomen fuit.*” *Liv. i. 39.*

EXERCISE.

When Plato had come to the Olympic games, the most crowded of all the assemblies in Greece, he boarded and lodged in the company of persons, of whom he knew nothing, and to whom he was unknown. While he remained at Olympia, he so captivated and attached them to him by the sweetness of his manners, and by his conversations, which were free from all affectation of wisdom, that they rejoiced exceedingly in the society of such a man. He made no mention, however, of the Academy, or of Socrates; he told them, merely, that he was named Plato.

OBSERVATIONS.

DUCO.

FERO.

Ducere and *ferre* are each of them rendered in English, by the verb “to take;” hence the young scholar is apt to confound them. *Ducere* is “to take,” “lead,” or “conduct,” as, “Take me (conduct me) to your house,” *Duc me.* *Ferre* is “to take,” or “carry,”

as, “He took,” or “carried with him, many presents,”
Tulit secum multa dona.

OSTENDERE.

MONSTRARE.

Ostendere is “to shew,” “to exhibit,” or “present to sight.” *Rem ostendere*, is *Rem spectandam exhibere*. “*Ostendimus*,” says Dumesnil, “quod circa nos est, ut animadvertatur; *monstramus*, ut cognitum sit.” *Ostendere* is to shew, for the purpose of being observed; and generally does not imply, that the object is in sight, or near at hand—and answers to the modern Latin phrase, *Videre facio*. It implies no desired discrimination, or distinction. *Monstrare*, “to point out,” generally denotes, that the object is in sight, or near at hand, and implies selection or discrimination. “Shew me the man,” *Hominem ostendas*, that is, “bring him into my sight.”—“Point out the man,” is *Hominem monstra*. “Shew me, which is he.”—“Jamne ostendisti signa nutrici.” *Ter. Eun.* v. 3, 5. *Monstrasti* would mean, “Have you pointed them out, that they may be distinguished.”—“Qui erranti comiter monstrat viam.” *Ex. Enn. Cic. Off.* lib. ii. Here discrimination or selection is clearly implied—the traveller being supposed to have mistaken the road. *Ostendimus*, ut videatur; *monstramus*, ut dignoscatur.

Without is often rendered in Latin by a simple negative, as *nec*, *non*, joined to an adjective, or participle, or by *in* privative, as, “Without tarrying longer,” *Nec longius moratus*. “They went off, without ob-

serving," *Abierunt, haud animadvertentes*. "I said it, without knowing, who he was," *Dixi, quis esset ignarus*. "He said so, without having read the letter," *Ita dixit, litteris haud perlectis*, or "The letter not having been read."

The Latin language has no definitive article. *Homo* means sometimes "a man," sometimes "the man," and sometimes "man in the species." To express an individual definitely, the Greeks employed the article *ὁ, ἡ, το*, as *ὁ ἀνθρώπος* "the man." To denote an individual indefinitely, they omitted the article; but, as they signified the species by the same omission, ambiguity was thus sometimes created*. The English language possesses, in this respect, a decided superiority over both. We have "a man," to denote an individual indefinitely; "the man" to signify an individual definitely; and "man" to express the species. The Latins for the definite article

* *Ἐγενετο ἀνθρώπος ἀπεσταλμένος παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ* may signify either "man in the species was sent," or "man as an individual." The author of the article "Grammar" in the "Encyc. Britan." 3d edition, observes, that the word *ἀνθρώπος* is here restricted to an individual, by its concord with the verb and the participle. If he mean by this observation, that the noun can here signify only one individual, because a singular verb and participle are joined with it, he certainly errs. Numberless examples might be adduced, to prove the contrary. *Ἀνθρώπος γέννεται κόπῳ*, "man (mankind) is born unto trouble." *Job*, v. 7. Here the noun, though not denoting an individual, but a species, is joined to a verb singular. *Ἀνθρώπος, ἐν τιμῇ ὧν, οὐ σὺνη εἰ*, "man, being in honour, abideth not." *Ps.* xlix. 12.

employed the pronoun *ille*, as *Beatus ille*, or *ille homo*, “Happy the man.”

EXERCISE.

When the games were over, and they had come to Athens, Plato received them very kindly. Being very desirous to see the philosopher, they said, “shew us that namesake of yours, the philosopher Plato, the disciple of Socrates, whose reputation is every where so great. Take us to the Academy.” He, softly smiling, as he used to do, said, “I am the man.” His visitors were struck with amazement, when they found that they had been the companions of Plato so long, without knowing him.

OBSERVATIONS.

COMES.

SOCIUS.

SODALIS.

Comes, “a companion,” or “fellow traveller.” *Socius*, “a companion,” or “associate,” a generical term, denoting “a member of the same society,” “a sharer or partner in the same fortune.” In the latter acceptation, it is synonymous with *consors*. *Sodalis*, “a companion in amusement, or pleasure.” *Comes* iter facit; *socius* cum altero societatem coivit, et aliquid cum alio communiter possidet, aut pari opera et consilio curat: *sodalis* adolescentiæ nomen est. Ita *comes* tutus; *socius* æqualis—*sodalis* amicus.” *Fronto*. “*Socii* plerumque sunt in rebus seriis et fortunæ subjectis, *sodales* in rebus levioribus, in conviviiis et lusibus.” *Valla*. To the same purpose nearly is the following distinction of Noltenius:

“*Consortes* conjungit amor, *socios* labor idem;
Missio *collegas* ad eundem copulat actum:

*Consortes fortuna eadem, socios labor idem ;
Unum collegas efficit officium ;
Ast eadem comites unit via, mensa sodales."*

" Sacerdos Jovis, cum conjuge et liberis, Deorum monitu, *comitem* se Elissæ, *sociumque* fortunæ præbuit." *Justin.* lib. xviii. cap. 5.

Gifanius observes, that *sodales* frequently denotes members of the same college. The propriety, however, of this usage, has been questioned by one or two eminent critics. See *Nolt. Lex. Antib.—Pitisc. Lex. Antiq. Rom.—Guther.* i. 3. *de Vet. Jur. Pont.*

In modern Latin, the word *Comes* is employed to denote "Count," or "Earl." In the courts of the Roman emperors there were certain counsellors, who constantly attended the sovereign, and assisted him with their advice. These were called "Comites Augustales." Having frequent access to the emperor, and possessing considerable influence in all his counsels, they were invested with the most lucrative and honourable appointments. When they left the imperial court, to undertake the government of any town or province, they relinquished the title of "Comites Augustales," and were designated *Comites* of the town or province, to which they were appointed. Thus, "Comites littoris Saxonici,"—"Counts of the Saxon shore," who were appointed to command the troops on the coast side, and defend the country against the depredations of the Saxons. "Comes Britanniarum," "The Count of Britain." Hence arose the French word *compte*, and the English *count*.

Convenio is thus construed, *Convenire in urbem*, “To come into the city, and assemble.” *Convenire in urbe*, “To assemble in the city, having been there before.”* *Convenire aliquem*, “To speak to any one,” or “To have an interview with him.” *Convenit hoc mihi*, “this suits me,” or “is convenient to me.” *Convenit mihi cum illo*, “I agree with him.” *Convenire in aliquem* is *ad eum pertinere, in eum cadere*. “*Suspicio convenit in eum.*” *Cic.* “The suspicion is consistent with his character.”

Palairer considers *convenire* to govern an accusative by an ellipsis of *ad*. If this verb were not found in the passive voice in this sense, we should concur with him in opinion ; but when we find classic writers saying, “*Me conventum esse expedit.*” *Ter.* “*Sunt, qui volent te conventum.*” *Plaut.* “*Convento Antonio.*” *Cic.* we must conclude *convenire* to be in the sense of “to meet,” an active transitive verb.

The term *person* is derived from *persona* ; but the reader should understand that they are not mutually equivalent words. *Persona* means properly “a mask,” used by actors on the stage, and hence denotes a mask generally. “*Non hominibus tantum, sed et rebus persona demenda est, et reddenda facies sua.*”

* This distinction is analogous to that between *abdere se in silvas*, and *abdere se in silvis* ; the former denoting, that they went into the woods ; the latter, that they were there, before they hid themselves. “*Domum se abdidit.*” *Cic. in Pis. ad fin.* “He went home, and hid himself.” This distinction, however, though subservient to perspicuity, is not always observed. “*Fuere, qui se speluncis . . . abderent.*” *Tac. Ann. xiv. 23.*

Sen. Ep. 24. Goclenius observes, that it never signifies “an intelligent substance,” but an association of accidents or qualities. “Si mihi propter res meas gestas hanc imponis personam.” *Cic. Or. pro Sylla.* “Cum dicit,” says the critic, “*mihi*, intelligit substantiam; cum dicit *personam*, intelligit accidens.” “In homine,” says Valla, “*persona* significat qualitatem, qua alius ab alio differunt.” Scaliger offers a similar explanation. “*Persona* intelligitur status hominis ab animo, aut fortuna. Neque verum est, quod aiunt, significare individuum substantiam rationalem; sed accidens notat, ut servum, liberalem, ingenuum, heroem, senatorem. Itaque cum definivimus ab animo, virtutem et vitia comprehendimus; quum fortunam, libertatem, et contraria: sic enim locuti sunt probati auctores.” It means, therefore, the distinctive qualities, or accidents of an individual. Hence “*dramatis personæ*,” denotes certain assemblages of physical, moral, and intellectual qualities, severally constituting the characters in the drama, and exhibited in the persons of the actors. Some critics have considered it as thus synonymous with *histrion*, or the “stage player.” But Davus or Parmeno, though each a *dramatis persona*, is surely different from the *histrion*, who played the part. “Tres personas unus sustineo, meam, adversarii, judicis.” *Cic. de Orat. lib. 2.* “I support three characters.” “I act in three capacities.” To the explanation of the term, given by the critics above quoted, we fully assent, as sanctioned by the usage of the most reputable writers. That, towards the decline of the Latin language, it

came to be sometimes employed to denote *persons*, or *individuals*, there can be no doubt ; but even when thus used, it seems still to have a reference to distinctive qualities. We cannot concur with Faciolati in thinking, that it was ever used *absolutely* in the sense of “ homo.”

Ait and *inquit* correspond to our words, “ he says,” and “ quoth he.” The former is used in direct, as well as in oblique sentences ; it may, therefore, be followed with an infinitive ; *inquit* introduces the speaker in his own words, and is used only in direct sentences. We may say, “ *Aio* te, Æacida, Romanos vincere posse,” but not *inquam*.

EXERCISE.

Dion, being banished from Syracuse, by Dionysius the tyrant, went to Megara. Here, when he wished to have an interview with Theodorus, the chief person of the city, and had gone to his house for that purpose, being detained a long time at the gate, and, after all, refused admittance ; he said to his companion, calmly, “ This must be borne with patience ; perhaps we also, when we were in authority, sometimes did such things.” By this tranquillity of mind, he rendered the circumstances of his banishment far more tolerable.

OBSERVATIONS.

VERITAS.

VERUM.

FIDES.

The Latin termination *itas* corresponds to the English termination of abstract nouns in *ness* or *ity*. Thus, *lenitas* “ lenity,” or “ gentleness.” *Veritas* accordingly means, “ truth,” “ trueness,” or “ verity,”

as *Hujus rumoris veritas*, “The truth of this rumour.” It has therefore been defined, *Conditio ejus, quod verum est*. It sometimes means, “veracity,” or “moral truth;” as “Cultor veritatis.” *Cic. Off.* i. one who cultivates “the moral duty of veracity,” or “the property of speaking truth.”—*Verum* means “a truth,” or “a true thing.”—“It is truth,” *Verum est*, i. e. “a truth,” or “true thing.” *Fides* means “faith,” “honour,” “veracity;” “the congruity between words and sentiments,” and also “between words and actions.”—“Fundamentum justitiæ est fides, id est, dictorum conventorumque constantia et veritas.” *Cic. Off.* lib. i.

A participle governs the case of its own verb, and is incapable of comparison. When it is divested of the idea of time, it becomes a participial, and governs the genitive. It then admits comparison—thus, *Amans virtutem*, “One at present loving virtue.” *Amans virtutis*, “A lover of virtue.” *Servantior æqui*, “One more observant of equity.” *Doctus linguam Latinam*, “One who has been taught the Latin language.” *Doctus linguæ Latinæ*, (*Cic.*) “One skilled in Latin.”

MENTIRI.

MENDACIUM DICERE.

We learn from A. Gellius, that Nigidius, a critic of eminence, made the following distinction between *Mentiri* and *Mendacium dicere*.—“*Qui mentitur, ipse non fallitur, sed alterum fallere conatur; qui mendacium dicit, ipse fallitur. Vir bonus præstare debet, ne mentiatur; prudens, ne mendacium dicat.*”

A. Gellius adds, “Varie, mehercule, et lepide Nigidius tot sententiās in eandem rem quasi aliud atque aliud diceret, disparavit.” *Lib. xi. Cap. 11.* Though this distinction does not appear to be well founded, we do not agree with A. Gellius in thinking, that Nigidius offered a distinction, where there can be no difference. No one will maintain, that a lie, and a falsehood, are one and the same thing.

What one is in the habit of doing or saying, is frequently expressed by the preterimperfect tense. The reason will be explained hereafter.

EXERCISE.

Aristides among the Athenians, and Epaminondas among the Thebans, are said to have been such lovers of truth, that they never told a lie even in joke. Atticus, likewise, with whom Cicero lived in the greatest intimacy, neither told, nor could bear, a lie. “I hate that man,” Achilles used to say, “as much as I do the gates of Pluto, who says one thing, and thinks another.”—“Liars,” Aristotle was wont to observe, “gain this, that when they have spoken the truth, they are not believed.” Simplicity and sincerity are most suited to the nature of man.

OBSERVATIONS.

DONUM.

MUNUS.

“Donum *Deorum est*,” says Donatus, “munus *hominum*.”—See also *Dolet. Comment.* Servius observes, that *donum* is a gift from a superior to an inferior, and that *munus* implies the reverse. “Dona,” says he, “*sunt tantum superiorum, munera sunt inferiorum*.” Ulpian is of opinion that *donum* is the

generic term, and *munus* the special; *munus* he defines to be *donum cum causa, puta natalitium*. Dumesnil's distinction appears more correct and precise. "*Donum*," he says, "is purely a gift, no obligation being implied on the part of the giver." *Munus*, "a present," which usage or obligation requires. This distinction has also the authority of Popma, and might be inferred from the affinity in meaning between *munus* and *officium*.

"Num solus ille dona dat?" *Ter. Eun.* i. 2, 83. "Porro autem Geta ferietur alio munere, ubi hera pepererit; porro autem alio, ubi erit puero natalis dies." *Ter. Ph.* i. 1, 12. In the latter of these examples, usage, and the obligation thence resulting, are implied; in the former, the presents were voluntary, and tokens of affection.

PERDERE.

AMITTERE.

Amittere is simply "to lose the possession of that, which one has once had." *Perdere* is "to lose," "destroy," or "throw away uselessly or hurtfully;" thus, *Decius, qui se devovisse dicitur, vitam amisit, sed non perdidit*. Auct. ad Herenn. (See *Vavas. de Vi et Usu Quorund. Verb.*) "Classes optimæ atque opportunæ amissæ et perditæ." *Cic. in Verr.* *Amittere* is sometimes used like the English verb, signifying, "to let slip from us something which we might have obtained": thus, "Quid tandem erat, quod ea nocte consequi posset, amitteret autem, si postridie mane Romam venisset." *Cic. pro Mil.*

It may be here remarked, that when *cum* is used, and the pronoun expressed, the pronoun must be *suis*; but when *et*, *ac*, *atque* are employed, the pronoun must be *is*, *ille*, or *iste*; thus, “He punished the thief, and his associates,” *Sumsit supplicium de fure, cum sociis suis*, or *et sociis ejus*.

EXERCISE.

Ptolemy, having conquered Demetrius, gained greater glory from his moderation, than from his victory; for he dismissed the friends of Demetrius, not only with all their property, but also with valuable presents; saying, that he had not begun the war for the sake of plunder. Not long afterwards, Ptolemy, having engaged with Demetrius a second time, was himself defeated; and, having lost his fleet, fled into Egypt. Demetrius, in return for his kindness, sent him his son, his brother, and all his friends, together with their property.

OBSERVATIONS.

APUD.

CUM.

Apud means “with,” or “at the house of,” or “among;” as *Apud me*, “in my house.” *Apud Græcos mos erat*, “it was a custom among (or with) the Greeks.” *Cum* denotes “in company with.”

Apud, it is to be observed, never answers to the question *quo*; for it never signifies motion to, or towards. This rule is violated in such expressions as this, “Iveram hesterno die apud principem Hessum.” *Casauboni Epist.*

COMMON.

“Common,” or “belonging to all,” opposed to *proprius*, “peculiar,” “belonging to one or a few,” is rendered by *communis*. Thus, *Nomen commune*, “a common name,” or “the name common to every one of a whole class.” *Nomen proprium*, “a proper name,” “the name of an individual.” *Vita omnibus animantibus est communis; ratio hominis est propria*.

“Common,” “ordinary,” or “vulgar,” opposed to “singular,” or “rare,” is rendered by *vulgaris*. “Facilia an difficilia, singularia erant, an vulgaria.” *Cic.* “Rarum, et haud vulgare.” *Cic.* Obvious as this distinction is, some critics seem not to have been acquainted with it. “Omnes libri dent commune ridet.” *Wakefield in Luc. ii. 22.* instead of *vulgare*, or *usitatum*.

FUGERE.

CONFUGERE.

Fugere is “to flee from danger”—generically; *confugere* is “to flee for protection.”

PERIRE.

INTERIRE.

A distinction is sometimes made between these two verbs, but it is not universally observed. *Perire* is strictly equivalent to our expression “to be undone,” not implying, however, total and irremediable destruction. *Interire*, as distinct from this, denotes “to be irretrievably ruined,” “to perish irrecoverably.” *Vel te interîsse, vel perîsse prædicent.*

Dum pereas, nihil interduo, dicant vivere." *Plaut. Cap. iii. 5, 33.* " *Perire* levius est, et habet inventionis spem, et non omnium rerum finem." *Facciol.*

MORS.

NEX.

FATUM.

Mors is a generic term, denoting " death in any way," or " by any cause," whether by violence, disease, or old age. *Fatum* is understood by all critics to denote " a natural death;" but it has become a question, what this expression strictly implies. Aristotle considered every death to be violent, when produced by an external cause ; and natural, when occasioned by disease, or old age. Plato, on the contrary, termed every death *violent*, when it was the effect of disease, wounds, or any casualty. Hence *fatum* has been restricted by some critics to " death by old age;" while it has been extended by others " to death also by distemper, or disease." See *A. Gell. xiii. 1.* In the former acceptation, Seneca seems to have used it, " Quota pars moritur tempore fati." *Herc. Oet. Act. 1.* " Finem vitæ sponte, an fato, implevit." *Tac. Ann. lib. 2. cap.* Archelaus, to whom the passage refers, was an old man, and is represented by Tacitus, as " senio confectus." " Sed, ut demum fato functum, palam factum est." *Suet. in Calig. cap. 6.* The expression here cannot refer to a violent death, for it was not known at Rome, that Germanicus had been poisoned ; nor can it imply, that he died of old age, having reached only his 34th year. The term therefore must here denote " a premature death occasioned by

disease." It would seem then, that *fatum* is not restricted to "death by old age"; and that it denotes, what we call "a natural death," or where no external violence has been used. But this latter conception is implied in *nex*, a term used actively and passively. "Vitæ necisque in suos habet potestatem." *Cæs. B. G.* i. 16. "He has the power of life and death." "Mortem Arminii promittebat, si patrandæ neci venenum mitteretur." *Tac. Ann.* ii. 88.

Fatum, as a synonyme with *necessitas*, has been defined by Augustine, "Omnium connexio seriesque causarum, quâ fit omne, quod fit." *Lib. 5. de Civ. Dei, cap. 8.*

EXERCISE.

When Augustus Cæsar was supping with Vedius Pollio, one of the slaves broke a crystal vessel. Vedius immediately ordered him to be put to death; nor was he to die by a common death; for he ordered him to be thrown into a fish pond full of lampreys. The boy, terrified, fled to the feet of Cæsar for protection. The emperor, shocked at the barbarous order of Pollio, commanded that the boy should be set at liberty, that all the crystal vessels should be broken, and the fish pond should be filled up. "What!" said he, "because your vessel has been broken, shall, therefore, the bowels of a human creature be torn in pieces?"

OBSERVATIONS.

It is to be observed, that the verb *sum* never governs an infinitive mood; and that it cannot be joined with that mood; unless that infinitive be either the nominative to it, or supply the place of an accusative

before it. Thus, “It is honourable to die for one’s country,” *Decorum est pro patria mori*—that is, “To die for one’s country is an honourable thing.” Here the infinitive *mori* is not under the government of the verb *est*, but is the nominative to it. “I know, that it is honourable to die for one’s country,” *Scio, decorum esse pro patria mori*: that is, “I know, that to die for one’s country is an honourable thing.” Here *mori* supplies the place of an accusative before *esse*.

It has been observed, that verbs of *causing*, *effecting*, or *bringing to pass*, are followed by *ut*. The verb *curo*, though agreeably to the general rule, it may be followed by *ut*, is elegantly joined to the future participle passive; thus, “C. Volusenum Quadratum misit, qui eum, per simulationem colloquii, curaret interficiendum.” *Cæs. B. G. viii. 23*. In modern Latin, we find this verb, when denoting “to cause,” often joined with an infinitive, thus, “Pecuniam condi curabat.” *Dalzel in notis in Thucyd. in Collect. Græc. Maj.* This usage should be avoided. When it denotes “to mind,” “care for,” or “be anxious about,” it takes the infinitive. “Hunc ego amicum habere non curo.” *Cic. Ep. Fam. iii. 8*. “Si curas esse, quod audis.” “If you are anxious to be, what you are called.”

Future events are frequently, in English, expressed in the present tense, after the verbs *to promise*, *to expect*, *to hope*, and some others. Thus, “He promised to go,” *Se iturum esse pollicitus est*

—that is, “that he would go.”—“I hope to obtain,” *Me adepturum esse spero*—that is, “that I shall obtain.” In colloquial language, the Latins also sometimes use the present for the future tense, after the verbs *spero*, *polliceor*, *nego*, and a few others; thus, *Sperat se a me avellere. Ter. Eun. iii. 3, 14.* “She hopes to gull,” or “that she will gull.”—“Dene-gavit se dare granum tritici.”—*Plaut. Stich. iv. i, 52*, for *se daturum esse*, “that he would give.”—“Jusjurandum pollicitus est dare.”—*Plaut. Most. v. 1, 36.* “He promised to give,” for *se daturum esse*. These, and similar phraseologies, occur chiefly in dramatic writers. Historians and prose writers, in general, employ the future tense, as, “*Illud tibi possum polliceri, me curaturum, ut tibi succedatur.*” *Cic. Ep. Fam. viii. 10.*

It may be necessary to caution the reader against the use of *seducere* for *in malam partem allicere*, or “to seduce.” There are, indeed, quoted one passage from Quintilian, and one from Tacitus, in which the verb is thus employed; but the readings, if not false, are at least very disputable. In the time of Tertullian the verb was used in this novel acceptation, and this use was continued by theological writers.

EXERCISE.

When Pyrrhus, king of Epire, had made war on the Romans, and when he and the Roman army were distant from each other only a few miles, the physician of Pyrrhus came by night into the camp of Fabricius, promising to cut off the

king by poison, if a reward should be given him, proportioned to the magnitude of the service. Fabricius immediately caused him to be carried back to Pyrrhus, saying, that it was disgraceful to contend with an enemy by poison, and not by arms. On this, the king is reported to have said, “The sun can more easily be diverted from his course, than Fabricius be seduced from the path of honour.”

OBSERVATIONS.

PECUS.

JUMENTUM.

Pecus means “cattle in general,” whether used for clothing, or for food; and is a name, in fact, applicable to all animals—thus, “*Lanigerum pecus.*” *Virg.* “*Aligerum pecus.*” *Id.* “*Squamiferum pecus.*” *Id.*

Jumentum, “cattle used for labour of any kind.” *Dumesnil.*

JUBEO.

IMPERO.

Jubere is “to bid,” “desire,” “express one’s wish,” opposed to *vetare*, “to forbid,” as “*Milites incedere jussit.*” *Cæs.* “*Jubeo te salvere,*”—“I wish you good health.”—“I greet, or salute you.” “*Tullum regem populus jussit; patres auctores facti.*” *Liv. i. 22.* “The people expressed their desire to have Tullus king; and the senators gave their sanction.” So likewise, *Jubere legem*, “to express the desire of a law.”—“*Hoc verbo utebantur, cum legem obtinere vellent,*” “*Volumus jubemusque.*” (*Steph. Thes.*)

Imperare is to order with authority, requiring to

be obeyed. “Jubeo et impero.” *Ter.* “I express my desire, and command you to obey.”

In two of the former editions *jubere* governing a dative case was considered by us, as it has been by Vossius, and several other critics, to be a Græcism. It seems to be sanctioned, however, in a very few instances, by some writers of the Augustan age, if we can rely on the correctness of the readings. But, when we find in such writers as Cicero or Cæsar an expression, not only repugnant to their usual phraseology, but also to an established principle of the language, we are naturally inclined to doubt the accuracy of the lection. In writers of the silver and later ages, it unquestionably occurs. Vossius says, that it never governs an accusative, and that the accusative, which follows it, is not under the regimen of the verb, but the accusative before the subsequent infinitive. In this opinion, though supported by the authority of several eminent critics, it appears impossible to concur, without renouncing one of the clearest and best established principles of the Latin language. It is a rule, confirmed, not only by the nature of the thing itself, but also by universal usage, that the accusative after the active verb, expressing the patient or thing acted upon, invariably becomes the nominative to the verb in the passive voice, thus, *Hannibal vicit Romanos*,—*Romani victi sunt ab Hannibale*.—The nominative to the active verb must be the agent, and the person, or thing acted upon, is put under the government of the verb. When the passive voice is employed, the

person, or thing acted upon, now becomes the principal subject; what was, therefore, in the former example the accusative, now becomes the nominative.

If we find then a passive verb, having regularly a person, or thing, as its nominative, expressing the patient, have we not, consistently with the acknowledged principles of analogy, a right to infer, that the nominative to the passive verb must be its regimen in the active voice? This appears to me so evident, as hardly to require illustration, or to admit dispute. Let us apply the principle to the subject in question. We find *jubere* has a regular and complete passive voice. We find, for example, “Admissi in tabernaculum, jussique considerare.” *Curt.* vii. 8. “Cum castra vallo cingere juberetur.” *Val. Max.* ix. 1. *Ext.* 6. “Lictoribus abire jussis.” *Liv.* xxiii. 23. “Aliis alio itinere jussis.” *Liv.* i. 5. and a variety of other similar passages on the purest classical authority. Now, when we observe Curtius saying, “Equites discedere in cornua jusserat,” (viii. 12.) and immediately afterwards, “Jussis subistere cæteris,” equivalent to *Cum cæteri jussi essent*, have we not reason to affirm, that the *equites* is under the government of the verb *jusserat*? It will not be questioned, that we can say, *Te ire jubeo*, and *Tu ire juberis*. Do not then the principles of analogy require, that what is the nominative to the passive verb, and expresses the patient, shall be considered as under the government of the active verb, expressing the thing acted upon? Nothing is more evident. Now, were it true, as Vossius

supposes, that the accusative *te* is not governed by *jubeo*, but is the accusative before the infinitive, and that *te ire*, taken together, are the regimen of the verb, then it would follow, that this regimen would become the nominative to the passive verb. Are we then allowed to say, *Te ire jubetur?* Such an expression is not sanctioned by any classical authority.

I contend, therefore, that the accusative after *jubere* is the regimen of the verb. When Virgil says (if I may be allowed to appeal to poetical usage, merely for illustration) “*Ille meas errare boves permisit*,” I should without hesitation, admit, that *boves* is not under the government of *permisit*, because *boves* cannot become the nominative to the passive verb. No good writer would say, *Boves errare permissæ sunt*, but *Bobus errare permissum est*. In this case, *Boves errare*, (*Virg.*) taken together form the regimen of the verb, and jointly supply the place of an accusative. And if the passive expression of the sentiment in Virgil were adopted, it would be *Boves errare permissum est*. Here also, it is not the “oxen,” simply, that are permitted, but “their wandering;” and the person to whom the permission was granted might be subjoined, as *Boves errare tibi permissum est*. But very different is the construction of *jubere*: for we say, *Romanos incedere jussit*, and *Romani incedere jussi sunt*. This, surely, is sufficient evidence, that in the former expression *militēs* is under the government of *jussit*; for, otherwise, it could not become the nominative to the passive verb.

In addition to this argument drawn from a general principle, it may be remarked, that we find *jubere* governing an accusative without an infinitive. “*Litteras . . . non quæ te aliquid juberent.*” *Cic. Ep. Fam.* xiii. 24. “*Jube famulos, rem divinam mihi apparent.*” *Plaut. Stich.* ii. 2. 71. These examples are conclusive.

POTENTIA.

POTESTAS.

Potentia, according to Hill, implies a general command of means infallibly effective in fulfilling every purpose of the agent. “*Potentia est ad sua conservanda, et alterius obtinenda idonearum rerum facultas.*” *Cic. de Inv.* It is properly, he observes, the attribute of a sensitive being, but is also applied to things inanimate. *Potestas*, he says, does not mean “power in general,” but such a degree of it, as to enable the agent to produce the effect, and is always relative. This distinction, I believe, is generally observed: but the definition by Papin, which Dumesnil has adopted, appears to me more clear and more precise.—“*Potentia*,” says he, “as distinguished from *potestas*, consists in that which we have ability to do; *potestas*, in that which we have permission to do.”—“*Potentia* in eo quod possumus, *potestas* in eo quod licet.” *Papin.* From these two definitions the reader will sufficiently comprehend the difference between *potentia* and *potestas*. It may not be unuseful, at the same time, to observe, that *potentia* is nearly allied to *vis* or *vires*, denoting “strength,” “power,” “might,” and is applicable both to persons and things:

thus. “*Potentia solis.*” *Virg.* “*Potentia Neptuni.*” *Ov.* “*Potentia magistratum.*”—“*Potentia Romanorum.*” In these examples, *potentia* denotes the “power,” “strength,” “force,” or “energy,” of the persons or things spoken of.

The difference between *vis* and *potentia*, seems to be this, that, while the latter denotes the power or ability, the former signifies the force or strength, necessary to that power, as manifested by outward acts. “*Omnibus dictis factisque vim sibi ad potentiam struere.*” *Tac. Hist.* iii. 49.

Potestas means “power,” “authority,” “dominion,” “jurisdiction,” and is nearly allied to *ditio*, and *imperium*—being distinguished from the latter by its denoting “civil,” whereas *imperium* implies “military power.” Hence the terms *ditio* and *potestas* are frequently used as equivalent words: thus, “*In potestatem Romanorum sunt redacti.*” *Liv.* “*In ditionem redegit.*” *Id.* “*Imperio alteri aucti; alteri ditionis alienæ facti.*” *Liv.* i. 25. “*Et potestatis suæ ad ultimum manserunt.*” *Liv.* xxiii. 30. “*Potentia,*” says Priscian, “*magis pro vi accipitur, potestas autem pro ditione.*” The former answers to the Greek word *δύναμις*—the latter to *ἐξουσία*. It is to be observed, however, that *potestas* is sometimes used in a more extensive sense.

The following phraseology deserves the attention of the learner. “I have nothing to give,” *Nihil est, quod dem*, or “I have nothing, which I may give.”—“He had nothing to do,” *Nil erat, quod faceret.*

“ I shall have nothing to relate,” *Nihil erit, quod narrem*. This is the form of expression adopted by the best writers almost universally. It is at the same time to be observed, that the Greeks being in the habit of using ἔχω for *possum*, this idiom was sometimes adopted by a few Latin writers; and though *possum dicere*, and *habeo quod dicam* are not precisely equivalent expressions, *habeo dicere*, as ἔχω λέγειν, was employed to express both of these affirmations. “ Quid habeo dicere ?” *Cic. pro Cor. Bal.* “ Nihil habeo ad te scribere.” *Id. Ep. ad Att. ii. 22.* “ Hoc habeo polliceri.” *Suet.* “ Quid habeo precari ?” *Id. in Cæs. Aug. cap. 58.* After the time of Cicero, and writers of that period, the expression was used to denote duty or obligation; thus, *habeo legere* meant, “ I ought to read.” We do not, however, consider this phraseology as worthy of imitation. And here, I would offer one general observation, which the reader may apply to all cases similar to the present, namely, that it is not the authority of one or two passages, even in reputable authors, which will justify a deviation from their wonted and established phraseology. The most correct writers have their moments of oscillancy and inattention. We discover this failing in the best English authors; and we may fairly presume, that the ancients were not exempted from occasional inadvertencies. “ Ut rara vocabula,” says Scheller, “ quia sunt paulo ignotiora, sic quoque in primis raras constructiones, licet auctoritate priscorum se tueantur, fugere debemus.” *Schel. Præc. p. 601.*

When necessity or obligation is implied, the gerund, or the future participle passive, must be used; as, “I have to finish my work.” *Opus mihi peragendum est.* See p. 26.

EXERCISE.

Pisistratus, the tyrant, conducted himself with the greatest equity in the government of Athens, which he had unjustly seized; and, abstracting from his love of power, no citizen was better than he. If he saw any persons walking about idle in the market-place, he called them to him, and asked them, why they were idle. If they answered, that they had neither cattle nor corn, he gave them some, and bade them go, and work. When he appeared in public, two or three boys accompanied him with money to give to the poor.

OBSERVATIONS.

SPECTACULUM.

CONSPECTUS.

VISUS.

Spectaculum, “a sight,” “spectacle,” or “the thing seen,” as *spectaculum dirum*, “a dreadful sight.” *Conspectus*, “a sight,” “view,” or “prospect,” as “*Id factum magnæ parti peditum Romanorum conspectum abeuntis Albani exercitus intersepsit.*” *Liv. i. 27*,—“prevented great part of the Roman infantry from seeing the departure of the Alban army,” or “intercepted the sight, or view.” *Visus*, “sight,” or “the power of seeing.”—“*Visus est potentia obtuitus.*” *Steph.* “*An potest esse ulla tam perpetua discentis intentio,*

quæ non ut *visus* oculorum obtuitu continuo fatigetur." *Quint.* i. 3. Hence the expressions, "Acer visus." *Plin.* viii. 25, "A sharp sight."—"Hebes visus." *Sen. Herc. Fur.* v. 653, "Dim sight." "Visus deficiens." *Sen. Agam.* "An impaired, or failing sight."—"Sensus, de quibus loquimur quinque sunt; *visus, auditus, odoratus, gustus, et tactus.*" *Macrob.* lib. vii. cap. 1.

INDUERE.

VESTIRE.

Induere is simply "to put on," opposed to *Exuere*, "to put off." *Vestire* is not only "to dress," or "clothe," but also "to furnish clothes," and is opposed to *Despoliare*.

Opes, "power," or "wealth." Gifanius observes, that Cicero never uses this word for "wealth," but always for "power." Hadrianus Cardinalis makes a similar observation, and remarks that, *opes* is employed by the purest writers to denote that power, which consists in friends, clients, relations, and popular favour. "Divitiæ ut utare, opes ut colare, honores ut laudare." *Cic. de Am.* By the poets, and occasionally by a few prose writers, it is employed to denote wealth, or riches. "Effodiuntur opes irritamenta malorum." *Ov. Met.* i. 140. Here it particularly alludes to the precious metals—"Ubi familiares opes defecerant." *Sal.* "When their private fortunes had been exhausted." Here, also, it refers chiefly to property.

PROPE.

JUXTA.

These are properly adverbs, though they are often, the latter indeed generally, used as prepositions, governing an accusative case, *ad* being understood.

Prope denotes simply nearness or propinquity, and admits degrees, expressed by *Propius* and *Proxime**. Intensive words accordingly are joined with it. “*Quisnam hic loquitur tam prope?*” *Plaut. Stich.* ii. 2, 6. Hence it is evident, that it does not imply either contiguity, or the closest propinquity. *Juxta*, from an obsolete verb *Jugo* for *Jungo*, denotes not only nearness, but close propinquity, though not absolute contiguity. Hence it admits neither intensification, nor remission. “*Tam juxta nos,*” would be an absurdity.

—“*Furiarum maxima juxta*

Accubat, et manibus prohibet contingere mensas.”

Virg. Æn. vi. 605.

* Palairet has observed, that *proxime* is joined with an ablative case, by an ellipsis of *ab*. Here, we apprehend, the learned author has erred. He gives the following example: “*Proxime Pompeio in castris sedenti.*” *Jul. Obseq.* 119. p. 174. This example does not prove his position; for the regimen may be in the dative case; and examples occur in favour of this alternative. We find *prope* and *proxime* followed by the prepositions *a* and *ab*; but I have not discovered any clear example of the ellipsis which the author supposes. When an ellipsis obtains, I believe it to be of the preposition *ad*, as “*Proxime Hispaniam.*” *Sall. B. J. cap.* 22. “*Exercitum habere quam proxime hostem.*” *Cic. Att.* vi. 5. The construction of *prope* and *propior* confirms this opinion, which are never joined with an ablative without a preposition. “*Prope castra.*” *Cæs. B. G.* i. 22. “*Propior hostem.*” *Hirt. P. B. G.* viii. 9.

“Juxta eum vino gravem accubat.” *V. Max.* iv. 3, 3., denoting in the same bed. “Totos dies juxta focum atque ignem agunt.” *Tac. de Germ.* 17.

It may be necessary to caution the junior reader against an inelegant use of this preposition, very common in modern writers. Thus, we find “according to Plato,” “according to the words of Cicero,” “according to the will of God,” “according to the expression of the poet,” frequently rendered by *Juxta Platonem*, *Juxta verba Ciceronis*, *Juxta voluntatem Dei*, *Juxta illud poëtæ*. It must be acknowledged that this phraseology may plead in its defence the authority of Justin, Hieronymus, and a few other writers of inferior name; but it was never employed by any writer of the Augustan age. We should therefore say; *Secundum Platonem*, or *Ex sententia Platonis*, or *Judice Platone*, *Teste Platone*. *Ut est apud Platonem*. *Ut Ciceronis verba mea faciam*. *Ut Dei fert voluntas*. *Quemadmodum poëta canit*.

It is difficult to furnish the scholar with a precise rule for the use of the Latin genitive. One thing he should observe, that he may almost always safely use it, when the expression can be turned into the English genitive, or is already in that form. Thus, “the crown of the king,” or “the king’s crown,” *corona regis*. “The height of the mountain,” *altitudo montis*, or “the mountain’s height.” It is true, that the Latin genitive is sometimes used to express *of*, when it is not thus convertible, as “Liquidum urna,” *Hor. Sat. i. 1, 54*, “A pitcher of water;” and par-

ticularly when the second substantive is accompanied with an adjective, as, *Vir summæ prudentiæ*, “A man of consummate wisdom;”—but except in such examples, the learner should not use the Latin genitive to express *of*, unless it be convertible into the English. We say, *Mœnia Trojæ*, “The walls of Troy,” or “Troy’s walls,”—but we cannot say, *Vir Trojæ*, “A man of Troy,”—but *Vir Trojanus*.—We say, *Viæ Athenarum*, “The streets of Athens,”—but we cannot say, *Miltiades Athenarum*, “Miltiades of Athens,”—but *Miltiades Atheniensis*.

It may, therefore, be useful to admonish the junior scholar, never to put one noun in the genitive, as governed by another, unless the expression be convertible into the English genitive. By adhering to this rule he cannot err; and justifiable deviations from it, which are not many in number, he will easily learn by reading and observation. A few of the most common we shall here specify. 1st. The thing contained is governed by the thing containing, as, *cadus olei*, “a cask of oil.” 2d. What is done in a given time is governed by that time, as *dies doloris**, “a day of grief,” *hora cœnæ*, “the hour of supper.” 3d. A verbal substantive expressing the agent, governs the thing done in the genitive, as, *Actor causarum*, “A pleader of causes.” *Cultor justitiæ*, “An observer of justice.” 4th. A measure governs the thing measured, as, *Vini sextarius*, “A pint and a half of wine.”

* In *cadus olei* and *dies doloris*, there is probably an ellipsis of *plenus*. See *Palairer’s Ellipses Latinæ*.

It may be here also remarked, that though *of* is generally the sign of the genitive, the Latins used this case, where we employ other prepositions: thus, “*Hiemis perfugium.*” *Cic. pro. Leg. Man.* “A refuge from, or in, winter.” Tacitus, indeed, adopts a different phraseology from that of Cicero, but scarcely to be imitated. “*Suffugium hiemi.*” *Germ. cap. 16.*

We sometimes find the genitive used, in deviation from the general rule, that substantives, signifying the same thing, agree in case. Thus “*Aliis ego te virtutibus, continentiae, gravitatis, justitiae,*” &c. *Cic. pro Muren.* for *continentia, gravitate, justitia*, as we say in English, “The virtues of continence, gravity, justice,” &c.

It may be necessary to caution the reader also against an inaccuracy, which occurs frequently in modern Latin. In subjoining to the name of any person the name of his estate, or place of abode, it is not uncommon to place the preposition *de* for *of*, before the latter substantive, as “Peter of Brussels,” *Petrus de Bruxella.* “Robert of St. Albans,” *Robertus de Verulamio.* “James Howard of Rumford,” *Jacobus Howard de Rumford.* Now, as Despauter truly observes, classical writers never used such modes of expression. They said, “*Livius Patavinus,*” “*Cicero Arpinas,*”—“*Terentius Afer,*” “*Aristoteles Stagyrates,*” not “*Livius de Patavio,*” “*Cicero de Arpino,*” “*Terentius de Africa,*” “*Aristoteles de Stagyra.*”

The Latin idiom in the use of the verb *suppeditare*, differs from the English. We say, “To supply

any one *with* any thing.” The Latins, following their general rule, by which the thing given is put in the accusative, said, *Suppeditare aliquid alicui*.

The junior scholar should observe, that private disbursements of money are generally expressed by, *Facere*, or *impendere*, *sumptum*, or *sumptus*; *facere impensam*, or *impensas, in rem aliquam*; and that *erogare* is generally confined to the expenditure of public money. V. Maximus, in describing the liberality of Gillias, has applied it to the expenditure of private fortune. Noltenius condemns this usage, but, though not common, it is sanctioned by one or two examples in Cicero.

EXERCISE.

Gillias of Agrigentum, a man richer in mind than in wealth, was constantly employed rather in expending, than in getting money. He erected buildings for public purposes; he exhibited shows to the people; he supplied the poor with food; he gave dowries to young women; he entertained strangers in the kindest manner; and at one time fed and clothed five hundred horsemen, who had been driven on shore near his house by a storm. In short, whatever Gillias possessed, he seemed to consider as the common patrimony of all men.

OBSERVATIONS.

OMNES.

CUNCTI.

“*Cuncti* significat quod omnes, sed conjuncti et conjugati; at vero *omnes*, etiamsi diversis in locis sint.” *Gifan.* (Vid. *Verwey's Thes.* p. 103.)—Apuleius explains *cunctim* to be “non sigillatim ac discre-

tim, sed coacervatim.”—*Omnes*, “all,” therefore, is opposed to *nullus*, “none,” or any partitive.—*Cuncti*, “all,” is opposed to *Sejuncti* or *Diversi*—and means “all together,” or “considered as one aggregate,” quasi *ad unum versi*.

Universi is opposed to *singuli*, as “Ex iis rebus universis eloquentia constat, quibus in singulis elaborare permagnum est.” *Cic. de Orat.* i. 5. Some critics have defined *universi*, as meaning, “all at one time,” while *cuncti* means “all in one place.” This distinction, though it may have some foundation, is rarely observed.

Totus “the whole,” is not strictly synonymous with *omnes*, or *omnia*, “All.” The former means “the whole collectively,” “the sum total;” the latter, “the details,” or “all the particulars.” This distinction is well illustrated by Quintilian. Qui dicit, expugnatam esse civitatem, complectitur omnia, at si aperias hæc, quæ verbo uno inclusa erant, apparebunt et fusæ per domos ac templa flammæ, et ruentium tectorum fragor, infantium et fœminarum ploratus, &c. Licet hæc omnia, ut dixi, complectatur *eversio*, minus est tamen *totum* dicere, quam *omnia*. *Lib. viii. cap. 3.*

It may be proper here to apprise the young reader, that, though *sed* is not used for *but* (*bot*), or *moreover*, unless when followed by *etiam*, and then the latter conjunction indicates the addition, *autem* is often used in an adversative sense, and in the same meaning with *sed*.

Cellarius observes, that comic writers sometimes

use “Omnis,” after “Sine,” instead of “Ullus,” and that Cicero, with all his contemporaries, uniformly use the latter, as “Sine ullo tecto.”—“Sine ullo sensu.”—“Sine ullo dolore.” That the latter phraseology is far preferable, being much more conformable to the general usage of classic writers, there can be no question: but we find the other form of expression in Plautus, in Terence, in Ovid, and once at least even in Cicero himself. “Sine omni periculo.” *Ter. And.* ii. 3.17. “Sine omni malitia.” *Plaut. Bacch.* v. 2. 13. “Omni sine labe.” *Ov. Trist.* iv. 8. 33. “Sine omni sapientia.” *Cic. Orat.* ii. 1.

It has been already observed, that verbs of advising are generally followed by *ut*, as “Monere, ut magnam infamiam fugiant, non desistimus.” *Cic. Ep. Fam.* 1. They are sometimes, though rarely, found with an infinitive. I am aware that Vorstius has delivered a contrary opinion, affirming that *hortari* is, by good writers, joined with the infinitive, rather than with *ut* and the subjunctive mood. He seems even to extend the observation to all verbs of advising. To what authority he would have appealed (for the few examples which he has adduced, are nothing towards the establishment of a general rule) in favour of this opinion, I am utterly at a loss to conceive; so contrary is it to the general practice of the purest classics. That *hortari* and *suadere* are sometimes joined to an infinitive, is readily admitted. “Res ipsa hortari videtur, quoniam tempus admonuit, supra repetere.” *Sall. B. C.* cap. 5.

“Egregiis virorum pariter ac feminarum operibus fortitudo se oculis hominum subjecit, patientiamque in medium procedere hortata est.” *Val. Max.* iii. 3. But that the infinitive is the most common and most elegant form of construction, is an assertion altogether unfounded. I know of no prose writer, with whom this construction is so common as the subjunctive form of expression; and in Cicero, Cæsar, and Livy, it seldom, or never, occurs. The examples now quoted from Justin, Valerius Maximus, and Sallust, are the only examples, which I have remarked, in my perusal of these authors. If there be any others, their number bears no proportion to those of the contrary usage.

Critics, it is apprehended, have been led into error on this subject, by confounding two distinct significations, which belong to some verbs of advising. Thus, *Monere* signifies “to advise to any action,” or “to apprise, by way of counsel, of any truth or fact.” In the former sense, it is construed almost uniformly with *ut*, and in the latter, it is joined with the infinitive, and admits no other construction. Thus, “A philosophia eum mater avertit, monens imperaturo contrariam esse.” *Suet. in Ner.* cap. 52. Here *monere* denotes information, rather than advice. The clause following the participle does not express any mode of action recommended; but that counsel, which is conveyed by the statement of a fact. So also in the following example, “Monentibus amicis cavendum esse Mutium.” *Id. in Flav. Vesp.* cap. 14, “His friends

telling him, by way of caution or admonition, that Mutius ought to be guarded against." But when advice to action is implied, the action recommended is almost uniformly expressed by *ut*. The same author says, "Monitus est, ut vim multitudinis caveret."

In the same manner, *persuadere*, when it denotes "to persuade," that is, "to advise thoroughly," or "with effect," is very generally followed by *ut*; when it signifies "to persuade," or "to convince," it is uniformly followed by an infinitive. Of these two modes of construction, we shall afterwards have occasion to produce several examples.

It may, therefore, be delivered to the scholar as an incontestable rule, that verbs of advising are almost uniformly followed by *ut*, with the subjunctive mood, expressing the thing recommended to be done; and, that *monere* is seldom, or never joined with an infinitive, unless when it implies the communication of a fact.

There are more examples of the government of an infinitive by a noun substantive, than some grammarians have supposed. "Consilium ceperunt oppido fugere." *Cæs. B. G.* vii. 26. "Corpora curare tempus est." *Liv.* xxi. 54. "Libido gratificari." *Sall. B. J.* cap. 3. "Cupidine superare." *Just.* xii. 7. We would not, however, recommend this usage to the adoption of the reader, unless where the expression has the sanction of reputable authority. The gerund in *di* after a substantive is the more common phraseology.

EXERCISE.

Antisthenes, the philosopher, used to exhort his scholars to pay great attention to their studies; but few of them complied with his advice. At last, being in a passion, he turned them all away. Diogenes, however, who was one of the number, being inflamed with a great desire to hear the lectures of the philosopher, came frequently to his school, and resolutely stuck to him. Antisthenes threatened, that he would break his head with a staff, which he used to carry; and when he saw, that Diogenes was not frightened away by this threat, he one day did actually beat him.

OBSERVATIONS.

It has been given as a rule, that, when the verb preceding *ut* is in the present, or future tense, the verb following *ut*, if expressing an action, contemporaneous with that of the principal verb, is put in the present subjunctive; and if the principal verb be in any of the preterite tenses, the verb following *ut* is in the preterimperfect, or the preterperfect tense.

This rule, however, though very generally, is not universally observed. Cæsar says, “Persuadet Castico, ut regnum occuparet.” *B. G. cap. 3.* “Facere possum, ut essem.”* *Cic. de Leg. Agr.* “Dumnorigi, ut idem conaretur, persuadet.” *Cæs. B. G. lib. i. cap. 3.* In these three examples, the preterimperfect follows the present. This form of expression, however, is far less usual than the other, and much less agreeable to the natural and established association of the tenses.

* Ernesti writes *Sim.*

In the following, we have the preceding verb in the preterite, and the subsequent in the present tense. “Summonuit, ut vestem cum illo mutem.” *Ter. Ph.* iii. 5. 24. The latter of these phraseologies, however, seems more consistent with strict propriety, than the former, the present tense expressing either the act simply, or denoting time present, in relation to the primary verb, and not absolutely. *Ut mutem* may be considered as synonymous with *mutare*. “He advised me to change,” or “He advised my changing.”*

When the two actions are not contemporaneous, the rule here given does not hold; thus “Velim, ut

* It has been questioned, whether the present tense denotes time at all; and, if it does denote present time, whether it signifies that time expressly or inferentially. I am inclined to think, that its real and proper character is to denote the act simply, and that the time is always inferred. To examine this question with accuracy, would occupy several pages; I shall, therefore, only submit to the learned reader the two following observations: 1st. We find this tense employed to denote universal truths, or propositions at all times true, involving, therefore, the present, the past, and the future. Thus, “Ex nihilo nihil fit.”—“Omnes eodem cogimur.”—“Sol terram calefacit.”—“Death spares no man.” 2dly. We find it, when employed to express particular facts, denoting sometimes the present, sometimes the past, and sometimes the future. “Ego hinc abeo.” *Ter. Eun.* iii. 2. 41. “I will go away.” “Quia cum inde abeo, jam tunc cœperat turba inter eos.” *Ter. Eun.* iv. 4. 57, “When I went away.” “Hos prius introducā, et quæ volo simul imperabo; postea continuo exeo.” *Ter. Eun.* iii. 2. 40, “And then I’ll immediately come out.” In English, this use of the present tense is, in colloquial language, still more common.

vitasses." *Cic. Ep. ad Ter. xvi. 9*, "I wish that you had avoided."—"Timeo, ne fecerit." *Cic.* "I fear, lest he may have done it."—"Vellem, eum tecum abduxisses." *Cic.* "I wish, that you had taken him with you." *Fratri culpa factum est, ut miser sim*, and *Fratri culpa factum est, ut miser essem*, mean, as Scheller observes, two different things. The former implies, that I am now—the latter, that I was—miserable.

It is to be remembered also, that the preterite definite, in English, is a compound tense, made up of the present tense of the verb "to have," and the perfect participle. Hence it always refers to present time, denoting an action continued either actually, or in its effect, to the present moment. In Latin, the English preterites definite and indefinite are each expressed by the same tense, as *Docui*, "I have taught," and also, "I taught." The preterite definite, therefore, having always a reference to present time, the particle *ut*, when it follows this tense, is frequently joined to the present subjunctive, and not the imperfect. "Ea ne (ut non) me *celet, consuefecit* filium." *Ter. Ad. i. 1. 29.*, "I *have* accustomed my son, not to conceal."—"Balbus ad me *scripsit*, tanta se epiphora oppressum, ut loqui non *possit*." *Cic. ad Ter. xvi. 23.*, "Balbus has written." "Itaque ad reliquos hic quoque labor *accessit*, ut omnes *adhibeam* machinas ad tenendum adolescentem." *Cic. ad Brut. 17.*, "This labour has been added."—"Itane *parasti* te, ut spes nulla in te *siet?*" *Ter. Eun. ii. 2. 9.*

When the preceding verb, whether rendered in English by the preterite definite, or not, refers to present time, the same observation is applicable. “Quam inique *comparatum* est, ii, qui minus habent, ut semper aliquid *addant* divitioribus!” *Ter. Ph. i. 1. 7.*

The present and the preterite definite so naturally harmonize, that we find them connected in a variety of instances,—“Saltat Milonius, ut semel icto accessit fervor capiti, numerusque lucernis.” *Hor. Sat. ii. 1. 25.*

“Si est, culpam ut Antipho in se admiserit.” *Ter. Ph. i. 5. 40.*, “If it be, that Antipho has committed.”

In rendering also Latin into English, it is necessary to attend to this combination of tenses. If we say, “Ita conturbasti mihi rationes omnes, ut eam non possem tradere suis,” the tense *possem* clearly indicates that *conturbasti* is to be considered as the preterite indefinite, and that the meaning is, “You so *deranged* all my plans, that I could not.” But when Thais says, “Ita conturbasti, ut non possim,” *Ter. Eun. v. 2. 29.*, the latter verb, by its tense, evidently shews, that the preceding verb is to be considered as the preterite definite, and that the meaning is, “You *have* so deranged, that I cannot.”*

* As the order of nature is maintained by a succession of contrarieties, the termination of one state of things naturally implies the commencement of its contrary. Hence the preterite definite is employed to denote an event the contrary of that, which the

The observations here offered respecting *ut*, are applicable to all relative terms, and to interrogative words taken indefinitely, and also to most of the conjunctions, as *qui*, *quantus*, *quis*, *cur*, *quin*, *quo minus*, *ne*, *nisi*, &c.

Adjectives signifying *desire* or *disdain*, *knowledge* or *ignorance*, *innocence* or *guilt*, also verbals in *ax*, and participials in *ns*, govern the genitive case.

EXERCISE.

Diogenes, however, did not go away. “Strike,” said he, “if you please; I present to you my head; but you will not find any staff so hard, that it will drive me from your school. I love you, and am desirous to hear your prelections. I have prevailed on myself to submit to any thing, for the sake of knowledge.” Antisthenes, perceiving that he was very fond of learning, took him back, and conceived a great affection for him. “Nature,” says Tully, “has implanted in man an insatiable desire to search for truth, that he may become wiser and better.”

OBSERVATIONS.

PUGNA. PUGNARE. PRÆLIUM. PRÆLIARI.

That these words are not precisely, as one or two critics have supposed, respectively synonymous, must be evident from the two following examples: “Prælia pugnasque edere.” *Lucret.* ii. 117. “Pugnare, et prælia obire.” *Id.* iv. 965. “Habeant reges sibi pugnas, sibi prælia.” *Plaut. Curc.* i. 3. 22. What verb expresses. Thus *vixit*, “he has lived,” signifies “he is dead.” “Fuit Ilium,” “Troy has been,” or “Troy is no more.”

the distinction is, it may be somewhat difficult to ascertain. That, like many other synonymes, they are often used indiscriminately, when no misconception is to be apprehended, will not be questioned. They agree in denoting a contest for an object, and are included in the generic terms, *certare* and *certamen*. Hence, they are used indifferently, when merely the general idea of a contest is implied. “Quibuscum ego non pugno, utrum sit melius, an verius.” *Cic. de Orat.* lib. i. “I do not dispute.” “Vehementer præliatus sum.” *Cic. ad Att.* lib. i. 16. Here *pugnare* and *præliari* are equivalent to *Verbis certare, vel contendere*.

According to Valla, *prælium* denotes “a contest of armed men;” *pugna*, “a battle, with or without arms.” To this distinction Noltenius objects, observing, that *præliari* is often used, when arms are not implied. See *Cic. ad Att.* i. 16.—also *Dolet. Com.*

Isidorus defines *bellum*, *pugna*, and *prælium* thus. “*Bellum* universum dicitur, ut *Punicum*; hujus partes sunt *pugnæ*, ut *Cannensis*. Rursus, in una *pugna* sunt multa *prælia*. *Bellum* igitur est totum; *pugna* unius diei; *prælium* pars *pugnæ* est.” *Isid.* xviii. 1.

Hill adopts the following distinction. “*Prælium*,” he says, “denotes one of those conflicts which make part of *Bellum*, a war between contending nations; while *pugna* has a more extensive meaning, being applicable not only to one of those conflicts, but also to combats and squabbles between individuals, origi-

nating in a private concern." Of these several explanations, that of Isidorus excepted, each has some foundation in truth.

Though etymology is by no means, in all cases, a safe guide, it frequently serves to assist us, in ascertaining the distinctive meaning of synonymous words. *Pugnus* and *pugna* are evidently derived from $\pi\upsilon\grave{\nu}\xi$, *pugno vel pugnīs*; the hand or fist, previously to the invention of arms, being doubtless the chief instrument of attack and defence. "Namque veteres," says Donatus, "ante usum ferri, et armorum, pugnīs, et calcibus et morsibus, corporum luctatione certabant." *Donat. in Proleg. Hec.*

"Unguibus et pugnīs, dein fustibus, atque ita porro
Pugnabant armis, quæ post fabricaverat usus."

Hor. Sat. i. 3. 101.

Hence it is said by Donatus, who in this is followed by Popma, Doletus, Dumesnil, and several others, that *pugna* means "a battle," in which the combatants came to close quarters; and *prælium* "a battle, in general." In this distinction, we are inclined to concur. But it may be further observed, in accordance with Hill's explanation, that, as *pugna* originally denoted "a fight with fists," implying close action, and the manual force of the contending parties, we have some reason to conclude, that this idea continued to be conveyed by the term *pugna*, and that it referred chiefly to the closeness of the fight, and the physical exertions of the combatants. *Prælium*, on the con-

trary, expresses rather the state of battle, in whatever manner conducted, as *bellum* denotes a state of warfare. And, while *acies* signifies the field of action, *prælium* refers to the whole scene, or the battle generally, including the evolutions, and manœuvres practised by each party, while *pugna* directs the attention chiefly to their manual exertions. From a variety of examples too, we should be inclined to think, that, while *pugna* may be either long or short, with or without preparation, *prælium* denotes a contention of some length, for which generally preparation is made. “Sed hoc superari, quod diuturnitate pugnae defessi prælio excedebant; alii integris viribus succedebant.” *Cæs. B. G.* iii. 4. “Wearied by the long continuance of their exertions, they quitted the battle.” “Ego enim, quamdiu senatûs auctoritas mihi defendenda fuit, sic acriter et vehementer præliatus sum, ut clamor concursusque, maxima cum mea laude, fierent.” Here *præliari* expresses “a continued contention.” He adds, alluding to the same subject; “Te non solum auctorem consiliorum meorum, verum etiam spectatorem pugnarum mirificarum desideravi.” *Cic. ad Att.* i. 15. Here the term *pugnarum* refers to the individual exertions; and it is manifest, contrary to the opinion of Isidorus, that *pugnae* were only parts of the *prælium*, and that the latter consisted of the efforts implied in the former.

The distinction here offered between those words, appears to receive some confirmation from this circumstance, that *bellum* and *prælium* are sometimes

used indiscriminately, each denoting “a state of warfare,” or “a state of battle;” but *pugna*, as far as our observation has extended, is never used for *bellum*. See *Justin.* iii. 6. ii. 12. ix. 4. *Liv.* xxxi. 2. xxi. 8.

The words *to* and *for*, signs of the Latin dative, are in English frequently omitted, as, “He bought me a book,” *Emit librum mihi*, that is, “He bought a book for me.”—“I told you this,” *Hoc tibi dixi*, or “I told this to you.”

Deducere est a terra in mare, *subducere* e mari in terram. Some modern writers have not attended to this distinction.

It has been remarked, that we say in English, “to communicate a thing to any one,” but in Latin, *communicare aliquid cum aliquo*. When a thing is imparted by one person to another, this is the classical mode of expression. We find in Cæsar three examples, in which the verb governs a dative case; but in one of them the reading has been questioned, and in the other two, the verb may be construed absolutely. It seems, however, to have escaped the attention of critics, when they have censured the use of the dative case, that this case is admissible, when the verb means “to give in common to two or more individuals,” the giver himself having no share of the gift. Thus, “*Sibi communicatum cum illo, non ademtum esse, imperium.*” *Liv.* xxii. 27. The givers here were the Roman senate; the participants, Minucius and Q. Fabius.

EXERCISE.

Themistocles, having conquered the Persians in a naval fight, said, in an assembly at Athens, that he had a plan in contemplation which would be serviceable to the state, but that it was necessary it should not be made public. He, therefore, demanded a person to whom he might communicate it; and Aristides was appointed for that purpose. He then told Aristides, that the fleet of the Lacedemonians, which had gone into harbour at Gytheum, might be secretly set on fire, and thus the naval power of the Lacedemonians be destroyed.

OBSERVATIONS.

CÆTUS.	CONCIO.	CONVENTUS.	COMITIA.
	CONCILIUM.	CONSILIUM.	

These words are thus distinguished by Dumesnil — *Cætus*, “An assembly of few, or more, for business or amusement.” *Comitia*, “An assembly for the election of magistrates.” *Concio**, “An assembly of soldiers, or commons, for hearing an oration.” *Concilium*, “An assembly of chiefs, for the purpose of deliberation, or the enactment of laws.” — “Dimissa

* “Verrii, opinor, Flacci erat in quo scripta hæc fuerunt, *senatum* dici et pro loco, et pro hominibus; *civitatem* et pro loco, et pro oppido, et pro jure quoque omnium, et pro multitudine hominum; *tribus* quoque et *decurias* dici et pro loco, et pro jure, et pro hominibus; *concionem* autem tria significare, locum, et verba, suggestumque unde verba fierent.” *A. Gellius*, 18. 7.

We find sometimes an ellipsis of *concilium*. “Quomodo iste commune Milyadum vexârit.” *Cic. in Verr.*

concione, concilium habitum." *Liv.* ix. 15. "The assembly of the soldiers being dismissed, a council of war was held." *Conventus*, "A meeting, or assembly, for the celebration of a festival, the purposes of traffic, or the administration of justice."—"Agere conventus." *Cæs.* "To hold the assizes."

The explanation here given by Dumesnil of the word *concilium* is not perfectly correct. Gronovius has endeavoured to prove, and, I think, very successfully, that in the passage quoted from Livy, *consilium* is the true reading, and not *concilium*. He contends, that the latter means an assembly of the people, or an assembly of deputies from several nations, or bodies of men, as *Bœoticum concilium*, *Achaicum concilium*; and that *consilium* means a meeting of counsellors, or chiefs. The *consilium* of the Roman generals, he says, were the lieutenants, and the tribunes of the soldiers, whom they used to summon for the purpose of consultation; and the *consilium* of the pretors were the judges, and the assessors, or assistants. In this opinion Drakenborch concurs. Stephans agrees with Gronovius in defining *concilium* to be *conventus populi, et multitudo populorum diversorum, in unum locum consulendi gratiâ congregata*; and, he observes, that *concilium* properly means "a meeting of the commons only, summoned by the senators, and not of the whole Roman people." (See also *A. Gell.* xv. 22.) Turnebus, whose opinion also seems to coincide with that of Gronovius, says, that *consilium* means frequently, a military council for assisting the

general in deliberation.—*Consilium habitum*, therefore, as it stands in all the oldest editions, seems to be much the preferable reading.

In addition to the numerous examples adduced by Gronovius, to prove that *consilium* means, sometimes, a military council, that is, either the meeting itself, or those who compose it, we quote the following passage from Tacitus, “Addidit classi urbanas cohortes, atque ipsis ducibus consilium, et custodes.” *Tac. Hist.* i. 87. That *consilium* denotes a deliberative assembly, is still further confirmed by the authority of Cicero. “Senatus est summum populi Romani populorumque et gentium omnium ac regum consilium.” *Cic. pro Dom.* “Nulla est in hac urbe societas publicanorum, nullum collegium, nullum concilium, nullum denique commune consilium, quod non,” &c. *Cic. pro Dom.* “*Concilium*,” says Gifanius, “is conventus plebis, quem indixisset tribunus.” *Cic. in Vat.* He adds, “*Consilium* fit de paucorum, et selectorum virorum, *Concilium* variorum sine delectu coeuntium aut confluentium cœtu, seu turba.” The observations of Schorus are to the same purpose. These authorities, supported as they are by classical usage, in general, are sufficient to prove that *consilium* denotes an assembly of chiefs, or leading men, for the purpose of deliberation; and that *concilium* signifies a promiscuous assembly, or one composed of the inferior orders.—*Consilium* also signifies “an advice,” “plan,” or “scheme,” “policy,” “presence of mind.”

QUIDEM.

EQUIDEM.

Some have supposed, that, while *quidem* may be joined to any of the three persons, and to either of the numbers, *equidem*, compounded, as they say, of *ego* and *quidem*, can be joined to the first person singular only. This is a mistake. It may be joined to any person, and either number. Of this, a variety of examples might be produced. “Jampridem equidem nos vera rerum vocabula amisimus.” *Sall. B. C.* cap. liv. “Vanum equidem hoc consilium est.” *Ibid.* “Equidem id erat primum.” *Cic. ad Att.* “Non equidem hoc dubites.” *Pers. v.* 45. (Vid. *Gifan. Obs. in Ling. Lat.*)

The words *ne quidem*, “not even,” are always separated. “Sed querelæ, ne tum quidem gratæ futuræ.” *Liv. præf.* “Ne hostis quidem approbavit.” *Cic. Off. lib. i.* “Me vero nihil istorum ne juvenem quidem movit unquam.” *Cic.*

Note, that the postpositive conjunctions, so called, because they are never used as introductory words in a sentence or clause, but always put in the second or third place, are *autem*, *enim*, *vero*, *quoque*, *quidem*—thus, we say, *Sed ille*, or *Ille autem*—*Nam legit*, or *Legit enim*—but not, *Autem ille*, or *Enim legit*.

REPUDIARE.

REJICERE.

Repudiare (ex *re* et *pudet*) signifies “not to accept,” or, after having accepted, to dismiss, or put

away, a thing of which you are ashamed. “Ita dictum,” says Festus, “quod fit ob rem pudendam.” It always conveys the idea, that the thing offered, or received, is unworthy of the person, to whom it is offered.—*Rejicere* is simply “to reject,” for whatever cause; and is opposed to *Deligere*. “Orat vos Avitus, judices, ne se matri, cujus vota et preces a vestris mentibus repudiare debetis—condonetis.” *Cic. pro Cluent. ad fin.* “Deligit bona, rejicit contraria.” *Cic.* “Repudiatae rejectaeque legationis manebit testificatio sempiterna.” *Cic. Phil. ix. ad fin.*

EXERCISE.

Aristides, having heard this, returned to the assembly, and told them, that the plan of Themistocles was, indeed, a very useful one, but by no means honourable. The Athenians, judging that to be unprofitable, which was not honourable, rejected, on the authority of Aristides, a plan, which they had not even heard. We are born for justice; nor is right founded in opinion, but in nature. Cicero observes, that justice is the queen of virtues. Let it then be a fixed principle with us, that what is dishonourable is never useful.

OBSERVATIONS.

FACUNDIA.

ELOQUENTIA.

“*Facundi*,” says Varro, “sunt, qui facile fantur; *eloquentes*, qui facile et bene.” These words, however, as also *facundia* and *eloquentia* are often used

indiscriminately ; but that they are not precisely synonymous, is evident from Quintilian's observation, " Alere facundiam vires augere eloquentiæ possit." *In Procem.* *Facundia* seems to refer to " grace and facility" in speaking ; *eloquentia* includes these and also all the other requisites for persuasion. *Facundiâ auditorum animos conciliamus ; eloquentiâ etiam persuademus.*

DEDERE.

TRADERE.

Dedere signifies " to give up," " surrender," or " devote." "*Se dedere ad scribendum.*" *Cic.* " Tibi me dedo." *Ter.* *Tradere* (transdare), " to deliver," or " transmit." *Dedere* implies, that the person, or thing, surrendered is put under the power, and direction of the person, to whom it is given, for an unlimited time, as if it were his own. *Tradere* denotes, that the mere possession is transferred, but not the right of property, or ownership. *Dare est quod repetas—dedere est ad perpetuum—Damus amicis—dedimus hostibus.*—This is the distinction between *dare* and *dedere*.—*Dare* and *tradere* may be distinguished thus—*Dare est transfundere in alium dominium rei.*—*Tradere est nudam rei possessionem alteri cedere non proprietatem.* " Itaque," says Popma, " si quis stipuletur rem suam sibi *dari*, erit inutilis stipulatio ; at, contra, utilis, si *tradi* stipuletur." In a metaphorical sense, *tradere* and *dedere* are frequently used indiscriminately. Thus we find, *Dedere*

se studio—and *Tradere* se studiis used by Cicero, and *Tradere* se quieti used by Pliny.

Grammarians do not seem quite agreed concerning the rule of *Apposition*, or the concord of one substantive with another. Despauter seems to think, that two substantives in *apposition*, cannot, with propriety, be of different numbers; and observes, that this diversity can only take place, when the one wants the number of the other, or is a collective noun. Vossius, on the contrary, denies it to be necessary, that the nouns should agree either in gender or in number; citing, *Aquila rex avium. Tempus magister multorum. Urbs Philippi.* Ruddiman concurs with Vossius, and extends the rule, observing, that they need not agree either in gender, or in number, or in person; and remarks, as if there were no discordance of opinion between him and Despauter, that the latter admits a difference of number in the two cases above mentioned.—Thus it appears, that while Vossius and Ruddiman assert the admissibility of *different* numbers, as the general rule, Despauter is inclined to contend for an *identity* of number, subject to two exceptions. Now, it seems very evident, that, wherever the words admitted accordance in gender, they were uniformly made to agree. They said, *tempus magister multorum*, by necessity, *magister* having no neuter; but they did not say, *Historia magister vitæ*, but *magistra*: not *virtus socius vitæ*, but *socia*. Cic. *Ultor gladius, ultrix cura.* And when a sub-

stantive of common gender agrees in case with another substantive, the former is always considered to be of the same gender with the latter. Thus, “*Quia sequantur naturam, optimam bene vivendi ducem.*” (*Cic. de Am.*) not *optimum*. We believe, that they were guided by a similar principle, in respect to number, in all cases, where the according or modifying word partakes of the nature of an adjective, as in the terms, *inventor inventrix, cultor cultrix, nutritor nutrix*, thus, “*Omnium doctrinarum inventrices Athenas.*” *Cic. de Orat. lib. i.* On this subject, however, we would not be understood to deliver a decided opinion; but we are rather inclined to adopt the doctrine of Despauter, and say, that the modifying substantive should agree with the other in number, when that agreement is possible. A collective noun cannot be said to form an exception, its singular being equivalent to a plural, as, “*Turba ruunt in me luxuriosa proci.*” The following example, which I find in Ovid, favours the opinion of Despauter. “*Testes estote Philippi.*” *Fast. iii. 707.* Here the appellative, according with a proper name expressing a single object, is put in the plural number, because *Philippi* is plural. Would *Philippi testis* be admissible?

EXERCISE.

Anaxagoras, of Clazomene, was illustrious not only for his wealth, and the nobility of his birth, but also for the

greatness of his mind. In order that he might deliver himself up entirely to the study of philosophy, he surrendered his patrimony to his friends, and went to Athens, the nurse of literature at that time. There Pericles became his scholar, a man of exalted mind, of uncommon eloquence, and very bountiful to the poor. It happened, however, that, being much engaged in public affairs, Pericles seemed to neglect his master, Anaxagoras.

DOMINUS.

HERUS.

PRÆCEPTOR.

Dominus denotes not only “the master of a house,” but also, “the owner of any property whatever.” *Herus* is “a master in relation to his servants,” *herus* being the correlative term to *famulus* and *servus*. “Me aut herum pessum dabunt.” *Ter. And.* i. 3. “They will ruin me, or my master,” said the slave Davus. “Iis sit sane adhibenda sævitia, ut herus in famulos.” *Cic. Magister*, “a master,” “overseer,” or “superior,”—also, “a person skilled in any art or science,”—hence, sometimes, “a teacher,”—thus, *Magister pecorum*, *Magister equitum*, *Magister artis*. It is derived from *magis*, and is opposed to *minister*, from *minus*. In the following distinction by Varro, it is considered as synonymous with *Præceptor*. “Educit enim obstetrix, educat nutrix, instituit pædagogus, docet magister.” *Varro de lib. educat. Præceptor*, “a master,” or “teacher.” (See *Gifan. page 66, Verwey’s Thes.*)

ABHINC.

EXINDE.

The composition of these adverbs might lead one to suppose, that they are words nearly of the same meaning. Accordingly *abhinc*, as Schorus observes, has been often improperly used by modern Latin writers, to denote future time, commencing with the present moment. Thus, “Ten years hence,” is frequently rendered, *Decem abhinc annis*, whereas Cicero never employed this expression, but as equivalent to our phrase, “Ten years ago.” It is incorrect therefore to say, *Desinent induciæ abhinc annis septem*. It should be, *post septem annos*. *Exinde*, on the contrary, refers to time posterior to the fact, or event mentioned. By the former we count backward from the present time; and by the latter, forward.

EXERCISE.

The old man, perceiving this, went to bed, and, wrapping up his head, determined to starve himself to death. Pericles, having heard this circumstance, flew to his master, and, with tears, besought him to live, and to preserve to him that wisdom, and that light, which had been of so much service to him. Anaxagoras, uncovering his head, mildly said, “Pericles, those, who have need of a lamp, feed it with oil.” From that time Pericles paid great attention to Anaxagoras; and, indeed, not long afterwards, saved his life.

OBSERVATIONS.

DOLOR.

LUCTUS.

MOEROR.

Dolor denotes either "pain of body" or "grief of mind." *Luctus* "grief for the death of a relation or a friend," and also the usual demonstrations of mourning. "Senatus consulto diebus triginta luctus est finibus." *Liv.* ii. 56. "The public mourning." *Moeror* "deep grief," and also its expression by the countenance, or by tears. "Moerorem minui, dolorem nec potui; nec, si possem, vellem." *Cic. Att.* xii. 28.

IMPERATOR.

DUX.

Dux is a general or leader, subordinate to *Imperator*. *Imperator præest toti exercitui; dux parti alicui.* "Namque Leuctrica pugna imperatore Epaminonda, hic fuit dux delectæ manus." (*Nepos in Epam.*) Vid. *Gif. de differentiis*.

DUCERE.

NUBERE.

Ducere, "to marry," or "to take in marriage," is used when a man is the subject of discourse, or the nominative to the verb. "Veteribus enim mos fuit, nuptam e patris domo noctu tædis ardentibus prælatis velatam, in mariti domum deduci." *Donat.* "Itane tandem uxorem duxit Antipho?" *Ter. Ph.* i. 5. 1. *Nubere*, "to be veiled," or *duci*, "to be led," is used,

when a woman is the subject of discourse, or nominative to the verb. “ His duobus, ut ante dictum est, duæ Tullia, regis filia *nupserant*.” *Liv.* i. 46. “ Lucumoni contra, omnium hæredi bonorum, quum divitiæ jam animos facerent auxit *ducta* in matrimonium Tanaquil, summo loco nata ; et quæ haud facile iis, in quibus nata erat, humiliora sineret ea, quæ *innupsisset*.” *Liv.* i. 34. Vir *ducit* ; femina *ducitur*, seu *nubit*. Tertullian, therefore, is chargeable with error, when he says, speaking of persons in heaven, *Neque nubent, neque nubentur*, instead of “ Nec viri ducent uxores, nec feminae nubent,” or, more concisely, “ Nec connubia conjungentur.”

EXERCISE.

Marcia, the daughter of Cato, when she was lamenting her deceased husband, being asked, what was to be the last day of her grief, replied, that the last day of her life would be the last day of her grief. And Valeria, the sister of the Messalæ, being asked, why she would marry no one, her husband Servius being dead, answered, “ My husband Servius always lives to me.” The wife of Phocion said to a lady, who was ostentatiously shewing her all her jewels, “ My greatest ornament is Phocion, a poor man, indeed, but now twenty years general of the Athenians.”

OBSERVATIONS.

OBSIDERE. OPPUGNARE. EXPUGNARE. CAPERE.

Obsidere, is “ to besiege,” or “ blockade.” *Oppugnare*, “ to attack,” or “ assault.” *Expugnare*,

“to storm,” or “take by assault.” *Capere*, “to take in any way, whether by force or stratagem.” “*Obsidere* circumstistere significat, occlusum tenere, ac vallo et fossa septum retinere. Inter *obsidere* et *oppugnare* hæc est differentia, quod illud fit mora, hoc impetu.” *Steph.* “*Obsidere*, *oppugnare*, et labefactare urbem aliquam.” *Cic. de Arusp. Resp.* 6. “*Consi- liis ab oppugnanda urbe ad obsidendam versis.*” *Liv.* ii. 11.

Expugnare est pugnando capere. “*Primum ædes expugnabo.*” *Ter. Eun.* iv. 7. 3.

Sometimes, though very rarely, we find it used to denote the taking of a town without fighting, or the force of arms—thus, “*Sedendoque expugnaturum se urbem spem habebat.*” *Liv. lib. ii.* 12.

To Deliver.

When this verb signifies “to free,” it is rendered by *liberare*; when it denotes to “to give up,” by *tradere*.

The junior reader has been already cautioned against making one substantive govern another in the genitive, except in those cases, in which the expression involves the English genitive, or may be changed into that genitive, thus, “The love of God,” or “God’s love,” *Amor Dei*. “The law of nature,” or “Nature’s law,” *Lex naturæ*.—By observing this rule, he will not be liable to error; and attention, while he reads the Classics, will soon teach him the admissible

deviations from it.—One of the most common of these, as has been already observed, is, when the latter substantive has an adjective joined to it, modifying the quality or property as belonging to the former, thus, “A man of great wisdom,” *Vir summæ prudentiæ*, or *summa prudentia*. In these cases the expression cannot be turned into the English genitive; the latter substantive in Latin is, notwithstanding, put in the genitive, and also in the ablative. Vossius and Despauter remark, that a few examples occur, in which the latter substantive is put in the genitive, without any adjective joined to it—and they give each of them the following passage from Cicero, as an example, “Nunquid hi quos protulit, ante fuerunt aut opinionis aut gloriæ.” *Cic. in Sall.* The accuracy, however, of this reading, is questionable. Lambinus has it, much more consistently with the phraseology of Cicero, “*ullius opinionis aut gloriæ*,” where the term *ullius* evidently modifies the following substantive. The examples, indeed, where the latter substantive is put in the genitive, without an adjective joined to it, are in the best writers very few, if there be any. The scholar, therefore, should avoid this phraseology, and, instead of saying, “A man of prudence,” *Vir prudentiæ*, say, *Vir prudens*; “A man of courage,” not *Vir fortitudinis*, but *Vir fortis*. The ablative is also rarely used in this sense, without an adjective. “Virum auctoritate famaue.” *Tac. Hist. iv. 53.* “A man of authority and reputation.”

EXERCISE.

When king Porsena was besieging Rome, and thought that he should soon take the city, C. Mucius, a youth of daring spirit, determined to introduce himself into the camp of the enemy, and to slay the king. Fearing, however, lest, if he should go without the order of the consuls, he might be reckoned a deserter, he went to the senate, and spoke thus, “I intend, O fathers, to cross the Tiber; and, if I can, to enter the camp of the enemy, not, however, as a plunderer, but as the deliverer of my country. Plunder is not in my thoughts; if the Gods assist me, I meditate greater things.”

OBSERVATIONS.

Uter means “which of two,” *quis*, “who,” or “which of many,” as “*Uter dignior, quis dignissimus.*” *Quint.* Among the poets, *quis* is sometimes used for *uter*, as,

“De Jove quid sentis? Estne, ut præponere cures
Hunc cuiquam? Cuinam? Vis Staio? an scilicet hæres,
Quis potior judex, puerisve quis aptior orbis?”

Pers. Sat. ii. 18.

that is, “which of the two is the better judge.”

AD. PRO. OB. PROPTER.

Ob means “for,” or “on account of,” as *quam ob rem*, “wherefore,” “for,” or “on account of what thing.”—“*Ob delictum pœnas Dii expetunt,*” *Cic. pro Marcel.*—that is, “for,” or “on account of

the trespass.”—*Propter* has the same meaning.—It may preclude a difficulty, if we here remark, that *ob* and *propter* are often suppressed. “*Quid tristis es?*” *i. e. ob quid.* “*Id operam do.*” *Ter. i. e. ob id.* “*Hic eam rem volt, scio, mecum adire ad pactionem.*” *Plaut. Ob eam rem.* “*Ea te demoritur.*” *Plaut. i. e. propter te.*

Pro signifies “for,” or “instead of,” “in exchange for,” “in defence of,” “in proportion to,” as “*Hostis pro hospite.*” *Liv. i. 58,* “An enemy instead of a friend.”—“*Mori pro patria.*” *Hor.* “In defence of one’s country.”—“*Pro multitudine autem hominum angustos se fines habere arbitrabantur.*” *Cæs. B. G. i. 2,* “Narrow territories for the population,” or “in proportion to the population.”

Ad means “for” or “for the purpose of,” as *Ad id,* “for that purpose.”—“*Argentum dabitur ei ad nuptias.*” *Ter. Heaut. iv. 5. 29,* “For the wedding.”

EXERCISE.

The fathers approve the design ; and he accordingly sets out, with a sword concealed under his garment. When he came into the camp of the enemy, he posted himself in the thickest part of the crowd, near the king’s tribunal. It happened, that pay was at that time giving to the soldiers ; and they were going up to the secretary to receive it, who was sitting beside the king, nearly in the same dress. Fearing to ask, which of the two was the monarch, lest he might discover himself to be a Roman, he killed the secretary instead of Porsena.

OBSERVATIONS.

AD. ANTE. CORAM. PRÆ.

Ante means “before,” not “after,” or “behind,” in respect to time or place; and is opposed to *Post*; as *Ante fores*, “Before the door,” “not behind.”—*Ante horam tertiam*, “Before ten o’clock,” opposed to *Post horam tertiam*, “After ten o’clock.”

Coram means “before,” or “in the presence of,” and is nearly synonymous with *In conspectu*, *In præsentia*, *Illo præsentē*, as, *Coram prætore verba feci*, “I spoke before,” or “in presence of, the Pretor.”

Ad means “before,” or “to,” as “he was taken before the king.” *Ad regem ductus est*, that is, “conducted to the king.”—“They dragged him before the Pretor,” *Ad prætorem traxerunt*. *Ante* would imply, “before,” and “not behind,” the Pretor. *Coram prætore* would mean, “in presence of the Pretor,” but not “into the presence.” *Præ*, says Dr. Hill, expresses the relation, which one or more persons moving, bear to others following in the same path, “I *præ*, sequar.” *Ter. Ante*, he observes, is applicable both to animate and inanimate objects; *Præ*, to those only which are animate, or supposed to be such, or such objects, as have motion communicated by the person expressed by the correlative term. “*Præ se armentum agens nando trajecerat.*” *Liv. i. 7.* “*Præ se pugionem tulit.*” *Cic.* According to the same author, it always denotes

nearness, and thereby shews its connexion with *pro*. This explanation I conceive to be neither quite correct, nor sufficiently precise. The preposition *præ* is by no means confined to animate objects, or to the relation, which one or more persons moving bear to others following them. When it either denotes the cause, being synonymous with *ob* or *propter*, or when it means, "In comparison with," we find it often applied to things inanimate. Thus, "*Præ ira*," *Liv.* xxxi. 24. "For, or through, anger." "*Præ formidine*," *Ter. Eun.* i. 2. 18. "For, or through, fear." "*Præ divitiis*," *Liv.* iii. 26. "In comparison with riches." "*Præ meo commodo*," *Ter. Adelph.* ii. 3. 9.

In none of these examples is *præ* joined with an animate object, or an object in motion. The learned critic, therefore, does not appear to me to have correctly explained the distinction between *ante* and *præ*, a distinction, which, had not the etymology of the latter preposition escaped his observation, must have been sufficiently evident. The preposition *præ* is clearly an abbreviation of the Greek *παρὰ*, *præter vel juxta*, and therefore denotes propinquity. This relation we find uniformly expressed by it, in every form, in which it occurs, simple or compounded, *ante* denoting "before, at any distance," *præ* "immediately before." Thus, *I præ, sequar*. *Ter. And.* i. 1. 144. *Præ se ferre, Præ se gerere, Præ se agere*. The expression also *Præire verba* (*verba pronunciare mox alii recitanda*) and its meaning in

the compounds *prægustare*, *prælibare*, *præsidere*, *præsentire*, *præcipitare*, metaphorically understood, conveys the same idea. Hence, also, it denotes “in comparison with,” things in juxta position being most easily compared. The only precise and uniform characteristic of *præ* appears, therefore, to be, that it expresses proximity, an idea by no means necessarily annexed to the term *ante*. It is applied, as we have seen, to animate and inanimate objects, either in motion, or at rest. It agrees with *pro*, signifying “before,” as denoting propinquity; and differs from it in this, that while *præ*, in this sense, is not applied to material objects, *pro* is uniformly confined to them. “Quod ni maturasset pro curia signum sociis dare,” *Sall. B. C.* cap. 18. “immediately in front of the senate-house.” “Pro æde Jovis Statoris.” *Cic. 2 Phil.* In these examples *præ* would be inadmissible; and *ante* would not imply proximity.

I am aware of one passage, and only one, which may possibly be opposed to this explanation. “Arma ante januam projecerunt, ac *præ* foribus stantes intro-mitti orabant.” But the expression occurs in a passage, which, independently on positive proof, bears internal evidence that it is not the production of Curtius. *Præ* is here improperly joined with a physical object, instead of *pro*.

It is common in English to employ the preposition *of* with a numeral adjective, obliquely referring the number specified to the class, to which they be-

long, and also to make the numeral adjective the nominative to the verb, even when the subjects are the persons addressed, or make a common subject with the person, who speaks. The Latin idiom is different. We say, “Three youths of us met yesterday,” or “Three of us youths met.” The Latins, *Tres adolescentuli heri coiimus*, literally, “We three youths met.”—“Four of you friends have heard,” four being the number addressed, *Quatuor amici audivistis*, literally, “Ye four friends have heard.”—The English idiom marks the number as part of a whole, and distinguishes the persons speaking, from the persons addressed, and both from the persons spoken of, by subjoining the appropriate pronoun, thus, “Three youths *of us* (youths).”—The Latins do not express, whether the number be the whole, or a part of the class to which they belong; but consider it as necessary to note them distinctly, by the person of the verb, as either the persons addressed, the persons spoken of, or the persons included with the speaker himself. The same difference of idiom obtains, where the number is indefinite, or uncertain. “How many are there *of us*?”—“How few *of you* there are?” *Quot sumus? Quam pauci estis?*

I may here remark a similar difference of idiom. In English we say, “I should like to obtain this favour from one of you, that *you* would investigate and tell me the causes of this immense disparity.” But the Latins said “*Velim impetratum ab*

aliquo vestrum, ut causas hujus infinitæ differentiæ scrutetur, et reddat." *Dialog. de Orator.* cap. 15.
 "that *he* would investigate."

The reader will remember, that when the preposition *with* implies concomitancy, or that one person accompanies another, the preposition *cum* must be used. We have now to observe, that even with the instrument, which is otherwise put in the ablative, without the preposition, the word *cum* is employed, when concomitancy is signified, as "Ingressus est *cum* gladio," "He entered with a sword," or "having a sword with him."—"Cum falcibus multi purgarunt, et aperuerunt locum." *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.* "Many armed with hooks," or "having hooks with them, cleared and opened the place." Were the preposition omitted, the idea would be somewhat different; and the meaning would be, that they cleared the place *by*, "*by means of*," or "*by the instrumentality of*, hooks."

EXERCISE.

When he was making his way through the trembling crowd, with a bloody sword, he was seized by the king's life guards, and brought before the tribunal. Fearing nothing, he said, "I am a Roman citizen; they call me C. Mucius. I, an enemy, wished to kill an enemy; nor is my mind less prepared for bearing death, than it was for taking away your life. To do and to suffer brave things is the property of a Roman. Three hundred youths of us have conspired against you; it behoves you, therefore, to prepare yourself."

OBSERVATIONS.

VIDERE.	SPECTARE.	INTUERI.	ASPICERE.
	ANIMADVERTERE.	CERNERE.	

Aspicere est intendere aut adjicere oculos ad aliquid, aut aliquò. *Cernere* est videre aut intueri, quò conjeceris oculos. “ Ut possit is illa omnia cernere, qui tantum modo aspexerit.” *Cic.* (Verw. Thes. in Vavass.) Fronto thus distinguishes them, “ *Videmus* natura—*Spectamus* voluntate—*Intuemur* cura—*Aspicimus* negligenter, et improviso—*Animadvertimus* animo—*Cernimus* oculis. More accurately, perhaps, they may be distinguished thus, *Videre* is simply, “ to see,” *Aspicere* is “ to behold,” or “ look at,” whether by accident, or intentionally. “ Vix aspicendi fuit potestas.” *Cic. de Orat.* i. 161. “ Forte unam *aspicio* adolescentulam.” *Ter. And.* i. 1. 91. *Intueri* is “ to look at designedly and carefully,”—“ to gaze upon.” *Cominus inspicere*, (*Steph.*) as, “ Terram *intuens* modeste.” *Ter. Eun.* iii. 5. 32. “ *Intueri* et contemplari aliquem.” *Cic. pro Planc.* “ Acrioribus oculis aliquid *intueri*.” *Quint.* ii. 20. *Spectare*, “ to view,” or “ look at steadily or often ;” “ Sosia age, me huc aspice. Sos. *Specto*.” *Plaut. Amph.* i. 2. 118. “ Siderum motus scite *spectare* dicuntur.” *Q. Curt.* iii. 9. *Animadvertere*, “ to notice,” “ to perceive,” opposed to, “ to overlook,” or “ not to observe.” “ Nostros lacesere cœperunt. Postquam id *animadvertit* Cæsar.” *Cæs.* i. 24. It

frequently, however, signifies also, “ purposely to direct the attention of the mind to any object.”—“ Non enim pro tua prudentia debes illud solum *animadvertere*.” *Cic. Cernere* is “ to see clearly,” so as to be able to discriminate, or judge, whether by the eye, or by the mind. It is evidently, by metathesis, the Greek verb κρίνω, *separo, secerno*, and its original signification, as Hill observes, was “ to sift or separate the flour from the bran.”—“ Per cribrum minutissime *cernere*.” *Cat. R. R.* cvii. 1. In the following passages, its meaning, as opposed to *videre*, is well illustrated. “ Nos enim ne nunc quidem oculis *cernimus* ea, quæ *videmus*.” *Cic. Q. Tusc.* i. 20. “ Quæ volunt sic intuentur, ut ea *cernimus*, quæ *videmus*.” *Cic. pro Mil.* “ As we perceive what we see.” Perception implies the discrimination of qualities, or substances. It sometimes also denotes, “ to perceive clearly by the sense of hearing,” *Vox illius est certe, idem omnes cernimus.* (*Nonius*.)

VIRTUS.

FORTITUDO.

AUDACIA.

Virtus is thus defined by Cicero. “ *Virtus* nihil aliud est, quam in se perfecta et ad summum perducta natura.” *Cic. de Leg.* 1. “ *Virtus* rationis est absolutio.” *Id. de Fin.* 5. “ Rationis perfectio est *virtus*.” *Id. de Fin.* 4. *Fortitudo* he defines thus, “ *Fortitudo* est considerata periculorum susceptio et laborum perpessio :” and also, “ Animi affectio cum in adæundo periculo, tum in labore et dolore patiando, procul ab omni metu.” *Tusc. Quæst.* 5. Thus *virtus* is a ge-

neric term denoting the force and vigour of the mind, as exerted in the practice of every virtue, whether of an active, or passive, nature. It is, accordingly, sometimes opposed to mere strength of body. “Sed diu inter mortales certamen fuit, vine corporis, an *virtute* animi, res militaris magis procederet.” *Sall.* It is sometimes used in a more extensive sense, denoting power, excellence, or value in general. “Atque in sensibus est sua cuique *virtus*.” *Cic. de Fin.* “*Virtutes rei.*” *Quint.* “*Mercis virtus (quod valet, vel bonitas).*” *Plaut. Mil.* iii. 1. 132. It is sometimes even applied to the brute creation. “Etiam fera animalia, si clausa teneas, *virtutis* obliviscuntur.” *Tac. Hist.* iv. 64.—“Est in equis patrum *virtus*.” *Hor. Carm.* iv. 4. 30, and sometimes also to the vegetable creation. This application, however, is considered by Cicero to be an abuse of the word. “Nam nec arboris, nec equi *virtus*, quæ dicitur, in quo abutimur nomine,” &c. *Cic. de Leg.* 1. In its limited and special sense it is used for *fortitudo*, “courage,” because, as Cicero observes, “Viri maxime propria est fortitudo,” in the same manner as ἀνδρεία, from ἀνὴρ, denotes “courage.” *Fortitudo* and *virtus*, as used in this sense, are distinguished from *audacia* by this circumstance, that they imply a virtue of the mind—a rational principle, in which they originate, and by which they are governed. *Audacia*, in general, as Hill justly observes, implies a defect. It is, as he says, a constitutional boldness, without any regard to the value of the object. “*Audacia temeritatis est,*” says

Nonius. “Imitatur *audacia* fortitudinem,” is the observation of Cicero. And when he quotes, with approbation, a saying of Plato, he gives it in these words, “Non solum, inquit, scientia, quæ est remota a justitia, calliditas potius, quam sapientia, est appellanda, verum etiam animus paratus ad periculum, si sua cupiditate, non utilitate communi impellitur, *audaciæ* potius, nomen habeat, quam fortitudinis.” *Cic. de Off.* 2. Cicero pronounces it a vice. “*Audacia* non contrarium (fidentia) sed appositum, ac propinquum, et tamen vitium est.” *Cic. de Inv.* ii. 54. “Oppressa virtute *audacia* est.” *Cic. pro Mil.* “Audacity was crushed by valour.” Sallust opposes it to *virtus*. “Pro virtute *audacia* vigebat.” *B. C.*—and Cato, in his speech, complains that it had usurped the name of *courage*. “Vera rerum vocabula amisimus, quia malarum rerum *audacia* fortitudo vocatur.” *Id.* It is sometimes, however, used in a favourable sense, and by no writer, as far as I have observed, so frequently as by Sallust. “Duabus his artibus, *audacia* in bello, ubi pax evenerat, æquitate, seque remque publicam curabant.” *Id.* “*Audacia* pro muro habetur.” *Id.* “Quanta cujusque animo *audacia* natura aut moribus inest, tanta in bello patere solet.” *Id.* Here *audacia* is put for courage, whether implanted by nature, or imparted by education.

EXERCISE.

When the king, enraged and terrified, was ordering him to be burned, unless he should quickly disclose the plot of

the Roman youths; Mucius thrust his hand into a pan of coals, and said, "Behold how contemptible is the body to those, who have glory in view!" When he was holding his hand in the fire, seemingly without any sense of pain, the king, amazed at his fortitude, sprung from his seat, and ordered him to be set at liberty. Next day he sent ambassadors to Rome, to offer terms of peace.

OBSERVATIONS.

MAGNUS.

AMPLUS.

INGENS.

Magnus means "Great in general;" and is opposed to *Parvus*, denoting "Littleness in general;" as "*Magna Dii curant, parva negligunt.*" It is applied figuratively to things immaterial, as "*Magnum ingenium.*" *Cic.* "*Animus magnus.*" *Id.* and is to be considered as the generic term to express "Great." It may be necessary, however, to caution the young reader against applying it to a person, to denote "great in stature, or size." "*Vir magnus,*" signifies "A man great in mind;" "great by his virtues;" "great by his achievements." (*Scheller*, vol. i. p. 71.)

Amplus means "Spacious," or, as Doletus defines it, *Quod late patet*, referring to its limits or extent. "It denotes," says Hill, "that greatness, which consists in superficial capacity." This, certainly, is its true meaning. "*Theatrum amplitudine amplum.*" *Cic. ad Quint.* "*Gymnasium amplissimum.*" *Id. in Verr.* It is used figuratively, to denote "Great in rank, or character," as *Homines ampli*, "Great men," "Men eminent for rank or virtue."

Of this word, various etymologies have been proposed by different critics, some regarding it as compounded of ἀνὰ et πλέος, *plenus*—others of ἀνὰ et πλοῦς, *navigatio*—and some of ἀμφὶ et πλοῦς. Were we to offer a conjecture on the subject, we should be inclined to suggest, that it is derived from ἀναπλόω, *Expando*, and that ἀπλοῦς, διπλοῦς, *Amplus* (*anaplus*) *Duplus*, &c. are all members of the same family.

Ingens, “Huge,” rises in signification above *Magnus*. “*Ingens*,” says Doletus, “est *maximus*, et *summus*.” *Thr.* “Magnas vero agere gratias Thais mihi?” *Gn.* “Ingentes.” *Ter. Eun.* iii. 1. 1.

Grandis seems to hold a middle rank between *Magnus* and *Ingens*. It is properly defined to be “Quod magnum incrementum habet.” (See *Nolt. Lex. Ant.*) or “Magnum incremento,” “Great by increase.”—“Grandem pecuniam credere.” *Cic.*—“Grande pondus auri.” *Id.* Donatus affirms, that the ancients applied the word to the age, and not to the size, or the person, of the subject; and most critics and lexicographers have adopted this opinion. Noltenius, however, scruples not to ridicule such an idea. “Donatus,” says the learned critic, “fuum nobis vendit, quum assertum it, ‘Grandem ad ætatem veteres retulisse, non ad corpus.’” In confirmation of his opinion, he quotes the two following passages, “Grandior ut fœtus siliquis fallacibus esset.” *Virg. Geo.* i. 195. “Grandiores victimæ.” *Plin. Paneg.* cap.

52. Grangæus adopts the same opinion with Nolenius; for, in his note on the following passage from Juvenal,—“Metuens virgæ, jam grandis Achilles, Cantabat patriis in montibus; *Sat.* vii. 210. he says, that the adjective must refer to the person, and not the years, of Achilles; for, that the hero left his native country, before he was nine years of age, and went to the court of Lycomedes. The argument here is inconclusive; for, unless we are to suppose, that his years and his growth did not mutually keep pace, it must be evident, that if *Grandis* be applicable to him in respect to his person or size, it must be equally so, in regard to his years; and that if it be not applicable to his years, it is alike inapplicable to his person. The fact seems to be, that *Magnus* and *Grandis* each refer to size, and that it is either by ellipsis, or by inference, that they denote “age.” Hence we find them frequently joined with *Ætas* and *Ævum*, two adjuncts completely redundant, if the terms themselves expressed the age. But as years and growth kept mutual pace to a certain term, an advance in stature is employed to express an increase of age. Hence, in Greek, the term *ἡλικία* means either “stature,” or “age.” (See *Luke*, xii. 25.) But though *Grandis* strictly refers to size, and only by inference denotes “age,” yet I am inclined to think, with Donatus, that when the human species is the subject, it refers to years, and not to stature.

Though *Grandis* generally relates to an advanced

period of life, or, at any rate, to perfect manhood, it is applicable to the completion of the different stages of human existence. Thus, we say, “Grandis infans;” “Grandis puer;” “Grandis ephebus;” “Grandis virgo.”

Vacare is thus construed. In its absolute sense, it is equivalent to *Otium habere*. “Scribes aliquid, si vacabis.” *Vacare philosophiæ*, that is, “*Operam dare*,” “To give attention, or application.” *Vacare culpa*, “To be free from fault.” *Vacat locus*, “The place is empty.” *Vacat mihi audire verba tua*, “I am at leisure to hear your words.”

“An uncle by the father’s side,” is rendered by *Patruus*, and “by the mother’s,” by *Avunculus*. In the following exercise, the latter is to be used.

Deficere is construed thus, *Deficit mihi*, i. e. *Deest mihi*. *Deficit me*, i. e. *Destituit me*. *Deficere ab aliquo*, i. e. *Deseiscere ab aliquo*. Scioppius has objected to the expression *Defectus viribus*, for “His strength failing him.” It is true, I believe, that the participle of this passive verb, joined with an ablative, is not found in any prose writer of the golden age, but it occurs frequently in the poets; and we find the verb so construed in the indicative, subjunctive, and infinitive moods, in Cicero and Cæsar; thus, “Mulier consilio, et ratione deficitur.” *Cic. pro Cluen.* “In eo prælio—cum aquilifer viribus deficeretur.” *Cæs. B. C. lib. iii.* It would be fastidious, therefore, to reject the expression, sanctioned as it is, not only by strict analogy, but also by

poetic usage, and all the writers of the silver age. The scholar may, therefore, consider himself justified in saying, either *Consilio, ingenio defectus*, or *Consilio, ingenio deficiente*.

EXERCISE.

Alcibiades, when he was yet a boy, called one day on his uncle Pericles, and found him sitting by himself, thoughtful and sad. The boy asked him the cause. "I have," replied Pericles, "by an order of the city, erected the porch of Minerva's temple; and having expended a vast sum of money on the work, I know not how to give in my account." "Contrive, rather," said Alcibiades, very promptly, "how you may not give it in." Accordingly, this sagacious and eminent man followed the advice of the boy, and so managed the matter, that the Athenians being involved in a war with their neighbours, had no leisure to call for accounts.

OBSERVATIONS.

Nequis is elegantly used for *Ut nemo*, as "He gave orders, that no man should leave the camp," *Imperavit, ut nemo castris exiret*,—elegantly, *Nequis castris exiret*. "Ponere leges, *nequis* fur esset." *Hor. Sat. i. 3. 105*, "That no man should be a thief." We sometimes also find *ut nequis*, as "Ut nequid prætermittam." *Cic. Att. xi. 12*.

IMPERARE.

PRÆESSE.

Imperare denotes, "to have the command of," or "to have authority over," and also, "to give

an order or a command," as invested with that authority. *Præesse* is merely "to be the chief," or "to have the command of," but is not used to denote any particular order, or act of authority. "Hæc ut imperet illi parti animi, quæ obedire debet, id videndum est viro." *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.* ii. 47. Here the habitual exercise of authority or control is implied. "Non *imperabat* coram, quid facto opus esset puerperæ." *Ter. And.* iii. 2. 10. Here an act simply is expressed. *Præesse exercitui*, is "to have the command of an army." *Imperare exercitui*, is "to have the command of an army," and also, "to give orders to an army."

EXERCISE.

When the Romans were carrying on war against the Latins and the Tusculans, the consuls, T. M. Torquatus and P. Decius, published an edict, that no one should fight with the enemy without their order. It happened, that among the other captains of companies, who had been sent to different parts, to explore the situation of the enemy, T. Manlius, son of the consul, came near the post of the Tusculan cavalry, which Metius, a man illustrious for his birth and his exploits, commanded. When he saw the Roman horse, and the son of the consul marching before them, he instantly rode up to them, and challenged Manlius to single combat.

OBSERVATIONS.

ADOLESCENS.

JUVENIS.

Adolescens properly means, "one growing to maturity." *Juvenis*, "a person grown up," or "one

arrived at maturity.”—“*Juvenis*,” says Schorus, “*Latine non dicitur de prima ætate, sed adulta potius.*” *Verw. Thes.* The successive gradations of age are expressed by *infantulus*, *infans*, *puerulus*, *puer*, *adolescentulus*, *adolescens*, *junior*, *juvenis*, *senior*, *senex*. Respecting the precise periods, at which the terms *puer*, *adolescens*, *juvenis*, and *senex*, were applied by the Romans, various opinions have been entertained. Some have divided human life into periods of fifteen years each, and give it as their opinion, that till the age of fifteen the term *puer* was applied—from fifteen to thirty, *adolescens*—from thirty to forty-five, *juvenis*—and from forty-five, *senex*. This opinion, however, is chiefly conjectural. The reader will find much information on this subject, by consulting *H. Steph. Schediasm.* lib. iv. 21, 22.

Vavassor justly observes, that *adolescentia* is confined to one particular period of life, like the term *pueritia*; but that *juventus* is often used generally, so as to include the periods marked by *pueritia* and *adolescentia*. “*Legendus est hic orator, si quisquam alius, juventuti.*” *Cic. de Cl. Or.*—that is, *pueris, adolescentibus, junioribus*.

It is necessary here to guard the young scholar against an impropriety, not uncommon in modern Latin. C. Stephans, in the very beginning of his Dictionary, uses the following expression, “*Remenssem adolescentiam*,” and also, Adr. Turnebus, “*Ad inducendam adolescentiam comparata est.*” Now it is to be observed, that classic writers never employ

adolescentia, which signifies “youth,” or “the season of youth,” to denote “youth,” or “young men,” though *juventus* is often used by them in this sense; thus, *Trojana juventus*, that is, *Trojani juvenes et adolescentes*; but we cannot say, *Trojana adolescentia*, to denote “Trojan youths.”

It deserves the attention of the reader, that when the relative clause is not restrictive of the antecedent, the relative may be resolved into *Et is*, or *Et ille*. Thus, “Discontent is an evil, which poisons human life,” or “Discontent is an evil, and it poisons human life.” When no particular stress is to be laid on the relative clause, the combination of the conjunction and demonstrative pronoun, in the relative *qui*, is to be considered as preferable, and is by classic writers generally adopted. Thus, “A friend was then at my house, and he told me so,” *Amicus, qui tum apud me erat, mihi ita dixit*. “I asked him this question; and when he did not answer, I refused to do it,” *Hoc ex eo quæsivi; qui cum non respondisset facere nolui*—better than, *Et cum ille*.—*Pater mortuus est; et cum eum sepelire vellem*—better, *quem cum sepelire vellem*. *Qui* is used also for *Et ego*, *Et tu*; thus, “You reminded me of my danger, and if I had followed your advice, I should now be in a better situation,” *De periculo me commonefecisti, cujus consilio si paruissem, meæ res sese melius haberent*; (Cic.) better than, *Et si tuo consilio paruissem**.

* It is somewhat surprising, that Harris did not perceive, that *qui* is not always resolvable into *et ille*, and that the relative

REVERTI.

REDIRE.

The attentive reader of Cicero will remark, that he frequently uses *Reverto* in the sense of the deponent *Revertor*, but only in the preterite, and its derivatives.

POENA.

SUPPLICIUM.

Poena is a generic term, denoting punishment of any kind. *Supplicium* is equivalent to *gravior animadversio*, vel *cruciatus*, signifying "severe punishment," generally capital. "De Atimeto supplicium, sumptum, validiore apud libidines principis Paride, quam ut poena afficeretur." *Tac. Ann.* xiii. 12. "Atimetus was punished with death, Paris having too great an ascendancy over the prince, to be subjected to any punishment." "Supplicium est poena peccati." *Cic. in Pis.* "Punishment is suffering the penalty for a crime."

EXERCISE.

The courage of the youth was roused by this challenge ; and, forgetting his father's command, he rushed to the contest. At the first onset, he dismounted the Tusculan, and stabbed him through the heart. He then returned to his father, with the spoils of his enemy. "Challenged," said he, "by a Tusculan, I slew him, and have brought you the

is not uniformly both a substitute and a connective. In one of his own examples, "Qui metuens vivit, liber mihi non erit unquam," *Hor. Ep.* i. 16. 66. the relative is evidently not resolvable into *et ille*.

spoils." The father ordered the soldiers to be assembled, and, in their hearing, addressed his son thus: "Titus Manlius, you have slighted the consular authority; you have fought contrary to orders; and if others should imitate your example, the Roman state would soon be ruined. In order, therefore, that the republic may sustain no injury from your conduct, you must be punished capitally for your offence." The gallant youth accordingly suffered death for his excessive bravery.

OBSERVATIONS.

CARBO.

PRUNA.

Pruna means "a live coal," or "burning coal;" *carbo*, "charcoal," whether alive or dead. "Subjiciunt verubus *prunas* et viscera torrent." *Virg. Æn.* v. 103. "Nunquam ad flammam ungi oportet, interdum ad *prunam*." *Cels.*

"Tam excoctam reddam atque atram, quam *carbo* est." *Ter. Adelph.* v. 3. 63. "Creta an *carbone* notandi." *Hor. Sat.* lib. ii. 3. 246. "Rubrica picta, an *carbone*." *Id. Sat.* lib. ii. 8, 98. In these examples, *carbo* denotes "charcoal," or a substance once ignited or red hot, and now a dead coal. It is sometimes used for the same substance, again alive, or in a state of ignition: as, "Lentis carbonibus ure." *Ov. Trist.* iii. 11. 47. "Cultros metuens tonsorios, candente *carbone* sibi adurebat capillum." *Cic. Off.* ii. 25. "Cum *carbo* vehementer perlucet." *Plin.* 18.

The distinction given by Servius between *carbo* and *pruna*, is this, "*Carbo et pruna differunt quod*

pruna dicatur quamdiu ardet—*carbo* quum extincta est." Noltenius adopts the same distinction, "*Pruna* cremat." *Nolt.* p. 391. And he observes, that when *carbo* stands by itself it means "a dead coal." *Nolt. Lex. Antibarb.* p. 860. The example from Pliny proves this to be not universally true.

CÆDERE. SCINDERE. SECARE. RESECARE.

Cædere, according to Dumesnil, signifies "to strike," "cut," or "divide in pieces," as "*Januam cædere saxis.*" *Cic.* "*Virgis ad necem cædi.*" *Id.* *Cædere*, he observes, when we speak of stones, signifies "to cut them from quarries." *Secare* is "to cut them for the purpose of any building or work." "*Marmora secanda locas.*" *Hor.* *Resecare* is "to retrench," "lop off," or "pare by cutting."—" *Resecare linguam, palpebras.*" *Cic.* *Scindere*, "to cut," implies an effort, or the exertion of strength—and by this chiefly is distinguished from *findere*. Of the distinction between these verbs and *scindere*, he has said nothing.

Scindere, according to Hill, signifies the violent separation of the parts of a substance, by the use of any instrument, fitted to effect it. He adds, "that in this operation the impelling force may, or may not, be exerted by human strength; and that the instrument may, or may not, act by means of an edge."

Cædere, he says, "implies, that the separation is always made by the edge of that which effects it,

whether blunt or otherwise; and that the cut is made by the severity of the blow."

Secare signifies "the act of separating by means of the sharpness of an instrument: differing from *cædere* in not requiring a severe blow," and "from *scindere* in supposing it effected by *dint* of sharpness." This explanation is more precise than Dumesnil's; but appears to me to be somewhat incorrect.

Scindere is "to rend," "tear," or "separate the parts forcibly by any means whatever," as *Penulam scindere*, "To tear, or rend, a cloak." *Cic. Epistolam scindere, Cic.* "To tear or rend, a letter." *Scindere vela*, "To split or rend the sails." *Plaut. Trin.* iv. 1. 18. *Mordicibus scindere* (*Plaut. Aul.* ii. 2. 57.) "To tear with the teeth." *Sentes scindunt* (*Id. Cas.* iii. 6. 2.) "The brambles tear."

Cædere is to "strike," "beat," or "cut," and while it implies a blow or stroke inflicted or given, whether with an edged instrument or not, always signifies at the same time the action of an animate being. *Scindere* is applied also to the agency of mere physical force.

Secare always implies sharpness in the instrument, and generally some degree of care or nicety in the operation. Hence it is applied to surgical operations, as "Cum varices secabantur C. Mario, dolebat." *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.* ii. 2.; to reaping or mowing, "Pubentesque secant herbas." *Virg. Geo.* iii. 126. It is also used to denote generally, "to pass through, or

divide," as "Limes, qui ita secabat agrum, decumanus vocabatur." *Plin.* xviii. 34.

Cædere differs, it would appear, from *scindere* in these particulars:—1st. *Scindere* denotes force or violence; *cædere* does not necessarily imply a severity of blow, or any considerable effort. This is evident from the expression "cædere ferula," *Hor.* 1 *Sat.* iii. 120, "cædere femur," "pectus," "frontem." *Quint.* lib. ii. cap. 12, and several others which might be quoted.

2dly. *Scindere* necessarily implies a separation of the parts, "a cutting," or "sundering:" *Cædere* does not; or when this separation is implied, it is rather by inference, than the strict import of the word. This is evident from the examples which have been just now adduced. When Quintilian speaks of orators striking their forehead, their thigh, or their breast, he does not mean to signify, that they inflict on themselves any wound, or severe blow, so as to produce a separation of the parts. And when Persius says, "Nec pluteum *cædit*, nec demorsos sapit unguēs," *Sat.* i. 106, it is not to be understood, that the blow separates the parts of the desk. Nor is this necessarily implied in the expressions *Pugnis cædere*, *Loris cædere*.

3dly. *Cædere* implies the action of an animate being; *scindere* is applicable to things animate and inanimate. In consistency with this opinion, Valla defines *cædes* to be "Mors non fatalis, sed ferro, aut

ligno, aut saxo, similibusque illata, præsertim occidere, aut ferire, aut percutere, volentis.” By metaphor it is sometimes employed to express the inflictions of a guilty conscience, as—“Quos diri conscia facti Mens habet attonitos, et surdo verbere cædit.” *Juv. Sat. xiii. 194.*

ENSIS.

GLADIUS.

MUCRO.

Ensis and *gladius* seem to have precisely the same meaning; but the reader should be aware, that while *gladius* is used both in poetry and in prose, *ensis* is confined to the former. *Mucro* denotes the point of a sword, and by synecdoche, “the sword itself.”

It is to be observed, that in such expressions as these, “On the day before he came,”—“On the day after he came,” instead of saying, *Die antequam venit*, or *Die postquam venit*, we elegantly say, *Pridie quam venit*, that is, *Die priore quam venit*, and *Postridie quam venit*, that is, *Die posteriore quam venit*. It may be here also remarked, that *antequam* and *postquam* are sometimes divided, each into its component parts, placed in different clauses, the preposition governing its proper case. Thus, instead of saying, *Anno et quatuor mensibus, antequam decederet*, we may say, “Ante annum, et quatuor menses, quam decederet.” *Suet. in Cæs. Aug. cap. 50*, either *Quarto anno postquam redierit*, or with *Nepos* “Quartum post annum quam redierit.” *Vit. Dionis.* “Post tertium diem, quam in hoc statu fuerat.” *Curt. iii. 6., i. e. tertio die postquam.*

The effect, or purpose, instead of being expressed by *ut* or *ad*, is elegantly expressed by the relative pronoun: thus, “He asked for water, to allay his thirst.” *Aquam petivit, qua sitim leniret*, “with which he might allay.”

EXERCISE.

When Porcia, the daughter of Cato of Utica, heard that her husband Brutus had been conquered and slain at Philippi, she called for a sword to kill herself. This not being given her, she took some burning char-coals, and swallowed them. Before this time, indeed, she had disciplined herself for enduring the pain of death with fortitude. The day before Cæsar was slain by the conspirators, she called for a razor, as if to pare her nails; and having received it, she wounded herself severely with it, as if it had accidentally slipped from her hand.

OBSERVATIONS.

ANCILLA.

FAMULA.

Ancilla, says Dumesnil, is “A maid-servant and slave.” *Famula*, “A maid-servant, but free.” That *Ancilla* was “A maid-servant” in the lowest condition, we learn from Martial, who, in stating his preferences according to the several ranks of females, says, “Extrema est *ancilla* loco.” *Ep.* iii. 33.

Ancilla and *Serva* are, in a variety of cases, used as synonymous, or as denoting each “a female servant in a state of slavery.” That *Famula* may sometimes imply “a female servant in a state of freedom,” cannot

be questioned ; but that this is its only proper signification, appears improbable, for these reasons :

1st. If the derivation of *Famulus* or *Famula*, be from *Famel*, written by Ennius *Famul*, a word denoting, in the ancient language of Campania, as Holyoke informs us, “ A slave,” we may reasonably infer, that the primitive and leading idea is retained in the derivative term.

2dly. We find that the term *Famula* is applied to a person, whom we know to have been a slave, and to have been designated by the term *Serva* ; and we find the same word used to denote “ a female slave,” assigned to another slave as his property, “ Me famulam, famuloque Heleno transmisit habendam.” *Virg. Æn.* iii. 329.

When Sisygambis, a captive, addresses Alexander, and says, “ Ego me tuam *famulam* esse confiteor,” *Curt.* iii. 12, she cannot be understood to signify, that she confessed herself to be in a state of freedom, or that she was to be regarded as one of his free attendants, or domestics.

In the following passage from Ovid, there can be no question, but the term *Famulas* alludes particularly to the slaves. “ Quæ Dea sit; quare *famulas* a limine templi Arceat.” *Ov. Fast.* vi. 481. Again — We find that the *Famulæ* are frequently represented as compelled to the same labour with the *Ancillæ*. “ Aut hærent telæ, *famulasque* laboribus urgent.” *Ov. Met.* iv. 35.

“Quinquaginta intus *famulæ*, quibus ordine longo
Cura penum struere, et flammis adolere penates.”

Virg. Æn. i. 707.

And when Horace uses the expression, “Cum *famulis* operum solutis,” *Hor. Car. iii. 17. 16.* he clearly includes all who served in the family.—This subject, however, will be resumed, when we come to consider the difference between *Servus*, *Famulus*, and *Verna*.

For is frequently, before a verb, expressed by *quia*, or *quod*, as “I care less for your having turned away the workmen,”—“Minus curo, *quod* operarios ejecisti.” *Cic.*

It deserves the attention of the junior reader, that nouns, implying either action or passion, have an ambiguous signification, when governing other nouns in the genitive case. Thus, *Amor Dei* denotes either *Amor, quo Deus amat*, or *quo Deus amatur*. “Injuria consulis.” *Liv. xlii. 1.* “The injury, which the consul did.” “Injurias Æduorum.” *Cæs. B. G. i. 35.* “The injuries, which the Ædui suffered.” Analogy, therefore, would lead us to infer, that, when such substantives are joined with a possessive adjective, they have either an active, or passive signification. Accordingly, we find this to be the case. It is to be observed, however, that when the signification is passive, classic writers, instead of employing the possessive adjective, generally use the genitive of the simple noun. This has been remarked by Despauter, by

Ruddiman, and several other grammarians. Thus, *Amor meus* denotes, “My love towards another,” i. e. *Amor, quo amo*: but *Amor mei* means, *Quo amore amor*, or “The love, which another bears to me.” “Desiderium sui reliquit apud populum.” *Cic. pro Rab*; *desiderium, quo desiderabatur*. “Mea lux, meum desiderium.” *Cic. Ep. Fam.* 14, i. e. *desiderium, quo desidero*. “Magnis muneribus ad studium sui perducit.” *Sall. B. J. cap.* 80. i. e. *quo sibi favebatur*. “Polliceri, et profiteri suum eximium et singulare studium.” *Cic. Ep. Fam.* v. 8. i. e. *quo studebat*. Examples occur of a contrary usage; but they are far less numerous. “Nam neque negligentia tua, neque odio id fecit tuo.” *Ter. Phor.* v. 9. 27. Here the noun, joined with a possessive adjective, is used in a passive sense.

I am aware, that Drakenborch, in his note on *Liv.* xxx. 44, maintains the contrary doctrine, and contends, that *odium vestrum* should be rendered “hatred towards you.” In this he errs. That the noun, joined to a possessive adjective, has sometimes a passive signification is admitted; but that this is uniformly true, we have ample authority for denying. The contrary usage, indeed, is far more general.

When the governing substantive is used in an active sense, the dative is sometimes used for the genitive; thus, “Auctor his rebus quis est?” *Ter. Adel.* iv. 5. 37. for *harum rerum*. “Non hominibus sed virtutibus hostis.” *Cic. pro Domo*. “Venit legi dies.” *Cic. Att.* iv. 16. “The day for enacting the law.”

EXERCISE.

The maidservants immediately raised a cry, and Brutus came into the bedchamber to inquire the cause.—When he began to chide her, for thus doing the office of a barber, “I did not,” said she, “inflict this wound by chance, but designedly; it is a sure evidence of my love towards you; for I wished to try, whether I had spirit enough to seek death by the sword, if your noble purpose should not turn out according to your wish.” Brutus affectionately embraced her; then raising his hands to heaven, he fervently prayed, that the Gods would make him worthy of so excellent a wife.

OBSERVATIONS.

CAPERE.

SUMERE.

ACCIPERE.

The two latter are thus distinguished by Popma, Fronto, and Noltenius. *Sumimus* quæ posita sunt: *accipimus* quæ porriguntur—thus, “Epistolam super caput temere positam sumit.” *Cic.* “Quod mihi a te datur, *accipio.*” *Cic.* “Ita *sumimus* ipsi; *accipimus* ab alio quod datur, sive rem datam capiendo tollimus.” Sic quum damus, et de manu in manum tradimus, dicendum est *accipe*; quum permittimus alicui quippiam tollere, dicendum est, *sume*. The distinction between *Capere* and *Sumere*, is thus given by Hill. *Capere*, he says, supposes, that the agent of his own will, lays hold of an object, over which he has a certain power; and the general idea suggested by the verb is founded upon a necessity, which sometimes operates upon that which is taken, and at others,

upon the person, who takes, thus, “Hic jaculo pisces, illic *capiuntur* ab hamis.” *Ov. de Art. Am.* i. 765. Here the necessity lies on the things (*pisces*), which are taken; while the power and right of the sportsman are also implied. “Desiderium quod *capiebat* ex filio.” *Cic. de Sen.* Here the necessity operates on the person taking.

Sumere excludes necessity, and denotes the act of taking that, which may, or may not, be the property of the person who does so, and involves no force, or coercion, in respect to the thing taken. The act likewise may depend on the will of the person taking, or on permission from others.

This explanation of the verbs *sumere* and *capere*, as implying or excluding a necessity, which operates sometimes on the thing taken, and sometimes on the person taking, appears much too vague to furnish any precise idea of the distinction. It would appear that the difference between *capere* and *sumere* is simply this, that the former implies the idea of power or ability, the latter of right or permission.—*Capimus* quod possumus; *sumimus* quod permittitur, vel quod positum est. I believe this distinction comprehends every point of difference.

When the Scythian orator said to Alexander, “Concupiscis, quæ non capis.” *Curt.* vii. 8, he meant to signify, that he coveted, what he *could* not take. The same idea is implied in Alexander’s observation concerning Parmenio, “Majora quam capit, spirat.” *Curt.* vi. 9. “Casus est,” says Cicero, “in *capiendo*,

locus, eventus, occasio." (*Cic. pro Flacc.*) signifying that the ability of taking depends on the three circumstances specified. I observe, also, that the intention generally implied by *Capere* is, "to hold,"—while that implied by *Sumere* is, "to use." Hence *capere* frequently denotes to keep, or contain, and also to admit, as "*Orbis te non caperet,*" *Curt. vii. 8*, "The world would not contain you;"—and accordingly *capax*, the verbal adjective, signifies, "able to contain." And as our power to take often depends on the inclination of others, *capere* is frequently used for *accipere rem oblatam*: as "*Cape hoc argentum, et defer.*" *Ter. Heaut. iv. 7. 3*. "Take," or "receive."

Sumere implies "permission," and hence, "a right," real, or conceived. It denotes "to take," generally for the purpose of using. "*Hoc mihi sumo,*" *Cic. in Verr.* "I assume this as a right." "*Id mihi non sumo.*" *Id.* "*Quid ergo? hoc tibi sumis, ut quia tu defenderis, innocens judicetur?*" *Orat. pro Sylla.* "Do you assume this as a right principle?"—"Id sumam," *Ter. Ph. iv. 3. 76*. "I will take that for my use." The idea of permission, or right, as involved in *sumere*, is clearly implied in the following passages: "*Res non concessas sumere, et ex illis efficere quid velis.*" *Cic. de Fin. 4.* "*Sed quum bis sumpsit, quod vult, id tamen quod assumit, concedi nullo modo potest.*" *Cic. de Div. ii. 103.* "*Quis Antonio permisit, ut et partes faceret, et utram vellet, prior ipse sumeret.*" *Cic. de Orat.*

Hence *sumere* sometimes denotes, “to borrow,” as “*Sumeret alicunde.*” *Ter. Phor.* i. 5. 70.

And as *choice* is equally compatible with the act of taking, whether that act be done by means of our own power, or by the permission of another, or as a matter of real or fancied right, so these two verbs are frequently used as equivalent to *Eligere*, “to choose,” as, “*Sumat aliquem ex populo, monitorem officii sui,*” *Sall. B. J.* cap. 85, “Let him choose some person.” “*Nunc terras ordine longo Aut capere, aut captas jam despectare videntur.*” *Virg. Æn.* i. 399. “They seem to choose, or pitch upon, a spot of ground.”—“*Ante locum capies oculis.*” *Id. G.* ii.

Before we leave this subject, it may be useful to observe, with Dumesnil, as a caution to the young scholar, that though we may say, *Capere voluptatem*, “To receive, or derive, pleasure,” and also passively, *Voluptate capi*, “To be captivated with pleasure,” we cannot say, *Capi dolore, molestia*, &c. though we may say actively, *Dolor me cepit*, “Grief seized me.”

FORMA.

PULCHRITUDO.

Vavassor admits a difference between these two words; but confesses his ignorance of its precise nature. (See *Verw. Thes. in Vav.*)

Donatus says, “*Forma est oris, et naturæ; figura artis; pulchritudo totius corporis.*”—“*Forma*,” says Dumesnil, “is that, which determines the matter to be this thing or that; and results from the construction and arrangement of the parts.” This he opposes

to *Figura*. *Pulchritudo*, “beauty,” he observes, is that property which strikes the eye. And he quotes Cicero as defining it, “*Pulchritudo* corporis apta compositione membrorum movet oculos.” From this definition it would appear, that *Pulchritudo* regards merely the symmetry of the person, or just proportion of the members of the body; and, on this definition, the opinion of Donatus seems to have been founded. Others, on the contrary, suppose that *Pulcher*, derived from *πολυχρους*, *Multicolor*, refers chiefly to that beauty, which consists in colour, and that *Formosus*, from *Forma*, regards chiefly the symmetry of the members. To this opinion, respecting the signification of *Pulcher*, or *Pulchritudo*, the passage quoted from Cicero presents, it would seem, an insuperable objection.

But we have fortunately another passage, in which the author completes his definition; for he says, “*Quædam apta figura membrorum cum coloris quædam suavitate, ea dicitur pulchritudo.*” *Cic. lib. 4. Tusc. Quæst.* It is clear, therefore, that *Pulchritudo* includes the symmetry of the parts, the regularity of the features, and the beauty of colour. *Forma*, as opposed to *Pulchritudo*, refers entirely to the shape, though sometimes used in a more extensive sense. See *Ter. Eun. ii. 3. 4.—ii. 3. 7. Ph. i. 2. 54. 58. Eun. ii. 3, 21, 22, 23.*

EXERCISE.

Cæcinna Pætus, the husband of Arria, was sick; her

son also was sick, each, as it seemed, irrecoverably. The son died, a youth of uncommon beauty, of great modesty, and very dear to his parents. Arria prepared for his funeral, and conducted it in such a manner, that her husband knew nothing of it. Nay, as often as she entered his bedchamber, she pretended that her son was alive, and was better. When he asked what the boy was doing, she used to answer, “He has rested well, and has eaten his victuals with pleasure.” At last, when her tears, long restrained, overcame her, and burst forth, she retired to her chamber, and gave herself up to grief.

OBSERVATIONS.

PETERE.

QUÆRERE.

The former means “to ask,” or “seek,” in order to receive—the latter, “to seek,” or “search for,” in order to find. “*Responsum dedit petenti.*” *Virg. Ecl.* i. 45. “*Ubi quæram, ubi investigem?*” *Ter. Eun.* ii. 3. 3. “Ask, and ye shall receive—seek, and ye shall find.”—“*Petite, et impetrabitis—quærite, et invenietis.*” To ask any one a question is rendered by *Quærere aliquid ex aliquo*.

When the verb “to go,” in English, expresses an *effort, endeavour, or preparation*, for any action, it is rendered by *ire*; thus, “Are you going to advance your reputation at the hazard of my life?” *In mea vita, tu laudem is quæsitum?* that is, “are you setting yourself about advancing?” When no studied effort or preparation is implied, it is expressed by the future participle; thus, “I am going to read,” *Lecturus sum*.

EXERCISE.

When she had her fill of crying, she returned to her husband with a composed countenance, and endeavoured to sooth his grief for the loss of their son. After Scribonianus, who had made war on Claudius, was slain, Pætus, who had been of his party, was dragged to Rome. When he was going to embark, Arria entreated the soldiers, that she might be put on board along with him. “You are going to furnish him,” said she, “with servants, from whose hands he may receive his food, by whom he may be dressed, and by whom he may be undressed. All these things I alone will perform.” She did not, however, obtain her request.

OBSERVATIONS.

MURUS. PARIES. MÆNIA. MACERIA.

The explanation already given of the three first, I shall briefly repeat. (See p. 2.) *Murus* is the wall of a city, of a town, or of any edifice, generally of stone: it is sometimes, however, applied to a rampart of earth, or rubbish. *Paries* is the wall of a private house, either exterior or interior. *Mænia* is a fortified wall. *Maceria* is a wall inclosing a garden, a villa, a grove, or a vineyard, composed of any materials. “*Maceria ex calce, cæmentis, silice, ut dominus omnia ad opus præbeat; altam pedes quinque facito.*” *Cato R. R. cap. 15.* Varro enumerates four kinds, *e lapide, e lateribus coctis, e lateribus crudis, ex terra et lapidibus compositis.* Cæsar has employed it to denote a rampart. “*Fossamque et maceriam sic*

in altitudinem pedum prædicaverant." *B. G.* vii. 69. Some read *materiam*, but, as we conceive, with less propriety.

In the following exercise, an expression occurs, which the junior scholar, misled by the English idiom, is apt to render incorrectly. The expression, to which I allude, is "determined to die," which I have frequently seen rendered by *statutus*, in concord with the person determining. This is a violation of that rule, by which the accusative after the active verb, invariably becomes the nominative to it in the passive voice. The verb *statuere* governs the accusative of the thing determined, or resolved upon; therefore the thing determined, and not the person determining, must be the nominative to the passive verb. We say *statutum est* "It was determined," but not *statutus est* for "He was determined." This would be to confound the person resolving with the thing resolved upon. The proper expressions are *morti*, or *in mortem*, *intentus*, *ad moriendum obstinatus*. Tacitus says, "Id destinatum mulieri." "The woman was determined on that." He uses also the following expressions, "Certus degere," "Determined to live." "Sceleris certa," "Determined on the crime." "Certus discernendi." *Hist.* iv. 14.—These phraseologies are not found in prose writers of the Augustan age.

From is frequently rendered by *ne*, *quo minus*, *quo secius*, or the infinitive, instead of the gerund; thus, "A certain accident prevented me from doing

it,"—"Casus quidam, ne facerem, impedivit." *Cic. Ep. Fam. xi. 10.* "Nothing hinders us from being able to do it,"—"Nihil impedit, quo minus facere possumus." *Cic. de Fin. i. 58.* "They are prohibited from going to their children,"—"Prohibentur adire filios suos." *Cic. in Verr.* It is at the same time to be observed, that *ne* and *quo minus* are not used indiscriminately in such examples. If the preceding clause be negative, the latter, and not the former, must be employed. Thus we say, *Impedivit, ne*, or *quo minus, facerem*; but we cannot say, *Nihil impedivit, ne facerem*, but *quo minus facerem*. *Recusavit ne*, or *quin*, or *quo minus, diceret*; but we must not say, *Non recusavit, ne diceret*. The same observation is applicable to other verbs of hindering, or restraining, followed by *ne*, or *quo minus*.

CADERE.

RUERE.

CORRUERE.

Cadere is simply "to fall." *Ruere*, and *Corruere* (*ruere unà*) signify, "to fall with violence, or precipitation." *Corruere* is often used for the simple verb.

NEGARE.

INFICIARI.

The English verb "to deny," has two meanings. It denotes either "to contradict" as opposed to "to affirm," or "to refuse," as opposed to "to grant." *Negare* corresponds to it, in both these senses: *inficiari* agrees with it, in the former acceptation only, and generally denotes "to deny, or not to confess, what we know to be true." Hence some write *infi-*

tiari, quasi non fateri. “Negat quis? nego: ait? aio.” *Ter. Ph.* iii. 2. 39. “Liviæ, pro quodam Gallo roganti, civitatem negavit; immunitatem obtulit.” *Suet. in Cæs. Aug.* “Cum id posset inficiari, repente confessus est.” *Cic. in Cat.* 3.

EXERCISE.

Arria, therefore, hired a fishing-boat, and followed the ship. When she came to Rome, and, despairing of her husband's safety, seemed determined to die, she was very strictly watched by her friends. Perceiving this, she said, “Ye lose your labour; for ye may make me die painfully, but ye cannot prevent me from dying.” At the same time, starting up from her chair, she knocked her head with great violence against the wall, and fell. Stunned for a little, upon recovering she said, “I told you, that I would find a hard death, if you should deny me an easy one.”

OBSERVATIONS.

AMOR.

CARITAS.

These words agree in signifying love or affection. They differ in these particulars. *Amor* is a general term, and implies every species of love, pure or impure; *caritas* denotes virtuous affection. *Amor* is a mere passion or emotion; *caritas* implies also a sentiment of the understanding. *Amor* extends to superiors, equals, and inferiors; *caritas* is generally confined to superiors. “Nam aut caritate moventur homines, ut deorum, ut patriæ, ut parentum; aut amore, ut fratrum, ut conjugum, ut liberorum, ut fa-

miliarium." *Cic. de Part. cap. 16.* See also *De Orat. lib. 2.*

PECTUS.

SINUS.

GREMIUM.

Pectus is "the breast," extending from the neck to the belly, consisting of the breast bone and the ribs, which inclose the heart and the lungs. "*Pectus hoc est, ossa præcordiis ac vitalibus natura circumdedit; at ventri quem necesse erat increocere, ademit.*" *Plin. lib. 11. sect. 82.*

Sinus, "the bosom," or "what may be inclosed within the breast and folded arms," extending to the pit of the stomach.

Gremium, "the lap," "*locus inter complexum ventris et feminum, quem sedentes effricimus.*" *Facc.* Dumesnil, with whom we agree, extends it from the girdle to the knees of a person sitting. "*Gremio ac sinu matris educabatur.*" *Dial. de Orat. cap. 28.*

The difference between the English and the Latin idioms, in expressing "ability," "liberty," "duty," and "will," requires some explanation. In English, when these circumstances are to be expressed as present, the verb governing, and also its regimen, are each put in the present tense, as "I can read," "We will go," "Thou mayest depart," "I ought to write." And when these circumstances are to be denoted as past, both verbs are put in the preterite tense, as "I could have read," "We would have gone," "Thou mightest have departed," "I ought to have written."

Now, when present duty, present ability, present will, or present liberty is to be expressed, the idioms of the two languages concur, as *Possum legere. Ire volumus. Discedere licet. Scribere debeo.* But, when “the duty,” “the ability,” “the will,” or “the liberty,” is to be denoted as past, it is only the verb, which expresses these circumstances, that is in Latin put in the preterite tense, the verb following being almost always put in the present tense. Thus, *Legere potui. Ire voluimus. Discedere licuit. Scribere debui.* In these examples, the past time is sufficiently denoted in Latin by the preterite tense of the governing verb. Perspicuity does not require, that the latter of the two verbs, as is the case in English, shall also be put in the preterite tense. It is to be observed, at the same time, that the English verb *Ought*, which was originally a preterite tense, is now used only as a present; and that *past duty* must, therefore, necessarily be expressed by the preterite tense of the following verb; as, “I ought to read.” “I ought to have read.” In Latin, as has been just now remarked, the past obligation is expressed by the preterite tense of the verb, denoting the obligation, as *Legere debui.—Legere me oportuit*; the object of the obligation being correctly signified by the present tense, to be relatively present, or contemporaneous with the obligation itself. Thus also in expressing future obligation, as *Debebis legere. Te legere oportebit.* “It will be your duty to read.”

Good prose writers generally observe this phrase-

ology, almost uniformly signifying “the duty,” “liberty,” “ability,” or “will,” as past, present, or future, by the tense of the verb, denoting any of these circumstances, and not by the tense of the verb following in the infinitive. A few examples of a different phraseology with the verb *Debeo*, occur in Cicero; but they are very rare. “Quid enim debuit prætor *fecisse*?” *Cic. in Verr.*

Poets more frequently deviate from this general usage. Thus Juvenal (Sat. iii. 163.) says, “Debuerant olim tenues *migrasse* Quirites,” and Lucretius sometimes expresses a past obligation or necessity by a present tense, and the simultaneous relatively present act or state, by a preterite tense, thus

“Omnia enim *debet*, mortali corpore quæ sunt,
Infinita ætas consumpse ante acta, diesque.”—I. 233.

“Ought to have destroyed.” This is precisely our idiom.

Nothing can be more evident, than that the obligation, or duty, and the object of that duty, how far back soever the obligation may be referred, must be contemporaneous, that is, that the one must be present in relation to the other. When Parmenio says, “Oportuit rem prænarrasse me.” *Ter. Eun.* v. 6. 12, *oportuit* sufficiently expresses the past obligation. *Prænarrare* would have been more conformable to general usage.

The learner is sometimes at a loss to determine when he ought to employ the impersonal, and when the personal verb. “I please,” is sometimes rendered

Ego placeo, and at other times, *Placet mihi*. “I delight,” *Ego delecto*, and also *Delectat me*. The two following rules will, it is hoped, render this matter sufficiently plain.

1st. If the verb, in English, be followed by an infinitive mood, the impersonal verb should be employed, to which the infinitive mood is, strictly speaking, the nominative: as, “I please to read,” *Placet mihi legere*, that is, “To read pleases me.” If it be not followed by an infinitive mood in English, the personal verb must be used, as “I please all men,” *Omnibus placeo*.

2dly. If the nominative to the verb, in English, be active, the personal verb must be employed, as “I delight my friends,” *Amicos meos delecto*. Here the principal subject, or nominative to the verb, is active; *I am doing*, not *suffering*. But if the subject, or nominative, be passive, the impersonal verb should be used, as “I delight to read,” *Delectat me legere*, that is, “To read delights me,” or “I am delighted with reading,” equivalent to *Delector legendo*.

EXERCISE.

After Pætus was put to death, if Arria had pleased to survive her husband, she would have been allowed to live, being the very intimate friend of Messalina the wife of Claudius; but she preferred dying with her husband. Nay, that she might rouse him to meet death, like a man, she first plunged the dagger into her own breast; then, extracting it

from the wound, she held it out to him, and said, "Pætus, I feel no pain."

Conjugal affection is ordained by nature to mitigate the sorrows, and ease the labours of human life. It makes adversity less, and prosperity greater. Domestic pleasures are, unquestionably, preferable to all others.

OBSERVATIONS.

The Latins have no simple future subjunctive, the tense, which is commonly called by that name, being truly an indicative tense, and denoting a future action, as *absolutely* perfected, before another action, likewise future, shall have been completed. Thus, *Cænabo*, while it signifies, "I shall sup," indefinitely, denotes also, "I shall be at supper," or "I shall be supping." *Cænavero* implies, that the future action will be perfected, and means, "I shall have supped," or "I shall have finished supper." They are each an indicative tense: the former is the future imperfect; and the latter the future perfect. Thus, "Quod mihi dederit de hac re consilium, id sequar." *Ter. Ph.* ii. 3. 21. Here both events are future, namely, "the giving advice," and "the following it." But as the advice must be given, before it can be followed, in other words, as the act of counselling must be completed, before the observance of the advice can take place, the former is expressed in the perfect future, and the latter in the imperfect.

The learner, therefore, must remember, that the

Latins have no future subjunctive ; and that they supply its place by the future participle, and the verb *Sum* ; thus, *Amaturus sim, sis, sit, &c.* If I say, “ I doubt not, but he will do it,” it must be rendered, *Haud dubito, quin facturus sit*,—*quin* being joined to the subjunctive mood. The mode of expressing the three tenses, past, present, and future, when the clauses are indefinite, is exemplified in the following passage : “ Facta autem et casus et orationes tribus in temporibus considerabuntur, quid fecerit, aut quid ipsi acciderit, aut quid dixerit, aut quid faciat, quid ipsi accidat, quid dicat, aut quid facturus sit, quid ipsi casurum sit, qua sit usus ratione.” *Cic. de Invent. Lib. i.*

When the future of the infinitive is wanting, the periphrasis *Fore ut*, must be employed. Thus, “ I hope, that he will recover,” *Spero fore, ut convalescat*, that is, “ that it will come to pass, that he shall recover.”—“ I hoped, that he would recover,” *Spes mihi erat, fore, or futurum esse, ut convalesceret*. “ I hoped, that he would have recovered,” *Futurum fuisse, ut convalesceret*.

It is to be observed, that *futurum esse*, and, indeed, the future of the infinitive of other verbs, are sometimes used absolutely without any regard to the number or gender of the noun preceding ; thus, Cicero said, in his fifth oration against Verres, “ Hanc sibi rem præsidio sperant *futurum*.” Several critics, says A. Gellius, conceive, that this reading is erroneous, and that it should be *futuram*. He produces, in defence of it, the following analogous ex-

pressions,—“Credo inimicos hoc *dicturum*.”—“Hostium copias ibi occupatas *futurum*.” *Quad. Ann.*
 “Est quod speremus Deos bonos bene *facturum*.”
Ib. “Omnia ex sententia *processurum* esse.” *Val. Ant.*

“Etiamne habet Cassinæ gladium? Habet, sed duos
 Quibus, altero te occisurum ait, altero villicum.”

Plaut. Cas.

Without impeaching the critical sagacity of A. Gellius, it may be safely affirmed, that this form of expression is totally unworthy of imitation. See *Aul. Gell.* lib. i. cap. 7.

It is to be observed also, as has been already remarked concerning the participles, that *fore*, which is equivalent to *futurum esse, vel fuisse*, does not determine the tense of the verb following *ut*. The tense of the verb, which follows *ut*, is determined according to the rule already given, by the tense of the principal verb in the sentence, and is not affected either by *fore*, or by an intervening participle. “I hope, that he will be willing,” *Spero fore, ut velit*. Here the governing verb is present. “I hoped, that he would be willing,” *Speravi fore, ut vellet*. In the former example, the present tense (*spero*) requires *ut velit*; in the latter, the preterite (*speravi*) requires *ut vellet*. “He returned home, believing that his son would recover,” *Domum rediit, credens fore, ut filius convalesceret*. The tense *convalesceret* is determined by *rediit*, and is nowise affected either by *fore*, or the participle.

ANIMADVERTERE.

OBSERVARE.

“Notamus *rem*,” says Dumesnil, “*ut memoriæ hæreat*; observamus, *ut iudicium feramus*.” The purposes of the two acts, denoted by the verbs *notare* and *observare*, are here correctly distinguished.

Animadvertere, it has been already observed, signifies sometimes, “To notice without intention,” and sometimes, “Purposely to direct the attention to any object.” *Observare* means, “To observe narrowly,” or “To watch,” implying always a conscious effort. Thus we may say, *Eum animadverti, et observavi*, “I noticed, and watched him.”—“Observes filium, quid agat.” *Ter. And. i. 1. 142.* “Ego te in consulatu observâram.” *Cic. 7 Fam. Epist. 27.*

Note; That *animadvertere in aliquem*, by an *ellipsis* of *supplicio*, signifies to “punish any one.”

NUNC.

MODO.

MOX.

Nunc signifies “Now,” or “at this time;” *Modo*, “Just now,” or “A little before this time;” *Mox*, “Now,” “Immediately,” or “A little after this time;” as, “Ex sua libidine moderantur quæ est *nunc*, non quæ *olim* fuit.” *Ter. Heaut. ii. 1. 4.* “Non video hercle *nunc*; sed vidi *modo*.” *Plaut. Merc. v. 2. 54.* “Quid dico nuper? immo vero *modo*, atque adeo paulo ante.” *Cic. in Verr.* “Discedo paulisper a somniis, ad quæ *mox* revertar.” *Cic. 1 de Div.* *Mox*, in the decline of the Latin language, was sometimes used for *modo*, and also for “some time afterwards.” “In causas malorum, quæ *mox* tulimus, sæpius redi-

turus." *Tac. Hist.* iv. 50. "C. Cæsar, intuens Claudium patrum suum, a quo *mox* principe Nero adoptatus est." *Suet. in Claud. Ner. cap.* 6. i. e. *post undecim annos.*

Nunc referring to time relatively present, or to an event, as contemporaneous with another event, may be therefore joined to a preterite, a present, or a future tense. "Sine nunc res facere, dum per ætatem licet." *Ter. And.* It is emphatically joined with *ipsum*. "Nunc ipsum ea lego." *Cic. Att.* xii. 40. "At this very time." "Nunc reus erat apud Gracsum divitem Vectius de vi." *Cic. Att.* ii. 24, i. e. *hoc tempore erat.* "Nunc adeò ibo illuc." *Plaut. Merc.* ii. 2. 57. "I will now go." *Tunc* and *tum*, "then," or "that time," refer in like manner to time relatively past or future.

Noltenius distinguishes *modo*, *nuper*, *pridem*, *dudum*, *olim*, *quondam* and *diu*, thus. "*Modo* significat tempus vixdum præteritum: *dudum* tempus paulo longius; *nuper* et *pridem* tempus adhuc longius; *olim*, *quondam* tempus longissimum; *diu* continuationem temporis." The last, expressing a space of time, admits comparison, by *diutius* and *diutissime*; the others refer to the date of an action or event, and admit no variation. It is remarked by Noltenius, that we cannot say, *Quamdiu rediit?* but *Quamdudum rediit?* So also in English, we cannot say, "How long has he returned?" Though we may say, "How long has he been returned?" but, "How long ago did he return?" not *Jamdiu animam efflavit*, but

Jamdudum, or *Jampridem*, the action expressed not admitting *diu*, that is to say, *his expiring* not being an action, or state continued till now. But we may say, *Jamdiu mortuus est*, not *Jampridem*, for “he has been now long dead.” It must be observed, however, that though *jamdudum* and *jampridem* refer to a point of past time, they may be also connected with a present tense; thus, “*Jamdudum animus est in patinis.*” *Ter. Eun.* iv. 7. 46. “My heart was long ago, and now is among the dishes.” The adverb here, with the verb *est* expresses merely two points of time; *jamdiu* would imply a space, “was long ago, and has continued to be.”

We say in English, “To have a person or thing in one’s eye,” “To lie under the eye,” “To cast the eye,” “To have a watchful eye upon.” The Latins more correctly said, *In oculis habere*,—*Oculis subjici*,—*Oculos conjicere*,—*Intentis oculis observare*.

EXERCISE.

When Solon saw one of his friends, one day, very sorrowful, he took him up to the citadel, and bade him take a view of the houses lying under his eye. When he observed, that he had done so, “Think,” said he, “with yourself, how many griefs have been, now are, and will afterwards be, under these roofs; and cease to lament, as peculiar to yourself, those evils, which are common to all mankind.” The same person used to say, that, if all the misfortunes of men were collected into one place, every one, after inspecting the mass, would choose rather to bear his own, than his neighbour’s evils.

OBSERVATIONS.

VEL.

SIVE.

Vel, “or,” is commonly called a disjunctive, and *seu* or *sive*, a subdisjunctive conjunction. The difference is this; *Vel* disjoins, or contrasts, facts, or circumstances,—*Seu* and *Sive* disjoin names also. If the things be contrary, or different, *Aut*, or *Vel*, should be used. If the things be the same, and only the names different, *Seu*, or *Sive*, should be employed: thus, “It is either day, or night,” *Vel dies, vel nox est*. “A man, or a woman,” *Vir, aut, femina*. “He is a man or a god,” *Homo est, vel deus*. Here the things are different. But if we say, “Phœbe or Diana,” (both being names for the same person) we must use *Seu*, or *Sive*, as *Phœbe, seu Diana*. In the same manner we say, *Paris, sive Alexander—Iulus, sive Iulus*. *Sive*, in such examples, is merely explanatory.

The learner should observe, that in our mode of numeration, we mix the cardinal with the ordinal numerals. Thus we say, “twenty-third,” joining “twenty,” a cardinal, with “third,” an ordinal numeral. The Latins never used this phraseology, unless with *unus*, which they frequently joined with an ordinal numeral. Thus, “twenty-third,” is *vigesimus tertius*: “twenty-first,” *vigesimus primus*, sometimes *unus et vigesimus*. The latter, or last, numeral in English, will direct the learner to the proper expression. If *it* be a cardinal numeral, the

cardinal numerals must be used; as “one hundred and thirty-four,” *centum et viginti quatuor*: if it be an ordinal numeral, he must employ the ordinal numerals, as “thirty-fourth,” *trigesimus quartus*. It may assist the junior reader in expressing numbers, if he will attend to the following direction and examples.

1st. If the number to be signified be under 20, and two distinct cardinal numerals to be employed, the greater of the two precedes, whether the copulative conjunction be expressed, or understood; thus, we say, *Decem quinque*, or *Decem et quinque*. We say also, *Quindécim*.

2d. In the ordinal numerals, either may precede, thus, *Decimus quintus*, or *Quintus decimus*.

3d. When the number is above 20, and under 100, the contrary rule takes place, if the copulative be used, as, *Quinque et viginti*, *Duo et quadraginta*. But, if the conjunction be omitted, the greater of the two precedes, thus *Viginti quinque*, *Quadraginta duo*.

4th. Above 100, the greater number precedes, with, or without, the copulative, thus, *Ducenti quadraginta quinque*, *Sexcenti et triginta*.

The reader should observe also, that in expressing two, or more, thousands by *mille*, they employed the adverbial numerals, thus, *ter mille*, *quinquies mille*, equivalent to *tria millia*, *quinque millia*; but they did not say, *tres mille*, *quinque mille*. “Some thousands,” *aliquoties mille*.

These rules are generally observed: deviations occur, but they are not frequent.

The expression of numbers above 100, may be thus exemplified. Were we to express 3000, we should say, *Tria millia*, or *Ter mille*; 36,254, *Triginta sex millia ducenti et quinquaginta quatuor*; 100,000, *Centena millia*, *Centum millia*, or *Centies mille*; 367,425, *Ter centena et sexaginta septem millia quadringenti et viginti quinque*. Thus, it is to be observed, that any multiple of 100,000 must be expressed by the adverbial numerals, as *Quinquies centena millia*, *Septies centena millia*, not *Septem centena*. The Romans had no distinct term for a million; they expressed it therefore by *Decies centena millia*, thus, 9,876,435 they denoted by *Nonagies octies centena septuaginta sex millia quadringenti et triginta quinque*, that is, “Ninety eight times a hundred thousand.” LVIIII. LXXXIIII. LXXII, *i. e.* quinquagies novies centena, octoginta quatuor millia, septuaginta duo, or, 5,984,072.

Squares and cubes were thus expressed; the square of 2 was denoted by *bis bina*, the cube *bis bina bis*—the square of 3 by *ter terna*, the cube by *ter terna ter*, or *ter novena**.

* The import of the letters V, X, L, C, D, M, in Roman notation must be sufficiently known by every reader; but the junior student may need to be informed of some other modes of notation, used by Latin authors. Thus IC is equivalent to D or 500, and if another C be placed before these characters, it doubles their value: thus CIC denotes 1000; but if another C

For combinations of units, as *tens*, *hundreds*, &c. they had appropriate names. Thus, “a four,” is *quarternio*, “a five,” *pentas*, “a ten,” *decas*, “a hundred,” *centuria*, “a thousand,” *chilias*. “Five sevens” would be expressed by *quinque heptades*, “four tens,” by *quatuor decades*, “three thousands,” *tres chiliades*. The junior reader should be careful to observe that, when a multiple of any number is expressed, the adverbial numeral is considered to be of the neuter gender, and singular number. “Ubi, *est* septies millies sestertium, *quod* in tabulis, quæ sunt ad Opis, patebat?” *Cic. Phil. ii. sub fin.*

It has been observed, that when the English is “in,” the Latin preposition *in* should be joined to the ablative, and when the English is “into,” it should

be subjoined to them, instead of being put before them, it makes their value ten times greater; thus $I\text{D} = 500$, $I\text{DD} = 5000$. This sum doubled would be expressed by $CCI\text{DD} = 10,000$; and $I\text{DDD}$ would denote 50,000, $CCCI\text{DDD} = 100,000$. It is a general rule, that when the smaller number precedes, it diminishes by its value that of the greater, thus $CCI\text{DD} \cdot CCCI\text{DDD}$ represents 90,000, that is 100,000 *minus* 10,000. It may be useful to observe also, that 1000 is sometimes noted by ∞ , thus $CCI\text{DD} \cdot \infty \infty \infty CC$ stands for 13,200, that is 10,000 and 3000 and 200. The reader, by attending to the rule, now given, will perceive that $CCI\text{DD} \cdot CCI\text{DD} \cdot \infty I\text{DD}$ denotes 24,000. The first and second divisions express each 10,000, and the 1000 (marked ∞) preceding the 5000 (marked $I\text{DD}$) is, being the smaller sum, to be subtracted from it.—Thus $10,000 + 10,000 + \overline{5000 - 1000}$. In like manner $CCI\text{DD} \cdot CCI\text{DD} - \infty \infty \infty \infty CDXXCIX$ will denote 24,489, where CD represents 400, and XXC 80.

be joined to the accusative. This is a very general, though not a universal, rule. To prevent mistake, the learner should always attend to the literal meaning of the verb. If we say, "He arrived in England," it must be rendered, "*In Angliam pervenit*," because literally it is, "He came *into* England." The exceptions to the general rule will be specified hereafter.

The junior reader may require, perhaps, to be informed that we say, in English, "By sea and land," but the Latins, *Terra marique*, "By land and sea."

EXERCISE.

About this time, a much greater disaster befel Priam, king of Troy. Refusing to restore Helen, the wife of Menelaus, king of Sparta, who had been carried off by his son Paris, or Alexander, he was stripped of his kingdom by the Greeks, after a siege of ten years, and, at the same time, lost his life. Troy was destroyed in the four hundredth and thirty-sixth year before the building of Rome, and one thousand one hundred and eighty-four years before the birth of Christ. Æneas, a Trojan of great piety, whom the Greeks had spared, left his country, and after a variety of adventures, both by sea and land, arrived in Italy, and succeeded Latinus, king of the Latins, whose daughter he had married.

OBSERVATIONS.

METUERE.

TIMERE.

FORMIDARE.

VERERI.

PAVERE.

The distinction between *Metuere* and *Timere* has been the subject of some controversy, among critics

and philologists. Donatus says, “*Metuo* illum, qui mihi aliquid facturum est; *Timeo* ab illo, cujus causa possum aliquid mali pati, etiamsi ipse nihil in me male consulat. *Metuimus* eos, qui nos amant. *Timemus* etiam inimicos.” The latter of these distinctions, it is apprehended, is incorrect. *Metuere* does not imply the affection of love in those, we fear. When Cicero says, that the sentiment, “*Oderint, dum metuant,*” would have been unworthy of Æacus or Minos, because they were good men, but perfectly in unison with the character of Atreus, who was a cruel tyrant, he cannot be understood as intimating, that the least sentiment of love or affection existed in the mind of Atreus towards those, who feared him. The former of the two distinctions given by Donatus, is better founded; but it is clearly too narrow.

Metuere, says Dumesnil, is, “To fear any thing, that is distant.” *Timere*, “To fear approaching,” or, rather “immediate, danger.” The signification here assigned to *Metuere*, is demonstrably incorrect. Doletus considers *Timor* as a generic term, including *Metus* and *Formido*. This seems nearly to be the opinion of Hill, who says, that *Timere* is a generic term, signifying “To fear,” without regard either to the nature of the object, or the extent of the evil. *Metuere*, on the other hand, he observes, implies that a hostile disposition is always dreaded in the person exciting the fear, and that the evil apprehended is great. By this he must be understood to mean, not a

hostile disposition actually existing, but an hostility which possibly may exist.

When Ovid says of Numa,—“ Quo non metuentius ullum Numinis ingenium terra Sabina tulit,” *Fast.* vi. 259. he certainly does not mean to convey the idea, that Numa dreaded hostility in the gods, as actually existing in their minds towards him.

Let us now attend to the words of Cicero. After observing, that the placid and rational emotion of joy is expressed by *Gaudium*, and its excess by *Lætitia*, he adds, that prudence in foreseeing evils, and guarding against them, is termed *Cautio*; but, if this foresight be accompanied with an abject depression of spirit, and a dereliction of reason and prudence, he says, it may be called *Metus*. *Tusc. Quæst.* lib. iv. He then defines *Metus* to be “ The apprehension, or dread, of an evil, impending and appearing to be intolerable,” “ *Metus*, opinio impendentis mali, quod intolerabile esse videatur.”—Hill, therefore, should not have said, “ that the evil apprehended is great,” but that it is apprehended to be great, or rather intolerable. Cicero then describes the passion thus, “ *Metui* subjecta sunt, pigritia, pudor, terror, timor, pavor, exanimatio, conturbatio, formido.” *Pigritia* he defines, “ *Metus* consequentis laboris : *terror*, *metus* concutiens, ex quo fit ut pudorem rubor, terrorem pallor et tremor et dentium crepitus consequatur : *timor* *metus* mali appropinquantis.” Its effect he describes thus, “ *Metus* efficit recessum quendam

animi et fugam," "It makes the mind shrink and recoil." Now it is to be observed, that the words of Cicero, when describing *Metus*, are to this effect, that as *Gaudium* is the placid and rational emotion of joy, and *Lætitia*, its excess, or a transport of joy, so *Cautio*, he says, is the rational foresight of evils, and *Metus*, that dread of them, which unhinges the mind, depresses the spirit, and disqualifies for action. We may hence, it is conceived, warrantably infer from the analogy here instituted, that as *Lætitia* is a transport of joy, *Metus* implies excessive fear; the one originating in the recent acquisition of some great fancied good, the other in the apprehension of some weighty impending evil, and each manifesting itself by external signs. It is conceived, therefore, that, while *Timor* expresses the simple emotion of fear, without any reference to the evil apprehended, as either great or small, or to its effect on the mind, *Metus* ("Opinio magni mali impendentis." *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.*), as distinguished from *Timor*, refers to the conceived magnitude of the evil, and its discomposing effect. Hence we have *Timere* opposed to *Gaudere*, as "Minus gaudent, qui timuere nihil." *Mart. Ep. xi. 37.* and *Mæror* also conjoined with *Metus*, each implying the violence of the passion, and its external expression, "Perturbata animi mens in mœrore metuque." *Lucr. vi. 1181.* "Metus atque mœror civitatem invasere." *Sall. B. C. cap. 39.*

From this explanation given by Cicero, we may infer, as has been just now observed, that *Timor*,

expressing the emotion of fear in general, has no reference to the evil, as either great or small, while *Metus* always implies, that the evil apprehended is conceived to be great—that *Timor* is the fear of an evil approaching (“*Appropinquantis*”), or coming near us—*Metus*, the fear of an immediate evil (“*Im-pendentis*”), an evil now impending over us—and hence, that *Timor*, denoting the emotion in general, does not necessarily imply a sense of any great power in the person to injure us, as is expressed by the term *Metus*. Accordingly, we find the verb *Timere* employed, where the evil is evidently trifling—thus,

“*Si potes archaïcis conviva recumbere lectis,
Nec modica cœnare times olus omne patella.*”

Hor. Ep. i. 5. 1.

It appears evident, likewise, from a great variety of examples, which might here be adduced, that the first of the two distinctions, which Donatus has offered, is correct, namely, that *Timere* does not imply an apprehended inclination in the person feared to injure us—whereas *Metuere* always denotes an apprehension of hostility towards us, either as possible, or actually existing. Thus, when Martial says to Ligurinus, “*Vir justus, probus, innocens timeris;*” *Ep. iii. 44. 18.* he evidently means, that Ligurinus intended neither harm, nor inconvenience, to those, who shunned and feared him. The evil also apprehended was inconsiderable.

Though the verbs in question are thus distin-

guished, in many cases they are used indiscriminately, when no particular modification of fear is intended to be expressed. “*Quis aut eum diligat, quem metuit, aut eum a quo se metui putet?*” *Cic. de Am.* “*Omnium autem rerum nec aptius est quicquam ad opes tuendas ac tenendas quam diligere, nec alienius, quam timeri.*” *Cic. Off.* ii. 7. We find Macrobius also, when he is describing the effects of fear, as producing trembling, paleness, &c. employing the verbs *Timere* and *Metuere* indiscriminately. (See *Sat.* vii. 11.)

When reverential fear is to be expressed, *Vereri* is almost always employed. “*Metuebant servi, verebantur liberi.*” *Cic. de Sen.* This verb, however, is frequently used to denote simply apprehension of evil, or inconvenience. *Cæs. B. G.* i. 39.

Pavor is defined by Cicero to be, “That fear, which stupifies the mind.”—“*Pavor est metus loco movens mentem.*” *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.* Its primitive and generic meaning, however, seems to have been, “A palpitation common either to fear or joy,” or any violent emotion, thus,

“*Et ni successu nimio lætoque pavore,
Proditus elapso foret inter verba flagello,
Forsan sacrasset Zephyro quas voverat aras.*”

Sil. ad Pun. xvi. 432.

“*Lymphatis cæco pavore animis.*” *Tac. Hist.* i. 82.
“With minds maddened with blind fury.”

Thus, also, in Livy, “*Gallos quoque, velut ob-*

stupefactos, miraculum victoriæ tam repentinae tenuit, et ipso *pavore* defixi primum steterunt, velet ignari, quid accidisset," lib. v. cap. 39.—" Exultantiaque haurit Corda pavor pulsans." *Virg. Geo.* iii. 103.

Formido is defined by Cicero to be, "Metus permanens," "Constant fear." See *Tusc. Quæst.* lib. iv.

Timere, when it governs the accusative, signifies "to fear as an enemy," thus, "Timere populum Romanum." *Sall. B. J.* cap. 13. — "He feared the Roman people." — "Iram timere possemus." *Curt.* vii. 1, "We might fear his anger." When it governs the dative, it signifies, "to fear for," as a friend, as "Eo magis refert, me mihi atque vobis timere." *Sall. B. C.* cap. 54, "that I should fear for myself and you."—"Pars timere libertati." *Sall. B. J.* cap. 43, "Some feared for their liberty." "Si illum relinquo, ejus *vitæ* timeo; sin opitutor, hujus minas." *Ter. And.* i. 3. 5. Sometimes we have both cases, as "Quem justitiæ suæ minime timet." *Quint.* lib. iv. cap. 1. *ad init.* "He fears as an enemy to his justice."—"Cum furem nemo timeret caulibus et pomis." *Juv.* vi. 17. "When no one feared a thief as enemy to," or "who should steal, the potherbs and apples."

VITIUM.

CULPA.

Vitium, specially, or in its more confined signification, signifies "vice," or "moral depravity," and is opposed to *virtus*—thus "Maxime autem absurdum, *vitia* in ipsorum esse potestate, nec peccare

quenquam nisi assensione hoc idem in *virtute* non esse." *Cic. Acad. Quæst.* lib. iv. In its more extended signification, it denotes any "fault," "defect," or "blemish," and is applied not only to persons, but to things likewise; thus, "Uni verbo *vitium* potius quam *virtus* inest." *Quint.* lib. i. cap. 5. *ad init.* where *Vitium*, "A blemish," or "deformity," is opposed to *Virtus*, "An excellence," or "beauty in words."—"Si nihil est in parietibus *vitii*." *Cic.* "If there is no defect, or fault, in the walls."

Culpa is applied to persons only, and denotes "a fault," or "error," of a trivial nature: "In *vitium* ducit *culpæ* fuga, si caret arte." *Hor. De Art. Poët.* that is, "An unskilful endeavour to avoid a fault, frequently leads into great errors," "Si aliqua *culpa* tenemur erroris humani, a scelere certe liberati sumus." *Cic.* where *Culpa* "a fault," is opposed to *Scelus*, "Villany," or "Criminality."

Ne is used, instead of *non*, with the imperative mood, and also with the present subjunctive, as *Ne time*, or *Ne timeas*, "Do not fear." We also say, *Noli timere*, *Nolite frangere*, "Do not fear," "Do not break." *Ne* is also sometimes joined with the tense called "the future subjunctive," as "Ne cogitaveris." *Tac. Ann.* vi. 8. "Do not think," "Ne dubitaris." *Cic. Att.* vii. 3.

EXERCISE.

Croesus, king of Lydia, had a son of uncommon beauty, and excellent genius; but he was dumb. The father had

tried all means to correct this defect; but all the arts of physicians had been of no service. When the army of the Persians had taken Sardis, and a soldier rushing on Cræsus with a drawn sword, was going to stab him, not knowing him to be the king; the youth, alarmed for the safety of his father, made a great and sudden effort to speak; and, rupturing the string of his tongue, cried out, “Do not kill my father Cræsus.”

OBSERVATIONS.

ALIUS.

ALTER.

Alius, when followed by *alium*, means “One of many;” when it stands alone, it means “Another of many.” *Alter* means, “One of two;” as “Præstat tamen ingenio *alius alium*,” *Quint. lib. 1*, “One surpasses another in genius.”—“*Alius alium hortari*.” *Sall. B. C. cap. 5*, “One encouraged another.”—“*Alterum alterius auxilio eget*,” *Id. cap. 1*, “The one needs the assistance of the other,” alluding to the mutual dependence of the mind, and the body.

It has been a matter of great doubt, whether the word *alter*, joined to an ordinal numeral, means “first,” or “second;” and authorities of the highest respectability are divided on this question.—Orosius, Pighius, Servius, Gifanius, with many other critics, contend, that *alter* is equivalent to *secundus*;—Sigonius, Tursellinus, and others, among whom, perhaps, may be numbered, H. Stephans, consider it, in such examples, as synonymous with *primus*. The subject, unquestionably, involves considerable diffi-

culty. That *alter* means, “the second,” in such expressions as “Proximus, *alter*, tertius.” *Cic.* “Primus, *alter*, tertius.” *Id.* “In *alteram*, vel tertiam gemmam,” *Colum.*—cannot be questioned; but it may be contended, that in these, and similar examples, the connection affixes a meaning to the term, which does not strictly belong to it; for if one be mentioned, *alter* subjoined must naturally denote a second. Nor does the passage in Cicero, which has been quoted by both parties, determine the controversy; it being impossible to ascertain, by any document whatever, whether he means the first, or the second. “Literas accepi tuas, quas mihi Cornificius altero vicesimo die—reddidit.” *Ep.* xii. 25. The expression, “Alter ab undecimo,” in Virgil, *Ecl.* viii. 39, is rendered by Servius and Scaliger, the 13th; several other critics contend, that it means the 12th, and, in support of their opinion, adduce the expression in *Ecl.* v. 49, “Alter ab illo,” which, they say, denotes “The first after him.”

The passage, however, which has created the most laboured discussion, is found in Livy, iii. 33, in which the historian informs us, that the Decemviral power began “Anno trecentesimo et altero ab urbe condita.” Robortellus endeavours, at great length, to evince by computation, that *alter* here must mean, “the second;” and in this opinion he has been followed by several distinguished lexicographers and critics. The argument founded in chronological calculation is con-

firmed, they observe, by the authority of Dionysius, who makes the Decemviral power begin in the 302d year after the building of the city. Sigonius, on the other hand, contends, that *alter*, in the passage in question, means “the first,” and appeals to the same chronology. The argument, drawn from the authority of Dionysius, he endeavours to rebut, by shewing that the historian has departed from the chronology of Livy, by dividing the events of one year between two consulates. In this latter opinion, the learned Drakenborch seems to concur.

After an attentive and patient examination of Livy's Chronology, from the foundation of the city to the introduction of the Decemviral power, it appears to me demonstrable, that no decisive argument, favourable to either side, can be founded upon it. The number of years is not recorded by the historian with that precision, which can enable us to determine with certainty, whether *alter*, in the passage in question, means “first,” or “second.”—(See *Sigon. in Liv. Chron.*—*Verr. Flocc. Chron.*—*Robortellus de conven. Supput. Liv. cum Marmor. et Gruter. vol. 2.*)

The next evidence adduced to prove that *alter* means “the second,” is likewise taken from Livy, who says, that Attalus died, “*Altero, et septuagesimo ætatis anno,*” lib. iii. 33. That *alter* here means “the second,” is strenuously contended, because Polybius informs us, that he lived seventy-two years. This

evidence, however, instead of proving, that *alter* means “the second,” would serve to shew, that it denotes “the third.”

Burman has endeavoured to evince, that, when Suetonius says, that Titus died, “*Altero, et quadragesimo ætatis anno,*” he must mean, “the forty-first,” because the same historian informs us, that Titus was born in the very year, in which Caligula was killed, which, says Burman, was the year 41 after Christ, and that he died in the middle of September, in the year, according to the same critic, 81 P. C. aged forty years, nine months, and fifteen days. That Titus was born in the year in which Caligula was slain, is attested by Suetonius, and may be admitted as a fact; but that he was born in December of the year 40, and died in the middle of September 81, is so far from being certain, that it seems to me highly questionable. Besides, I must own, there appears to me to be an error in Burman’s reckoning; for, if he refers the death of Caligula to January 41, and the death of Titus to December 41, then, if he died in September 81, he was only thirty-nine years of age. If he refers the death of Caligula to January 41, and the birth of Titus to December 40, then the two events did not take place in the same year *.

* As I may have possibly misunderstood the learned critic, I subjoin his words:—“*Natus fuit Titus 3 Kal. Jan. anno insigni Cajana cæde, teste Suetonio, cap. i. quod capiendum ante annum cum Cajus sit occisus anno Christi xli. 29. Jan. Obiit vero Titus Id Sept. An. Christi lxxxI. Vixit ergo annos quadra-*

Another passage has been quoted as evidence, from Val. Maximus, which appears to be equally involved in obscurity, and therefore equally inconclusive. We are informed by that writer, that Plato died, “*Altero et octogesimo ætatis anno.*” 8, 7, 3, *Ext.*; and we are told by another writer, that the Magi were wont to sacrifice to him, as being more than man, because he died on the anniversary of his birth, and had just completed the square of nine. This testimony, however, is justly questioned, being opposed by a variety of others, some of which make his age eighty, and others eighty-two.

From authorities so contradictory, no certain conclusion can be drawn. There are one or two passages, however, of a less equivocal nature, to which we may appeal. The first is contained in “*Dialog. de Orat. cap. 34.*” (See Tacit.) “*Nono decimo ætatis anno, L. Cassius, C. Carbonem; uno et vicesimo Cæsar Dolabellam; altero et vicesimo Asinius Pollio, C. Catonem, non multo ætate antecedens Calvus Vatinium, iis orationibus insecuti sunt, quas hodieque cum admiratione legimus.*” Here, it is presumed, a progression or climax is clearly intended; *uno* and *altero*, therefore, cannot possibly be synonymous; nor can the latter mean “the first.” This passage would probably be deemed decisive of the question, were not its authority somewhat weakened by one, if not two,

ginta, menses novem, et dies quindecim.” See *Burm. in Petr. cap. 108.* See also *Suet. in Cal. cap. 58. Id. in Tit. Vesp. cap. 2.—et cap. 11.*

errors in the dates. But as all the editions, with which I am acquainted, have the same lection, the probability is, that the error or errors here involved, are ascribable, not to copyists, but the historian himself. If this probability be admitted, the anachronism does not affect the argument.

There is another passage in the same author, which seems to corroborate the opinion, that *alter* denotes "the second." "Illud ex libertate vitium, quod non simul, nec ut jussi, conveniunt; sed et alter, et tertius dies cunctatione coeuntium absumitur." *Tac. Ger. cap. 11.* Here it cannot be contended, that *alter* is preceded by *unus*, *primus*, or any other word, which might impart to it a signification, which it does not strictly bear. It evidently means "a second," without reference to any preceding term.

It has been already observed, that the chronology of Livy, from the foundation of Rome to the introduction of the Decemviral power, is too obscure to furnish any decisive evidence, by which we may determine the dates to the accuracy of a single year. When that historian, therefore, tells us, (iii. 33.) that the Decemviral power began "Anno trecentesimo et altero," it is extremely doubtful, if we compute from the commencement of the æra, whether the 301st or the 302^d be intended. But there is a passage in the following book of the same historian, by which the date of the Decemviral power may be accurately determined, and the meaning of the term *alter* clearly ascertained. He informs us, (lib. iii. 33.) that the

Decemviral power was introduced “Anno trecentesimo et altero,” and he tells us, likewise, that the military tribunes were created “Anno trecentesimo decimo.” lib. iv. 7.

Now we know, on the same authority, that there was an interval of eight years, between these two events; for the Decemviral power lasted three years, and he has informed us of five regular consular elections*. Hence, it is presumed, we are justified in concluding, that the Decemviral power commenced in the year of the city 302, and that *alter*, therefore, means “the second,” and not “the first.” Sigonius, feeling the force of this argument, in order to reconcile the two dates with this hypothesis, resorts to the gratuitous conjecture, that L. Valerius and M. Horatius continued in the consulship two years; but this supposition is totally inadmissible.

The meaning of the expressions in Virgil, “*alter ab illo*,” and “*alter ab undecimo*,” has been much disputed. It was stated in our first two editions, that

* 302	Decemviri consulares primi.		
303	Decemviri consulares secundi.		
304	Decemviri consulares tertii.		
305	L. Valerius, M. Horatius.		
306	Lar. Herminius, T. Virginus.		
307	M. Geganius, C. Julius.		
308	T. Quinctius, Ag. Furius.		
309	M. Genucius, C. Curtius.		
310	{	A. Sempronius,	}	{ Tribuni Milit. Cos.
		T. Clælius,	}	{ Pot. Primi.
		L. Attilius,	}	

“alter ab illo” we conceived to be analogous to the English phrase, “second to him,” and that in the series, *alter ab illo, tertius, quartus, &c. ille* must be regarded as the first term. In every such series indeed, in which the terms are like, we believe, with a reviewer*, that the term governed by *a, ab, or post*, is included, considered as the first term. When Eutropius says, “Aurelius Commodus . . . ab Augusto decimus septimus Imperator est creatus,” and “Septimius Severus vicesimus post Augustum . . . administrationem suscepit,” Augustus is included, as the first term, making, in the one case, one of the seventeen, and, in the other, one of the twenty Emperors. Consequently, in the expression “alter ab undecimo,” we must consider *undecimus*, as the first term, and *alter ab undecimo*, as the second, so that the year is the twelfth, and not the thirteenth. Servius says, that, if *unus ab undecimo* means the twelfth, *alter ab undecimo* must denote the thirteenth. Hypothetically this is true, and here the question hinges. If an example of *unus, or primus, ab undecimo*, can be produced, we should concur with him, in asserting, that *alter ab undecimo* must express one more than *unus, or primus, ab undecimo*. We find such examples as “annus primus ab honorum perfunctione.” *Cic. 3 de Orat.* But here the terms are unlike; and the *perfunctio honorum* cannot be regarded, as a part of the period. If *undecimus* then be admitted,

* See N. Edinburgh Review, No. VI.

according to general usage, as the first term, and no example be found analogous to *unus*, or *primus ab undecimo*, *alter ab undecimo* must express the second term, and denote the twelfth year.

Alius, it is to be observed, means “another,” indefinitely, and is applied to one of a plurality. *Alter* though sometimes used for *alius*, strictly denotes “the other,” or “the second of two.” And, in investigating its true import, this circumstance particularly demands attention, that it never denotes “the first,” generally, but “the first of two,” and never even “the first of two,” unless followed by another *alter*, as *alter dixit*, *alter negavit*. When it denotes “one of two,” no distinction of order is implied, as *alter oculorum*, *altera manuum*, “one of the eyes,” “one of the hands.” In every other case *alter* denotes “the second.” When, therefore, we say, *Vigesimus et alter*,—*alter* cannot possibly mean “the first,” because it never denotes the first of any number whatever, but “the first of two,” and never “the first of two,” unless followed by another *alter*. Should it be said, that *Vigesimo et altero anno*, may mean, “In the twentieth, and another,” that is, “the first year,” it may be answered, that here, it would seem, lies the radical error.—*Alter* does not mean “another,” but “the other of two,” or “the second.” And though we sometimes find it used for *alius*, and though in such expressions as “*Primus, alter, tertius*,” (*Cic.*) we may say, “A first,” “another,” “a third,” it is to be remembered, that from this occasional indiscriminate

use of any two terms, we are not justified in concluding, that the terms are equivalent in all cases, or strictly synonymous. The proper meaning of “*Primus, alter, tertius,*” is “The first,” “the other,” or “The first,” “the second,” “the third,” or “A first,” “a second,” “a third.” If *alter* meant “another,” it would be allowable to say, “*Primus, secundus, tertius, alter;*” but no such phraseology, as far as I know, occurs in any classic. It is incumbent, therefore, on those, who contend, that *alter* means “the first,” when joined to an ordinal numeral, to produce some example in which *alter* means the first of any number *above two*, and also an example in which it means *first of any number*, unless when followed by another *alter*. Independently then on the chronological argument deduced from Livy, and that drawn from the passages in Tacitus, the strict import of the term *alter*, as ascertained by classic authority, to denote “one of two,” and its being confined by classic usage to “the latter of two,” or “the second,” unless the term be repeated, clearly evince, that with an ordinal numeral it denotes “the second.”

Before we dismiss this subject it may be useful to observe, that *alter* is not confined to “one individual of two,” but often denotes one class, or assemblage, of individuals, as opposed to another; thus, “*Quippe imperio alteri aucti; alteri ditionis alienæ facti.*” *Liv.* i. 25, where the former refers to the Romans, and the latter to the Albans. Thus also Cicero, “*Ad Brutum*

nostrum hos libros alteros quinque mittamus," where "these five," constituting one set, are opposed to another set.

Quo is elegantly joined with a comparative instead of *ut*, to express the effect, or purpose, thus, "Assist me, that it may be done the more easily," *Adjuta me, quo id fiat facilius*. "In order to render the matter more wonderful," *Quo rem mirabiliorem faceret*. In such examples *Quo* is properly the ablative of the pronoun, and may be considered, as denoting the measure of excess, as in the expressions, *Eo melior, Tanto sapientior, Quo diligentior es, eo doctior evades*.

EXERCISE.

A stag, blind of one eye, was feeding on the seashore. In order more effectually to provide for his safety, fearing no danger from the sea, he always turned the whole eye towards the land. A ship accidentally sailing past, the sailors spied him, and one of them, aiming an arrow at him, killed him. Finding himself mortally wounded, he exclaimed, "Ah, wretch, what an error have I committed! How has the event disappointed my expectation! I feared the land, from which no harm has happened to me, and trusted to the sea, whence death has come upon me." The fable teaches us, that those things, which we consider as useful and profitable, frequently bring upon us calamity and sorrow.

OBSERVATIONS.

QUIVIS.

QUILIBET.

QUISQUAM.

QUISPIAM.

ULLUS.

Fronto's rule for the distinction of these words, is correct as far as it extends; but it is not sufficiently comprehensive. “*Quisquam, Quispiam, et Ullus* aut negant, aut interrogant; *Quivis, Quilibet*, semper affirmant.” (*Fronto*.) The three first are used in the following cases.

1st. After negative words, and the preposition *sine*, which has, in fact, a negative import. “*Nosstrarum numquam vidit quisquam.*” *Ter. Eun.* iv. 4. 11, “Never did any one of our people see him.” “*Omnes certatim de mea salute sine ulla varietate dixerunt.*” *Cic. pro Sext.*

2dly. In interrogative clauses, as, “*Est quispiam, qui, cum hoc cognoverit, suspicari possit?*” *Cic. pro Cluent.* “*An hoc dubitavit quisquam omnium, quin is venalem in Sicilia jurisdictionem habuerit.*” *Cic. in Verr.*

3dly. In conditional clauses, as, “*Si quisquam fuit unquam—ego profecto is sum.*” *Cic. Att.* xv. 4. “*Si potuisset illinc ullo modo evadere.*” *Cic. pro Ligar.*

4thly. After comparatives, as, “*Tetrior hic tyrannus Syracusis fuit, quam quisquam superiorum.*” *Cic. in Verr.* “*Nisi vos fortiores cognoscerem, quam quenquam virum.*” *Cic.*

Quivis and *Quilibet* are used,

1st. In affirmative clauses, as, “Id *quivis* perspicere possit.” *Cic. pro Quint.* “Any man may discern that.” *Quamlibet* partem legere possum, “I can read any part,” that is, “any part you please.”

2dly. They are used like *Quisquam* in conditional clauses, when the word *any* is emphatical; and they are then elegantly joined with *unus*, as, “Si tu solus, aut *quivis unus* in me impetum fecisset.” *Cic. pro Cecinn.*

3dly. After a negative, when the word *any* is synonymous with *every*, that is, when the negation is not wholly, but partially exclusive, as “Non temere a me *quivis* ferret idem.” *Hor. Ep. ii. 2. 13.* “Not every man,” “Not any man you please.”—“Non quisquam,” would mean, “Not any man,” or “No man.”—“Tantum detraxit, quantum non *quivis unus.*” *Cic. in Brut.*

These distinctions are observed by prose writers, and very rarely neglected by the poets.

CONSULERE.

Consulo te means, “I consult you,” or “I ask your advice.” *Consulo tibi*, “I provide for your interest,” “I consult your good.” *Consulo boni*, “I take it in good part.” *Bonum judico.* In the following passage, the verb occurs in the two first acceptations. “Consuli quidem te a Cæsare scribis; sed ego tibi ab illo consuli mallet.” *Cic. Ep. Fam. vii. 11.* “You inform me, that Cæsar consults you;

I would rather, that he consulted your interest." It should be observed, that, though the verb governs the accusative, when it denotes "to consult," or "take advice," it governs the dative, when the verb "to consult" is used figuratively, and has not a person, but a thing, for its object; thus, "Perterritus miles timori magis, quam religioni, consulere consuerit." *Cæs. B. C. cap. 67.* "Consulted their fears, more than the obligation of their oaths," i. e. "they were governed by their fears." Schorus cautions his readers against using *Consulo tibi*, for "I give you advice," and observes, that neither Cicero, nor any of the ancient classics, used this expression. "Admonere hoc loco volui imperitiores, ne *Consulo tibi* pro *Suadeo tibi*, aut *Auctor sum tibi*, quemadmodum solent, deinceps dicant; significat enim, *Consulo tibi*, aut *rebus, salutis, gloriæ, &c. tuis consulo*, longe aliud, ac vulgus putat, nimirum *consilio, opera, studio alicui aut rebus alicujus adesse et juvare.*"—"Nunc vero nihil pene tam tritum est quam."—" *Consulo tibi, ut abeas.*" " *Quid mihi consulis,*" cum Latini dixerint, " *Ego tibi suadeo, Auctor sum.*" (*Verw. Thes. de Phras. Schor. Auct.*)

SANITAS.

VALETUDO.

Sanitas is a generic term, signifying "soundness," applicable to body or mind, but chiefly to the former—as, "Petere sanitatem ægri." *Quint. ii. 17.* "Animi sanitas." *Cic. 3 Tusc. Quæst. 9.* When applied to the former, it always denotes "good health,"

as, “Si robur corporibus bonum non est, minus sanitas.” *Cic. Valetudo* means “health,” whether good or bad, as “Firmare valetudinem.” “To establish good health.” *Tacit. Ann.* iii. 31. “Quod me propter *valetudinem tuam non vidisses.*” *Cic. de Orat.* “On account of your bad health.”

EXERCISE.

Pomponius Atticus, a little before his death, sent for three of his friends, and, leaning on his elbow, thus addressed them: “It is needless for me to relate to you at great length, what care I have employed for preserving my health; for you all know, that I have omitted nothing, which could tend to cure me; now it remains, that I provide for myself. I am determined to give over feeding the distemper; for whatever food I have taken, during these several days, I have by that so prolonged my life, that I have increased my pains, without the hope of recovery; nor can any thing now restore me to health.” He died on the last day of March, in the consulship of Cn. Domitius and C. Socius.

OBSERVATIONS.

INTER.

PER.

Both these prepositions are employed to denote “during,” but not precisely in the same sense. They answer, each of them to the question, When? as “O Chreme, *per tempus advenis.*” *Ter. And.* iv. 4. 44. “You are come in good time.” “*Hæc inter cœnam Tironi dictavi.*” *Cic. ad 2 Frat.* iii. 1. “In time of supper.” When they signify during, *per* only answers to “How long?” denoting the whole of a spe-

cified time ; thus, “ Tenuisti provinciam per decem annos.” *Cic. Ep. Att.* “ During the space of ten years.” Here, as Hill observes, the governed word expresses the length of a space, and not like *inter*, the place it holds, in respect to periods prior and posterior. This distinction is conformable to the original import of the terms, as applied to space, *inter* denoting “ within,” and implying certain limits, *per* denoting “ throughout a given space,” and hence “ throughout a specified time.”

AGERE.

FACERE.

The former is simply “ to act ;” the latter implies also something made, or produced, by the action. There seems to be much the same difference between these two verbs, as between *πρασσειν* and *ποιειν*. Quintilian, in explaining the three divisions of art, distinguishes the *πρακτικη* from the *ποιητικη*, thus, “ Aliæ (artes) in *agendo*, quarum in hoc finis est, et ipso actu perficiuntur, nihilque post actum relinquunt, quæ *πρακτικη* dicitur, qualis est *saltatio* ; aliæ in effectu, quæ operis, quod oculis subjicitur, consummatione finem accipiunt, quam *ποιητικην* appellamus, qualis est *pictura*.” The result of the former terminates with the act itself ; the produce of the latter remains. *Fabulam agere* “ to act a play.” *Fabulam facere* “ to make a play.” When mere action is signified, with no reference to any thing made, or produced, they are used indiscriminately. *Quid faceres ? Quid ageres ?* “ What would you do ?”

The learner ought to observe, that the word *should* after *that* is not always a sign of the future of the infinitive, but frequently of the present; and that *should have* is often a sign of the preterite of the infinitive, as “It is wonderful, that you *should* covet riches,” *Te divitias appetere mirum est*, that is, “For you to covet riches is wonderful,” where *Te appetere* is strictly the nominative to the verb. “It is shameful (that) he *should have* done so.” *Eum ita fecisse turpe est*, that is, “For him to have done so is a shameful thing.”

It has been already observed, that *qui* is used for *et ille, et hic*. It is also frequently employed in Latin, especially by Cicero, Cæsar, and Livy, to introduce a sentence or clause, where in English we use the demonstrative pronouns simply,—“Since I have explained this to you,”—“*Quod* quoniam tibi exposui.” *Cic. Ep. Fam. i. 9*. “As these things were uncertain.” “*Quæ cum essent incerta.*” *Cic.*

EXERCISE.

An old man, an Athenian, during the Olympic games, was desirous to see the disputing of a prize; but there being no empty seat, he was laughed at and mocked; for he went from place to place, and nobody would give him a seat. But, when he came to the Lacedemonians, not only all the young men rose up to him, but even many grown men made room for him. When the Athenians and other Greeks saw this, and were vehemently applauding their countrymen for acting in this manner, the old man, shaking his grey hairs, and shedding tears, said, “Ah! how much it is to be lamented,

that all the Greeks should know, what is right ; but that the Lacedemonians alone should practise it."

OBSERVATIONS.

CONTROVERSIA.

DISCEPTATIO.

CONTENTIO.

Controversia is "A dispute, or controversy, concerning any questionable, or doubtful, matter." It generally, though not necessarily, implies discordance of opinion, and always denotes contradiction and opposition. "Sine controversia a dîs solus diligere." *Ter. Ph.* v. 6. 16. "Sine controversia." *Cic. pro Rosc. Com.* that is, "Without dispute," implying, that the fact could not be questioned. As a forensic term it is confined by Cicero to points in civil law, or matters relating to property. (See *Cic. 2. de Orat.*) "Sine controversia omne argentum redderet." *Plaut. Curc.* v. 2. 69. that is, "Without contesting the matter," or "without litigation."

Disceptatio means "A discussion," or "debating concerning a matter of controversy (*de controversia*) with a view to a decision."—"Cum esset controversia nulla facti, juris tamen disceptationem esse voluit." *Cic. pro Mil.* "Though there was no controversy, or dispute, in regard to the fact, yet he wished that the point of right should be debated." It is generally supposed to consist in argument ; thus, "Duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum per vim." *Cic.* It may be observed, however, that *Disceptare*, whence it is derived, frequently denotes, by

metaphor, “To dispute,” or “To bring the question to issue by force;” thus, “Dolebam pilis et gladiis, non consiliis, de jure publico *disceptari*.” *Cic. Ep. vi. 1.*

Contentio means simply, “A striving together.” Its primary idea is a strenuous exertion of faculty, corporeal or mental; thus, “In omnibus officiis persequendis, animi adhibenda est contentio.” *Cic. Fam. Ep. viii. 9.* Here it is synonymous with “Intentio,” as used by Cicero in similar cases. It implies, secondarily, that this exertion is either with, or against, others, for some common object. “Permulta vehementissima contentione animi ingenii et virium ab eo dicta esse, constabat.” *Cic. 3 de Orat. v.* “Summa dissensio est, sed *contentio* dispar.” *Cic. Ep. i. 7.* “The contest, from the inequality of the strength exerted, is unequal.”—“Quum ne contentionis quidem minimæ res fuerit.” *Cic. Fam. Ep. viii. 9.* “An affair not occasioning even the least struggle.” It is distinguished from “Disceptatio,” by implying a strong exertion of our faculties, whether by argument, or by force—while “Disceptatio” is, I believe, entirely confined to argumentative discussion. It is distinguished from “Controversia” by these two particulars: 1st. “Controversia” implies a question of right and wrong; the subject of “Contentio” may be any matter whatever. 2dly. “Controversia” does not necessarily imply vehemence, heat, or animated exertion—“Contentio” always does. 3dly. As we may say, *Contendere cum re vel cum homine*, so we may say, *Con-*

tentio *cum re vel cum homine* ; but *Controversia aut Disceptatio cum homine tantum de re*.

It may be observed also, that “Contentio” is nearly allied to “Certamen,” “A trial for the superiority,” “A contest for the victory ;” and hence “Certamen” is sometimes used for “Contentio,” as “Diu magnum inter mortales *certamen* fuit, vine corporis, an virtute animi, res militaris magis procederet.” *Sall. B. C. i.* In the dispute between Xerxes and Artamenes, respecting their right to the crown, Justin (lib. ii. cap. 10.) says, “Controversiam Xerxes referebat non de ordine, sed de nascendi felicitate.” Here “controversia” implies “the question of right.” He adds, “Hoc certamen ad patrum deferunt,”—“This contest for pre-eminence or superiority.”—“Hanc contentionem,” would have implied very nearly the same idea, but would denote a greater degree of vehemence. Justin, in a similar passage, employs *Contentio*, “Inter Scythas et Ægyptios diu *contentio* de generis vetustate fuerit.” Lib. i. cap. 2.

EXERCISE.

Epaminondas was, without dispute, the chief man, not only among the Thebans, but also among all the Greeks of his own time. Before the Thebans employed him as their general, they performed no memorable action ; and, after his death, were remarkable only for the disasters, which they suffered. How bravely, and how willingly, he laid down his life for his country, the following circumstances sufficiently bear witness. When he was, with his army

drawn up in battle order, going to attack Mantinea, a city of Arcadia, the Lacedemonians, who were intent on his destruction, assailed him singly; nor did they desist until they saw him fall.

OBSERVATIONS.

SENTIRE.

Sentire signifies “To perceive by any one of the senses,” therefore, “To see,” “To hear,” “To smell,” “To touch,” “To taste;” thus, *Sentire dolorem*, “To feel pain.”—“*Meæ istuc scapulæ sentiunt.*” *Plaut. Poen.* i. 1. 25. “My shoulder-bones feel that.” *Sentire clamorem*, “To hear a noise.” “*Sentio sonitum.*” *Plaut. Curc.* i. 2. 69. “I hear a sound.” “*Qui quodam odore suspicionis sensisset.*” *Cic. pro Cluent.* “Had smelled,” or “had perceived by smell,” (metaphorically). “*Ut nudari latera senserunt.*” *Liv.* i. 27. “When they perceived,” or “saw.” *Sentire amarum*, “To perceive,” or “taste, it bitter.” “*Nam scelere in tanto, ne quæras et dubites, an Prima voluptatem gula senserit.*” *Juv. Sat.* xv. 90. His mouth first tasted the pleasure.

Sentire, though properly applicable to the external senses, is frequently used to denote “a thought of the mind,” “a perception of the intellect.” “*Te-cum sentio.*” *Plaut. Pseud.* iv. 2. 3. “I think with you,” “*Sentio.*” *Ter. Eun.* iii. 1. 48. “I comprehend you.” *Censere* denotes “to think,” “to have a

fixed opinion" and sometimes "to express that opinion," and hence "to vote." "Quid senserim, quidque censuerim." *Cic. Brut. Ep.* 15.

The reader should observe, that *If*, when synonymous with *Whether*, should be rendered by *Num*, *An*, *Utrum*, or the enclitic conjunction *Ne*; as "He asked, if all was well," "Quæsivit, satin', salvæ res essent."—"I know not, if he will do it," "Nescio, an facturus sit." Plautus and Terence, sometimes, use *Si*, as "Expecto, si tuum officium scias." *Plaut. Pæn. Prol.* 12. Livy, in one or two passages, uses the same particle; but the suspensive conjunctions are much to be preferred. In the following passage, the distinction is clearly marked, and the necessity of attending to it obvious, if perspicuity be consulted. "Cum enim quærimus, si possint celare, quid facturi sint, non quærimus possintne celare." *Cic. Off.* iii. 9.

SCUTUM.

CLYPEUS.

PARMA.


PELTA.

ANCILE.

Scutum is a generic name for any kind of shield, and also a name for a particular sort of shield. The *Scutum*, strictly so called, was of an oblong form, and externally convex. It was made of wood, generally fig-tree, or willow. These, indeed, seem to have been the materials, of which shields in general were made among all nations, in the earliest ages. (See *Lipsius*, vol. 3. lib. iii. dial. 2.) The *Parma*

was round, three feet in diameter, as described by Polybius ; and, according to Suidas, was made chiefly of leather. The *Clypeus* was of the same form with the *Parma*, round, and somewhat convex ; but was made of brass—"Ardentes clypeos, atque æra micantia cerno." *Virg. Æn.* lib. ii. The eye of Polyphemus is described by Virgil, as round, like the *Clypeus*, "Argolici clypei aut Phœbeæ lampadis instar." *Æn.* iii. 637. *Pelta* is described by Suidas, and also by the Scholiast on Thucydides, as a quadrangular, or four-cornered, shield, somewhat resembling the *Scutum*. Plutarch, in his Life of Numa, describes it as round. Some have believed it to have been of the shape of a crescent, or of a half-moon ; and, in support of their opinion, quote "Ducit Amazonidum lunatis agmina peltis." *Virg. Æn.* and from Seneca, "Lunata latus protecta pelta."—Lipsius, notwithstanding these authorities, maintains, that the *Pelta* was round, and called *Lunata*, from its containing two representations of a half-moon, and that this is evinced by ancient stones and monuments, on which the *Pelta* is sculptured. Pliny represents the *pelta* to be the same with *parma*. Nepos distinguishes them, "Ille *peltam* pro *parma* fecit." *In vit. Iphic.* The probability seems to be, that they were the same in shape, but that the *pelta* was the smaller of the two. The *Ancilia* were made of brass, and are described by Plutarch in his Life of

Numa. The four following representations have been given of it ;—the last is approved by Lipsius :



The reader, if desirous of further information on this subject, may consult *Guther de jure Pontif. Rosin. Antiq. Rom. Burm. ad Fast. Ov. Ald. Man. Quæst. Lips. de Mil. Rom. and Jo. Cam. Problemata.*

EXERCISE.

When his friends had carried him to the camp, he remained for some time senseless ; but coming to himself, and feeling that he had received a mortal wound, he asked the by-standers, if his shield was safe. When, with tears, they assured him that it was safe, he expressed a desire to see it. The shield, therefore, was brought to him ; and he kissed it, as having been the companion of his labours and his glory. He asked then, if the enemy were conquered ; and they answered, “ Yes.”—“ It is well,” said he, “ I have lived long enough, for I die unconquered.” He then ordered the spear to be extracted from the wound, and he instantly expired.

OBSERVATIONS.

In English, every male animal is considered to be of the masculine, every female animal of the feminine, and every thing without life of the neuter gender. In Latin, the gender of nouns is generally determined by

their termination—thus, *Penna*, “A pen,” in Latin is feminine, in English neuter. Nouns, which are sometimes masculine, and sometimes feminine, as the sense may require, are called common, as *Hic* aut *Hæc parens*, “A father,” or “Mother.”—If either masculine or feminine, independently on the sense, and at the will of the author, they are called “Doubtful,” as *Hic* aut *hæc anguis*, “A snake.” When under one gender, a noun denotes either sex, it is called *Epicene*—as, *Hæc aquila*, “An eagle,” either male or female. When it is necessary to distinguish in doubtful nouns, whether the male or female is implied, the word *Mas* for the male, or *Femina* for the female is added—thus, “He found a bitch sitting beside the infant,” “*Invenit canem feminam juxta infantem sedentem.*” *Just.* i. 4.

In English, when we speak of animals in the species, that is, without regard to the sex, we assign them either to the masculine, or feminine gender, according, as it would seem, to the characteristic properties of the animal itself. Thus, in speaking of the horse as a species, we always say, *He*; in the same manner we consider an elephant, a lion, a tiger, a fox, to be of the masculine gender. On the contrary, when we speak of a hare, or a cat, if their sex is not known, or not regarded, we always assign them to the feminine gender—thus, “A cat, as *she* beholds the light, draws the ball of her eye small and long.” It is to be observed also, that, in speaking of animals, especially those of inferior size, we frequently con-

sider them as devoid of sex. “The mouse is an animal, timid in *its* nature, and quick in all *its* motions.”

Now, in this respect, the idiom of the English, and that of the Latin language, are very different. In Latin, *Felis*, for example, is always considered as feminine—it is never spoken of as neuter; so also, *Mus*, “A mouse,” *Apis*, “A bee,” *Vespa*, “A wasp,” *Pulex*, “A flea,” and many others, are never considered, as they are in our language, to be of the neuter gender. We say, in English, “The spider had been his companion, and he was unwilling to hurt *it* ;” in Latin, *Aranea fuerat socia, et eam lædere noluit*. In Latin, also, as we have remarked, the gender of the names of animals depends generally on their termination, and whether the animal be spoken of, as an individual, or a species, it still retains the same gender. The scholar, therefore, should be careful to attend to the gender of the Latin term, lest the difference of idiom should lead him into error.—Thus, if we say, “The fox saw the lion, and *he* was terrified,” where *the fox*, regarded as a species, is considered as masculine, we render it, in Latin, *Vulpes leonem vidit, et (illa) territa est*.

The auxiliary verb, in English, is frequently omitted, as “Wait, till he return,” *Mane, donec redierit*, “till he shall return,” or strictly, “till he shall have returned.”

EXERCISE.

A hungry fox, seeing some bread and meat, which had been left by shepherds, in the hollow of a tree, went in and ate them; but his belly being swelled, and he not being able to get out, he began to groan, and lament his condition. Another fox, that chanced to be passing by, hearing his groans, came up, and asked him the cause. Having learned, what had happened, he said, “ You must remain there, till you become such, as you were when you entered: and then you will easily get out.” The fable teaches us, that time removes difficulties.

OBSERVATIONS.

FATIGATUS.

FESSUS.

These words are thus distinguished by Servius, “ *Fatigatum* corpore dicimus; *fessum* quoque animo, quum tamen *fatigatum* de animo etiam dicitur.”—The following is the distinction of Noltenius, “ *Fatigatus* proprie is dicitur, qui vexatione aut molestia aliqua ad corporis lassitudinem est deductus, ut qui tempestate jactatus, aut curru equove duriter vectus. *Fessus* est, qui labore, onere, morbo, aut angore, deficit. Itaque plus est *fessus* quam *fatigatus*.” *Nolt. Lex. Ant.* When the body is fatigued, or the strength exhausted by labour, exercise, or trouble, we use *fatigatus*; but it is seldom or never employed to denote that weariness of spirit, or sinking of mind, which is occasioned by care, vexation, or affliction. *Fessus* is applied to both; and is not only more generic in point of signification, but also implies a greater de-

gree of fatigue and debility.—“ *Animus curis et laboribus fatigatus*,” *Sall. Orat. 2 ad Cæs.* “ A mind harassed with cares and labours.” *Animus curis fessus*, would imply a mind exhausted, or worn out, with cares. *Fessus*, therefore, rises above *fatigatus* both in kind and in degree.

ANGOR.

MÆROR.

DOLOR.

LUCTUS.

ÆRUMNA.

“ *Ægritudini*,” says Cicero, “ *subjiciuntur* angor, mæror, dolor, luctus, ærumna, afflictatio. *Angor* est ægritudo premens; *Mæror* ægritudo flebilis; *Ærumna* ægritudo laboriosa; *Dolor* ægritudo crucians; *Afflictatio* ægritudo cum vexatione corporis; *Luctus* ægritudo ex ejus, qui carus fuit, interitu.” *Cic. Tusc. Quæst. iv.*

In respect to the generic term *Ægritudo*, Cellarius observes, that it is improperly applied to the body, and was never so used, till the Latin language began to decline.—(See *Lex. Antib.*)

He would have said more correctly, that it was very rarely employed to denote, “ Disease of body,” till the Latin language began to decline; and in the last edition of his “ *Liber Antibarbarus*,” and in his “ *Curæ Posteriores*,” he has, we believe, so expressed himself. “ *Sed proprie, ut ægrotatio in corpore, sic ægritudo in animo nomen habet, non se junctum a dolore.*” *Cic. Tusc. Quæst. lib. iii.* But though *ægrotatio* be properly a diseased affection of the body, it is often metaphorically applied to the mind.—Cicero

says, “ Quomodo autem in corpore morbus, *ægro-
tatio* et vitium, sic in animo.” *Tusc. Quæst.* lib. iv. And accordingly from this analogy, he applies it to the mind—thus, “ Definiunt autem animi *ægrota-
tionem*, opiniationem vehementem de re non expe-
tenda, tanquam valde expetenda sit.” *Ib.* In the decline of the Latin language, as has been just now remarked, *Ægritudo*, which we have the authority of Cicero for saying, belongs properly to the mind, was frequently employed to express sickness, or disease of body—thus, Columella, in treating of the diseases of goats, says, “ Quod si ea res *ægritudinem* non de-
pellit ;” and Pliny, “ Augurium ex homine ipso non timendi mortem in ægritudine, quam diu oculorum pupillæ imaginem reddant.” Lib. xxviii. cap. 6.

Me tædet, “ I am weary,” “ I am tired of.”—*Fatigatus sum*, “ I am wearied,” or “ fatigued.”

EXERCISE.

An old man, having cut some sticks in a wood, was carrying them home. Having travelled a considerable way, and being fatigued, he laid down the sticks, and began to think of the evils of his condition, old age, weakness, and poverty. At last, weary of life, he called on death to come, and release him from his toils. Death heard the old man's prayer, and instantly made his appearance, asking him, at the same time, what he wanted. The old man, much frightened, replied, “ I called you, only to lift up my burden, and put it on my back.” The fable shews, that even in the worst circumstances almost all men prefer life to death.

OBSERVATIONS.

Nihil is elegantly used for *nullus*, as, “No money,” *Nihil pecuniæ*. “No delay,” *Nihil moræ*. “No cause,” *Nihil causæ*.

SINERE.

PATI.

PERMITTERE.

Pati, in its proper and largest acceptation, is opposed to *Agere*, and signifies, “To suffer,” or “To be acted upon.” Ulpian accordingly explains it thus, *Negotium patitur is, cui alius negotium facit*. Hence it is sometimes applied to a person, who is acted upon by good, as well as by evil, (*qui bono, vel malo afficitur*,) thus, “Fortiter malum qui *patitur*, idem post *patitur* bonum.” *Plaut. As. ii. 2. 58*. Its usual signification, however, is, “To suffer,” “To endure,” as, “Egon’ hæc patiar?” *Plaut. Asin. iv. 2. 1*. “Shall I endure these things?”—“Patiar quod lubet.” *Plaut. Epid. i. 2. 4.*, “I will suffer,” or, “submit to, what you please.”

Permittere is “To suffer,” “To permit,” or “Give leave.” Auctor ad Her. defines *Permissio* to be “Rem tradere, et alicujus voluntati concedere.” *Auct. ad Her. lib. iv.* “Ludere quæ vellem calamo permisit agresti.” *Virg. Ecl. 1*, “Permitted,” or “gave me leave to play.”—“Lex jubet, aut *permittit*, aut vetat.” *Cic. de Inv.* “The law orders,” or “grants leave,” or “forbids.”

Sinere is “To suffer,” or “To let alone.” In

respect to *Permittere*, it is merely negative, the one implying that permission is actually given, and the other, that no prohibition, or obstruction, is interposed; thus, “Sine, sine cadere me,” *Plaut. Most.* i. 4. 15, that is, “Suffer, or leave, me to fall,” “Do not prevent me.” Letting go her hold of him, she answers, “Sino,” “I leave you to yourself, and suffer you to fall.”—“Sine meo nunc me vivere modo.” *Ter. And.* i. 1. 126, “Leave me to live;” “Don’t hinder me from living in my own way.” The three verbs, therefore, may be thus distinguished: *Patior*, “non ago” vel potius, “aliquid mihi fit;” *Sino*, “non prohibeo;” *Permitto*, “potestatem do.” These are strictly the significations of the verbs *Pati*, *Sinere*, *Permittere*.

It is to be observed, however, that “*Pati*” (*Non agere*) is often naturally enough used for “*Sinere*,” or “*Non prohibere*,” and also for “*Permittere*,” or “*Licentiam, vel potestatem, dare*;” thus, “*Fila trium patiuntur atra.*” *Hor.* “*Ætas patitur.*” *Virg. G.* iii. 60. Ovid says, “*Dum vires, annique sinunt.*” *Art. Am.* ii. 69. “*Nec spernere leges sinebant.*” *Hor. Carm.* ii. 15. 18. In these examples, the three verbs may be considered as synonymous with “*Potestatem dare*,” or with “*Non prohibere*,” there being scarcely a shade of difference. The contrary sentiment is expressed by *Prohibere*, in the following passage, “*Dum ætas, metus, magister prohibebant.*” *Ter. And.* i. 1. 27.

EXERCISE.

A lady of illustrious birth being condemned for a capital crime, the pretor delivered her to the triumvir to be put to death in prison. The jailor, moved with compassion, did not immediately strangle her, according to the sentence, but wished, rather, that she should die of hunger. He, therefore, suffered no victuals to be given her : nor did he allow her daughter, whom he permitted to visit her, to enter the jail, until he had carefully searched her. After several days had passed, and she still lived, the keeper, by narrowly watching the daughter, discovered, that she supported her mother, by giving her suck. This circumstance being communicated to the judges, her mother received a pardon, as a reward of her daughter's singular affection.

OBSERVATIONS.

When there are two or more substantives of different genders, subjects of a common attributive, and expressing persons and things, the adjective and relative are generally put in the neuter gender, but sometimes agree with the nearest substantive.—“*Divitiæ, decus, gloria in oculis sita sunt.*” *Sall. B. C. cap. 21.* “*Domus, uxor, liberi inventi invito patre.*” *Ter. And. v. 3. 20.* When the substantives express things only, and are of one and the same gender, the adjective and relative sometimes take that gender, though more commonly the neuter. “*Misericordia in eo ac perfidia pari jure dilectæ.*” *Just.* “*Ex summa lætitia atque lascivia, quæ diuturna quies pepererat.*” *Sall. B. C. cap. 32.*

ADIMERE.

AUFERRE.

Aufert, *qui dedit*—Adimit, *imperio coactus*. *Itaque auferre possumus, adimere jubemur* (Fronto. Popma). This distinction, Noltenius observes, is not uniformly attended to; nor is it, we apprehend, quite correct. *Auferre*, according to Dumesnil, is “to carry away,” as from a place, and *Adimere*, “to take away,” or “deprive of.” In this explanation, the radical distinction between these verbs is correctly exhibited.

Auferre means, generally, “To carry off,” and in this literal sense Plautus has almost uniformly used it. In its several varieties of signification, this idea is always preserved; thus, “*Auferre aurum*,” *Ter.* “To carry off the gold.”—“*Auferre laudem*,” *Cic.* “*Auferre præmium*,” *Plaut.* “*Auferre victoriam*,” *Liv.* “*Auferre responsum*,” *Cic.* “*Paucos dies auferre*,” “To carry off,” “to obtain,” or “to gain,” *praise, reward, victory, &c.* “*Ne te auferant aliorum consilia*,” *Cic. 2 Fam. Ep. 7*, “Let not the counsels of others mislead you,” or “carry you away.”

Even when the verb is found bearing contrary significations, the radical idea is still retained, serving as the foundation of two opposite meanings. Thus, when Horace says, “*Abstulit clarum cita mors Achillem*,” *Car. ii. 16. 29*; the meaning is, “Carried off,” or “cut off;”—and when Florus says, “*Abstulit virtus parricidam*,” *lib. i. cap. 3*, he means, “Courage

carried off," or "saved the life of, the parricide." It is, therefore, by inference only, or indirectly, that the verb *Auferre* signifies "to take away," or "deprive of."

"Adimere," which is of the same import nearly with "Demere," signifies "To take away," or "to deprive of," and is opposed to "Addere," as

" Qui sæpe propter invidiam adimunt diviti,
Aut propter misericordiam addunt pauperi."

Ter. Ph. ii. 1. 47.

" Aliquid additur aut demitur." *Cic. 4 Ac. Quæs.*—
" Adimam bona." *Hor. Ep. i. 16. 7.* " I will take away," or "deprive you of, your property,"—" Adimat jus." *Id. Sat. ii. 3. 217.* " Take away the right," or "deprive of the right."

These examples sufficiently evince the inaccuracy of Popma's, and Fronto's explanation. The question then is, what is their exact difference. The distinction given by Dumesnil explains the radical meaning, but is not sufficiently precise, to enable the scholar to determine, when the one verb, and when the other should be employed. It would appear, that the essential distinction between these two verbs, as signifying to "Take from," is this, that *Auferre* does not exclude the consent of the person, from whom the thing is taken, or his power to retain it; and that *Adimere* implies, that he has no choice, the person, or thing, "taking away," acting irresistibly, or authoritatively. Hence we find, that when there is implied the idea of

deprivation by the exercise of authority or power, *Adimere* is generally used. Thus, when Val. Maximus informs us, that the senate, in the exercise of its authority, and by way of punishment, deprived Claudius of his liberty, he says, “*Libertatem ademit*,” lib. vi. 3. 3. When Livy acquaints us, that Ancus, after subduing the Veientes, took from them the Mæscan wood, he says, “*Silva Mæscia adempta*.” i. 33. Thus also, “*Collatia et quicquid circa Collatiam agri erat, Sabinis ademptum*.” *Liv.* i. 38. “*Novella hæc oppida Romanis ademit*.” *Id.* ii. 39. In the three last examples are implied the diminution of strength on one side, and an equal accession on the other, effected by the exertion of authority or power. The idea is fully expressed in the following passage, “*Ademptum Medis imperium primus in Persidem intulit*.” *Curt.* iv. 14.

It has been already observed, that “*Auferre*” does not necessarily either imply, or exclude, the consent of the person, from whom the thing is taken, and that “*Adimere*” always denotes, that he is acted upon by necessity, or is compelled to be passive. Hence, “*Auferre*” being a generic term, may in all cases, where obscurity is not created by the use of it, be employed for “*Adimere*;” but not “*Adimere*” for “*Auferre*.” Accordingly, we find them often used indifferently, as in the following examples: “*Fortuna vitam ademit*.” *Val. Max.* i. 8. *Ext.* iii. “*Nisi vitam abstulisset*.” *Id.* viii. 7. *Ext.* vii. “*Nec leves somnos timor, aut cupido sordidus, aufert*.” *Hor. Carm.* ii. 16. 5. “*Nec*

tibi somnos *adimunt*." *Id. Carm. i. 25. 3.* "Dat somnos, *adimitque*." *Virg. Æn. iv. 244.* "Prospectum nubes *abstulerat*." *Curt. iv. 15.* "Prospectum *ademerat* nubes." *Id. v. 13. 12.* And when Horace says, "Multa *ferunt* anni venientes commoda secum, Multa recedentes *adimunt*." *De Art. Poët. 175.* the term *Auferunt* would have been equally suitable, this being, as I conceive, the only difference, that *Adimunt* implies, that we are necessarily, or without our consent, deprived of many advantages by "retiring (declining) years," having no power to retain these advantages, and that *Auferunt*, as here opposed to *Ferunt*, would signify, that while "coming (rising) years," bring with them many advantages, so "retiring years" carry many away with them, or deprive us of many. It would not, however, express the act of taking away, as irresistible on our part, or done without our consent.

EXERCISE.

Demetrius Poliorcetes had taken the city Megara. Upon his asking Stilpo, the philosopher, if he had lost any thing, the other answered, "I have lost nothing; for all my property is still mine." Yet his patrimony had been plundered, his sons carried off, and his country taken. He affirmed, notwithstanding, that he had suffered no loss; for that he still possessed true wealth, namely, learning and virtue, which, the enemy, he said, could not take from him. "The things, of which the soldiers have plundered me," said the philosopher, "I never regarded as my own." No man

should call that his, over which fortune possesses any power : it may be his to-day, and to-morrow in the possession of another.

OBSERVATIONS.

SEQUI.

COMITARI.

Sequi denotes “to follow,” or “go after.” *Comitari*, “to accompany,” or “to go along with.”—“*Nèque enim attinet repugnare naturæ, nec quicquam sequi, quod assequi non queas.*” *Cic. Off.* i. 10. “*Nullò latus comitante.*” *Sen. Hipp.* v. 414.

The dative is frequently used acquisitively after a verb, instead of the genitive, and with great elegance. “They threw themselves at Cæsar’s feet,” “*Se ad pedes Cæsari projecerunt.*” *Cæs. B. G.* for “*Pedes Cæsaris.*” “*Jam admodum mitigati animi raptis erant.*” *Liv.* i. 10. It is used likewise instead of the possessive adjective, thus, instead of saying, “It came into my mind,” *Meam in mentem venit*, we say, more elegantly, *Mihi in mentem venit*, “He delivered it into my hand,” *Mihi in manum tradidit*, better than *Meam in manum*.

CAPTIVUS.

VINCTUS.

Captivus means “A prisoner,” “A captive in war,” or generally, “One taken and reduced under the dominion of another.” *Vinctus*, “A prisoner,” “A person bound,” as “one in jail.”—“*Vincti solu-*

tique se undique in publicum proripiunt." *Liv.* lib. ii. cap. 23. "Ne quis Romanum vinctum teneret." *Liv.* lib. ii. cap. 24. Here the word is applied to a prisoner for debt.

EXERCISE.

Alexander the Great, having conquered Darius at Issus, sent some of his people to acquaint Darius's mother and his wife, whom he had taken prisoners, that he was coming to see them. Soon after he sent the message, he entered their tent, accompanied by Hephæstion, who was of the same age with the king, but superior to him in person. Accordingly, the royal captives, thinking that Hephæstion was the king, made their obeisance, after the manner of the Persians. The mother of Darius, being informed of her mistake, threw herself at Alexander's feet, and begged his forgiveness. The monarch, raising her with his hand, courteously replied, "You have made no mistake; for this also is Alexander."

OBSERVATIONS.

ALIQUIS.

QUIDAM.

Aliquis (ex *alius* et *quis*) means indefinitely, "Some one or other," as *Aliquis mihi dixit*, "Some one, or other, told me," implying, "I know not who."—"Certum quam aliquid mavolo," *Plaut. Curc.* ii. 3, "I would rather have something certain, than something, or other," that is, "something uncertain." *Quidam* means, "Some one," "some," or "certain."

Its distinctive office, as opposed to *aliquis*, is to individuate, or discriminate. Hence, it sometimes alludes significantly, and with peculiar emphasis, to a person, or persons, known either to speaker or hearer, or to both. “*Quodam* tempore natus sum, *aliquo* moriar.” “I was born at a certain time; I shall die some time or other,” a determinate period being noted in the former clause, and an indeterminate in the latter. “*Quendam* ex amicis hortatus est, ut in equum suum ascenderet, et fuga se reciperet.” *Curt.* i. 7. *Aliquem* would imply, “some one or other,” indefinitely; *quidam* denotes one singled out. “Est *quidam*, qui illam ait se scire, ubi sit.” *Plaut. Cist.* iv. 2. 69. “There is a certain person (somebody, whom I know) that says, he knows the place, where it is.” “*Quidam* sortiti metuentem sabbata patrem.” *Juv.* xiv. 96. Here *quidam* refers to a known class of persons.

Its office being to individuate, or discriminate, it is often rendered by the English word *one*, “a person,” definitely; while *unus* expresses *one*, numerically. “*Quidam* Octavius.” *Suet.* “One Octavius,” “a person, named Octavius.” *Unus Octavius* might mean “one,” not two or more.

For *aliquis*, we frequently find employed “*Nescio quis*,” “Somebody or other.” “I know not who,” as, “*Nescio quis teneros oculus mihi fascinat agnos.*” *Virg. Ec.* iii. 103. “*Certe nescio quid secreto velle loqui te Aiebas mecum.*” *Hor. Sat.* 1. 9. 67. that is, “*Aiebas te velle loqui aliquid*,” *Nescio quid*. In neither of these sentences is the speaker’s igno-

rance of the subject the predicate, or the principal idea; *quid*, therefore, cannot be considered as indefinite. “I know not, what eye bewitches,” and “I know not, what you said you wanted to talk about,” would convey very different ideas from those expressed in the original, and intended by the speakers. So also, when Phædria says, “Nescio quid absente nobis turbatum est domi.” *Ter. Eun.* iv. 3. 7, he does not mean, “I know not,” or “I cannot tell,” what disturbance has taken place; for this sentiment would be expressed by *turbatum sit*, the principal verb being *Nescio*, and the leading idea, his ignorance of what had happened. But he means to say, “some disturbance or other (*Aliquid, Nescio quid*) has taken place in my absence.” Here the principal verb is *turbatum est*, and the primary idea expressed, is, that a disturbance must have taken place. *Nescio quomodo* is used in the same way, “Nescio quomodo facilius in timore benigni, quam in victoriâ, grati, reperiuntur.” *Cic. Brut. Ep.* 15.

Aliquis denoting “some one or other,” is naturally opposed to *nemo*, “nobody;” and, as the latter term often signifies, not an absolute non-existent, but “a person of no consequence,” so *aliquis* and “somebody,” denote a person of some consideration, however insignificant. “Si vis esse aliquis.” *Juv. Sat.* i. 74. “If you wish to be somebody,” *i. e.* “not nobody.” “Ut tu aliquid tamen esse videare.” *Cic. Div.* “That you may appear to be something.” *Aliquid* is by ellipsis sometimes omitted. “Mos est civitati-

bus ultro ac viritim conferre principibus vel armementorum vel frugum." *Tac. Ger. cap. 15.*

DARE PŒNAS.

SUMERE PŒNAS.

In these, and similar phrases, it should be observed, that the proper meaning of the word *Pœna* is not "punishment," but "atonement;" thus *Dare pœnas*, is "To give satisfaction," "To make atonement," or "To be punished;" as "He was punished by his father." *Patri pœnas dedit*, "He made an atonement to his father." *Sumere pœnas*, is, "To exact atonement," "To take satisfaction," or "To punish." "Sumpsisse laudabor pœnas," *Virg. Æn. ii. 585*, "I shall be praised for having punished," or "for having taken satisfaction."—"Pœnas peteret ab optimo quoque." *Cic. Ep. lib. i. 15.* "Dum pro civibus suis pœnas caperent." *Sall. B. J. cap. 71*, "Should take satisfaction, (for the murder of their countrymen,) or should punish."—The meaning of the expression, "Capere pœnas," in this passage, was evidently mistaken by R. Stephans, when he translated it, "should suffer punishment," supposing that "Caperent" was synonymous with "Subirent." There are one or two passages, in which Cicero uses *dare pœnam* for "to assign," or "to adjudge punishment." "Qui non pœnam confessioni, sed defensionem dedit, is causam interitûs quærendam, non interitum, putavit." *Cic. pro. Mil. cap. 6.*

The reader should observe, that while *Pœna*, "The satisfaction," is put in the accusative, and the

person, to whom the satisfaction is given, or who inflicts the punishment, is put in the dative, both being governed by the verb *Dare*, the crime, or fault, is elegantly put in the genitive, as the regimen of the noun *Pœna*, while the manner is generally expressed in the ablative—thus, “Egregius adolescens immoderatae fortitudinis morte pœnas (*patri*) dedit,” *Sall. B. C.* 56, “Was capitally punished by his father for his excessive courage.”

Audax, “bold,” or “daring,” is generally employed, to denote an excess of the attribute, and is for the most part used in a bad sense. Thus, “O scelestum, atque audacem hominem.” *Ter. Eun.* iv. 4. 41. “Alii petulantes, audaces, protervi.” *Cic. 1 de Fin.* “At etiam minitatur audax.” *Plaut. Rud.* iii. 4. 6. In these examples, the term is used in an unfavourable sense. In the following passage, it modestly implies an excess of the quality, denoting “adventurous.” “Da facilem cursum, atque audacibus annue cœptis.” *Virg. G.* i. 40.

Examples, however, occur, in which it is employed in a good sense, as, “Quæ non deliquit, decet audacem esse, confidenter loqui.” *Plaut. Amph.* ii. 2. 207.

Prehendere, *Apprehendere*, signify “To take,” or “To lay hold of.” *Deducere*, “To take,” or “To conduct.”

It has been observed, that *ambo* signifies *oî duo*, “the two,” and this is its general acceptation. It would seem, however, that its strict and proper meaning is indefinitely, not “the two” but “two taken

together ;” admitting therefore a definitive. “ At-
 tonsæ hæ quidem ambæ usque sunt.” *Plaut. Bacch.*
 v. 2. 6. We may therefore say, *Hi ambo*, to express
 “ these two taken together.” See *Exercise*, p. 22.
 “ Ἀμφω, whence comes *ambo*, and likewise ἀμφοτεροι,
 occasionally admit a definitive. This has been denied
 by some critics and lexicographers. (See Suidas’ Lexi-
 con, and Harris’s *Hermes*, p. 226.) Examples, how-
 ever, of this usage do occur. (See *Stephan. Gr.*
Ling. Thes. Ed. Nov.)

It may serve to obviate a difficulty, which may
 present itself to the young reader, if we here observe,
 that the subject of the passive participle, in examples,
 of the ablative absolute, is not always expressed by a
 noun or pronoun, but sometimes by a clause either
 with an infinitive, or with *ut*, *quod*, or *quis*, thus,
 “ Simul nunciato, regem Artaxiam Armeniis a Ger-
 manico datum.” *Tac. Ann.* ii. 64. Here the latter
 clause expresses the subject of *nunciato*, and supplies
 the place of a substantive in the ablative case ; or the
 expression may be considered, as if *eo* were understood,
 “ it being reported.”

EXERCISE.

Rhacoces, by birth a Mardian, had seven sons, the
 youngest of whom, by name Cartomes, a youth daring beyond
 his years, was daily doing some mischief or other to his
 brothers. When his father had repeatedly admonished him
 to no purpose, the judges, who, by order of the king of Per-
 sia, used to travel through the provinces, for the adminis-

tration of justice, happened to come into that part of the country, where Rhacoces dwelt. Having heard of their arrival, he took his son, and, binding his hands behind his back, dragged him before the judges, and demanded that he should be capitally punished for his contumacy. The judges, amazed at this strange demand, did not pronounce sentence, but took them both to Artaxerxes the king.

OBSERVATIONS.

INDIES.

QUOTIDIE.

Indies, or more properly, *in dies*, is generally used, when any increase, or diminution, for any number of successive days, is implied; as *Indies doctior*—*Indies crudelior*. *Quotidie* denotes, in general, “On every day,” without any reference to the preceding, or subsequent, days. Hence Cicero says, “*Quotidie, vel potius in dies singulos, breviores ad te literas mitto.*” *Cic. ad Att.* *Quotidie* might imply, “I daily send you shorter letters, than I sent you antecedently to this period,” in which case, “*Breviores*” would denote no comparison of the letters one with another, which he then sent, but of his letters then with his letters formerly.—This, however, was not Cicero’s meaning. He therefore mends his expression by the word *Indies*, implying, that his letters were shorter, as they increased in number. This is strictly the distinction between *Indies* and *Quotidie*; but it is not universally observed. “*Hi curatione adhibita levantur in dies: alter valet plus quotidie.*” *Cic.* But though *Quotidie*, as in this example, is sometimes

used for *Indies*, the latter is very rarely indeed used for the former.

FERRE.

PATI.

SUSTINERE.

Vavassor acknowledges a difference between *Pati* and *Ferre*—*Perpeti* and *Perferre*; but at the same time candidly confesses, that he could never ascertain, in what that difference consists. *Verw. Thes. in Vavass.* To determine the distinction between these verbs, it may be necessary to refer to their primitive, or literal signification. *Ferre* means simply, “To carry,” in any way. *Sustinere*, “To bear on one’s head, or shoulders,” “To support, or uphold.” *Pati*, “To be acted upon,” or “To suffer.” After carefully examining a variety of passages, in which the verbs *Pati* and *Ferre* occur, attending strictly, at the same time, to their literal import; it appears to me, that, though they may be frequently used as synonymous, they differ from each other nearly, as the English verbs, “To suffer,” and “to bear,” which we find also may be often used indiscriminately. The difference between these two verbs, as contradistinguished to each other, may be illustrated by one or two examples, which will also serve in a great measure to explain the distinction between *Pati* and *Ferre*, according to our conception, at least, of that distinction.

When it is said, “The young lions do lack, and suffer hunger,” the latter verb evidently expresses simply a state of passion, and alludes entirely to what

they feel. If we substitute the other verb, and say, "Bear hunger," the expression points rather to what they do, than to what they suffer, and implies energy, or the exertion of fortitude. The term denotes vigour, or a sort of reaction in the sufferers. It is said also, "Ought he not to have suffered these things," (Bible) alluding to the passion. Change the verb, and say, "ought he not to have borne these things;" and you convey an idea evidently different. The one implies, that it was ordained that "he should be subjected to that state of suffering," the other, "that he should bear, or support, these evils."

Ferre, in the same manner, seems, agreeably to its active form, to imply something active in the subject of discourse, and *Pati* as contradistinguished to it, to imply a state of mere passion, or suffering. Their difference is much the same, as that which subsists between the expressions *Portare onus*, and *oneri sub-jici*, the former implying, that the person bears, or carries, the burden; and the other merely, that it is laid upon him. Thus we may say, *Onus ei impositum est, et tulit*, "A burden was laid upon him, and he bore it." Thus also, *Injuria ei illata est, et tulit*, may be deemed equivalent to *Injuriam passus est, et tulit*, "He suffered an injury, and bore it," the former expressing simply, what was done to him as passive, and the other what he did, or how he acted. Hence Terence makes Geta say, "Quod fors feret, feremus." *Ph. i. 2. 88*, "What fortune shall bring, or lay upon us, we will carry, or bear." It is presumed, then, that

Ferre essentially implies action, energy, or exertion in the subject of discourse; and that *Pati*, in its strict and primitive signification, denotes merely, "To be acted upon," or "To suffer." "Is in culpa sit," says Cicero, "qui faciat, non qui patiatur injuriam." *De Amic.* Here the latter clause is equivalent to *cui injuria fiat*: and he says, "Quæ (contumeliæ) si tolerabiles erunt, ferendæ sunt." Here *patiendæ*, which would merely imply, that we are necessarily subject to insults, would not express the intended idea, namely, that we ought to bear them.

By an easy and natural conception, the verb *Pati*, from expressing simply a state of passion, or suffering, comes also to denote "submission." The primary idea of being acted upon, without reaction, is still retained, its signification being equivalent to *Non resistere*, or *Non repugnare*. Cicero, indeed, in the following passage, directly opposes *patienter* to *repugnanter*, "Alterum patienter accipere, non repugnanter." *De Am.* This appears to be the meaning of the verb *Pati*, when the same author says, "Patietur, perferet, non succumbet," *Tusc. Quæst.* 2, "He will submit, or not resist," "he will bear the torture to the end," "he will not sink under it." When Terence makes Chremes say, "Pateretur, nam quem ferret, si parentem non ferret suum?" *Heaut.* i. 2. 27, he means, "He should patiently submit to his father's severity (*Non repugnaret*): for whom should he strive to bear, if not his parent?"—"Omitto, quæ perferant, quæque patiantur ambitiosi." *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.*

79, “I omit, what things ambitious men bear and suffer,” that is, “what energy they display in bearing, what patience in suffering.”

Sustinere, in its strict and literal acceptation, signifies “to bear up, as with the shoulders,” “To support;” hence, also, “To withstand.” It is, therefore, more nearly related to *Ferre* than to *Pati*.—“Magnum onus sustines capite, regium insigne; hoc moderate perferendum est.” *Curt. lib. vii. cap. 4*, “You sustain, or support, on your head a great burden, the ensign of royalty; this must be borne, or carried, with moderation.” Here the verb *Pati* is inadmissible. It is literally distinguished from *Ferre* by this circumstance, that while *Ferre* signifies “To bear,” or “carry” in any way—the other denotes, “To support,” “To uphold,” “To bear up against.” In this metaphorical signification, it appears to differ from *Ferre*, by implying not only in general, a weight, or evil of greater magnitude, but also a complete counteraction of the effect, which it is calculated to produce. “*Sustinere* eleganter dicimur rem, ad quam perpetranda non videbamus satis animi aut voluntatis habere potuisse.” *Snakenborg. Ind. in Q. Curt.* The distinction given by Donatus, namely, “*Onera feruntur, supplicia sustinentur*,” is much too confined. It may, perhaps, be correctly expressed thus—“*Patitur, cui aliquid fit, vel qui non repugnat: fert qui onere vel malo quolibet sese non levat; sustinet, qui non succumbit.*” And in the passage quoted from Cicero, on this subject, “*Patietur, perferet, non succumbet,*”

we conceive that *Non succumbet* is equivalent to *sustinebit*—allowing for the weakness of the negative expression. We find Cicero, in another passage, using precisely this phraseology, “*Quid, qui non modo ea futura timet, verum etiam fert, sustinetque præsentia.*” *Tusc. Quæst. lib. v. ad init.*

It may be observed farther, that *Sustinere* is frequently used for *Posse ferre*. “*Nec solus, inquit, bibere sustineo,*” *Curt. lib. vii. cap. 5*, “Nor can I bear to drink alone.” “*Namque Parmenionem, nuper acrius quam vellet increpitum, rursus castigare non sustinebat,*” *Id. lib. iv. cap. 13*, “For he could not bear,” or, rather, “he did not dare to chastise.” “*At non impositos supremis ignibus artus Sustinuit spectare parens.*” *Ov. Met. xiii. 583*. “The parent could not bear to look at the limbs,” that is, “*Spectaculum ferre non potuit.*” See *Liv. lib. i. 26*.

“In the case of,” is generally, before a noun, expressed by *In*, joined to the ablative—as, “In the case of your brother,” *In fratre tuo*. “*Quæ, obsecro te, ista acerbitas est, si idem fiat in te, quod tute in alio feceris?*” *Gell. xx. 1*, “If the same thing be done in your case, which you yourself did in the case of another.”

When we express simple excess indefinitely, we use the comparative only; when we denote the measure, or the cause, of that excess, we use also the definite article in English, and in Latin *eo*, as “Better,” *Melior*.—“The better,” *Eo melior*. This distinction will be farther explained hereafter.

Ferre sententiam et dicere sententiam have been thus distinguished, *Judex fert*, senator *dicit*, *sententiam*. This distinction, however, is not universally observed. “*Quum vero jurato (judice) dicenda sententia sit, meminerit Deum se adhibere testem.*” *Cic. Off. lib. iii.* But we believe, that *ferre sententiam* is not applied to senators.

EXERCISE.

When Rhacoces appeared before the king, he requested, that his son might be punished with death. “Will you, then,” said the monarch, “be able to bear the sight of a dying son?”—“Yes,” said he, “when I cut off the bitter shoots of my lettuces, the mother plant suffers no injury: but, on the contrary, flourishes the more; so, when I shall be freed from this son of mine, matters will go on the better, and I shall live in peace.” Artaxerxes praised him highly, and ordered him to be seated among the judges, saying, that he, who pronounced sentence on his own son with such justice, would doubtless be an impartial judge in the case of others. The king, at the same time, dismissed the son, with a suitable admonition.

OBSERVATIONS.

ÆDES. FANUM. DELUBRUM. TEMPLUM.

Heusinger explains *Ædes*, as in the singular number, denoting the cottage, or habitation, of a private individual, which is wholly exposed to view, when you enter it, and is not divided into chambers: also “any single chamber.” *Vid. Obs. Antibarb. p. 388.* From denoting originally a house, not divided.

into apartments, it came naturally to denote “a temple” or “chamber for divine worship”; and to this latter acceptation it seems almost entirely, if not wholly, confined. Noltenius remarks, that though generally used in the singular number for “a temple,” and very rarely for a house, it is sometimes employed in the latter acceptation, and he quotes, as one example, the following passage from Horace, *Car.* i. 30.

“ O Venus, regina Cnydi Paphique,
 Sperne dilectam Cypron, et vocantis
 Thure te multo Glyceræ decoram
 Transfer in ædem.”

Here the lexicographer appears to have erred in his interpretation of the word *Ædes*. By referring to the passage, and consulting the spirit and intention of the ode, it would seem more probable, that the term in question here denotes “a chapel” or part of the house, dedicated to the worship of the *Lares* and the *Penates*. The two passages, which are adduced from Curtius, Snakenborg considers to be chargeable with false readings; and also the passage, which Alciatus has quoted from Cicero’s Oration for Cluentius. Noltenius asserts other authorities; but, as he does not quote them, we can form no judgment of their number, or their validity. When we reflect, that there is only one example in Cicero, and that one doubtful, that there is none in Livy, Cæsar, Sallust, or Suetonius—that the plural *Ædes* occurs in Plautus more than 250 times, as denoting a house, and

not once as a singular,—we naturally suspect a reading, which violates usage so general, as this appears to be. One circumstance however may be pleaded in its favour, which we shall presently notice.

R. Stephans affirms, that *Ædes* in the singular number *uniformly* means “a temple,” and in the plural, either “a house,” or “temples,” but differs from *templum* in this respect, that *Ædes* is always accompanied with an adjection, as *Ædes Jovis*, *Ædes Vestæ*, *Ædes sacra*. Noltenius more correctly states, in accordance with Valla, that it is *almost universally* used with an adjection, and that we say with propriety, “Fui hodie in templo;” not so correctly “Fui hodie in æde,” but “in æde sacra.” And here, we would remark, that the necessity of this specification for the sake of perspicuity would seem to indicate, that *Ædes* in the singular number may, though very rarely, have been applied to “a house,” otherwise the adjection would have been wholly superfluous. *Ædes*, according to Dumesnil, is a sacred building, raised in honour of a deity, but without the intervention, or the aid, of *augurs*. *Templum*, as contradistinguished to *Ædes*, means “a place” consecrated by *augurs*, and does not necessarily imply, that it was dedicated to any divinity. Thus, the palaces of Hostilius, Pompey, and others, were called *Templa*. Denoting “a temple,” (*ædificium deo sacratum*,) it is distinguished from *Delubrum*, by signifying a place of larger dimensions, *Delubrum* being merely a small chapel, or part of a temple; or, as Noltenius defines it, “*Ædícula*, in

qua stat Dei cujusdam simulacrum—parvum templum, vel pars templi." The capitol was called *Templum*, in which there were three *Delubra*, inclosed by a common wall, namely, Jupiter's, Juno's, and Minerva's. *Fanum* was a place consecrated for the erection of a temple, "Solum certis atque solemnibus verbis quasi fando sacratum." *Nolt. Lex. Ant.* "Fanum tantum, id est, locus templo effatus, sacratus fuerat." *Liv. lib. x. cap. 37.*

GAZA.

THESAURUS.

Gaza, says Dumesnil, signifies "Riches," "Money," "Moveables." The word is originally Persic; or, according to Epiphanius and Buxtorff, more probably Hebrew, from *Ganax*, Thesaurus.—"Gazam," says Curtius, "pecuniam regiam Persæ vocant," lib. iii. cap. 13. *Gaza*, however, was used to denote not only "the riches themselves," but also "the treasury," or place where they were kept. Servius, and the scholiast on Lucan, (lib. i. 216,) tells us, that *Gaza*, a city in Palestine, was so called, because Cambyses left his riches there, when he set out on his expedition into Egypt. This seems to be a mistake; for *Gaza* was a word used by the Hebrews, and was the name of the city before Cambyses was born.—(See *Judges*, chap. xvi. ver. 21.)

Thesaurus means a collection of precious things, and also the place where they are kept, either "the treasure itself," or "the treasury."—"Theca ubi res pretiosa deponitur; hinc ipsa res condita." *Holyoke.*

It is sometimes, however, used in a bad sense, denoting “A repository,” or “store” of evil—and by this it is distinguished from *Gaza*, which is always employed to denote “An abundance of things, rare or valuable.”—“Perii! tu quidem thesaurum huc mihi apportasti mali.” *Plaut. Merc.* i. 2. 51.

ACCIDIT.

CONTINGIT.

EVENIT.

These verbs have been thus distinguished, *Contingunt* bona, *accidunt* mala, *eveniunt* utraque. This distinction is incorrect, the verb *accidere* being used in a good, as well as a bad, sense. “Omnia secundissima nobis, adversissima illis, accidisse videntur.” *Cic.* *Contingit* also is found, though very rarely, expressing the occurrence of an evil, or misfortune. “Magis adeo id facilitate, quam alia ulla culpa mea, contigit.” *Cic. de Or.* lib. 2.; see also *Cic. Ep. Fam.* xi. 16. where it refers to exile. That the verbs are not strictly synonymous, the following example will suffice to shew. “Adhibe diligentiam tuam, et intueri quid sint res nostræ, non quid vocentur, et scies, plura mala contingere nobis, quam accidere.” *Sen. Ep.* 110. Lipsius considers the verb as here equivalent to *ex voto accidere*. This explanation appears entirely irreconcilable with the scope of the philosopher’s reasoning, whose object was to shew, that immediate good, or evil, is not always ultimately such. Though it may accord with his observation, that evils frequently turn out to be benefits, and so far may be said to happen, as we wish, it is evidently inconsistent

with the converse remark, that immediate good often terminates in evil, an event surely not to be wished. We may observe also, that the passage already quoted from Cicero, shews, that *contingit* is not always used in a good sense, or to denote events agreeable to our wish. General, if not universal, usage, will justify the following distinction. *Accidit* casu, vel bene, vel male: *Contingit* sorte vel fortuna, fere semper *bene*: *Evenit* quod e præcedentibus exoritur. Hence this distinction is uniformly observed, that while *accidit* is confined to facts, or occurrences, *contingit* is applied to persons. “Nonne debemus optare, ut operibus nostris similis tui scriptor prædicatorque contingat?” *Plin. Ep. 7. 33.* “Quanquam ille paternus etiam clarus spectatusque (avus) contigerit.” *Id. Ep. 9. 3.* “It has fallen to his lot to have,” or “he has had the good fortune to have a grandfather.” In these examples *accidit* would be inadmissible. And in the passage quoted from Seneca, may not the philosopher mean to say, that fewer evils happen to us by chance, the causes of which were purely accidental, than result from the natural constitution of things, evils thereby issuing in good, and good terminating in evil? See *N. Edinburgh Review*, No. VI.

In regard to the distinction between these verbs and *Evenire*, we are inclined to think, that the former refer to a casual, or accidental occurrence, without any special reference to its beginning, or its end; and that the latter refers to an accidental circumstance, as issuing, or arising, from something previous; and

has always a regard to the end, or the event. Cicero defines *Eventus* to be “*Exitus* alicujus negotii, in quo quæri solet, quid ex quaque re evenerit, eveniat, eventurum sit.” *Cic. de Invent. lib. i.*

EXERCISE.

When Pyrrhus, king of Epire, returning from Sicily, was sailing past Locri, he robbed the Temple of Proserpine; and having carried the money on board his ships, he himself set out by land. What happened? His fleet, next day, was torn to pieces by a dreadful storm, and the ships, which contained the sacred treasure, were thrown ashore on the coast of Locri. Taught by this disaster, the existence of a God, he ordered all the money to be searched for, and carried back into the temple. After this, nothing ever prospered with him. He was driven out of Italy, and died by an ignoble death, being killed by a poor old woman, when he was attacking the city Argos.

OBSERVATIONS.

HORTULANUS.

OLITOR.

The former of these words was not introduced into the Latin language, until the time of the Antonines. “Tullio, et aliis,” says Vossius, “is est *Oli-tor*.” To the same purpose is the observation of Cellarius. “*Hortulanus* necessarium magis quam antiquum verbum, quo ante Antoninos nemo superstitum scriptorum usus est. *Olitor* dicebant antiqui, sed significantius est vocabulum *Hortulanus*, quod Apuleius et Macrobius nobis reliquerunt.” There

is, doubtless, an ambiguity in the word *olitor*, with which the term *hortulanus* is not chargeable, the former signifying not only “a gardener,” but also “a fruiterer,” or “fruitseller.”

Donare is construed two different ways—thus, *Donare aliquid alicui*, or *Aliquem aliqua re*.

Exercere artem, for “to follow a trade, or occupation,” has the authority of Horace, and is supported by analogy; *facere artem* is the preferable expression.

EXERCISE.

Cleanthes had a very dull and slow understanding; and was, besides, in indigent circumstances. But, after a love of wisdom had seized his mind, he overcame the slowness of his understanding by study and diligence, attending Zeno in the day-time, and earning in the night a little money, by drawing water from a well, for the use of a gardener. They say, that he was once called before the judges, because, though of a robust body, he seemed to follow no occupation, by which he might get his bread. But, when he brought the gardener, for whom he drew the water, as a witness of the manner, in which he gained a livelihood, he was not only dismissed, but also presented with ten minæ; which, however, he would not accept.

OBSERVATIONS.

INNOCENS.

INNOXIUS.

The former is used only in an active sense, and means “not hurting,” the latter both actively and passively, corresponding to our ambiguous word

“harmless,” signifying “not hurting,” and also “not hurt.” “Non possum innoxia dici.” *Ov. Met.* 9. 627. “I cannot be called innocent.” “Ipsi innoxii, florentes, sine metu ætatem agere.” *Sall. B. C.* “They themselves unhurt.”

After a negative, *But* is rendered by *Nisi*, *Præter*, *Præterquam*, as “Nothing but money.” *Nihil nisi pecunia, præter pecuniam, præterquam pecunia*, “Unless,” or, “Except money.”

The following phraseologies require the attention of the reader. “Would you have me do so?” *Visne me ita facere?* “Would you have us wait?” “*Visne opperiamur.*” *Ter. Eun.* v. 2. 56. That is, “Do you wish me to do so?”—“Are you willing, or do you wish, that we wait?” We also find *Velisne*, and *Vellesne*, “Can you, or would you be willing?”

Impersonal verbs, in Latin, do not admit a person as their nominative, the person being always put in the case, which the impersonal verb governs, as “I please,” *Mihi placet*,—“We happened,” *Nobis accidit*,—“Ye repent,” *Vos pœnitet*,—“They are weary,” *Illos tædet*,—“Who delights,” *Quem delectat*.

EXERCISE.

Socrates, the most celebrated philosopher of antiquity, was wont to say, that nothing should be asked from the gods, but that they would be pleased to give us, what is good for us. Being consulted by a young man, whether he should take a wife, or refrain from marriage, he answered, that, whichsoever of the two things he should do, he would repent

of it. When the Athenians had passed the horrid sentence on his life, he took the poison out of the executioner's hand with a resolute mind, and unaltered countenance. When he was applying the cup to his lips, and when his wife, bursting into tears, cried out, that he died innocent, "What, then," said he, "would you have me die guilty?"

OBSERVATIONS.

LEGERE.

RECITARE.

Legere is *oculis scripta percurrere*; *Recitare* is *clara voce legere*, "To read aloud."

SENATUS DECRETUM.

SENATUS CONSULTUM.

"The *Senatus Consultum*," says Dumesnil, "was a Law, or Regulation, the observance of which was obligatory, unless the people rejected it. The *Senatus decretum* was but a part of the *Senatus consultum*. To entitle any resolution to the name of *Senatus consultum*, it was necessary, that it met with no opposition, that the senate had been summoned according to law, and that a sufficient number, not fewer than two hundred, attended. If any of these requisites was wanting, it was called *Senatus auctoritas*." This is the explanation given by Dumesnil. Drakenborch, who refers his reader to Gronovius, gives the same explanation; but observes, that the expression *Senatus auctoritas*, was sometimes used for *Senatus consultum*, even when the senate was legally convoked in sufficient numbers*, and when the

* The reader, desirous of learning, at what particular times, in what places, and in what manner the senate could be legally

decree met with no opposition from the tribune. It is to be observed, however, that the terms *Senatus consultum* and *Senatus decretum*, were used indifferently, to express a decree of the senate. Dumesnil says, the noun *Decretum*, had rather individuals for its object, as when a province, a triumph, money, or a thanksgiving (*Supplicatio*) was decreed. *Consultum* embraced also the great body of the people, and regarded the more important political enactments. This distinction is by no means uniformly observed. But, though the terms *Senatus consultum*, and *Senatus decretum* are used indifferently, the simple nouns are not to be considered as synonymous. *Consultum*, when opposed to *Decretum*, refers to what is resolved, or decreed, by a council, or a deliberative body ; and *Decretum* is “the decision,” “decree,” or “judgment, of the magistrates.” So Havercamp has distinguished them ; and, we believe, correctly. “*Consulta*,” says he, “*proprie, quæ ex concilii sententia statuuntur, ut Decreta, quæ magistratus, non adhibito concilio, pronunciat.*”—“*Oportere quinquennii consulta et decreta omnia rescindi.*” *Sall. B. J. cap. 11.* “*Levius enim vaniusque profecto est sua decreta et consulta tollere, quam aliorum.*” *Liv. lib. iii. cap. 21.*

Plebiscitum was a law proposed by a tribune to the common people alone, and was not binding on the assembled, may consult *Gruter. Thes. Criticus.*—*Auli Gellii Noctes, Donati Dilucidat. in Sueton. and Adam's Roman Antiquities.*

patricians, until the year 304, when the common people obtained for the *plebiscitum* the force of law. This ordination was afterwards confirmed by the dictator P. Philo, in the year 414, and by Hortensius, the dictator, in the year 468; but until this last confirmation, the patricians had never entirely acknowledged the authority of a *plebiscitum*. The *privilegium* was a law affecting a private individual.

EPISTOLA.

LITERA.

LITERÆ.

Just. Lipsius defines *Epistola* to be “Scriptum animi nuncium ad absentes, aut quasi absentes.” “*Epistolarum* usus est,” says Ambrose, “ut disjuncti locorum intervallis affectu adhæreamus.” And Cicero says, “Hac causa inventa res ipsa (*Epistola*) est, ut certiores faceremus absentes, si quid esset, quod eos scire aut nostra aut ipsorum interesset.” *Fam. Ep. ii. 4.*

Litera, in the singular number, is “A letter of the alphabet;” in the plural it means, “Writings of any kind,” and is also, in this form, synonymous with *Epistola*, “A letter,” or “Epistle.” There is, however, this difference between *Literæ* and *Epistola*, that the former requires a distributive, and the latter a cardinal numeral—thus, “Two letters were sent,” *Duæ epistolæ*, or *Binæ literæ missæ sunt*; but not, *Binæ epistolæ*, or *Duæ literæ*. The latter expression would imply two alphabetical characters. “*Binas a te literas accepi.*” *Cic. Ep. Fam. iv. 13.* Among

the poets *Litera* is sometimes used in the singular number, to denote “an epistle,” as,

“*Litera pro verbis tibi Messaline, salutem*

Quam legis, a sævis attulit usque Getis.”

Ov. Ep. ex Ponto, lib. i. ep. 7.

When Cicero says “*Ille autem, cum ad Thermum de Parthico bello scriberet ad me literam nunquam misit,*” *Fam. Ep. lib. ii. 16*, the latter clause may, perhaps, be considered as equivalent to our expression, “He never wrote a single syllable;” “*Cum literam nullam scripsisset.*” “When he had not put pen to paper.” *Orat. pro Arch.*

Epistola is also considered, by some critics, as distinguished from *Literæ*, by its denoting a letter written for the purpose of communicating instruction, as *Pauli Epistolæ*, “The Epistles of Paul.”—When instruction is intended, *Epistola* is the preferable term; but it is frequently used as synonymous with *Literæ*.

Concerning the usual form of letter-writing, as practised by the Romans, the following observations may be useful to the young reader. The Romans began their letters with a *Præloquium*, or Address, expressing first, the name of the writer, and next, the name of the person, to whom the letter was written, as “*L. Catilina, Q. Catulo, S.*”—that is, “*L. Catiline greets Q. Catulus,*” or “*wishes him health,*” “*Salutem dicit,*”—the verb being frequently understood. If either of the parties was invested with an

office, civil or military, it was usual to express it thus, "P. Serv. Rullus Trib. pl. x. vir Pompeio Consuli." When the person addressed was an intimate friend, they sometimes added the epithets, "Humanissimus," "Optimus," "Suavissimus," and very frequently *Suus*, as "Prætores Syracusani Marcello suo." The "Præloquium" was, sometimes, conceived in the following terms, "Si vales, gaudeo; ego valeo," or "Si vales, bene est, ego valeo," and frequently written in the initials only, thus, S. V. G. E. V.—S. V. B. E. E. V. The letter frequently ended with the word "Vale," sometimes "Ave," "Salve," to which, in some instances, was added the expression of endearment, "Mi anime." The place, where the letter was written, was subjoined, unless previously communicated. The date always expressed the day, frequently the year, and sometimes the hour. They used no signature, or subscription, unless when writing to emperors. There was very rarely any inscription on the outside, the letter being delivered to a letter carrier, *Tabellarius*, who was made acquainted with the person, for whom it was intended. The letter was tied round with a string, the knot of which was sealed. The seal was, generally, a head of the letter-writer, or of some of his ancestors, impressed on wax, or chalk. "Signum iste animadvertit in cretula." *Cic.* "Cedo tu ceram, ac linum," "Give me the wax, and the string." "Age oblige, obsigna cito." *Plaut.* Hence the phrases for, "To open a letter," *Vinculum solvere, Incidere linum, Epistolam sol-*

vere. It was usual also for the bearer of the letter, before it was opened, to request the person to examine the seal, that he might be sure, there was no imposture, “*Accipe, hem cognosce signum,*” *Plaut.* “*Cape, signum nosce.*” *Id.* “*Cum prius omnes signa cognovissent.*” *Sall.* Vid. *Lipsii Opera*, vol. 2. and *Gruter. Thes.* vol. 5.

For a general explanation of Kalends, Nones, and Ides, we refer the reader to p. 24. We shall here quote a few examples, to illustrate the manner, in which the Romans expressed dates.

Cicero, dating one of his letters to Terentia, says, “*Die ante diem sextum Kalendas Decembris Dyrrachii,*” *i. e.* “*At Dyrrachium on the 26th of November,*” or “*the 6th day before the Kalends of December.*” “*Litteras a te mihi stator tuus reddidit Tarsi ante diem decimum sextum Kalendas sextiles.*” *Cic. Ep. Fam. lib. 2.* He might have said *decimo sexto die ante Kalendas*, or *Kalendarum*. Of these the first is the most common form of expression; the last is seldom used by good writers, unless after *pridie*, as *pridie Kalendarum* to denote the last day of the preceding month. We find also *pridie Kalendas*. *Kalendæ primæ, secundæ, tertiæ* mean the first day of the first, of the second, of the third month; *i. e.* “*the 1st of January, of February, of March.*” *Sextæ Kalendæ* is the first day of June, or “*the sixth Kalends,*” *i. e.* the first day of the sixth month.

Deponent verbs, whose signification is active, have, in general, the two participles active, and the

two participles passive. Hence they have also the future of the infinitive active, which is much more frequently used than the passive form—thus, *Loquens, Loquendus, Locutus, Locuturus, Locuturum esse*.

“To affirm any thing to any one,” *Affirmare aliquid alicui*. “To assure any one of any thing,” *Confirmare aliquid alicui*.

Indignari strictly conveys the idea of unworthiness. Generally accompanied with this conception, it means sometimes “to be offended,” sometimes “to feel anger at an insult,” and sometimes likewise “to express that feeling.”

EXERCISE.

Caius Popillius was sent as an ambassador to Antiochus, for the purpose of prevailing upon him to give up the war against Ptolemy. When he came into his presence, and when Antiochus was, in a friendly manner, stretching forth his hand to him, he, in his turn, would not stretch forth his; but delivered to him the letter, containing the decree of the senate. When Antiochus read it, he said, that he would commune with his friends on that subject. Popillius, being offended at his proposing a delay, enclosed with a circle the ground on which he stood, saying, “Before you stir beyond this circle, give me an answer, to carry back to the senate.” Antiochus immediately assured him, that Ptolemy should no longer complain of him.

OBSERVATIONS.

ACCEDERE.

APPROPINQUARE.

Accedere is “To advance,” “To go, or come towards.” *Appropinquare*, is “To advance near to.” “*Appropinquare finibus*,” *Cæs.* is “To come near the territories.” *Ad fines accedere*, is “To advance towards the territories.”—“*Specioso periculo propinquat, quisquis ad reipublicæ gubernacula accedit*,” “He approaches,” or “comes near, whosoever advances,” &c. (*Dumes.*) Hence we find, “*Prope*,” “*Propius*,” and “*Proxime*,” *Accedere*.

PRÆDO.

LATRO.

Prædo is “A robber,” “A pirate,” or “A freebooter, whether by sea or land.”—“*Omnium templorum, atque tectorum, totiusque urbis prædo*.” *Cic. pro domo.* “*Si cui naviganti, quem prædones insequantur*.” *Id.* “*Maritimi prædones*.” *Nepos.* *Latro* is “A robber,” or “highwayman.”—He was probably so called, either because he was originally a person, who attended his sovereign, as a guard, *quasi a latere*; and hence we find the term sometimes synonymous with *satelles*; or, he may have been so named ἀπὸ τοῦ λατροῦ, that is, *a stipe*, from the pay, or wages, which he received, and accordingly he is likewise denominated *Stipator*. Hence, also, we find the word, denoting, “a soldier serving for pay;” and *Latrocinari*, for “To serve

in the army," occurs oftener than once in Plautus. It is conjectured, therefore, that, as highwaymen were not improbably, in the early ages of the Roman state, *Latrones*, or *Milites conductitii*, the term *Latro* came to denote "A robber," or "highwayman."

EXERCISE.

When Scipio Africanus was residing at his country seat, a band of robbers came to see him. Believing, that they intended to offer violence to his life, he placed a guard of his domestics on the roof of his house, and was making preparations to defend himself. The robbers, having learned this circumstance, threw away their arms, and approached the door, telling him, that they came not with a hostile intention against his life, but as persons, who admired his courage. When he heard this, he desired the door to be unbarred, and the robbers to be admitted. As soon as they entered, they eagerly seized his hand, and kissed it, rejoicing, that it had been their good fortune to see Scipio.

OBSERVATIONS.

FORMA.

FIGURA.

These words agree in denoting the outlines of an object, as perceived by sight or touch. Their difference we shall endeavour to explain. "*Figura* est dispositio totius corporis, ut hominis figura recta est, prona animantium, mundi rotunda. *Forma* est facies cujusque rei, et convenientia partium expleta, atque perfecta, ut in homine forma regia, liberalis, mediocris. Illa discernit genera rerum, et in unoquoque

a natura idem est. Hæc species rerum separat, et in aliis alia apparet." *Ascon. Ped.* Dumesnil adopts nearly the same opinion, *forma* according to him being applicable to species, and *figura* distinguishing individuals. *Forma*, says Hill, refers to a class, to which bodies, though differing a little, one from another, are reducible. "Were there," he observes, "but one object in nature, it would possess *figura*, but not *forma*, because there would be no standard. The varieties, of which *figura* is susceptible, from the possible combinations of bounding lines, differing in breadth, length, and curvature, are infinite; those of *forma*, on the other hand, are limited by necessary approximations to the standard."

Forma then signifies not an individual object, but a species, and Cicero uses it as equivalent to the Latin term *species*, or the Greek *idea*. "Formarum est certus numerus, quæ cuique generi subjiciuntur." *Cic. Top.* Thus, under the general notion of animals, we have *forma hominis*, *forma belluæ*, *forma avis*, "a form common to men," "a form common to brutes," "a form common to birds." Hence, from denoting a form common to all of the same species, it came naturally to signify "a model," "pattern," or "exemplar," to which individuals are to be assimilated. Thus we have *sutoris formæ*, *Hor. Sat. ii. 3. 106.* "Shoemaker's lasts," and *formula*, "a set form to be observed, or copied." But, though *forma* be a generic term, it is less comprehensive than *figura*. This is evident from the following passage; "Corporis nostri

magnam natura ipsa videtur habuisse rationem, quæ formam nostram reliquamque figuram—posuit in promptu.” *Cic. Off.* lib. i. Here the expression *reliquam figuram* clearly shews, that *forma* is only a part of *figura*. The question then is, what does *figura* comprehend, as applicable to animated forms. The following passage will explain. “Corporis igitur nostri partes, totaque figura, et forma et statura, quam apta ad naturam sit, apparet.” *Cic. de fin.* lib. v. Here *figura* is described, as including *forma* and *statura*. In connection with the shape, it signifies the height, and the position or attitude of the object. “*Figura*,” says Asconius Pedianus, “est circa gestum situmque membrorum.” The *forma* will remain the same, while the *figura*, including the *motus* and *status*, may, as Cicero subsequently observes, be changed, “depravatione, motu, statu *deformi*, aut si manibus ingreditur quis, aut non ante, sed retro.” In his work “*De Natura Deorum*,” he remarks that the dispositions are often different, where the *formæ* are alike: and the *figura* is frequently not accordant with the disposition; or, if we may be allowed to extend the meaning of the expression to the brute creation, with the moral character. This position he illustrates by the resemblance of the ape to man, adding “at moribus in utroque dispares;” and by the sagacity of the elephant, of whom he says, “At figura quæ vastior,” which expression evidently includes *statura*, i. e. *quantitas corporis stantis*. He then asks, “Inter ipsos homines nonne et simil-

limis formis dispares mores, et moribus figura dissimilis?" *Forma* then means "a shape common to a class," *figura* comprehends also its positions, its attitudes, and its various modifications. And generally, every object in nature must have *figura*, but it may be a unique, and therefore not have *forma*.

When there is no particular reference to the size, position, or attitude of the object, the two words may be used indiscriminately. A sphere is termed by Cicero *figura*, and also *forma* (*De Nat. Deor.* lib. ii.); and the figures of Archimedes have been designated by the names *figura* and *forma*.

"Utque novis fragilis signatur cera figuris,

Nec manet, ut fuerat, nec formas servat easdem."

Ov. De Art. Am. xv. 168.

See *Ov. Art. Am.* 3. 771, where *forma* would be inadmissible.

The reader is here reminded, that the verb *sum* must not be joined with an infinitive, unless that infinitive be the nominative to the verb. If we intend to express, "I am to read," we must not say, *Ego sum legere*, but *Ego sum lecturus*.

The relative pronoun, which is frequently omitted in English, especially in colloquial and familiar language, must always be expressed in Latin. In English, we may say, "The book, you gave me, is a valuable one," but in Latin we must say, *Liber, quem mihi dedisti, est pretiosus*. "The books, you see are my brother's," *Libri, quos vides, sunt fratris*.

It is common also, in familiar style, not only to suppress the relative, but also to conclude the sentence, or clause, with a preposition, thus, "The city, he had lived in, so many years, was destroyed in one night." *Urbs, in qua tot annos vixerat, una nocte deleta est.* "The city, in which he had lived." The same observation is applicable to interrogatives taken indefinitely, as, "Know you not the fear, I am in?" *Nescis, quo in metu sim?*

When explaining the distinctive meaning of the verbs *accidit, contingit, evenit*, it escaped me to remark, that, when the verb *of happening* is in the preterite or preterpluperfect tense, the subsequent verb, even when it expresses a complete action or event, is seldom or never, I believe, put in the preterite, but in the preter-imperfect tense. In rendering, "It happened, that he fell," we do not say, *Accidit, ut ceciderit*; but *ut caderet*, though the fall was perfect. This, as far as my observation at least extends, is the general practice. "Quare acciderit, ut id suspicarere," *Cic. Ep. Fam.* "Accidit, ut subito ille interiret." *Cic. Ep. Fam.* "Accidit, ut in furorem incideres." *Ib.* "Quibus jam evenit, ut morerentur." *Ib.* "Quoniam tecum ut essem non contigit." *Ib.* "Siquid tale posset contingere, ut aliquis deus nos tolleret." *Cic. de Am.* From the collation, indeed, of a great number of examples, we are inclined to think, that it may be delivered, as a very general rule, that, not only after verbs of happening but others also, when the leading verb is in the preterite, or the plu-

perfect, tense, the following verb is put in the preterimperfect. “Nullum adhuc intermisi diem, quin *darem*.” *Cic. ad Att.* vii. 15. “Tantum eximia consulis dignitas valuit, ut omne is flagitium se committere *putaret*.” *Cic. Orat. post reditum*. “Ejusmodi sunt tempestates consecutæ, uti opus necessario *intermitteretur*.” *Cæs. B. G.* 3. 29. “Ita perterritos egerunt, ut non prius *desisterent*.” *Ib.* 4. 12. “Perfecta ab Lucullo hæc sunt omnia, ut urbs fidelissimorum sociorum defenderetur.” *Cic. Orat. pro Murena*. This seems by far the most general mode of expression. The preterperfect rarely occurs. “Dissensiones ejusmodi fuerunt, ut non reconciliatione concordiaë, sed interneccione civium dijudicata sint.” *Cic. in. Cat.* 3. *ad fin.* When the leading verb is in the present tense, the following verb is put in the preterperfect, if expressing a prior action, or event. “Non est verisimile, ut Chrysogonus horum literas adamârit.” *Cic. Orat. pro Ros. Amer.*

Talis, qualis; Tantus, quantus, and such correlative words, are construed like the antecedent *Ille*, or *Is*, and the relative *Qui*. Where the learner is puzzled to know, in what case to put the correlative word, he will discover the proper mode of rendering, by considering how *Ille* and *Qui* would be expressed in a similar passage; thus, “The book is such a one, as you gave me yesterday,” *Liber talis est, qualem mihi heri dedisti*, correspondently to, *Ille est, quem mihi dedisti*. “Their perseverance was as great, as

their fury," *Perseverantia erat tanta, quantus furor*, that is, "Their perseverance was as great, as their fury was great;" where the antecedent agrees with *Perseverantia*, and the correlative term with *Furor*. "You did me such an injury, as you formerly had done me a kindness," *Talem mihi injuriam fecisti, quale prius beneficium contuleras*, that is, *Eam injuriam* under the government of *fecisti*, and *Quod beneficium*, the regimen of *contuleras*. The sentence is literally this, "You did me an injury of that kind; you had done me formerly a favour of which kind." "Debes hoc etiam si tibi curæ, Quantæ conveniat, Munatius." *Hor. Ep. i. 3. 30*; i. e. *ei curæ, cui*, or "*tantæ curæ, quantæ eum esse conveniat*."

EXERCISE.

It happened, that Cyrus, when asleep in his palace, one night, a little before his death, had the following dream:—He thought, he saw a young man advance towards him, of a more venerable than human form, and that he said to him; "Cyrus, prepare yourself for death, for you are now to leave this world." When he awoke, believing, that his dissolution was now at hand, he offered sacrifice to Jupiter, and the other immortal gods. While the sacred service was performing, he used the following short prayer;—"Accept, ye gods, this sacrifice; I thank you for all the favours you have conferred on me; and I beg, that you will grant me such a death, as you have given me a life."

OBSERVATIONS.

IMPERO.

MANDO.

PRÆCIPIO.

The distinction between *Jubere* and *Imperare*, has been already explained. (See p. 120.) *Mandare* differs from *Imperare*, as not implying any authority *in mandante*. It is merely *Cuivis gerendum vel pronuntiandum aliquid committere*; and the term *mandatum* corresponds very nearly to our English word, “Commission.” *Imperare* always denotes, that the person commanding is invested with authority. Quintilian says to his son, *Mandata tamen tua, fili, perago*; that is, “I execute your commissions.” The son had no authority to order, or command, his father, *Patri imperare*.

Mandamus non recusantibus; *Imperamus* etiam invitis. *Imperamus* tum aliis, tum nobismet; *Mandamus* non nisi aliis. *Præcipere*, is “To give lessons, or instructions, to another, for the direction of his conduct.”

“It is,” “it was,” and such expressions, are in Latin omitted, unless, when they impart any peculiar emphasis to the expression. Thus, “It is here, you err.” *Hic erras*, that is, “Here you err.” In the following exercise we consider the full expression to be preferable.

It is to be observed also, that a future time is frequently expressed in English by a present tense—thus, “When I am gone,” *Ubi abiero*, “When I

shall have gone.”—“ When you teach, I will listen,”
Ubi tu docebis, ego auscultabo.

When a verb in the active voice governs an accusative with any other case, it must be carefully observed, that, whatever word is in the accusative after the active verb, that, and no other, must be the nominative to it in the passive voice, and the other case remains unchanged, unless the cases be mutually convertible in the active voice, without altering the meaning. Thus, “ I give you a book,” *Librum tibi do*; passively, *Liber tibi datur*. “ He told me this,” *Hoc mihi dixit*; passively, “ I was told this,” *Hoc mihi dictum est*. “ I compare Virgil to Homer,” *Comparo Virgilium Homero*; passively, *Virgilius comparatur Homero*. In the last example, we can say, *Homerus comparatur Virgilio*, because actively we may render it, *Comparo Homerum Virgilio*. “ I present you with a book,” *Dono tibi librum*; passively, *Liber tibi donatur*, or *Dono te libro*; passively, *Tu libro donaris*.—“ I persuade you to this,” or “ of this,” *Persuadeo hoc tibi*. Here “ the thing ” is expressed in the accusative, and “ the person,” in the dative. The former, therefore, and not the latter, must be the nominative to the verb in the passive voice; thus, *Hoc tibi persuadetur*, “ You are persuaded of this.” If we say, “ He trusted me with this affair,” *Hanc rem mihi credidit*—and render it passively, “ I was trusted with this affair,” we must say, *Hæc res mihi credita est*. “ I told you this,” *Hoc tibi dixi*. “ You were told of this,” *Hoc*

tibi dictum est. “The person,” in all these examples, being put in the dative case with the active verb, cannot be made the nominative to the verb, in the passive voice.—This rule is at once simple, and conducive to perspicuity. It is founded, likewise, on the best classical authorities, being conformable to the uniform phraseology of Livy, Sallust, Cæsar, and Cicero.—In *Auct. ad Heren.* and inferior writers, we find the rule occasionally transgressed.

Does it follow then, that we can in no instance say, *Ego dicor*, *Ille dicitur*, or *Ille dictus est*? By no means. If the person be *he, to whom* any thing is said, it must always be expressed in the dative case, as in the preceding example; but if the person be *he, of whom* any thing is said, it may then be made the nominative to the verb.—Thus, “He is said to be a wise man,” *Ille dicitur esse vir sapiens.* Here *Ille* is the subject spoken of, the person *of whom* the assertion is made, not the person *to whom* the thing is told. In like manner, “I believe you,” *Credo tibi*, that is, “I give credit to what you say:” in the passive voice, *Tibi creditur*, not *Tu crederis*. But the latter expression is correct, if used to signify, not that credit is given to the words of the person, but that something is believed of him, as the subject of discourse, as *Tu crederis esse vir bonus*, “You are believed to be a good man.”

In short, it is to be remembered, that whatever is put in the accusative after the active verb, that,

and that only, must, in the same sense of the verb, be the nominative to it in the passive voice. Hence it is, that, if a verb does not govern the accusative in the active voice, it can have no passive, but impersonally.—Thus we say, “I resist you,” *Resisto tibi*, and, therefore, not *Tu resisteris*, but *Tibi resistitur*, “You are resisted,”—the verb being impersonal.—“You hurt me,” *Noces mihi*.—“I am hurt,” *Mihi nocetur*, not *Ego noceor*.—For the same reason, we cannot say, *Ego possum noceri*, “I can be hurt,”—but *Mihi noceri potest*, that is, *Id potest noceri mihi*. For the verb being used impersonally in the passive voice, the person cannot be admitted as a nominative, either to the verb itself, or to its governing verb. “Quamquam mihi quidem ipsi nihil jam ab istis noceri potest.” *Cic. in Cat. iii.* “Though I cannot now in any respect be hurt by them.” Hence also, though we may say, with Cicero, “Ut neque rogemus res turpes, nec faciamus rogati,” *De Amic.* we cannot say, *Ut neque petamus res turpes, nec faciamus petiti*; because *petere* does not govern the accusative of the person asked, in the active voice.

I am aware, that the rule here given concerning such verbs as govern two cases, and that also respecting those verbs, which have not an accusative for their regimen in the active voice, are not uniformly observed by some of the ancient writers. Thus, we find, “Persuasam feminam,” and “Jurejurando persuasus,” in *Val. Maximus*. “Nihil erat difficile persuadere persuasis mori.” *Just. ii. 11.* Virgil also,

speaking of Cassandra, says, “Haud unquam credita Teucris,” where *Cassandra* denoting “the person believed,” or, “to whom credit is given,” and which, after the active verb, would be put in the dative case, is made the nominative to the verb in the passive voice. “Triumphatis Spartanis,” is an expression of Justin, ii. 6. *Triumphare aliquem*, for, “To triumph over any one,” is not found in any author; “Triumphatis Spartanis,” therefore, violates a principle adopted by the best classics, and evidently subservient to perspicuity. These phraseologies, however, very rarely occur even in the inferior prose writers; and, in Livy, Cæsar, Sallust, and perhaps I may add Cicero, not an example is to be found*.

Nor is the rule here given, and to which the prac-

* The following passage, as a proof of a contrary phraseology, is quoted from Cicero. “Atque hanc quidem ille causam sibi ait non attingendæ reipublicæ fuisse, quod cum offendisset populum Atheniensem prope jam desipientem senectute, tum cum nec persuadendo nec cogendo regi posse vidisset, cum persuaderi posse diffiderit, cogi fas esse non arbitrabatur.” *Ep. Fam. i. 9.* When it is considered, that this is, as we believe, the only example, out of hundreds of a contrary phraseology, we are justified in offering any conjecture, which can reconcile it to Cicero’s usual mode of expression. We should be inclined then to assume, that *id* is understood before *posse persuaderi*. And what renders this probable, is the repetition of the adverb, as if there were a change of construction, instead of *et*, which would intimate that the verbs *posse* and *cogi* had one common subject. In *Auctor ad Herennium*, we have one incontestable example of a different phraseology, *Animus auditoris persuasus videtur*; but this form of expression cannot be recommended to imitation.

tice of the best classics is strictly conformable, the mere result of arbitrary usage. It contributes, as we have said, to perspicuity.—If *Ego credor* be employed to signify, not only, that *I*, as a person speaking, am believed, but also as a person spoken of, obscurity, or ambiguity, must frequently be created.

It has been observed also, that no verb can be regularly used in the passive voice, unless it governs the accusative in the active voice. The practice of the purest classics justifies this observation. The poets are less scrupulous. Thus, Horace says, “*Bactra regnata Cyro.*” *Car.* iii. 29. 27. where the verb *regnare*, which does not govern the accusative in the active voice, admits a nominative, as a regular passive verb. Tacitus also says, “*Gentes regnantur.*” *Hist.* i. 16. The best prose writers never employ this phraseology.

The reader has been informed, that verbs of “*Advising*,” and, consequently, verbs of “*Persuading*,” or “*Advising with effect*,” are followed by *ut*. Hence *Persuadeo*, in this sense, is generally followed by the conjunction. But when *Persuadere* signifies “*To persuade*,” or “*To convince*,” it is better, for the sake of perspicuity, to join it with the infinitive mood. Thus, if we say, “*He persuaded me to be*,” it is rendered, *Mihi persuasit, ut essem*. “*He persuaded me, that I was*,” *Mihi persuasit, me esse*. “*I could never be persuaded to take*,” *Mihi nunquam persuaderi potuit, ut sumerem*. “*I could never be convinced, that I took*,” *Me sumpsisse*. An attention to

this admonition, will very frequently prevent ambiguity.

EXERCISE.

After this he sent for his sons, and thus addressed them: "My life is now drawing to a close; but I hope, that I shall live hereafter, and be happy. I never suffered myself to be persuaded, that the soul lives, as long as it is in the body, and dies, when it quits it. Nothing resembles death, more than sleep; yet it is in sleep, that the soul of man clearly shews its own divinity. With regard to my body, when I am dead, I charge you to inclose it, neither in gold nor silver, but to restore it to the earth, the common mother of us all. Farewell, my sons; farewell, all ye friends." When he had said this, he covered his head, and soon afterward breathed his last.

OBSERVATIONS.

MINARI.

DENUNCIARE.

The former of these verbs is always used in an unfavourable sense, signifying "to hold out," or "threaten, evil;" the latter also generally occurs in a bad sense, but sometimes denotes "to announce, good." "*Crucem minari.*" *Cic.* "To threaten crucifixion." "*Non periculum, sed præsidium, denunci-ant.*" *Cic. pro Mil.* "They do not threaten danger, but announce protection."

SECURUS.

TUTUS.

SALVUS.

SOSPES.

INCOLUMIS.

Securus, i. e. *Sine cura*, means "Fearless," or "Free from apprehension of danger," "Regardless,"

or “Free from concern.” “Cum mare compositum est, *securus* navita cessat.” *Ov. de Art. Am.* lib. iii. 259. “The sailor *secure*, or *thinking himself safe*, rests.” “—Et nitido *securum* cominus hostem Ense petens.” *Ov. Met.* xii. 129. “Clam ferro incautum, superat *securus* amorum Germanæ.” *Virg. Æn.* i. 354. “Regardless of the love of his sister.” *Securus salutis*, “Regardless of safety.” *Securus pro salute*, “Secure of their safety.” *Tac. Agric.* cap. 26.

Tutus means “*Absolutely safe*,” or “free from danger.” Thus, we may say of a person in danger, but not aware of it, *Securus est, sed non tutus*, “He is secure, or not apprehensive of danger, but not safe.” “Fluctibus ejectum *tuta* statione recepi.” *Ov. Ep.* vii. 89. “In a station safe,” or “free from danger.”

Salvus, means “Safe,” “unhurt,” “in good health.”—“*Salvum* gaudeo te advenire.” *Plaut. Curc.* ii. 3. 27. “*Salvus* sis adolescens.” *Plaut. Pers.* iv. 4. 30. It is applied also to inanimate things, as “Fide *salva*.” *Cic.* that is, *Fide servata vel illæsa*. “Honour being safe.”—“*Salvis* legibus.” *Id.* “*Salvis* AUSPICIIS.” *Id.*

As *Tutus* signifies “Safe,” or “Free from danger,” so *Sospes* means “Safe,” or “Free from harm,” whether in relation to past, or future dangers, though most commonly applied to the latter, to which, indeed, Dumesnil seems to me, rather improperly, to confine it. “Sensim superattolle limen pedes nova nupta; *sospes* Iter incipe hoc.” *Plaut. Cas.* iv. 4. 1, 2. “Commence this journey safe, or free from harm.” “Ve-

nusinae Plectantur silvæ, te sospite." *Hor. Car.* i. 28. 26. "Let the Venusian woods suffer, you being free from harm." "Ipse quidem per me *tutus sospesque* fuisses." *Ov. Ep.* vi. 147. "As to me, you should have been safe and unhurt, or free from danger, and free from harm."

In the following passages, it clearly alludes to past dangers, implying an escape from them, without harm, or injury.—"Altera mater *sospiti* filio obviam facta in complexu exspiravit." *Val. Max.* ix. 12. 2, "Having escaped safe, or unhurt, from the destructive calamity," at Lake Thrasymene. "Sume Mæcenas cyathos amici *Sospitis* centum." *Hor. Car.* iii. 8. 13. Here the poet alludes to his escape from the danger, to which he was exposed, by the fall of the tree.—See *Ode* xiii. lib. 2.

Incolumis seems to have, strictly, no necessary reference to the existence of any evil or danger. It denotes, "safe," or "alive," opposed to "extinct;" also "whole and sound," opposed to "impaired," as, "*Incolumi* nam te ferrea semper erunt." *Suet. in Vit. Tib. Ner.* cap. 28. "You being 'safe,' or 'alive,' alluding also to his power being unimpaired."

"Si Turno *extincto* socios sum accire paratus,
Cur non *incolumi* potius certamina tollo?"

Virg. Æn. xii. 38, 39.

"Virtutem *incolumem* odimus,
Sublatam ex oculis quærimus invidi."

Hor. Car. iii. 24. 31.

Here, also, *Incolumem* means “safe,” or “alive,” opposed to *Sublatam ex oculis*, “removed,” or “dead.”

In the following passages it means, “unimpaired” by time or accident. “Vel cur his animis *incolumes* non redeunt genæ.” “Cheeks, whose beauty is unimpaired by age.” Ulpian uses the expression, “*Ædes incolumes*,” to signify, “A house not requiring repair,” “uninjured by time, or accident.”

ASTRUM.

SIDUS.

STELLA.

Astrum is applied to any of the heavenly bodies. Cicero says, “Moveri autem solem, et lunam, et sidera.” *De Nat. Deor.* and immediately afterwards includes these under the general name of *Astra*.

Stella properly means, “One of the stars,” whether fixed or erratic, including also the moon.—“Erant autem eæ *stellæ*, quas nunquam ex hoc loco vidimus, ex quibus erat illa minima, quæ ultima cœlo, citima terris, luce lucebat aliena. (*Sciz. Luna.*) *Stellarum* autem globi terrarum magnitudinem facile vincebant.” *Cic. Somn. Scip.* Here *Stella* means “A star,” or “planet.” Sometimes it is taken for *Sidus*, denoting “A constellation,” as “Singulas enim *stellas* numeras deos, easque aut belluarum nomine appellas, ut caprum, ut lupum, ut leonem.” *Id. de Nat. Deor.*—“Quorum simul alba nautis *Stella* refulsit.” *Hor. Car. i. 12. 28.*

Sidus means “A constellation,” or “collection of fixed stars.” Dumesnil derives it from σὺν ἰδεῖν,

“To see together.” Varro correctly from *Sidere*, “To settle,” or “to be fixed.” Macrobius thus defines *Sidera* et *Stellæ*, “Neque enim hic res una gemina appellatione monstratur, ut ensis et gladius, sed sunt stellæ quidem singulares, ut erraticæ quinque et cæteræ, quæ non admixtæ aliis solæ feruntur; sidera vero, quæ in aliquod signum stellarum plurimum compositione formantur, ut *Aries*, *Taurus*.” lib. i. cap. 14. This distinction, however, is not universally observed. Tacitus says “*Sidus cometes*.” *Ann.* xiv. 22. *Sidus* is sometimes used for *Stella*.

COMA.

CAPILLUS.

CÆSARIES.

CRINIS.

Capillus, quasi *Capitis pilus*, means “The hair of the head in general;” *Coma*, “The hair of the head, more or less dressed.” The latter is applied also to denote “The wool,” or “hair” of animals in general, “as *Comæ ovium*.” *Col.*—and also, “The leaves” of trees, and “tops, or flowers” of plants, as “*Comæ arborum*.” *Hor. Car.* iv. 7. 2. “*Comæ papaveræ*,” *Ovid*. “The tops, or flowers, of poppies.” *Cæsaries*, a *cædendo*, is particularly applied to “The hair of a man’s head”—the women, among the Romans, wearing theirs long. We sometimes, however, but very rarely, find it applied to the hair of females. “*Cæsariem effusæ nitidam per candida colla*.” *Virg. Georg.* iv. 337. *Crinis*, (α κρίνω,) “Hair plaited, or in tresses.”

EXERCISE.

When Ptolemy Euergetes was setting out on his expedition into Syria, his queen, Berenice, who tenderly loved him, fearing the dangers to which he might be exposed, made a vow, to consecrate her hair, in case he should return home safe. The prince returned not only safe, but crowned with victory. Whereupon Berenice, that she might discharge her vow, immediately cut off her hair, and dedicated it to the gods. But it being lost by the negligence of the priests, Ptolemy was much offended, and threatened to punish them for their carelessness. Upon this, Conon of Samos, a celebrated mathematician, gave out, in order to appease the king's anger, that the queen's hair had been taken up to heaven, and converted into a constellation.

OBSERVATIONS.

CUM.

QUANDO.

ECQUANDO.

“*Cum*,” says Dumesnil, “refers to the occasion; and *Quando* refers to the time.” To enable the reader to distinguish the proper use of each, his attention is requested to the following particulars; 1st. *Quando* is used interrogatively: *Cum* is never so employed. If we say, “When shall I see you?” we must render it, “*Quando ego te videbo?*” *Plaut. Curc.* i. 3. 56—and not, *Cum ego te videbo?*

2dly. *Quando*, being an interrogative, may be used indefinitely; *Cum* is never taken indefinitely. “I cannot even conjecture when, or where, I am to see you.”—“*Quando* (not *Cum*) vel ubi te visu-

rus sim, ne suspicari quidem possum." *Cic. Fam. Ep. lib. iii. 6.*

Hence, 3dly, the clause with *quando* may be the subject of a preceding verb; the clause with *cum* cannot—"I asked him, when he intended to set out," *Quando profecturus esset, quæsiui.* The subject of the question is the former clause of the sentence; and *cum* would be here inadmissible.

In the following passage, they both occur precisely in the same sense, each referring to a point of time, as the antecedent.

"Ne minus imperes mihi, quam cum tuus servus fui;
Apud te habitabo, et quando ibis, una tecum ibo
domum." *Plaut. Men. v. 7. 44.*

Each member of the sentence would admit either *Quando* or *Cum*, the meaning being "At the time, at which."

Ecquando is distinguished from *Quando*, by its implying indignation, or contempt, in the speaker. "Interrogat," says Noltenius, "cum increpatione, indignatione, vel inquisitione." It is also distinguished from *Quando*, by its not being taken indefinitely, but always interrogatively.

SUBINDE.

IDEMTIDEM.

Subinde, says Dumesnil, means "Soon afterwards." *Idemtidem*, "Frequently," or "Pretty often."

This distinction is consonant with the etymology of the terms, but is not justified by universal usage,

which, in regard to these words, is much divided. Gifanius asserts that, though Livy, and writers posterior to him, used *Subinde* for *Mox*, or *Paulo post*, “Soon afterwards,” the term was never used by Cicero, or writers of an earlier date, in this sense. Drakenborch also observes, as if with some degree of surprise, that Livy uses *Idemtidem* very often, instead of *Subinde*, for “Every now and then.” Of the accuracy of Gifanius’s assertion respecting the usage of Cicero, we have not been able to form a decided opinion. This, however, is certain, that Horace, who may be considered as a contemporary of Cicero, uses *Subinde* for “soon afterwards,” or *Mox*, thus,

“Si dicet, recte ; primum gaudere ; *subinde*
Præceptum auriculis hoc instillare memento.”

Ep. i. 8. 15.

We know also, that Cæsar and Cicero, as well as Livy, use *Idemtidem*, for “Every now and then.” See *Cæs. B. G.* ii. 19, also *Steph. Thes.* in *idemtidem*.

Noltenius, in opposition to Gifanius, affirms, that the proper, and original signification of *Subinde* was, “Soon afterwards,” and that it was not till the time of Quintilian, that it came to be frequently used for *Idemtidem*. This opinion seems to be better founded. The etymology of the term evidently points to the signification of “soon afterwards.” When Horace says, “Sparge *subinde*,” *Sat.* ii. 5. 103, it may certainly be rendered, “Immediately after,” though generally translated “Every now and then.” In writers

Argenteæ ætatis, it is frequently used for *Idemtidem*; we are inclined, however, to recommend the latter, in preference to *subinde*, to denote “every while,” or “every now and then.”

The verb *petere* is thus construed, *Petere aliquid*, “To ask any thing, in order to receive it.” *Petere aliquem*, “To attack any one.” *Petere locum*, “To go to a place.” *Petere pœnas ab aliquo*, “To take satisfaction,” or “To inflict punishment on any one.” *Petere ab aliquo*, “To request of any one.”

EXERCISE.

Information was given to Cæsar Augustus, that Lucius Cinna was laying snares for his life. He was told, when, where, and how, he meant to attack him. Augustus, having heard this, ordered a meeting of his friends to be called against the day following; and, in the mean time, he passed a very restless night. Groaning every now and then, he uttered to himself various, and discordant expressions. “What!” said he, “shall I suffer my enemy to walk in security, while I am thus anxious? Shall he not suffer punishment, who hath determined to take away a life, which has been in vain attacked in so many battles?” His wife interrupted him, and said, “You have hitherto profited nothing by severity; try now, what effect clemency will produce.”

OBSERVATIONS.

ARBITER.

TESTIS.

Concerning the etymology of the former of these words, lexicographers are not agreed. The most

probable opinion is, that it is derived from the obsolete verb *Bitere*, being compounded of *Ar* for *Ad*, and *Bitere*, “To go,” in the same way, as we have *Arcesso* for *Adcesso*—*Arversum* for *Adversum*. The obsolete verb is to be found in Plautus, in the two following passages :

“Ad patriam ne *bitas* : dico jam tibi.” *Plaut. Merc.* ii. 3. 127. “Fortunatus erit, si illa ad me *bitet*.” *Curc.* i. 2. 57.

Noltenius defines *Arbiter* to be, according to its primitive import, “Occulte adrepens qui suis oculis videt, suisque auribus audit.” *Sine arbitro* is, therefore, equivalent to *Nemine vel vidente, vel audiente*. (*Steph.*) Hence such expressions as, “Secretorum omnium *arbiter*.” *Cic.* “The witness of all my secrets,” *Qui omnia videt, et audit*.

Testis means “A witness,” chiefly in a cause, or trial, before a court, “One, who bears testimony.”

INIMICUS.

HOSTIS.

ADVERSARIUS.

Inimicus, i. e. *Non amicus*, is a man bearing enmity to another individually, that enmity being of a private nature. *Hostis* is an avowed, and public enemy, either to an individual, as “Attalum, antequam rex essem, *hostem* meo capiti fuisse meministis.” *Curt.* lib. viii. cap. 8, or to a people, or party ; as “*Hostes* omnes judicati, qui Antonii sectam secuti sunt.” *Cic. Epist. ad Brut.* “were judged enemies to their country.” In the latter sense, it may be defined in

the words of Raderus, “ Qui nobis, vel cui nos publice bellum indicimus.”

Hostis does not necessarily imply that enmity, which is signified by *Inimicus*. A person may be *Hostis*, that is, “ hostile to our country, or to our party ;” but not *Inimicus*, or at personal enmity with us as individuals. “ Multi, qui de castris visundi aut spoliandi gratia processerant, volventes *hostilia* cadavera, *amicum* alii, pars hospitem reperiiebant.” *Sall. B. C. ad fin.* Here the characters of *Amicus* and *Hostis* are represented, as united in the same individual.—“ Illi nunquam se *inimicos* ei, sed bello laccessitos *hostes* fuisse, respondent,” *Quint. Curt. lib. vii. cap. 10*, that is, “ not enemies to him as an individual, but open enemies to his cause.” “ Qui sæpius cum hoste confluxit, quam quisquam cum inimico concertavit.” *Cic. pro leg. Man.* “ Who has fought more pitched battles, than any one has maintained personal disputes.” This is the distinction between *Hostis* and *Inimicus*, considered as synonyms. The original meaning of *hostis* is thus explained by Cicero, “ *Hostis* gratiosum aliquando nomen, et sine invidia, nunc vero inimicitias denunciat.” *Cic. Off. lib. 1.* “ *Hostis* apud majores nostros is dicebatur, quem nunc peregrinum dicimus.” *Cic. Off. 1.*

Adversarius means “ An antagonist,” “ A competitor,” “ An opponent,” chiefly in controversy, or law suits. It implies, as Hill observes, no fixed enmity.

Cicero, speaking of Antony, says, “ Ego semper illum *hostem* appellavi ; cum alii *adversarium*.”

PRIMO.

PRIMUM.

Tursellinus says, that the difference between these two words is, that *Primum* refers to the order in which things are placed, and that *Primo* refers to time.—(*Tursell. de Part.*) In this he differs from A. Gellius, who, though with some degree of doubt, adopts the opinion of Varro—whose words are these, “ Aliud est *quarto* Prætozem fieri et *quartum* ; quod *quarto* locum adsignificat, ac tres ante factos ; *quartum* tempus adsignificat, ac ter ante factum.”—Tiro Tullius informs us, that when Pompey was about to dedicate a temple to Victory, it became a question, whether it should be written “ Consul tertio,” or “ tertium,” and that the most learned men of Rome were consulted on the subject. These disagreeing, it was referred to Cicero, who, for fear of offending either of the parties, advised Pompey to write, “ Consul tert.” The opinion of Varro, however, is opposed by one of the most ancient inscriptions at Rome, in these words :

“ P. DECIVS, DECII F. PRIMO. COS. DE SAMNITIBUS TRIUMPHANS SPOLIA EX HIS CERERI CONSECRAVIT ITERUM ET TERTIO COS.”

A. Gellius too informs us, that Cælius, a very learned

man, and also Q. Claudius, adopted this phraseology. If we refer to the use of *primo* and *primum*, we find, that general, if not universal, authority, is in favour of *primum*, as denoting either “in the first place,” or “for the first time,” and *primo*, as signifying “at first,” or “in the beginning.” “Primum docent esse Deos, deinde quales sint.” *Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. 2.* “In the first place, they teach that there are Gods.” “Ibi primum insuevit exercitus populi Romani amare.” *Sall. B. C. cap. 11.* “There,” or “then for the first time, the army became accustomed.” “Cœpi adversari primo.” *Ter. Phor. i. 2. 25.* “At first I began to oppose them.” “Primo magis ambitio, quam avaritia, animos hominum vexabat.” *Sall. B. C. cap. 10.* Here, *primo* is equivalent to *initio*, “at first.” “Desidentes primo mores.” *Liv. Præf.* We recollect no example, in which *primum* is found in this sense, though *primo* is often used in the same sense with *primum*, to denote “in the first place.”

EXERCISE.

Augustus thanked his wife, and immediately sent for Cinna. When he came, Cæsar having removed all witnesses, ordered a chair to be set for Cinna: then addressing him, he thus said, “In the first place, I request of you not to interrupt me, while I am speaking: when I have done, you shall be allowed to answer for yourself. Though I found you in arms against me, and saw you were my enemy, I spared your life, and granted you your property: this day you are so rich, that even the conquerors envy the con-

quered. When you were a candidate for the priesthood, I passed by several persons, whose parents had served with me, and gave it to you; yet, though these things are so, you have formed a design against my life." He said no more; and from that moment he found Cinna one of his warmest, and most faithful friends.

OBSERVATIONS.

AGRESTIS.

RUSTICUS.

Rusticus, according to Dumesnil, means, "What belongs to the country, or fields." *Agrestis*, "What grows in the country." *Rusticus*, says Stephans, means, "Quod ruris, vel rustici est." *Agrestis*, "quod rusticum est, vel ad agros pertinet." The former distinction appears to be incorrect, and the latter is somewhat obscure. *Rusticus*, as we conceive, is opposed to *Urbanus*, and means, "What belongs to the country," as opposed to "What belongs to the city."—(See *Hor. Sat.* ii. 6. 108.) Hence it means, "Unpolished," "Uncouth," "Clownish," as contradistinguished to "Polite," "Genteel," "Elegant."—" *Rustici delinquunt minus quam urbani.*" *Plaut. Merc.* iv. 3. 15. "Men living in the country commit fewer faults than those living in the city."—" *Urbanis rusticisque prædiis locupletatus.*" *Suet.*

Agrestis, as we apprehend its meaning, is opposed not only to *Urbanus*, but also to *Oppidanus*, implying, "What belongs to the country," as opposed to "What belongs to the city, (*Rome*) or to

any town or village." Hence it generally implies a greater degree of uncouthness, wildness, and rusticity, than the term *Rusticus*. The following passages from Cicero seem to justify this explanation: "Hunc hominem ferum atque *agrestem* fuisse, nunquam cum homine quoquam collocutum esse, nunquam in oppido constitisse." *Cic. Orat. pro Rosc. Amer.* Here the orator does not say, "In urbe," but "In oppido," implying that his manners and sentiments had not even that civilization, which may be acquired in a provincial town. "Vita autem hæc *rustica*, quam tu *agrestem* vocas, parsimoniæ, diligentiae, justitiæ magistra est." *Ib.* Here "Agrestis" is evidently used as a term of reproach, applied to what Cicero denominates, "Vita *rustica*," or "A country life." If our conception of the distinction be correct, every person, not an inhabitant of Rome, was named *Rusticus*, and every person not living either in Rome, or any provincial town or village, *Agrestis*.

ADJUVARE.

AUXILIARI.

OPITULARI.

SUCCURRERE.

SUBVENIRE.

Of these *adjuvare* may be considered as the generic term, denoting to assist by any means whatever—thus we have "Adjuvare auxilio," and "auxiliis." *Liv.* "Adjuvare consilio." *Cic.* "Adjuvare opera." *Tac.* "Adjuvare facultatibus." *Cic.* But it differs from the other verbs, as not only signifying "to assist a person," but also "to forward any operation," or "promote any effect, moral or physical, good or evil."

“Adjuvabat eorum consilium.” *Cæs. B. G. 2. 17.*
 “It strengthened their advice.” “Is, qui non modo non repellit, sed etiam adjuvat injuriam.” *Cic. Off. 3. 18.* “Promotes the injury.” “Cum C. Marius mœrorem orationis meæ præsens ac sedens multum lacrimis suis adjuvaret.” *Cic. de Orat. lib. 2.* “Enhanced the sorrow.” “Eam mutationem si tempora adjuvabunt.” *Cic. Off. 1. 33.* “If the times shall be favourable to that change.” I am not aware of any example, which would justify the use of any of the other verbs in these passages.

“*Auxilium*,” says Varro, “est *ab auctu*, quum accesserant, qui adjumento essent alienigenæ.” The noun, with its derivative *auxiliari*, though they were perhaps at first, as Hill observes, military terms, afterwards acquired a more extended signification, and the verb came to denote “to assist for any purpose, by increasing the power of the agent.” The notion, however, of augmented power in the immediate object of the verb, is not uniformly implied. It sometimes, by a metonymy, the disease being put for the patient, denotes “to assist by mitigating the evil.” “Ferulam quibusdam morbis auxiliari dicunt medici.” *Plin. 13. 22.* “Nec formidatis auxiliatur aquis.” *Ov. Ep. ex Ponto, i. 3. 23.*

Opitulari is *indigentibus opem ferre*. *Subvenire*, and *succurrere*, i. e. *festinanter subvenire*, denote “to relieve those, who are in difficulty or embarrassment.” These three verbs always imply that the object is in need of assistance, and in this they differ

from the other two, which do not necessarily involve this conception. “*Majores vestrum, miseriti plebis, decretis suis inopiæ opitulati sunt.*” *Sall. in Cat.* “*Si subito sit allatum periculum discrimenque patriæ, cui subvenire opitularique possit.*” *Cic. Off.* i. 43. “*Equites subvenientes periculo exemere.*” *Tac. Ann.* 2. 13. “*Catilina cum expeditis laborantibus succurrere.*” *Sall. in Cat.* cap. 63. We sometimes find *succurrere* and *subvenire* in the same member of the sentence. “*Succurrit illi Varenus, et laboranti subvenit.*” *Cæs. B. G.* 5. 43. “*Ran up to his assistance, and came to his relief.*” Valla remarks that we may say *auxilium dare*, and also *auxilium ferre*; not, however, *opem dare*, but *opem ferre*.

It is to be observed, that the expressions “*One another*,” “*Each other*,” &c. are elliptical, and that the ellipsis should be supplied, in order to ascertain how the correlative words should be rendered. Thus, “*They engaged, and slew one another*,” *Congressi sunt, et alius alium interfecerunt*, that is, “*They slew, one slew another*,” so that *Alius* is the nominative to *Interfecit*, understood, “*They engaged with each other*,” *Alter cum altero congressi sunt*, that is, “*They engaged, one (engaged) with the other*,” *Alter* being the nominative to *congressus est* understood.—“*They gave to each other*,” *Alter alteri dederunt*; that is, “*Each gave to the other*,” *Dederunt, alter alteri dedit*. These phraseologies may be varied thus, “*They vied with one another*,” *Inter se certarunt*, “*They love each other*,” *Sese mutuo*

amant. “ Brutus and Aruns slew each other,” *Brutus et Aruns invicem se occiderunt.*

EXERCISE.

When a boar, of huge size, was destroying the cattle on Mount Olympus, and likewise many of the country people, persons were sent, to implore the assistance of the king. Atys, one of the king's sons, a youth of enterprising spirit, urged his father to let him go, and assist in killing the boar. The king, remembering a dream, in which he saw his son perish by a spear, refused, at first, to permit him to go; reflecting, however, that the tooth of a wild beast was not to be dreaded, so much as the pointed steel, he consented. The youth, accordingly, set out, and while all of them were eagerly intent on slaying the boar, and vying with one another, which should be the first to strike him, a spear, rashly darted by one of the country people, missing its aim, pierced the heart of young Atys, and thus realized his father's dream.

OBSERVATIONS.

JUCUNDUS.

GRATUS.

Jucundus à *juvare* is applicable to whatever gives pleasure or delight, corporeal or mental; *gratus* means “ acceptable and obliging,” strictly implying the act of a voluntary agent. *Jucundum* id est, quod alteri est causa gaudii; *gratum*, pro quo nos sentire debemus. *Vid. Popm.* Grata est ægro medicina, verum injucunda. “ Amor tamen *gratus* et optatus; dicerem *jucundus*, nisi id verbum in omne tempus

perdidissem." *Cic. Ep. Fam. v. 15.* "Acceptable and obliging—I should even call it a source of delight, if delight were not a word, to which I had not bidden farewell for ever."

Though *gratus* is strictly applicable to the kind offices of a voluntary agent, it is often applied by the poets to physical objects.

FALLIT. FUGIT. PRÆTERIT. LATET.

Me fallit, Me fugit, Me præterit, are equivalent expressions, denoting, "It escapes my notice," or "my observation." *Latet me* and *Latet mihi*, though they occur in Justin, Pliny, and some other prose writers of inferior name, should be avoided. That one passage occurs in Cicero, and I believe, only one, in which *Latet* is joined with a case of the person, must be admitted. "*Lex populum Romanum latuit.*" *Cic. pro Sulla.* But, this being a solitary passage, and the ancients using the abbreviation P. R. it is impossible to determine, whether the dative, or the accusative, was intended by Cicero. Some accordingly read *Populo Romano*. One passage also occurs in Varro, in which *Latet* is joined with an accusative; but this, like one or two other expressions of the same author, may be a deviation from the pure Latinity of the Augustan age. The scholar, studious of elegance, will be careful to avoid every phraseology, which is not sanctioned by unquestionable classical authority.

The junior reader may require to be reminded, that the relative agrees with the antecedent, not only in gender and number, but also in person.—“ Thus, *Ego qui lego*, “ I who read.” *Tu qui scribis*, Thou who writest,” *Pater noster qui est*, “ Our Father who is.” Here the antecedent *Pater* is the subject spoken of. *Pater noster qui es*, “ Our Father, who art.” Here *Pater* is the object spoken to, and the antecedent is the pronoun singular of the second person—thus, *O Tu Pater, qui es*, “ O Thou, who art.” This rule is violated in the following examples, “ *Benedicite Domino omnes aquæ, quæ super cœlos sunt*,” *Hieron. in Cant. Trium Puerorum*. The waters are not the subject spoken of, but the objects addressed. The antecedent, therefore, being *Vos*, and the relative being of the second person, the verb should be *Estis*, “ In atriis tuis Jerusalem, Jerusalem quæ ædificatur, ut civitas.” For the reason just now given, it should be *Ædificaris*.

When a future action is to be expressed, not indefinitely, in regard to its completion, but as perfect, the tense, called the future subjunctive, but more properly the future perfect, should be employed, and not the future of the indicative. Thus, “ You will do a thing very acceptable to me, if you will treat him in such a manner.” “ *Pergratum mihi feceris, si ita eum tractaris*.” *Cic. Fam. Ep. xiii. 71*. That is, “ You will have done.” This phraseology is very common in Cicero; and there is a peculiar propriety

in marking the completion of the favour, as contemporary with the completion of the action.

EXERCISE.

Cicero greets Servilius—"My friend from Laodicea, I value more since my departure; because I have, in many things, experienced him to be a grateful man. It was, therefore, with no small pleasure, I saw him at Rome: for it cannot have escaped your observation, who have done kindnesses to many persons, that very few are found grateful. You will do me a singular favour, if you will manifest to him your value for me—that is, if you will take him under your patronage, and assist him, as far as you can, consistently with honour, and your own convenience. This will be highly acceptable to me; and I earnestly entreat you to do it. Farewell."

OBSERVATIONS.

ANIMOSUS.

FORTIS.

STRENUUS.

Animosus, according to Dumesnil, denotes a vigorous temper or disposition of mind; while *Fortis* denotes the actions, which spring from this temper. *Animosus*, he says, is the cause, and *Fortis* the effect; the former belonging to him, who dares; and the latter to him, who executes. *Strenuus* he explains, as denoting "active and brave." The distinction here given between *animosus* and *fortis*, is somewhat incorrect; for the latter, so far from being confined to action, very often, and especially, as Hill observes,

when coupled with *strenuus*, denotes the mere sentiment of courage—the temper, and not the conduct. Some critics have considered *Fortis* as a modification of the general attribute implied by *Animosus*.—But, if these two terms bore one to the other, either the relation of cause to effect, or of genus to species, would there not be an impropriety in saying, *Fortis et animosus*, and also *Animosus et fortis*? Yet both these expressions occur in classic writers, “*Rebus angustis, animosus atque, Fortis appare.*” *Hor. Car.* ii. 10. 21. “*Videremus quid esset fortis et animosi viri.*” *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.* lib. 2.

Perhaps the distinction may be explained thus; *Animosus* is an attribute of the soul; *fortis*, strictly, is an attribute of body, denoting “strength and firmness.” Its primitive meaning may be seen in such expressions as “*Reddes forte latus.*” *Hor. Ep.* i. 7. 25. “*Pascit fortes juvencos.*” *Virg. Georg.* iii. 50. Its figurative meaning is discoverable in the following expression of Cicero, “*Genus dicendi forte et vehemens.*” *Cic. de Orat.* lib. iii. When used metaphorically and specially, as applied to the mind, it denotes, that vigour of soul, which is denominated either courage, or bravery. *Leo est animalium fortissimus*, “The lion is the most courageous of animals.”—“*Adolescens bonus et fortis.*” *Cic. in Verr.* “A youth good and brave.” *Animosus* (derived from *animus*, literally, “breath,” “wind,” and hence “the soul,”) denotes, strictly, “possessing great spirit.” Its strict and proper signification may be seen in the fol-

lowing expressions, “Animosi Euri.” *Virg.* “Animosos ventos.” *Ov.* “Animosum frigus.” *Stat.* When applied to the mind, it denotes that character of the soul, which is expressed by the English phrase, “life and spirit.” This character forming an essential part of courage, the term is hence frequently used to denote “courageous.” This is its special and modified acceptance.

While *fortis*, therefore, may be defined generally, *Validis viribus præditus*, and specially, *Animi virtute præditus*, *animosus* may be explained, as denoting *Animi vehementiam habens*; referring to the spirit and ardor of the soul; whereas *fortis* points chiefly to the strength, and unshaken firmness of the mind.—*Strenuus* means “active,” “full of energy,” and, as distinguished from *animosus*, and *fortis*, always refers to *action*, being applied to a person characterised by acts of prowess. *Fortis*, as a synonyme of *animosus*, is opposed to *timidus*; and *strenuus*, as referring to action, is opposed to *ignavus*. “Compertum habeo, neque ex ignavo strenuum, neque fortem ex timido, exercitum oratione imperatoris fieri.” *Sall. B. C.* cap. 60.

The English pronoun *What*, not taken interrogatively, involves both antecedent and relative, as “I believe, what you say,” that is, “I believe that, which you say,” “Amat, quod tu das.” *Ter. Eun.* iii. 1. 57. “She loves, what (that, which) you give.” *Amat id, quod tu das.*

EXERCISE.

If I had been Cæsar, I would have dealt thus with the king of the Gauls. “ Brother,” I would have said, “ some evil genius raised this war between us; nor has the contest been for life, but for sovereignty. You, to the utmost of your power, shewed yourself a brave and active soldier; fortune, however, favoured me, and made you a prisoner, from being a king. What happened to you, might have happened to me; and your disaster reminds us of the instability of all human things. I give you your life; I give you your liberty; and I receive you as a friend, instead of an enemy. Henceforth let us vie with each other in good offices; and let the subject of our contention be, not which of us shall have the more extensive sway, but which of us shall reign with the greater moderation.”

OBSERVATIONS.

URERE.

CREMARE.

The former of these verbs denotes simply, “ To burn;” the latter, “ To burn to ashes.”—The former is applied to material and immaterial substances; the latter to material objects only. *Cremare* expresses the effect of heat; *Urere* the effect of heat or cold. “ Nullum desperationis majus indicium esse, quam quod urbes, quod agros suos urerent.” *Curt.* iv. 14. “ Hunc amor, ira quidem communiter urit utrumque.” *Hor. Ep.* i. 2. 13. “ Uro hominem.” *Ter. Eun.* ii. 2. “ I nettle the man.” In the two last examples it is applied to the mind. “ Pernoctant venatores in nive, in montibus uri se patiuntur.” *Cic. Tusc.* ii. 40. Here it denotes

“To be pinched with cold.” Sometimes it signifies,
 “To be pinched by pressure.”—“Ut calceus olim Si
 pede major erit, subvertet; si minor, uret.” *Hor. Ep.*
i. 10. 43. “Omnes collegas suos vivos cremavit.”
Val. Max. vi. 3. 2. “He burned them to ashes.”

GAUDERE.

LÆTARI.

We find sometimes an emotion, or passion, of the mind, and the expression of that emotion, denoted by distinct terms. Thus, *Dolor*, “Pain of body,” or “Grief of mind.” *Fletus*, *Ejulatus*, *Tristitia*, “The expression of grief, by tears, wailing, sadness of countenance.” *Misereor*, “I pity;” *Miseror*, “I deplore,” or “express my pity.” *Miserari*, says Gifanius, is equivalent to *Miserum dicere*. Sometimes we find the emotion, and the expression of that emotion, denoted by the same term; thus, *Admirari* signifies “to admire,” and also “to express admiration.” “Diodoro quid faciam Stoico, &c. quem et *admiror*, et diligo.” *Cic. de Orat.* Here is signified, merely, the sentiment of admiration.—“His ultro arrideo, et eorum ingenia *admiror* simul.” *Ter. Eun. ii. 2. 19.* The verb *Admirari* denotes here an expression of the sentiment, “I praise their parts,” or “I express my admiration of their talents.”—*Lugere* signifies “to mourn,” or “grieve for a deceased friend, or relative,” and also “to wear mourning, as an expression of grief.”—*Mœrere* “to be deeply affected with grief,” and also “to express that grief by countenance, or aspect.”

Gaudere denotes “To feel the calm and rational emotion of joy;”—*Lætari*, “to be overjoyed,” or “to be transported with joy.” Cicero ranks *Lætitia* among the “*Perturbationes animi*,” or “*Appetitus vehementiores*,” (See *Tusc. Quæst.* lib. 4,) and observes, that *Lætitia* occasions “*Profusam hilaritatem*,” “*Extravagant gaiety*,” “*Intemperate gladness, or mirth*.” In the following passage, he expresses his disapprobation of this excessive joy. “*Atque ut diffidere decet, timere non decet; sic gaudere decet, lætari non decet, quoniam docendi causa a gaudio lætitiâ distinguimus.*” *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.*

It is to be observed, however, that *Lætitia* and *Lætor* do not always denote “*Unbecoming triumph*,” or “*Intemperate joy*.” Cicero himself, speaking of his own deportment, where no censure is intended, says, “*Nulla enim re tam lætari soleo, quam meorum officiorum conscientia.*” *Fam. Ep.* lib. v. 7.—*Lætitia*, in like manner, is represented as either moderate, or excessive, thus, “*Admiratus rex tanta magnitudine animi oppetere mortem, revocari eos jussit, causam tam effusæ lætitiæ, quum supplicium ante oculos haberent, requirens.*” *Curt.* vii. 10.—“*Militantium nec indignatio nec lætitia moderata est.*” *Curt.* vii. 1. And in the following passage, the excess appears rather to be denoted by the attributives *gestiens* and *nimia*, than implied by the term itself, though several critics, it must be acknowledged, have quoted the passage, as an evidence that *Lætitia* means “*Excessive joy*.” “*Cum ratione animus movetur placide*

atque constanter, tum illud *gaudium* dicitur; cum autem inaniter et effuse animus exultat, tum illa *lætitia* gestiens vel nimia dici potest." *Cic. Tusc. Quæst. lib. 4.*

As vehement passions manifest themselves by gestures, countenance, or external actions, *Lætor* and *Lætitia* denote not only the feeling, or emotion, but also the expression of joy. A. Gellius defines *Lætitia* to be "Exultatio animi quædam cum gaudio efferventiore." *Lib. ii. cap. 26.* "*Gaudium*," says Noltenius, "est quum animus ratione movetur placide et constanter; *Lætitia*, quum animus affectum suum prodit per actus externos." Accordingly we find *Gaudium*, "The emotion of joy," opposed to *Luctus*, "The passion of grief;" and *Lætitia*, "Gladness," or "The manifestation of joy," to *Tristitia*—and *Mæror*, "Sadness of countenance." "Ex summa *lætitia* atque lascivia, quæ diuturna quies pepererat, repente omnes *tristitia* invasit." *Sall. B. C. cap. 31.* "Ita varie per omnem exercitum *lætitia*, *mæror*; *luctus*, atque *gaudia* agitabantur." *Id. B. C. cap. 61.*

Gaudere, therefore, appears to be distinguished from *Lætari* by these two circumstances:—1st. The former always expresses "joy rational and temperate"; the latter, sometimes, "a transport of joy." 2dly, The one denotes the simple emotion; the other the expression of that emotion; and it is this latter circumstance, which seems to constitute the chief distinction.

VIR.

HOMO.

Vir means “A man,” in contradistinction to “A woman,” or “A boy” *Vir* est, non *femina*—*Vir*, non *puer*. *Homo* denotes “One of the human species,” as opposed to a being of another species, to one of a superior, or one of an inferior, order.—*Homo*, non *deus*, “A man, not a God.” *Homo*, non *bellua*, “A man, not a brute.” Hence, as denoting merely a being having the form of humanity, *homo* is used to express “a slave,” or “the lowest of the species.” “Habebamus tunc Cappadocem hominem.” *Petron.* cap. 63., i. e. *Servum*. *Homo*, however, is sometimes used for *vir*, thus, “Mi homo, et mea mulier.” *Plaut. Cist.* iv. 2. 57.

Vir, being employed to denote “A man,” not a woman, or a boy, and implying those qualities and properties which constitute the *Man*, is used, as a term of respect; and hence it often signifies, emphatically, “A hero.”—*Homo* being applicable to any of the human species indiscriminately, implies no peculiar merit, or excellence, in the individual, to whom it is applied; and is used indifferently for men of any class, or character.

Vavassor observes, that Cicero seems to distinguish between *Vir* and *Homo*, but that the difference is more easily illustrated by examples, than explained in words. “Marco Fabio, viro optimo et homine doctissimo, familiarissime utor.” *Ep. Fam.* ii. 14. “Virum bonum et magnum hominum perdidimus.”

Ep. ad Att. iv. 6. “Credo Syrenem dicis, et Polydemum, cum optimos viros, tum doctissimos homines.” *De Fin.* ii. 119. “De quo tibi homine hoc spondeo,—probiorem hominem, meliorem virum, pudentio- rem esse neminem.” *Ep. Fam.* vii. 5. “Catonem me- hercle hominem, vel potius summum et singularem virum.” *De clar. Orat.* 135. When they are thus opposed to each other, it may naturally be presumed, that *Homo* points to the leading characters of the species, feeling, affection, and intellect, as modified by circumstances; *Vir*, to patience, fortitude, firmness, and energy. The one regards him as a sentient and intelligent, the other as an active, being. “Non sen- tire mala,” says Seneca, “non est *hominis*; et non ferre non est *viri*.” *Sen. de Cons. ad Polyb.* “Tulit dolorem, ut *vir*; et ut *homo* majorem ferre sine causa necessaria noluit,” (*Cic. Tusc. Quæst.*) that is, “Ma- rius bore the pain like a man (emphatically), but as a sentient and rational being, he would not bear greater pain, without some necessary cause.” “Te hortarer, rogaremque ut et hominem te, et virum, esse memi- nisses, id est, ut communem incertumque casum sapienter ferres, et dolori fortiter ac fortunæ resisteres.” *Cic. Ep. Fam.* v. 17. Here, observes Manutius, “Ab homine sapientiam, a viro fortitudinem postulat.” Va- vassor remarks, that the expression *Bonus homo* occurs only twice in Cicero; *Vir bonus*, a thousand times. It may be remarked also, that the latter expression is significant of respect, while *bonus vir* is generally used ironically, meaning the reverse. “Ille autem bonus

vir nusquam apparet.” *Ter. Eun.* iv. 3. 18. “He, good gentleman, is no where to be seen.” We have, indeed, in the same author, “*Ut est ille bonus vir, tria non commutabitis verba,*” *Ter. Ph.* iv. 3, 3, where the expression is used respectfully. Some manuscripts, however, have *vir bonus*.

EXERCISE.

Pyrrhus, having attacked the city of the Argives, was slain in the night time, and was found dead in the streets next morning. Alcyoneus, the son of king Antigonus, having cut off his head, carried it to his father, and threw it down at his feet; on which Antigonus chid him in severe terms, for rejoicing at the fate of so great a man, unmindful of the instability of all human things. After this he took up the head, and, having restored it to the body of Pyrrhus, caused him to be honourably burned; and having inclosed his bones in a golden urn, gave them to his son Helenus, to be carried into Epire.

OBSERVATIONS.

PRUDENTIA.

SAPIENTIA.

These words agree, in signifying knowledge. The former, however, denotes merely that knowledge, by which we distinguish things good, evil, and indifferent. “*Rerum bonarum et malarum, neutrarumque scientia. Partes ejus memoria, intelligentia, providentia.*” *Cic. de Inv.* 2. 53. *Sapientia* implies more than this, including *prudentia*, *scientia*, and *cognitio*, or knowledge generally. And, while the former is

confined to human things, the latter is extended to things divine. “Quæ (prudentia) est rerum expectandarum fugiendarumque scientia; illa autem sapientia, quam principem dixi, rerum est divinarum, atque humanarum.” *Cic. Off.* 1. 43.

HUMILITAS.

MODESTIA.

Humility, considered as the name of a Christian grace, denotes that lowliness of mind, of which we are conscious, when we reflect, what we are, in the eye of our Maker. For this virtue, the Latins had no name; the term *humilitas*, implying “lowness,” as opposed to “height,” and metaphorically “meanness,” and “abjectness.” “*Humilitas*,” says Cellarius *, “*altitudini opponitur*,” e. g. “*Humilitas navium*.” *Cæs. B. G.* lib. v. “*Humilitas animi, non virtus, sed vitium*.” *Cellar. de Sign. Barb.* “*Sidera inter se altitudine, et humilitate distantia*.” *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.* v. 69. Here it is literally opposed to *altitudo*. In the following passage, it denotes, metaphorically, “abjectness,” as opposed to dignity. “*Quis enim erat, qui non videret, humilitatem cum dignitate contendere?*” *Cic. pro Rosc. Am.* When the term *humility* is used, as synonymous with *modesty*, it denotes the absence of pride, vanity, and arrogance, in relation to our fellow creatures. In this sense it may be rendered, though not with strict pre-

* See also *Vorstius de Lat. merito suspecta*.

cision, by *modestia* ; but as the name of a Christian virtue, it is incapable of translation into the Latin language by a single term. Borrichius has, indeed, produced a few examples, in which *humilitas* is employed as nearly synonymous with *modestia* ; but they are examples of inferior authority, and unworthy of imitation. Castalio, sensible of the impropriety of using *humilitas* for the Christian virtue “humility,” employs the term *modestia* ; but this term conveys no idea of that piety, self-abasement, and reverential submission to the Supreme Being, which are expressed by the theological term “humility.” *Submissio animi*, an expression adopted by some translators, is equally objectionable.

ABLATIVE ABSOLUTE.

After carefully perusing the observations, which we have already offered, on the ablative absolute, the learner should attend to the following examples : “The king having said these things, the ambassadors departed,” *Rege hæc locuto, legati discesserunt*. In this example, the Latin exactly corresponds to the English, the verb being deponent, and the signification of its perfect participle, *Having spoken*. The substantive *king*, with which the participle agrees, not being the nominative to any verb, or a regimen to any word in the sentence, is, therefore, put in the ablative absolute. It is to be observed, however, as we have just now remarked, that the Latin precisely

corresponds to the English, and is a close translation of it. But, if instead of a deponent verb, we employ a passive verb, the meaning of the perfect participle of which is *Being*, and not *Having*, the English must be turned, so as to make it tally with the Latin. Thus, "These things being said by the king, the ambassadors departed," *His a rege dictis, legati discesserunt* *.

Cellarius observes, that *a* or *ab*, after a passive verb, does not always signify *by*, or denote the efficient cause, if the verb in the active voice admit the same preposition after it. Thus, *Redimere ab aliquo* signifies "To ransom from any one," as *A prædonibus redemerunt*, "They ransomed from the robbers;" strictly, therefore, he observes, *Redempti a Christo*, signifies, "Redeemed *from* Christ," not "*by* Christ."

It may be questioned, whether the meaning of the expression be strictly, what Cellarius affirms; for *a*, or *ab*, after a passive verb, is uniformly employed to denote the principal agent; but it cannot be denied, that the expression is ambiguous. Perspicuity, therefore, requires that, in such cases, *by* and *from* should be carefully distinguished. For, if we say *Pax ab iis petita est*, to denote either, "Peace was asked by them," or "Peace was asked from

* This phraseology does not often occur. Its accuracy having been questioned, I quote the following example. "Orationem principis secuto patris consulto, primi Ædui senatorum in urbe jus adepti sunt." *Tac. Ann. xi. 25.*

them ;” it must be impossible, in many cases, to determine, which is the intended meaning of the expression. Thus also, if we say, *Ab iis impetrata est*, to signify either, “from them,” or “by them,” the context only can determine, which of the two interpretations is to be adopted. To avoid this ambiguity, we should employ *a*, or *ab*, after the passive verb, to express the principal agent, and *de*, *e*, or *ex*, for *from*. Thus, *Ab eo quæsitum est*, “It was asked by him,” or, “He asked.” *Ex eo quæsitum est*, “It was inquired of him,” or “He was asked.” Inattention to this rule has produced, among many others, the following ambiguities. “*Ab Æduis bellum timebatur*,” *Liv.* iii. 15, “War was feared *from*, or *by* the Ædui.” The preposition *ex* for *ab*, would have removed the ambiguity. “*Agri a Vols- cis capti*,” *Liv.* iii. 1. “*A quo cum quæreretur*,” *Cic. Off.* ii. 25. “*Abstinebatur a patribus*,” *Liv.* iii. 36. “*A Vejente hoste clades accepta*,” *Id.* ii. 48. In general, however, the excellent historian from whom chiefly these examples are taken, and also Cicero, Cæsar, and Sallust, carefully attend to this distinction. “*In dominos quæri de servis iniquum est*,” *Cic. pro Rosc. Amer.* “*Oppida capta de Latinis*,” *Liv.* i. 38, “Taken *from* the Latins.” “*Captum ex hostibus*,” *Liv.* ii. 42. “Taken *from* the enemy.” The reader should uniformly bear in mind, that no authority whatever can justify ambiguity. It is necessary here to offer another caution to the junior reader, respecting the use of *a*, or *ab*,

after a passive verb. Some passive verbs, when followed by a noun in the ablative case, frequently express the same thing with the neuter verb, of cognate import with the noun. Thus, *affici dolore—gaudio—metu*, are the same as *dolere—gaudere—metuere*. “To grieve,” “to rejoice,” “to fear.” But, when the verb denotes not “to be affected with,” or, “to feel these emotions,” but “to be influenced,” or “governed by them,” the preposition must be expressed; thus, “*Gratiam illum . . . a qua te affici non magis potuisse demonstras, quam Herculem Xenophontium illum a voluptate.*” *Cic. Ep. Fam. v. 12.* “You were no more capable of being influenced by good will, than Hercules was by pleasure.”

Heusinger has observed, that *quam primum* is often confounded by modern writers with *quum primum*. The former means, “as soon, as possible,” the latter, “as soon as,” equivalent to *simul ac*, or *ubi primum*, and “when first.”

EXERCISE.

True wisdom never fails to be accompanied with humility. Certain Ionian young gentlemen having bought from Milesian fishermen a single cast of a net, as soon as the net was drawn on shore, a golden tripod made its appearance. The fishermen affirming, that they had sold only what fishes should be taken, and the young men maintaining, that they had a right to every thing contained in the net, a dispute arose between them, concerning the property of the tripod. To put an end to this dispute, they consulted the oracle at Delphos, who ordered it to be given to the wisest man in

Greece. They gave it, therefore, to Thales, he to Bias ; and, having gone through the other wise men of Greece, it came at last to Solon ; who saying, that God only excelled in wisdom, advised it to be sent to the oracle of Apollo.

OBSERVATIONS.

In the Latin language, the distinction between the active and the passive voice is, by prose writers, strictly observed, but in English the former is frequently employed for the latter. This idiom deserves attention. We say, for example, “ The grass cuts easily.” “ The wine drinks harsh.” “ The cloth soon tears.” In these examples, the verb evidently has a passive signification ; for the subject is neither active nor neuter, but clearly acted upon. If I say, “ He delights in reading,” the verb has evidently a passive meaning, under an active form. Its nominative does not act ; but is, on the contrary, acted upon. Accordingly, in Latin, we find either the passive verb employed, as *Delectatur legendo*, “ He is delighted with reading,” or, if the active verb be used, the person is still represented as receiving the action of the verb (*verbi transitus*) as *Delectat eum legere*, “ He delights to read,” “ He is delighted with reading,” and, literally, “ To read delights him.”

It is remarked by Mr. Pickbourn, in his dissertation on the English verb, that the use of the form *amatus fui* for the preterite passive is very uncommon ; and that, though it cannot be pronounced un-

grammatical, the form *amatus sum* is far preferable. He states that, “after reading a great part of Victor, Eutropius, Nepos, Justin, Cæsar, Sallust, Cicero’s Orations, Phædrus, Ovid’s Metamorphoses and Tristia, Virgil, Horace, Terence, and Juvenal, he was able to collect only three-and-twenty instances of *fuit* being joined to a perfect participle.” Our attention was drawn to this subject by Mr. Pickbourn’s Dissertation, which we perused immediately after its publication; and we have found, in the course of our reading, that a combination of the perfect participle with *fuit* very rarely occurs. It would seem also, that in several of those examples (we will not say in all) in which it does occur, the predicate has the character of a participial or adjective, rather than of a participle.

EXERCISE.

Cambyses, king of Persia, was immoderately addicted to drinking. Præxaspes, one of his dearest friends, advised him to drink more sparingly, saying, that drunkenness was shameful in a king. Cambyses replied, “I will immediately shew you, that, after drinking, my hands and eyes can do their duty.” He then drank more freely, than on other occasions; and being intoxicated, he ordered Præxaspes’s son to stand at a distance, with his left hand raised above his head. Then he bent his bow, and pierced the heart of the youth, asking his father, at the same time, if he had a steady enough hand. Such was the cruelty of this monster. The man, who delights in the misery of others, is unworthy of life.

OBSERVATIONS.

PECUNIA.

NUMMUS.

Servius says, that *Pecunia* is derived from *Pecus*, because all wealth originally consisted in cattle. “*Omnis pecuniæ pecus fundamentum*,” says Varro. Columella delivers the same opinion. “*Itaque sicut veteres Romani præceperunt, ipse quoque censeo tam pecorum quam agrorum cultum pernoscere; nam in rusticatione, vel antiquissima ratio est pascendi, eademque quæstuosissima. Propter quod nomina quoque et pecuniæ et peculii tracta videntur a pecore, quoniam id solum veteres possederunt.*” *Col. lib. vi.* Pliny adopts a different ground of derivation. He says, that *Pecunia* was so called, because it was stamped with the figures of sheep and oxen—that Servius Tullius was the first of the Romans that stamped it—and that their original coin consisted only of brass. He tells us further, that silver was stamped in the year of the city 484, five years before the first Punic war, and gold sixty-two years afterwards. Plutarch, in his life of Poplicola, says, that ancient coins were marked with the figure of a sheep, a sow, or an ox. Aristotle likewise observes, that the Rhegians marked their coin with the figure of a hare—the Cephallenians with that of a horse—the Argives with a mouse, and sometimes a wolf.

Nummus, according to some writers, is derived from *Numa*, who is reported by Suidas, to have been

the first of the Roman kings that introduced money made of brass; which, before his time, consisted of shells only, or leather—Suetonius, I believe, adopts this opinion. Others, with more probability, derive it from *Nóμος*, *Lex*, as *Numisma* is derived from *Nόμισμα*, because the use of money, instead of exchange by barter, was established by law. Lampri- dius seems to apply *Pecunia* to copper money only. He says, in his Life of Severus, “Nunquam aurum, nunquam argentum, vix *pecuniam* donavit.”

The distinction, however, between *Pecunia* and *Nummus* appears rather to be, that *Pecunia* means, “any property,” whether consisting of slaves, cattle, lands, houses, money, or any moveable effects—whereas *Nummus* always refers to “Coin,” or “Stamped money.” “Ad extremum pecunia, quo uno nomine continentur omnia, quorum jure domini sumus.” *August. de l. arb.* i. 15. “Pecuniæ nomine non solum numerata pecunia, sed omnes res, tam soli, quam mobiles, et tam corpora, quam jura.” *Ulp.* “Hoc posito, hæc jura pontificum auctoritatis consecutæ sunt, ne morte patrisfamilias sacrorum memoria occideret, et ut iis essent ea adjuncta, ad quos ejusdem morte *pecunia* venerit.” *Cic. de Leg.* ii. 48, “Si magna pars *pecuniæ* legata est.” *Ib.* ii. 49. In these passages, it seems to denote chiefly moveable property. “Amplissimæ *pecuniæ* fit dominus.” *Cic. Orat. pro Rosc. Am.* “He becomes the proprietor of a very large fortune.” Here it denotes property of any kind whatever—chiefly, how-

ever, what we term landed property, with its appurtenances. So also, in the following passages, “In hac enim causa cum viderent, illos amplissimam *pecuniam* possidere, hunc in summa mendicitate esse.” *Cic. pro Rosc. Am.* “Hoc cuiquam ferendum putas esse, nos ita vivere in *pecunia* tenui?” *Cic. Orat. in Ver.* “That we should thus live in narrow circumstances,” or “with a scanty fortune?” It is generally used in a more limited sense, as equivalent to *nummi*.

Pecuniosus and *Locuples* are thus distinguished by Cicero, agreeably to their original import, “Multaque ditioe ovium et boum, quod tunc erat res in pecore, et in locorum possessionibus, ex quo pecuniosi et locupletes vocabantur.” *Cic. Frag.*

Nummus, as has been observed, denotes coin. “Si sapiens adulterinos *nummos* acceperit,” *Cic. de Off.* “Counterfeit money.” “Sed nunc omnia ista jacere puto propter *nummorum* caritatem.” *Cic. Ep. ad Att.* ix. 11. “On account of the scarcity of money.”

Pecunia, if used for money, implies, uniformly, money in general; *Nummus* often denotes one particular piece of money, generally, the *Sestertius*, i. e. *Semistertius* marked LLS or HS, equal to two pounds and a half of brass, (duobus assibus cum tertio semisse,) or to the fourth part of a *Denarius*. The *Sestertius* was a silver coin, and was equal, in our money, to one penny, three farthings, and three-fourths of a farthing.

It may be here remarked, for the information of the junior reader, that *pecunia* is sometimes suppressed. “Quoniam collectam, Crasse, a conviva exigis.” *Cic. de Orat.* “Tres aureos accipiat absque sua pulveratica.” *Const. Theod. and Valent.* “Pecunia pulveratica,” was the money given to servants, when they went to war. —

It is very common in English, when reflex action is implied, that is, when the person, or thing, acting, is likewise acted upon, to suppress the pronoun after the verb. In this sense, English verbs are considered by Johnson as neuter. Here he appears to err; for, surely the verb is not the less active, because the action is not transitive, but confined to the agent. In French, active verbs thus employed are called “Reflex verbs,” and in that language, as in Latin, unless among the poets, the pronoun after the verb is very generally expressed; after some verbs, indeed, it is never omitted. We say, in English, either, “He behaves,” or “He behaves himself;” but, in Latin, we must say, *Sese gerit*. In English we say, “He turned himself away from the sight,” or “He turned away from the sight;” but, in Latin, we must say, *A speculo sese avertit*. In the same manner, if the English verb be intransitive, and the Latin verb transitive, the pronoun must be expressed after the verb—thus, “They interfered,” *Illi sese interposuerunt*, that is, “They interposed themselves.” Among the poets, the pronoun is frequently omitted—thus, “Jam nox humida cœlo præcipitat.” *Virg.* for *Præcipitat se*.

“Volventibus annis.” *Virg.* i. e. *Sese volventibus*. Sometimes, in prose, we find the active verb used reflexively, without the pronoun—thus, “Multi jam menses transierant, et hyems jam præcipitaverat.” *Cæs. B. G.* iii. 25. “Ab eo loco conscendi, ut transmitterem,” (alii legunt) “trajicerem.” *Cic. Phil.* 1. “Postquam ille Canusio moverat.” *Cic. Att.* ix. 1. for *sese moverat*, or *discesserat*. “Terror paulatim totus vertere in plebem cœpit.” i. e. *Vertere se*, or *Verti*. *Liv.* iii. 36. It is necessary, however, to admonish the scholar, never to employ the active verb in this manner, unless warranted by unexceptionable authority.

It has been already observed, that *Homo*, denoting any one of the human species, whether man, woman, or child, expresses no peculiar excellence of any individual of that species, and that *Vir*, on the contrary, implies a pre-eminence. “Monebat (Alexander) quemadmodum Dario majorem turbam *hominum* esse, sic *virorum* sibi,” *Just.* xi. 3, “He admonished them to consider, that as Darius had a greater number of persons, so *he* had a greater number of men.” Hence *homo* is sometimes used contemptuously, and may be employed to express the ideas annexed to the English term “fellow,” when used in a disrespectful sense.

EXERCISE.

A certain maid-servant had received a sum of money from two strangers, on this condition, that she should not restore it, unless both of them were present. Some time

afterwards, one of them returned to her; and pretending, that his companion was dead, carried off the money. Afterwards came the other also, and demanded it. The poor girl was at a loss, what to do; having neither money, nor friends to defend her, she was actually reduced to that state of despair, as even to think of putting an end to her existence. Demosthenes, having heard the affair, interposed in her behalf, and said to the man; “The woman is ready to return the money, but unless you bring your companion, she cannot do it, consistently with her engagement.” On this the fellow went away.

OBSERVATIONS.

ORTUS.

ORIUNDUS.

Valla and Noltenius have observed, that *Oriundus* is construed differently from *Ortus*, that the former is joined, 1st. To the ablative, with the prepositions *A*, or *Ab*, as *A Roma oriundus*: 2dly. Without a preposition, as *Oriundum Alba sacerdotium*: 3dly. To adverbs, *Inde est oriundus, unde tui majores*; and that *Ortus* takes only the genitive of the names of towns, or the ablative, if they be of the third declension, or plural number. With greater propriety they might have said, that the place of nativity is not governed, in any instance, by *Ortus*, as it is by *Oriundus*—thus, we say, *Româ oriundus*, but *Romæ ortus*. The latter expression means, “born at Rome.”

Ortus and *Oriundus* are thus distinguished, in regard to meaning, by Noltenius, and some other critics. *Ortus*, they say, respects the circumstances of our own birth; this is the opinion of Noltenius: and

Oriundus regards those of our ancestors. “Nati Carthagine, sed oriundi a Syracusis.” *Liv.* xxiv. 6. To shew that this distinction is not uniformly attended to, Fornerius quotes the two following passages, “Qui ab ingenuis oriundi sunt.” *Cic. Top.* cap. vi. “Denique cœlestis sumus omnes semine oriundi.” *Lucr.* ii. 989. These two passages do not appear to me to overthrow this distinction; and I am inclined to believe, that, while *Ortus* refers to one’s more immediate ancestors, *Oriundus* refers to the origin of the family.

The following phrases deserve attention: “He was on the point of being ruined,” *Fere in eo erat, ut periret*, i. e. “He was almost in that situation, that he was ruined,” or *Parum abfuit, quin periret. Non multum abfuit, quin periret. Propius nihil factum est, quam ut periret.* *Cic. Ep. ad Q. Fr.* “He was far from being ruined,” *Multum abfuit, ut periret.* “We are so far from being unwilling, that any thing should be written against us, that we even much wish it,” “*Tantum abest, ut scribi contra nos nolumus, ut id etiam maxime optemus.*” *Cic.* “You were so far from inflaming our minds,” “*Tantum abfuit, ut inflammares animos nostros.*” *Cic.*

EXERCISE.

Dionysius, being charmed with the character of Plato, expressed a great desire to see him. The philosopher, then about forty years of age, paid the tyrant a visit. But the king being displeased with the freedom of his conversation on the subject of monarchy, Plato was on the point of being

put to death ; his friends, however, Dion and Aristomenes, pleaded his cause ; and, at their intercession, the tyrant spared his life, but delivered him to one Potidius, to be sold as a slave. This man, accordingly, transported him to Ægina ; and happy was it for Plato, that one Anniceres, a native of Cyrene, was in the island at the time ; for he paid the sum which Potidius demanded, and sent the philosopher back to Athens.

OBSERVATIONS.

In for “ Into,” governs the accusative ; for “ In,” it is joined to the ablative. To this rule there are a few exceptions—thus, “ To give in marriage,” “ Dare in matrimonium.” *Cic.* “ Collocare in matrimonium.” *Cæs.* “ To speak in praise,” “ Dicere in laudem.” *Aul. Gell.* “ To succeed in the room of any one,” “ Alicui in locum succedere.” *Liv.* “ To substitute in the room,” “ Sufficere in locum.” *Liv.* “ In future,” “ In futurum.” “ To be in friendship,” “ In amicitiam esse,” *Cic. Verr.* more commonly in the ablative. “ To speak in blame of any one,” “ In culpam dicere.” *Aul. Gell.* “ Nearly in these words,” “ In hæc ferme verba.” *Liv.* xxv. 12. “ In,” or “ after the manner,” “ In modum,” *Cic. Liv. Tac.* as *Mirum in modum*, “ In a wonderful manner.” *Servilem in modum*, “ After the manner of slaves.” *In memoriam*, “ In memory,” an expression common in epitaphs ; but its accuracy has been questioned. The expression “ ad memoriam,” occurs several times in Cicero ; and “ in memoriam sempiternam spargere,” is a phraseology, which we find in his *Oratio*

pro Archia, in which the noun is used in an active sense, and follows a verb denoting motion. In later writers, it occurs frequently in a passive signification. “*Epulumque pronunciavit in filiae memoriam.*” *Suet. in Vit. J. Cæs.* “In honour,” *In honorem*; as, *Ponere in honorem*, “To erect in honour.” Vavassor observes, that the phrases, *In laudem*, *In honorem*, were never used by Cicero, nor by any writer anterior to him; and that *Honoris gratia*, *Laudis gratia*, were employed by the purest and best writers. He observes, further, that the Senecas were the first, who introduced this exceptionable phraseology. That Cicero never employed it, is true: but Vavassor mistakes, when he says, that the Senecas were the first, who introduced it, for we find in Horace, who wrote before their time, “*Plurimus in Junonis honorem, Aptum dicit equis Argos.*”—*Car. i. 7, 8, 9.*

It may be here remarked, in passing, that after the verb *Succedere*, the preposition *In* is sometimes joined, by modern Latin writers, with the ablative case—thus, Adams says in his *Selectæ*, “*Successit in regno.*” The verb *Succedere* being a verb of motion, signifying “To come up,” if *In* be used after it, the preposition should be joined with an accusative case. We have a few examples in Cicero, Justin, and I believe, Tacitus, in which the dative of the thing is used, as “*Successit regno.*” *Just.* “*Successit hæreditati,*” *Cic.*; but it may be safely affirmed, that no good authority can be pleaded for *Succedere in regno.*

“One of many,” is rendered, in Latin, by *unus*, unless followed by another, and then it is rendered by *alius*, as “One of the fingers,” *Unus e digitis*.—“One fought, another fled, and all were thrown into confusion,” *Alius pugnavit, alius fugit; et omnes turbati sunt*. One of two is rendered by *Alter*, as “One of the eyes,” *Alter oculorum*. “One of the hands,” *Altera manuum*, or *e manibus*. It may be remarked, as some aid to the memory of the scholar, that the pronominal adjectives expressing one of two, end in *er*—thus,

{ Which of many	<i>Quis.</i>
{ Whether, or which, of two	<i>Uter.</i>
{ One of many	<i>Unus.</i>
{ One of two	<i>Alter.</i>
{ None (of many)	<i>Nullus.</i>
{ Neither (of two)	<i>Neuter.</i>
{ Any (of many)	<i>Quilibet, or Quivis.</i>
{	<i>Quisquam, or Ullus.</i>
{ Either (of two)	<i>Uterlibet, or Utervis.</i>
{ Every one (of many)	<i>Quisque.</i>
{ Each (of two)	<i>Uterque.</i>
{ Whichsoever (of many)	<i>Quisquis, or Quicunque.</i>
{ Whethersoever (of two)	<i>Utercunque.</i>

Though the pronoun is generally understood, as the nominative to the verb, it must always be expressed, where a contrast is implied, or any emphasis laid upon the subject; as “I read, you write.” *Ego lego, tu scribis*.

There is a figure in grammar, termed *jeugma*, by which a word is in concord with, or under the government of, the nearest of two or more substantives, or attributives, to which it refers, and, with the necessary change of accidents, is understood to the rest; thus, “*Iratus rex est, reginaque non sine causa.*” Here *iratus* agrees with *rex* the nearest substantive, and changed into *irata* is understood to *regina*. “*Neque patris misereris, neque auxiliaris.*” Here *patris* is under the government of *misereris*, and *patri* is understood to *auxiliaris*. But it particularly deserves the attention of the reader, that, when, *nec, nec, aut, aut*, or any duplicate of similar particles, are connected with two substantives, verbs, or governing words, they are, as thus connected, considered as having a similar concord, and similar government. If they have not, the *jeugma* is inadmissible. Thus, we cannot say “*Tibi neque nocui, neque juvi,*” because the two verbs thus grammatically connected should have a similar power over the word they govern, whereas *nocere* governs the dative, and *juvare* the accusative case. We must say, “*Neque tibi nocui neque (te) juvi.*” We cannot say, “*Virgo corrupto vel corpore, vel mente,*” but “*corrupto vel corpore vel animo,*” or “*corrupto corpore vel mente,*” or “*corpore vel mente corrupta.*” This is a rule delivered by Valla, and justified, we believe, by classical usage. See *Despaut. Com. Gram.* p. 219.

EXERCISE.

A certain man, who had two daughters, gave one of them in marriage to a gardener, and the other to a potter. After the expiration of a few months, he went to see the wife of the gardener; and asked her, how she was, and in what situation her affairs were. She answered, that she had all things in abundance, and only prayed the Gods for one thing, namely, that they might have some rain, to water the potherbs. He then paid a visit to the wife of the potter, and put the same question to her. She answered, that she wanted nothing in the world but clear weather, to dry the earthenware. "If you," said the father, "want fair weather, and your sister wish for rain, I know not, what prayer I shall address to the Gods."

OBSERVATIONS.

QUI.

To ascertain when the relative pronoun should be joined to the indicative, and when to the subjunctive mood, is certainly one of the greatest difficulties, which the Latin language presents to the student in classic literature. The subject, indeed, is involved in great obscurity; nor is there to be found in any grammarian, that clear and ample information, which the scholar requires for his direction*. This arises chiefly

* This observation was made in the first edition, several years prior to the publication of Zumpt's Latin Grammar, in which the reader will now find the rules here given. Some of the learned author's examples, in illustration of these rules, clearly shew, that he has not been sufficiently attentive to the distinction, between the governing power of the relative word, and what is required by the sentiment itself.

from the difficulty of the subject, but partly also from inattention to that distinction between the subjunctive and the potential mood, which has been already explained, and which it may be useful now briefly to repeat.

It is to be observed, that, whenever the meaning is contingent, the potential mood must be employed ; and, in all such examples, it deserves particular attention, that the form of the verb is not affected by the relative, or any antecedent particle, but is strictly potential, the sense itself requiring that form. Thus, if we say, “ I read, that I may learn,” *Lego, ut discam*. —“ He sent men, who might tell the king,” *Misit homines, qui regi nunciarent*—the two verbs, *Discam* and *Nunciarent*, are not each *subjoined* to any preceding word, as its regimen ; but are to be considered as in the potential mood, the sentiment to be expressed clearly demanding that form of the verb. But, when this form is used, not because the sentiment requires it, as being contingent or conditional, but because the verb is subjoined to some adverb, conjunction, or indefinite term, which requires that form, it is then properly the subjunctive mood. If I say, “ He was so cruel a tyrant, that all men feared him,” *Tyrannus tam crudelis erat, ut omnes eum metuerent*—“ You err, who think,” *Erras, qui censeas*, the verbs *Metuerent* and *Censeas* must be considered as subjunctive ; for, were they not subjoined to *Ut* and *Qui*, they would be put in the indicative form, the sense being assertive and unconditional.

From inattention to this distinction, many grammarians have supposed, that, in the following, and similar examples, the verb is under the government of the relative pronoun, in respect to its mood. Nothing, however, can be more evident, than that the contingent meaning, and not the relative pronoun, requires the potential form:—" Ut omnibus in vitæ commodis una cum his fruuntur, quorum se amicitiaē dediderint," " To whose friendship they have (may have) devoted themselves." (*Cæsar, B. G. iii. 22.*) The indicative mood (*Dediderant*) would indicate a certain past event, and imply that they had actually devoted themselves; whereas the event was future and contingent, though represented as perfect, in respect to the state expressed by *Fruuntur*. " Seque ea, quæ *imperassent*, facturos pollicentur." *Cæs. iv. 22*, " They promise to do those things, which he should command." " L. Plancum proficisci jubet, ibique hiemare; quorumque opera *cognoverit* Tasgetium interfectum, hos ad se mittere," *Cæs. B. G. v. 25*, " He orders L. Plancus to send to him those persons, whom he learned, or should learn, to have been instrumental in the murder of Tasgetius." Some editions have *Cognoverant*, which is obviously inadmissible. Plancus had not learned, who were the authors of the murder, otherwise *Cognoverant* would be the apposite expression, but was, if possible, to find them out. " His mandavit, ut quæ diceret Ariovistus, cognoscerent, et ad se referrent," *Id. B. G. i. 38*, " He charged them to get acquainted with what

Ariovistus said, or should say, and report it to him."

In these examples, the state of the verb is not at all affected by the relative, as some grammarians have supposed. Its mood is strictly potential, the form of the verb being determined by the sense, and not subjunctive, as dependent on any antecedent word.

We proceed to consider, in what cases the relative affects the state of the verb, in other words, in what instances the relative pronoun requires the second form, or subjunctive mood, the sense being at the same time unconditionally assertive, and naturally requiring the indicative mood*.

* An attempt, in its object highly commendable, has been made by the Rev. R. Bathurst Greenlaw to reduce the following rules into one, and to shew, that the subjunctive mood is not the subject of any government, but is used solely "to distinguish the true predicate of a sentence." The author's rule is this. "If a clause be the TRUE subject of a proposition, or be properly attached to the TRUE subject, the verb of such clause is in the indicative mood; but if a clause be the TRUE predicate of a sentence (provided it does not contain the copula, blended with the verb) or, if it be properly attached to the TRUE predicate, the verb of such clause is invariably found in the subjunctive mood." To this rule he subjoins the following observations.

"1st. If a relative clause be employed, solely to define or explain more clearly an antecedent, and consequently has no connection with the predication, the verb in such clause is in the indicative mood; the clause being really parenthetical, and forming an independent sentence. 2dly, If the subject of a sentence be composed of two or more clauses, so dependent on one another, that together they form a perfect sentence, then if any verb is required to be in the subjunctive mood, as being attached

First, The pronoun *Qui* is uniformly joined to the subjunctive mood, when the relative clause does not express any sentiment of the author's, but refers it to the person or persons, of whom he is speaking.

Cæsar, in detailing the substance of the speech delivered by the Aduatici, when he was going to storm their towns, uses these words, “Dixerunt, unum petere, ac deprecari, si forte pro sua clementia ac mansuetudine, *quam* ipsi ab aliis *audirent*, statuisset Aduaticos esse conservandos, ne se armis despoliaret.” *Cæs. B. G. lib. ii. cap. 31.* Here it is obvious, that the relative clause expresses a sentiment delivered by the speakers, and is not to be considered as an obser-

to the predicate of the sentence taken independently, the same mood is used, when the sentence forms the subject of another.”

This canon the author considers to be not only universally true, but also of easy application. Simplicity of principle is, in all cases, so desirable, that every attempt to effect it should be favourably received ; and nothing would give me greater pleasure, than to have it in my power to say, consistently with truth, that the author's endeavour to establish his theory, is completely successful. My objections to his rule, as neither correct, nor easy in its application, I communicated to him by letter ; and I should have been gratified, if his replies had served to remove them. All that my limits will permit me to do here, is to offer, as I proceed, a few casual observations. But, while I thus candidly state my deliberate conviction, that the learned author has failed in establishing his doctrine, I feel it my duty, at the same time, to recommend the work, as containing many critical observations, worthy of the classical student's attention. His flattering notice of the “Gymnasium” and its author, I gratefully acknowledge.

vation of the author's. For Cæsar does not intend to tell his reader, that the Aduatici had heard of his clemency, but to inform him, that they themselves made this declaration.—The expression, “*Quam audirent*,” is equivalent, therefore, to *Quam ipsi audivisse dixerunt*; whereas *Ipsi audiebant* would imply an observation of Cæsar's equivalent to *Quam ego (sciz Cæsar) eos audivisse dico*. They conclude with saying, “*Sibi præstare, si in eum casum deducerentur, quamvis fortunam a populo Romano pati, quam ab his per cruciatum interfici, inter quos dominari consueissent.*” Here also the relative clause is an observation made by the speakers, and not by the author. *Consuerant* would imply an affirmation of Cæsar's. It would express a fact, as communicated by him, and not a statement, or observation, made by the Aduatici. In Cæsar's answer, we have another example, “*Civitatem conservaturum, si prius quam murum aries attigisset, se dedidissent; sed deditionis nullam esse conditionem, nisi armis traditis; se id, quod in Nerviiis fecisset, facturum.*” *B. G. ii. 32.* Here it is evident, that the relative clause is an observation of the speaker's. — “*Senatus decernit, Tarquiniî indicium falsum videri; eumque in vinculis retinendum, neque amplius potestatem faciundam, nisi de eo indicaret, cujus consilio tantam rem mentitus esset.*” *Sall. B. C. cap. 49.* *Mentitus esset* implies the senate's affirmation, that Tarquinius had told a falsehood, and not the historian's. “*Quod si fecerit, Æduorum auctoritatem apud omnes Belgas amplificaturum, quorum*

auxilio, siqua bella inciderint, sustentare *consuerint*.” *Cæs. B. G.* ii. 14. Had the verb been *Consuerunt*, it would have expressed an observation of Cæsar’s. It would have signified a fact, as incidentally communicated by the author; whereas *Consuerint* attributes the statement of the fact to Divitiacus. “Mamilius rogationem plebis ad populum promulgat, uti quæreretur in eos, *quorum* consilio Jugurtha senati decreta *neglexisset*.” *Sall. B. J.* cap. 44. The relative clause refers the charge of neglect to Mamilius, and not the historian. The meaning, indeed, in this passage, is also contingent. “Scire se illa esse vera, nec quenquam ex eo plus quam se doloris capere; propterea quod, quum ipse gratia plurimum domi, atque in reliqua Gallia, ille minimum propter adolescentiam posset, per se *crevisset*. Quibus opibus ac nervis non solum ad minuendam gratiam, sed pæne ad perniciem suam, *uteretur*.” *Cæs. B. G.* i. 21. Here the relative clause is the observation, not of Cæsar, but of Divitiacus, and is equivalent to *usum esse dixit*.

It would be easy to multiply examples, in illustration of this rule; conceiving, however, this to be unnecessary, we shall only subjoin the few following, “Ejusmodi sententiæ dicebantur, ut iisdem itineribus, *quibus pervenissent*, ad salutem contenderent.” *Cæs. B. G.* iii. 3. “Legatos, quod nomen ad omnes nationes sanctum inviolatumque semper *fuiisset*, retentos ab se, et in vincula coniectos.” *Ib.* iii. 9. “Quibus præliis calamitatibusque fractos, *qui* et sua virtute et populi Romani amicitia plurimum ante *potuissent*.”

Id. B. G. i. 31. “Sequanis vero, qui intra fines suos Ariovistum *recepissent*, *quorum* omnia oppida in potestate ejus *essent*, omnes cruciatus essent perferendi.”
Id. B. G. i. 32.—See *Liv. i. 47.* “Ex quo ipse *sit*.”
Ib. “Quæ omnia *fuerint*.” *Ib. i. 50.* “Qui concilium *indixerit*.” *Id. v. 15.* “Quo sibi eam mentem objecissent—quæ tum *cecinerit*.”—“Quæ Dii immortales vulgari *velint*.” *Liv. v. 15.* “Cum iis certamen fore, *quos* antea victos sub jugum *miserint*.”
Sall. B. J. cap. 53. “Quos Anco regnante *perpessi sint*.” *Liv. i. 52.* “Ad quem major pars injuriæ *pertineat*.” *Id. iii. 44.* “Quas *habuissent*.”
Cæs. B. G. i. 44. “Quam *voluisset*.” *Id. i. 45.*

By examining these several passages, the reader will find, that the relative clause expresses no statement of the author's, but refers the sentiment, or communication to the person, of whom the author is speaking, or whose sentiments the author is in substance detailing. In the following sentence, the relative clause may either be considered as expressing the conviction, or sentiment, of Fabius; or it may be reduced under another rule, which we shall soon have occasion to explain. “Sperans propitios esse Deos, *quorum* cultum, ne mortis quidem metu prohibitus *deservisset*, in Capitolium rediit.” *Liv. vi. 46.*

In the same manner, *Ubi* for *In quo loco*, not taken interrogatively, but relatively, in the sense now mentioned, governs the subjunctive mood—thus, “Romanos neque ullam facultatem habere navium, neque eorum locorum, *ubi* bellum gesturi *essent* . . .

perspiciebat.” *Cæs. B. G.* iii. 9. In the next sentence the author writes, “His initis consiliis . . . : naves in Venetiam, ubi Cæsarem primum bellum gesturum *constabat*, quam plurimas possunt, cogunt.” In the former of these passages *ubi* (in quo loco) is joined to the subjunctive mood, the relative clause being the subject of *perspiciebant*; in the latter with the indicative. *Quo* also for *Ad quem locum*, and *Unde* for *E quo loco*, relatively taken, and not expressing an observation of the author’s, or an object of his knowledge, govern the subjunctive mood:—thus, “Cognoscit, non longe ex eo loco oppidum Cassivellauni abesse, quo satis magnus hominum, precorisque numerus *convenerit*, i. e. *Convenisse intellexit*.” *Cæs. B. G.* v. 21. In the very next sentence, the relative clause expressing an observation of the author’s, we find the verb in the indicative mood. “Oppidum Britanni vocant, quum silvas impeditas vallo atque fossa munierunt, *quo* incursionis vitandæ causa, convenire *consuerunt*.” So also in the following sentence, “Certior factus est, ex ea parte vici, *quam* Gallis *concesserat*, omnes discessisse.” *Cæs. B. G.* iii. 2.

Whenever, therefore, the relative clause contains no statement, or observation, of the author’s, but expresses what is known, or communicated, by the person of whom he is speaking, or whose sentiments he is in substance detailing, the relative must be joined with the subjunctive mood *. On the contrary, when

* Mr. Greenlaw’s theory embraces this rule, and appears, in
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the relative clause is either the observation of the author, or the precise words of the person, of whom the author is speaking, the relative is joined to the indicative mood, unless the sense be contingent, or the subjunctive be required by either of the subsequent rules. The following short passages will still further illustrate this distinction.—“ Thus born, and thus elected king, he has favoured the meanest sort of mankind, whence he himself is sprung ; and the burdens, which were formerly common, he has laid on the principal citizens.”—These, supposed to be the words of Tarquin, addressed to the senators, would be thus rendered, “ Ita natus, ita creatus rex, fautor infimi generis hominum, ex quo *est* ipse, omnia onera, quæ communia quondam *fuerunt*, in primores civitates inclinavit.” But, if the historian did not introduce Tarquin as addressing the senate in his own words, but merely detailed the sentiments, which he expressed, the passage would proceed thus ; He said, “ That, being thus born, and thus elected king, he had favoured the meanest order of people, whence he himself was sprung ; and that the burdens, which had been formerly common, he had laid on the principal citizens,” “ Ita natum, ita creatum regem, fautorem infimi generis hominum, ex quo ipse *sit*, onera, quæ

truth, to be merely an extension of it to all the others, with this sole difference, that by the first rule in the “Gymnasium,” the relative clause must be part of the predicate, and by his doctrine, it may be either part of the predicate, or be only connected with it.

communia quondam *fuerint*, inclinasse in primores civitatis.”—See *Livy*, i. 47. “No man will enroll his name, no man will take up arms, none will fight for haughty lords, with whom they have no share in the honours of the state, and with whom, in private life, they can contract no affinity by marriage.” This is part of the speech of Canuleius, and is thus given by *Livy*; “Nemo est nomen daturus, nemo arma capturus, nemo dimicaturus pro superbis dominis, cum quibus nec in republica honorum, nec in privata connubii societas *est*.” *Liv.* iv. 3. The sentiments, as detailed by the historian, and not given in the words of the speaker, would be thus rendered, “Neminem esse nomen daturum, neminem arma capturum, neminem dimicaturum pro superbis dominis, cum quibus nec in republica honorum, nec in privata connubii societas *sit*.”—“Nihil est, quod expectetis tribunos, *quibus* ipsis vestro auxilio opus *est*.” *Liv.* Had *Livy* been detailing this in the words of the speaker, the sentence would have proceeded thus, “Nihil esse, quod tribunos expectent, *quibus* ipsis eorum auxilio opus *sit*.”

In almost all these examples, the subjunctive is equivalent to the infinitive mood, with *dixit* or *dixerunt*, the sentiment, in the relative clause, being that of the speaker, or of the person acting, and not of the author. This form of expression appears to have been adopted to distinguish between what is said, or observed, by the writer, and what is said, or observed, by the person, or persons, of whom he is writing, with-

out the tiresome repetition of the leading verb. Hence we find, that the subjunctive mood is used, not only as equivalent to *Dixit*, or *Dixerunt*, with the infinitive, but likewise in all oblique sentences, in which the following and subordinate verb is logically, though not grammatically, the subject of the antecedent and principal verb. In this case, in order to prevent the repetition of the principal verb, with the infinitive of that which denotes its subject, classic writers uniformly put the latter in the subjunctive mood—thus, “*Animadvertit Cæsar unos ex omnibus Sequanos nihil earum rerum facere, quas ceteri facerent.*” *Cæs. B. G. i. 32.* Here *Facerent* is equivalent to *Facere animadvertit*. “*Reperit ipsum esse Dumnorigem summa audacia—complures annos portoria, reliqua-que omnia Æduorum vectigalia parvo pretio redempta habere, propterea quod, illo licente, contra liceri audeat nemo.*” *Cæs. B. G. i. 18.*—“Cæsar finds, that Dumnorix was a man of consummate boldness, that he had the taxes of the Ædui on farm for several years, because, when he bade for them, no one dared to bid against him,” that is, “he finds, that no one dared to bid,” equivalent to *Audere reperit*. “*Æneum equum animadvertit, cujus in lateribus fores essent.*” *Cic. Off. iii. 9.* Here the relative clause is not an observation of the author’s. Cicero means to say, that Gyges observed a brazen horse, and observed also, that there was a door in his side. The passage is equivalent to “*Æneum equum animadvertit, cujus in lateribus (animadvertit) fores esse.*” Had Cicero

said, “Cujus in lateribus fores erant,” it would imply his own description of the horse, but would not signify, that Gyges observed the door in his side. The following sentence from A. Gellius serves at once to illustrate and confirm the rule. “Præterea traditum esse memoratumque, in ultima quadam terra, quæ Albania *dicitur*, gigni homines, qui in pueritia *canescant*,” lib. 9, cap. 4. In the former relative clause, being the observation of the writer, *qui* is joined to the indicative, in the latter, the relative clause is the subject of *traditum*, and therefore takes the subjunctive mood.

The reader may compare, at his leisure, the clauses, in which the relative occurs with the indicative mood, in the following passages, *Liv.* lib. v. cap. 51, 52, 53. *Id.* lib. i. cap. 19. *Id.* lib. i. cap. 38. *Id.* lib. i. cap. 58. *Cæs.* lib. vi. cap. 26, 27, 28. *Id.* lib. vi. cap. 13, 14, 15. *Id.* lib. vi. cap. 35. *Id.* lib. vii. cap. 23. *Just.* xiv. 4, with the clauses in which it occurs joined to the subjunctive, in the following passages, *Liv.* lib. iii. cap. 71. *Id.* lib. iv. cap. 15. *Id.* lib. v. cap. 11. *Cæs.* lib. vii. cap. 17. *Id.* lib. vii. cap. 32. *Id.* lib. viii. cap. 7. *Id.* lib. i. cap. 31. *Id.* lib. i. cap. 35. *Just.* ii. 10. *Id.* lib. xii. cap. 8. *Id.* lib. xiv. cap. 11.

It may be delivered, therefore, as a rule, admitting no exception, that, when the relative clause expresses no sentiment of the writer's, but refers that sentiment directly, or indirectly, to the persons, of whom he is speaking, the relative must be joined with

the subjunctive mood. In the two following examples the reference is less direct, than in any of the preceding; but the relative clause is evidently in each the sentiment of the persons, of whom the historian is writing. “Quoniam gemini essent, nec ætatis verecundia discrimen facere posset, ut Dii *quorum* tutelæ ea loca *essent*, auguriis legerent, qui nomen novæ urbi daret.” *Liv.* i. 6. The relative clause expresses a sentiment of the founders of the city, and is much the same as if the historian had said, “That the gods, under whose protection, *they conceived*, those places were,” &c. So likewise, in the following passage, “Deumque invocantes, cujus ad solemne ludosque, per fas ac fidem decepti *venissent*.” *Liv.* i. 9. This clearly means, “Invoking the gods, to whose solemnity, they said, they had come.” Unless we refer the relative clause to the Sabines, as a sentiment, or declaration, of theirs, we must be guilty of the absurdity of referring the expression, “Per fas ac fidem decepti,” to Livy himself, as an observation of his. “Adeo moverat eum et primi periculi casus, *quo* nihil se præter errorem insidiatoris *texisset*.” *Liv.* ii. 13. *Texerat* would express an observation of Livy; *texisset* denotes the feeling, or conviction, of Porsena. He felt, or was convinced, that nothing had protected him, but the mistake of the assassin. As this passage is commonly translated into English, the reader, or hearer, would be led to believe, that the relative clause expresses an observation of the historian. “The risk he had run in the first attempt, *in which nothing*

saved him, but the mistake of him, who had lain in wait for him," &c. (Translation Anony. 1761.) "Cæsar etsi a bello atque hoste discedere detrimensum esse existimabat, tamen non ignorans, quanta ex dissentionibus incommoda oriri consuessent, si tanta et tam conjuncta populo Romano civitas, *quam* ipse semper *coluisset*, omnibusque rebus *ornasset*, ad vim descenderet." *Cæs. B. G.* vii. 33. Here *aluerat* would refer the observation to the writer; *aluisset* with peculiar neatness and beauty represents the sentiment, as a recollection of Cæsar's. If we say with Duncan, "which he had always cherished and befriended," we leave in ambiguity the expression of a feeling, which it was the purpose of the author explicitly to signify.

I am aware, that Duker, in his annotations on Livy, has observed, that the relative *qui* in oblique sentences, has not always been joined by his author with the subjunctive mood. I feel it my duty also to observe, that, since the publication of the third edition of the "Gymnasium," my attention has been requested by one or two correspondents to a few of the passages in Livy, which seem to be at variance with the rule, which I have attempted to establish. Some of these I shall now proceed to examine.

It has been observed in a valuable little work, to which I shall soon have occasion to refer, that an author in detailing the sentiments of a speaker, often passes, by an instantaneous transition, from the oblique to the direct form, and represents him as ad-

dressing the hearer in his own words. It is also well known, as the same learned and acute critic has observed, that copyists have frequently inscribed on the margin explanatory notes, which, through the carelessness or ignorance of posterior transcribers, have been introduced into the text itself. Thus have expressions been attributed to authors, which they never used, nay some, which, we may confidently affirm, they never would have employed. It is obvious also, that these observations would naturally be presented in some parenthetic or relative clause. That such interpolations have crept into manuscripts, it would be easy, if our limits permitted, to produce ample and satisfactory evidence. It particularly, then, deserves the attention of the reader, that the historian, in detailing in his own words, a report, a message, an address, or an oration, delivered by another, occasionally introduces an observation of his own; and that, to distinguish this from the sentiment of the speaker, he expresses the thought, agreeably to our rule, by joining *qui* with the indicative mood. Of this distinction one or two examples have already been offered. But desirous, as I am, to illustrate and confirm the rule, though I would not trespass on the reader's patience by an idle multiplicity of examples, I may be pardoned for offering one or two from our own language, in order to render the subject as clear as possible to the junior scholar. I shall take the first, that presents itself in a work, now lying before me. "Lords Stormont, Mansfield, and the Chancellor in-

sisted, that the petitions, with which the motion was connected, were filled with absurd, and impracticable notions of reform." *Belsham's History*. Here it may be doubtful whether the relative clause was an observation of the speakers', or be a remark of the historian; but it is obvious that it must be the one or the other, and that in translating it into Latin, the distinction should be noted, the language being capable of expressing it precisely. On the former supposition, the verb would be in the subjunctive, and on the latter, in the indicative mood. I shall add another example. "The angel apprised Joseph, that there was no danger, for that Herod, who sought the child's life, was now dead." If the relative clause be a communication of the angel's, it should be rendered "qui vitam *peteret*," but if a parenthetical information by the writer, it would, we conceive, be properly rendered by *petebat*. Thus we have in Latin, "Existimavit, duos juvenes obvios sibi factos nunciare, die, qui *præterierat*, Persen regem a Paulo captum." *V. Max.* i. 8. The relative clause is not the subject of *existimavit*. The same observation is applicable to the following sentences. "Omnia, quæ post tergum *erant*, strata, et pedibus eorum subjecta, memorabat." *Q. Curt.* iii. 10. "Referens, Cæsarem in consulatu confirmasse regnum, de quo ædilis *cogitarat*." *Suet. in J. Cæs.* cap. 9. "Quæ minus admirabilia Eris Pamphylii casus facit, quem Plato scribit, inter eos, qui in acie *cecidérant*, decem diebus cecidisse." "Præterea traditum esse, memoratumque, in ultima

quodam terra, quæ Albania *dicitur*, gigni homines, qui in pueritia *canescant*." *A. Gell.* ix. 4. The former relative clause has *qui* joined with the indicative, because it is the observation of A. Gellius; the latter with the subjunctive, because it is the subject of *traditum esse*. In conclusion we observe, that the subjunctive is in such cases often turned by classic writers into the infinitive; and by this convertibility, the application of the rule may be generally ascertained. "Respondit licere, si velint, in Ubiorum finibus considerare, quorum sint legati apud se, et de Suevorum injuriis querantur; et a se auxilium petant." *Cæs. B. G.* iv. 8. He might have said *quorum* (et eorum) *legatos esse . . . et queri . . . et petere*. These passages are evidently conformable to our rule. Let us now direct our attention to a few others, which have been objected, as militating against its authority.

"Nunciare jussit, se ex Æquis pacem Romam tulisse, ab Roma Æquis bellum inferre, eâdem dextrâ armatâ, quam pacatam illis antea *dederat*." *Liv.* iii. 2. This is one of the passages, to which Duker has referred, as deviations from the common mode of expression. But there seems to me to be no impropriety, in considering the words after *inferre* to be an explanatory subjunction by the historian, and that the relative, therefore, in strict conformity to the rule, is joined with the indicative mood. "Eam esse voluntatem omnium, ut qui libertati *erit* in illa urbe finis, idem urbi sit." *Liv.* ii. 15. Here evidently the

words constituting the relative clause, are not the subject of any declaration made by the ambassadors, but modify the subject of *voluntas*. “ At illos debitos jam morti destinatosque alia nova scelera post mortem tyranni molitos ; palam primo, cum clausis Andranodorus insulæ portis, hæreditatem regni creverit, quæque procurator *tenuerat*, pro domino possederit : proditus deinde ab iis, qui in insula *erant*, circumsesus ab universa civitate, quæ Achradinam *tenuerit*, nequicquam palam atque aperte petitum regnum clam et dolo affectare conatus sit.” *Liv.* xxiv. 25. The charges introduced by the verb *arguit*, are, that they had hatched new crimes by Andranodorus’s seizure of the crown, and by his usurpation of the procurator’s power. The adverb *cum*, therefore, and the relative *qui*, are in the clauses containing the allegations, respectively joined to the subjunctives *creverit* and *possederit* ; but the clause “ quæ procurator tenuerat,” is not culpatory, but explicative ; for if it were equivalent to *procuratorem tenuisse arguit*, the verb would have been in the subjunctive mood. The latter part of the sentence assumes another form, the accusative and infinitive being dismissed ; and we find, therefore, *qui erant*, not *essent*. Why then, it may be asked, if this member of the sentence assumes a new form, or if the relative clauses are not the subjects of *arguit*, why do we find *tenuerit* ? In answer, I would observe, that, though manuscripts, as far as I can learn, favour this lection, it appears to me highly probable, that Livy wrote “ Achradinam *tenuerit*—

rat.” Nor is this opinion mere conjecture ; for when we find, in the clause preceding this, *qui erant*, there is surely great reason to conclude, that he wrote also *qui tenuerat*, unless we unwarrantably presume, that he was inconsistent with himself. Let both verbs be put in the same mood, and the clauses will accord one with the other ; and as *erant* is less likely to be written for *essent*, than *tenuerit* for *tenuerat*, the conclusion, which we advocate, seems fully justified.

There are two other passages, to which our attention has been requested. Both occur in the same address ; and, if we succeed in reconciling one with the rule, the same explanation will serve for the other.

“ Ibi inquit, annum se tertium et octogesimum agere, et in eo agro, *de quo agitur*, militasse, non juvenem vicesima jam stipendia merentem, quum ad Coriolos sit bellatum. Eo rem se vetustate oblitteratam, cæterum suæ memoriæ infixam, adferre ; agrum *de quo ambigitur*, finium Coriolanorum fuisse, capisque Coriolis, jure belli publicum populi Romani factum.” *Liv.* iii. 71.

It is asked, if our rule be correct, and the clause be parenthetic, as being an observation of the historian, and if the meaning be, “ which was then the subject of discussion,” why is it not *agebatur* ? The reason, we conceive, is, because the leading verb is in the present tense, and *agebatur* would involve an incongruity of tenses, and perhaps lead to a misconception ; for it might imply, that the discussion was antecedent to the speaker’s address. We cannot with

propriety, as expressing things contemporary, say, “He states, that the land, which then was the subject of deliberation;” but we must say “he stated.” If Livy had said *dixit* instead of *infit*, the historian’s observation would be *agebatur*. It may be asked then, why not *agatur*? We answer, that *agatur* would not only be admissible, but is far the more usual form of expression. We find, however, a historian occasionally passing, in his detail of a speech, from the oblique to the direct phraseology; and, as if identifying himself for a moment with the speaker, adopting his precise words. We have an example of this transition, very similar to the one in question, in a speech of Mithridates, as given by Justin. The historian, after observing, that Pompeius Trogus had exhibited this address in the oblique form, thus introduces it; “Optandum sibi fuisse ait, ut de eo liceret consulere, bellumne sit cum Romanis, an pax habenda Quippe adversus latronem, si nequeant pro salute, pro ultione tamen sua, omnes ferrum stringere. Cæterum, *quia non id agitur*, an liceat quiescere,” &c. The words “*quia non id agitur*,” like “*de quo agitur*,” in Livy, are the words of the speaker, and make no part of the historian’s detail. Agreeably to the oblique form, according to which the speech is professedly detailed, the expression would be *quia non id agatur*, if intended to convey a communication of the speaker, and as equivalent to *quia non id agi dixit*. It may be observed, also, that in this address several examples

occur, in which the relative clause expresses merely a known historical fact, and not a communication of Mithridates, or the subject of the leading verb, in which therefore the relative is joined to the indicative mood. This indeed constitutes the great advantage of the rule, that it enables the author to distinguish sentiments or truths communicated by the speaker, and to which he particularly desires to direct the attention of his auditors, from mere historical facts known to all, and of comparative insignificance. We have also in this address a remarkable example, how insensibly an author sometimes passes from the indirect to the direct form of expression in detailing a speech; for though the author set out with the professed intention to give the address of Mithridates obliquely, he actually concludes it with three long sentences in the direct form.

When it is inquired then, how these repugnant examples can be reconciled with our rule, the only reply we can offer, is, that they are to be ascribed to a momentary, but not unnatural, identification of the historian with the person, whose speech he is detailing. Whether this explanation be received or rejected, whether the expressions be inadvertencies of the authors, for the most correct writers have their inadvertencies, or errors of copyists, thus much is certain, that the rule here stated is not only essential to perspicuity, but is sanctioned by classic authority. We may therefore reasonably infer, that, whenever a rule so useful is violated, the deviation may be imputed

either to the inadvertence of the author, or to an error of a transcriber.

It may not be useless to observe, that *tantus*, *quantus*, *talis qualis*, and other similar correlative words are included in the rule. Thus, Cæsar says, “Quantum alteri sententiæ *de esset*, tantum alteri superesse dicebat.” *B. C.* ii. 31.

2dly. The relative pronoun is joined to the subjunctive mood, when the relative clause expresses the motive, reason, or cause of the action or event, or explains some circumstance in the character of the agent, which accounts for its production. In such examples it is frequently rendered in English by the preposition *in* with the imperfect participle. Thus, “Hannibal did wrong, in wintering at Capua,” that is, “Because he wintered,” *Male fecit Hannibal, qui Capuæ hiemarit*, or *Quod Capuæ hiemavit* *. He

* It is evident, that in this example, the relative clause expresses that, in which Hannibal’s error consisted. His wintering at Capua was, strictly speaking, not the cause of the error, but rather the error itself. In English, however, we employ the term *because*, though *in that*, or *inasmuch as* would more correctly exhibit the sentiment. In this example, and in others, which might be adduced, the secondary clause may be considered as attached to the predicate; but there are numberless examples, which come under this rule, in which the relative clause is with greater propriety referred to the subject, than to the predicate, as marking emphatically something in its state, or character, which gave occasion to the predicated action, or event. Such examples are at variance with Mr. Greenlaw’s rule. But another objection here presents itself, which in my judgment at least, is insuperable. All critics and grammarians, as far as I

said, that Cæsar did him a great injury, in diminishing his revenues by his coming, “Cæsarem magnam injuriam facere, qui suo adventu vectigalia sibi deteriora *faceret* :” that is, “who diminished,” or “because he diminished.” “You err in thinking,” *Erras qui* censeas—or, *quod* censes, “because you think.” “All praised my fortune, in having, or because I had, such a son,” “Omnes—laudare fortunas meas, qui gnatum *haberem* tali ingenio præditum.” *Ter. And. i. 1. 70.* “O fortunatum istum eunuchum, qui quidem in hanc *detur* domum !” *Ter. Eun. ii. 3. 74,* “Fortunate in being sent into this house.” “Non

know, are agreed in thinking, that *erras*, *quod* censes, and *erras, qui* censeas, are precisely equivalent expressions, denoting “You err, in thinking.” In strict analogy with these we have “Nihil errat, quod conservat.” *Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. 2.* and “Erras, quæ expectes.” *Plaut. Most. iv. 4. 26.* Now, the learned author comprises in his theory not only *qui*, but also *quod*, and all other conjunctions, representing them, as included under one and the same rule. It is evident then, that either he must prove, that these expressions are not mutually equivalent, in opposition to the concurrent opinion of all critics and grammarians, or he must acknowledge, that, if his rule be right in regard to *qui*, it is wrong, in regard to *quod*, and conversely. Mr. Greenlaw, it is true, promised to shew the difference between these two expressions, when he came to inquire into the construction of *quod*, and I looked with eagerness for the promised demonstration. I was disappointed, therefore, when I found, that the author did not resume the subject. The omission, he assures me, was owing to inadvertence. He has since favoured me with an explanation in writing ; but it appears to me irrelevant and unsatisfactory. To reconcile his theory with these two phraseologies is, in my opinion, utterly impossible.

se existimare, Romanos sine ope divina bellum gerere—qui tantæ altitudinis machinationes tanta celeritate promovere *possent*.” *Cæs. B. G. ii. 31*. Here it is signified, that the Aduatici thought that the Romans were assisted by divine power, *because* they were able to move forward their vast machines with such celerity. The relative clause is here also to be considered as the observation of the Aduatici.—“O fortunate adolescens, qui tuæ virtutis Homerum præconem *inven-eris!*” *Cic. Orat. post redit*. “O fortunate youth, who found,” “fortunate in having found,” or “because you found.”

This construction of the relative recommends itself, by its subserviency to perspicuity. If we say, “Male fecit, qui hiemavit,” we impute error to the person, who wintered; but do not express the error as consisting in his wintering. When we say, “Male fecit, qui hiemarit,” we signify, that “he erred, because he wintered,” or “in wintering.” If we employ the indicative to denote both sentiments, the expression becomes ambiguous. In such phraseologies the relative seems equivalent to *Quoniam*, or *quod*, *ego*, *Quoniam*, or *quod*, *tu*, *Quoniam*, or *quod*, *ille*. When Phormio says, “Quo redibo ore ad eam, quam *contempserim?*” the relative clause expresses the cause of his shame, and is nearly equivalent to *Quoniam ego contempserim*. It denotes not the person, or character, of the antecedent, so much as his conduct towards her. Had he said, “Quam contempsi,” it would have merely specified the *Eam*, as

the person, whom he had despised. “Cum esset, ut dicere institueram, constituta auctio Romæ, suadebant amici cognatique Cecenniæ—quoniam potestas esset emendi fundum illum Fulcinianum, qui fundo ejus antiquo continens *esset*, nullam esse rationem amittere ejusmodi occasionem.” *Cic. pro Cæcin. cap. 5.* Here the relative clause expresses the motive for purchasing, namely, the mutual propinquity of the two estates.

“Illi autem, qui omnia de republica præclara, atque egregia sentirent, sine ulla mora, negotium susceperunt,” *Cic. 3 in Cat.* “They, as being persons, who entertained the most noble sentiments.”—“Religione tactus hospes, qui omnia, ut prodigio responderet eventus, cuperet rite facta, ex templo descendit,” *Liv. i. 45,* “The stranger, being a person, who was desirous,” or “because he desired,” &c. “Pythius, qui esset apud omnes ordines gratiosus, piscatores ad se convocavit,” *Cic. Off. iii. 14,* “Pythius being a person, who had great influence.” When *ut, utpote, quippe* are expressed with the relative, they sufficiently mark the influence of the relative clause, and as all ambiguity is thus prevented, the relative is sometimes joined with the indicative mood; but much more frequently, agreeably to the general rule, with the subjunctive. “Prima luce sic ex castris proficiscuntur, ut quibus esset persuasum.” *Cæc. B. G. v. 25.* “Egressi Trojani, ut quibus nihil superesset,” *Liv. i. 1,* “As being persons to whom nothing remained.”—“Neque tamen Antonius

longe aberat, utpote qui magno exercitu locis æquioribus expeditos in fugam sequeretur." *Sall. B. C.* cap. 59. "Quippe qui videam." *Liv. Præf.* "Convivia cum patre non inibat; quippe qui ne in oppidum quidem nisi perraro veniret." *Cic. pro Rosc. Amer.*—"Frater ejus, utpote qui peregre depugnavit." *Cic. Phil.* v. 11.

And as *qui* used for *quod is*, *quum is*, *quoniam is*, takes the subjunctive mood, it may be scarcely necessary to observe, that it is construed in like manner, when employed for *et quod is*, *quum*, or *quoniam*, *is*. "Cum autem pulchritudinis duo genera sint, quorum in altero venustas sit, in altero dignitas." *Cic. Off.* i. 36. Here the relative clause is equivalent to "Et cum eorum in altero venustas sit." "Sed cum duplex ratio sit orationis, quarum in altera sit sermo, in altera contentio." *Cic. Off.* ii. 14. Here it is equivalent to "Et cum earum in altera." "Sed cum sint plura causarum genera, quæ eloquentiam desiderant." *Cic. Off.* ii. 14. Cicero does not mean to say, "But though there are several kinds of causes, and though these require eloquence." Had this been his meaning, he would have said, "Quæ eloquentiam desiderant." But he intended to say, "Though there are several kinds of causes, requiring eloquence." Here, only one concession is implied; and the verb is, therefore, in the indicative mood, the relative not being resolvable into *Et cum ille*. "Evenit facile, quod Diis cordi esset." *Liv.* i. 39, "That easily happened, which was agreeable to the gods," *i. e.* "because it

was agreeable. “Et qui jam ante inimico in nos animo *fuisse*, multo gravius hoc dolore exarsit.” *Cæs. B. G.* v. 4.

3dly. It is to be observed, that *qui*, when it is equivalent to *quanquam*, or *etsi*, *is—si modo, dummodo* is, requires the subjunctive mood *. “Credo,

* Three of the examples here given Mr. Greenlaw has endeavoured to reconcile with his theory. The concluding example under the last rule was inadvertently, in the last edition, placed as the first example under the third rule, and has therefore no relation to the question immediately before us. In order to reconcile the first example here given from Cicero, Mr. Greenlaw observes that the sentence is spoken ironically; but how this fact can possibly affect the question, or how it can prove, that the relative clause is connected with the predicate, I frankly own, I have not the sagacity to discover. To me the relative clause appears connected with the subject, and opposes the theory of the learned author. In the next example, it is true, that the preceding sentences refer to the servility of the Roman people at that time; but I am inclined to think, that there is no impropriety in considering Tiberius to be in the sentence quoted the principal subject. The point, however, in the multitude of examples, which might be adduced, is really of little or no moment. The example from Cæsar, *B. G.* vi. 36, the learned author has not attempted to reconcile with his theory. Whether its consistency with his doctrine is too obvious to require illustration, I must leave to the judgment of the candid and intelligent reader to decide. To me nothing can be more evident, than that the relative clause is connected with the subject, and is irreconcilable with his theory. And here I must remark, that every diversity of opinion, respecting the attachment of the relative clause, whether to the predicate, or the subject, furnishes an evidence that the rule, even if correct, is by no means of such easy application, as the learned author represents. He

qui te in tua civitate incolumem esse nollent, ii monumentum formæ—in suis civitatibus esse cupiebant.’” *Cic. in Verr.* “Although they wished not.” “Scilicet etiam illum, qui libertatem publicam nollet, tam projectæ servientium patientiæ tædebat.” *Tac. Ann.* iii. 65. “Cicero, qui per omnes superiores dies præceptis Cæsaris summa diligentia milites in castris *continuisset*—septimo die diffidens de numero dierum Cæsarem fidem servaturum—quinque cohortes frumentatum—misit.” *Cæs. B. G.* vi. 36. In these examples *qui* is equivalent to *quanquam*, *quamvis* or *etsi*, *is*. “Nulla est tam facilis res, quin difficilis *siet*, quam invitus facias.” *Ter. Heaut.* iv. 6. 1. *i. e.* “if you do it.” “An mihi potest quicquam esse molestum, quod tibi gratum futurum sit.” *Cic. i. e. dummodo sit*, “provided it be.”

4thly. When the relative pronoun follows an interrogative, or a negative, clause, the antecedent and relative clauses referring to the same subject, and logically expressing but one subject and one attribute, the relative is uniformly joined with the subjunctive mood *. Thus, “Quis est enim, cui non perspicua sint illa ?” *Cic. Off.* lib. ii. 5. “Who is there, to whom

himself acknowledges that in determining the question, he oftener than once experienced considerable difficulty.

* The reader will perceive, that Mr. Greenlaw’s rule is in accordance with the observations, which have been offered in the Gymnasium, as explanatory of the principle, on which this rule is founded, and that the relative clause is connected with the predicate, or rather the predicate itself.

those things are not clear?" "Quis est, qui utilia fugiat?" *Cic. Off.* iii. 28. "Quis est, qui non persequatur?" *Cic. Off.* "An est quisquam, qui hoc ignoret?" *Cic. pro Mil.* "An est quisquam, qui dubitet?" *Liv.* v. 3. "Num quid est mali, quod non dixeris?" *Ter. Eun.* v. 6. 25.

The reader, we presume, will observe, that this rule is applicable to those cases only, which are indeed far the most numerous, in which the interrogation is equivalent to an affirmation or negation. When the sentence implies a question, put for the sake of information, the relative takes the indicative mood. "Quis hic est, qui operto capite Æsculapium salutatur?" *Plaut. Curc.* iii. 1. 19. "Quis est, qui salutet?" would signify "Who is there, that salutes?" implying "Nobody salutes." "Quid est, quod audio; spintherem fecisse divortium." *Cic. Att.* xii. 51. "What is that, which I hear?" *Quod audiam* would mean, "What is there for me to hear?" or "What reason is there for my hearing?" Thus also, after a negative, "Nemo est, qui haud intelligat." *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* "There is no man, who does not understand." "Nulla pars est corporis, quæ non sit minor." *Ib.* "Neque est quicquam aliud præter mundum, cui nihil absit." *Ib.* "Nihil est in omni mundo, quod non pars universi sit." *Ib.* These, and similar phraseologies, admit the three following forms—Thus we say, "They ran through every flame," or "There is no flame, through which they did not run," or "What flame is there, through which they did not run?" "Per om-

nem flammam *cucurrerunt*. Nulla est flamma, per quam non *cucurrerint*,” or “Quænam est flamma, per quam non *cucurrerint*?” The last is the expression of Cicero. In the following passage, we have *Qui* after a negative, and also after an interrogative joined to the subjunctive mood. “Quid enim est, Catilina, *quod* te jam in hac urbe delectare *possit*, in qua nemo est, extra istam conjurationem perditorum hominum, *qui* te non *metuat*, nemo *qui* te non *oderit*?” *Cic. in Cat. 1.* The reader, therefore, will perceive the distinction between “Quid est, quod metuis.” *Plaut. Bacch. i. 2. 20.* and “Quid est, quod metuas.” *Ib. i. 2. 59,* the former signifying “What is it, which you fear?” and the latter, “What reason have you for fearing,” or “you have no cause for fear.”

In like manner, perspicuity requires, that after conditional, or hypothetical, clauses, the substantive verb not being a mere copula, and the two clauses being combinable into one, *qui* should be joined with the subjunctive mood. “Si quis est, *qui* Catilinæ similes cum Catilina sentire non *putet*.” *Cic. Orat. in Cat. 2.* “Si quis est, *qui putet*” may be considered as equivalent to *Si quis putat*; but with this difference, that the former is the more emphatic expression, “Si quis est, *qui* hoc dicat.” *Ter. Ph. Prol.* “Si quisquam est, *qui* placere se studeat.” *Ter. Eun. Prol.* It is true, that the author immediately afterwards says, “Si quis est, *qui* dictum in se inclementius existimavit,” but I entertain no doubt, that the true reading is that given by Bentley, namely *existimârit*.

I am persuaded also that the correct lection in the following passage is that, which Heyne and some other critics have adopted, “ Per, si qua est, quæ *restet* adhuc mortalibus usquam, Intemerata fides.” *Virg. Æn. ii. 142.* Heyne observes, that the subjunctive form is the more elegant; but the truth is, that the phraseology recommends itself not by its elegance, but its subserviency to perspicuity. If we say *Si est philosophus, qui ita existimat*, to express “ If he, who thinks so, is a philosopher,” and “ If there be a philosopher, who thinks so,” it would be impossible to ascertain, which of these is the meaning intended. But there can be no ambiguity, if the indicative form *existimat* be employed to express the former sentiment, and the subjunctive the latter.

It may be said, perhaps, that in one or two of these examples, the verb may be considered as potential. That the idea of contingency is wholly excluded in all of them, it would be temerity to assert; but that the verb would be in this mood, whether contingency were, or were not, implied, we have sufficient evidence for affirming. For, in several of these examples, it is clearly not involved; and we find the subjunctive form, where the action is actually past, and represented as certain, not contingent. Thus, “ Nemo, non modo Romæ, sed nec ullo in angulo totius Italiæ oppressus ære alieno fuit, quem non ad hoc incredibile sceleris fœdus non asciverit.” *Cic. in Cat. 2.* Besides, we find Cicero employing the expressions, “ Nemo non intelligit,” “ Nemo est, qui non intelli-

gat," " Quisnam est, qui non intelligat," and " Quisque intelligit,"—all precisely in the same sense. That in all the examples, which have been here adduced, the interrogative and relative, also the negative and relative clauses, refer to one and the same subject, and, logically considered, express but one attribute, may be sufficiently evident from the equivalence of the four expressions, last offered. *Nemo est, qui dubitet*, is clearly of the same import with *Nemo dubitat*; the *Nemo* also and the relative refer to the same subject.

When they refer to different subjects, or express two different attributes, the rule does not hold.—Thus, "Hoc nemini dubium est, qui reo custodiam, quæitori gratulationem, indici præmium decrevit, quid de tota re et causa judicaret." *Cic. in Cat.* 4. "Nihil sane id prosit Miloni, qui hoc fato natus est." *Cic. pro Mil.*

This rule, like the two former, appears to be dictated by a regard to perspicuity. For it is necessary to distinguish, whether the negative term with the substantive verb be the predicate, and the relative clause the subject; or whether the verb in the relative clause be the predicate, and the other terms the subject. If we say, *Nemo est, qui ita existimat*, it strictly means, "He, who thinks so, is nobody," that is, "a person of no consequence."—Here *Nemo est* is the predicate; *qui ita existimat* the subject. If we say, *Nemo est, qui ita existimet*, it means, "There is no one, who thinks so." *Nemo* is the subject; and the other terms, logically comprehensible in the verb

existimat, form the predicate—thus *Nemo existimat*.

As “*nemo est, qui putet*,” “*quis est, qui dicat*,” and similar phraseologies are not only subservient to perspicuity, but also more emphatical, than “*nemo putat*,” and “*quis dicit*;” so we find the subject of the antecedent emphatically expressed by an indefinite clause, and the antecedent, in such examples, joined to the subjunctive mood, “*Quid sit, quod me delectet, quæris?*” *Sen.* “Do you inquire, what that is, which gives me pleasure?” This might, but less forcibly, be rendered, “*Quid me delectet, quæris?*” “*Inspiciamus quid sit, propter quod accidant hæc.*” *Sen.* In the following sentence, it is the noun in the indefinite clause, and not the clause itself, which is the antecedent to the relative; but the whole expression being periphrastic, and the antecedent, though not grammatically, being yet logically, contained in the indefinite clause, namely “the fewness of the players,” the rule still holds. “*Quis ignorat, quam pauci histriones sint, quos æquo animo spectare possemus.*” *Cic.*

We sometimes find the sentiment briefly expressed, the relative and the substantive verb being omitted; thus, “They were eager to see, who that man was, who had so long despised the Roman power.” “*Avebant visere, quis ille tot per annos opes nostras sprevisset.*” *Tac. Ann. xii. 36. i. e. quis ille esset, qui, &c.*

Nearly allied to the preceding, is the

Fifth Case, in which the relative is very generally,

if not always, joined to the subjunctive mood; namely, when, in order to impart greater emphasis to the expression, a periphrasis with the verb *Esse* is employed, instead of simply the nominative with the principal verb*. In such examples, the verb *Esse* is not merely a copula, but a verb denoting "Existence." Thus, instead of saying, "Nonnulli dicunt," we say, "Sunt, qui dicant." *Cic. in Cat.* 2. This phraseology is adopted, in order to excite the particular attention of the reader; and it is for the same purpose, that the word *There* is frequently employed in English, in the introduction of a sentence. "Sunt, qui dicant," "There are persons, who say," "Fuerunt, qui censerent," *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* "There have been persons, who thought." "Fuere ea tempestate, qui dicerent." *Sall. B. C.* 23. "Erunt, qui existimari velint." *Cic. 2 in Cat.* Under this rule may be comprehended such expressions as, "Inventi autem multi sunt, *qui*—vitam pro patria profundere parati *essent*." *Cic. Off.* 1. "Plures inventi, qui propter ubertatem terræ in Crustumini nomina darent," *Liv. i.* 11, "There were more found, who gave in their names for Crustumini." "Plures tamen invenio, qui Romanos Horatios vocent." *Liv. i.* 24. The last example, indeed, may be comprised under the first rule; thus, "Plures tamen invenio, qui vocent," that is, *Quos vocare invenio*. An observance of this rule is, in some cases, essential to perspicuity; for, otherwise, the subject may be mistaken for the predicate. For

* Mr. Greenlaw's theory accords with this rule.

example, if we say, *Sunt boni, qui dicunt*, to express, “ They are good men, who say,” and also, “ There are good men, who say,” the expression is evidently ambiguous. This ambiguity is prevented by expressing the former sentiment by *Sunt boni, qui dicunt*, in which case the relative clause is the subject, and the antecedent clause the predicate; and by expressing the latter sentiment by *Sunt boni, qui dicant*, where the antecedent clause is the subject, and the relative clause the predicate.

When Cicero says, “ Erant in magna potentia, qui consulebantur,” *Cic. pro Muræn.*—he means, “ Those, who were consulted, were in great power.” Here the relative clause forms the subject, and the other the predicate. Had he said, “ Erant in magna potentia, qui consulerentur,” he would have expressed, “ There were men in great power, who were consulted.” Here “ men in great power” is the subject; and “ Were consulted” the predicate. “ Parvumque intervallum erat, quod aciem utramque divideret.” *Q. Curt. x. 10.* “ There was a small intervening space, which divided the two armies.” The relative clause is logically the predicate; “ a small space separated the armies.” *Quod dividebat* would express the subject, and *parvum erat* the predicate. “ The intervening space between the armies was small.” “ Cephaledii certus est mensis, quo mense sacerdotem maximum creari oporteat.” *Cic. in Ver.* “ There is a certain month, in which it behoves the chief priest to be elected.”

Poets frequently deviate from this rule, thus,

“ Est, qui nec veteris pocula Massici,
Nec partem solido demere de die
Spernit.” *Hor. Car. i. 1. 19.*

If there be any unquestionable examples, in prose writers, in which the indicative mood occurs, with the simple verb of existence, of which, it may be safely asserted, there are very few, I believe, it may be confidently affirmed, that not a single example can be found, in which *qui* is not thus joined to the subjunctive mood, if the substantive verb has its subject expressed. We may say with Horace, *Est, qui spernit*, without danger of misconception; but we cannot say *Est bonus, Est malus, Est sapiens qui spernit*, to denote “ There is a good man, &c. who despises;” for this would mean, “ He, who despises, is a good man.”

6thly. It has been already observed, that all intensive words, as “ So,” “ Such,” are followed by *Ut*, with the subjunctive mood. In like manner, when *Is qui, Ille qui, Hic qui*, are used for “ Such that,” in other words, when *Qui* is used for *Ut ego, Ut tu, Ut ille*, it is joined with the subjunctive mood*.

* There can be no doubt, that the relative, in such examples, is connected with the predicate, and that so far this rule is reducible under Mr. Greenlaw’s theory. But, if his doctrine be correct, and applicable universally to the construction of the relative, not only should *is qui*, signifying “ such that,” be joined

“Atque illæ dissensiones erant hujusmodi, Quirites, quæ non ad delendam, sed ad commutandam rempublicam pertinerent.” *Cic. 3 in Cat.* Parallel with which passage, we have the following immediately after, “Atque illæ tamen omnes dissensiones — ejusmodi fuerunt, ut non reconciliatione concordiæ, sed internecione civium dijudicatæ sint,” “The dissensions were such, that,” or “of that kind, that,” &c. “At ea fuit legatio Octavii, in qua periculi suspicio non subesset.” *Cic. Philip. 9.* “Nec tamen ego sum ille ferreus, qui fratris carissimi atque amantissimi præsentis mœrore non movear,” *Cic. 4 in Cat.* “I am not so obdurate, as not to be moved,” or “that I am not moved.” “Nec ulla vis imperii tanta est, quæ possit.” *Cic. Off. ii. 8.* “Secutæ sunt tempestates, quæ et nostros in castris continerent, et hostem a pugna prohiberent.” *Cæs. B. G. iv. 34.* “Storms, such as to confine,” or “so that they confined.” In the following example, the verb may be considered as potential. “Nec ulla profecto tanta vis reperietur,

to the subjunctive mood, but also when signifying “such as;” for in both senses the relative clause is connected with the predicate; *is qui*, with the accompanying verb, forming in the latter case the predicate itself. “Idem sum, qui semper fui.” *Plaut. Amph. i. 2. 291.* “Non hercle is sum, qui sum.” *Plaut. Men. iii. 2. 6.* “Si nos ii sumus, qui esse debemus.” *Cic. Ep. Fam. v. 19.* “Ego sum is, qui nullius vim plus valere volui, quam honestum otium.” *Cic. Ep. Fam. v. 21.* In these, and numberless other examples, which might be adduced, the relative clauses are the predicates; but the verbs, in contradiction to Mr. Greenlaw’s rule, are in the indicative mood.

quæ conjunctionem vestram—perfringere et labefactare possit.” *Cic. 4 in Cat.* “Sed cum is sit, qui iudicet,” *Cic. Off. iii. 3*, “But since he is one, who judges,” or “such a person, that he judges.” “Non sumus ii, *quorum vagetur* animus errore.” *Cic. de Off. lib. ii.*

And here the idiom of our language renders it particularly necessary for the junior reader to observe, that the relative is considered to be of the same person with the principal subject, and not with the antecedent, whose character is expressed in the relative clause. Thus, “Non is sum, qui omnia *sciam*,” “I am not a man, who *knows* all things,” or “the man, to know,” (colloquially) or “Such a man, that I know.” “Thou art not the man, who can command us,” *Tu non is es, qui nobis imperare possis.* To an inattentive reader, the expressions, “I am the man, who commands you,” and “I am the man, who command you,” may appear to be precisely equivalent. This, however, is by no means the case.—(See “*The Etymology and Syntax of the English Language explained*,” p. 261, fourth Edition.)*

* After adverting to my distinction between these two phraseologies, Mr. Greenlaw observes that the former “I am the man, who commands you,” would be rendered *Ego is sum, qui tibi imperem*, and the latter “I am the man, who command you,” *Ego is sum, qui tibi impero.* That these translations should be correct is necessary to the truth of the learned author’s theory; for, if they are not correct, the theory is wrong. Now, I believe, that classical usage warrants me in saying, that the former translation is sanctioned by no authority. If we read the introductory lines

When the pronoun *Is* is not causal, or efficient, but merely demonstrative, the fact expressed in the relative being nowise affected by that signified in the antecedent clause, the preceding rule does not take place—thus, “*Si tu is es, cui nuptam esse me arbitror.*” *Liv.* i. 47. The antecedent pronoun is merely demonstrative. The meaning is, “If you are the man, to whom I believe myself married,” not, “If you are such a man, that I believe myself married to him.”

7thly. The effect of the relative clause is sometimes explicative, and sometimes restrictive. If we say, “Man, who is born of a woman, is of few days,” the relative clause is explanatory of the antecedent. It does not confine, or limit, the generic import of the antecedent, “man;” but states a proposition applicable to the whole species, all men being born of woman. And, in such cases, the relative may be resolved into *Et ille*, thus, “Man is of few days, and he is born of woman.” But if we say, “The man is wise, who speaks little,” the relative clause limits the import of the antecedent, and confines it to that man, who speaks little. “*Vir sapit, qui pauca loquitur.*” The *Qui loquitur* is not explanatory of the term *Vir*, or predicable of the whole species, but restricts and

of Virgil’s *Æneid*, we find “*Ille ego . . . qui coegi,*” and in the passage quoted from Cicero in the preceding note, “*Is, qui volui.*” *Ego is sum, qui tibi imperem*, does not mean, as the learned author supposes, and as his theory requires, “I am the man, who commands you,” but “I am the man to command you.”

modifies its generic meaning. In English, the explicative, and the restrictive sense, are generally distinguished by the omission, or the insertion of the definite article. In Latin, perspicuity would be consulted by joining the relative, when the clause is restrictive, to the subjunctive mood; and when it is explanatory, to the indicative mood. This distinction, however, is not uniformly observed.

When Cicero says, "*Homo qui rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia cernit, principia et causas rerum videt,*" *Cic. Off.* lib. i. 5, the relative clause is explanatory, and the verb, as it always is in such cases, is joined with the indicative mood. In the following passage, the relative clause is restrictive, and the verb is, therefore, put in the subjunctive mood. "*Quomodo igitur jucunda vita potest esse, a qua absit prudentia?*"* *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.* lib. v. 35.—"How

* Mr. Greenlaw contends, that Cicero's reasoning here requires, that this interrogative sentence should be considered to be a universal affirmative proposition, signifying, that "every wise man is happy." By no legitimate rules of construction, grammatical or logical, can the sentence, in my apprehension, bear this meaning. If such latitude of interpretation were admitted, translation would be any thing, that either fancy, or the love of hypothesis, might make it. He observes also, that a negative conclusion would prove nothing. I cannot perceive either the truth, or the relevancy, of this observation. May not a negative conclusion be the thing to be proved, as is the case here? And may not a negative conclusion be the medium of another proof? But the learned author observes, that "the only conclusion, which will suit Cicero's argument, is an uni-

can the (or that) life be agreeable, which is devoid of prudence?" But there are numberless examples, in which the relative clause limits the import of the antecedent, while the verb is put in the indicative mood. "Ut enim adolescentem, in quo senile est aliquid; sic senem, in quo est aliquid adolescentis, probo." *Cic. de Senect. cap. xi.* "Non solum corporis qui ad naturam apti sunt, sed multo etiam magis animi motus probandi, qui item ad naturam accommodati sunt." *Cic. Off. lib. i.* In both these passages, the relative clause confines the import of the antecedent term; thus, "Not only do *the* (those) motions of the body, which are adapted to nature, deserve approbation, but much more also are those emotions of the mind, which are consentaneous with nature, worthy of praise,"—"Omnis homines, qui sese student præstare cæteris animalibus, summa ope niti decet." *Sall. B. C. cap. i.* In all these examples, the relative clause is restrictive, and not explanatory.

It cannot be questioned, however, that a difference of mood serves, in many cases, to prevent ambivalent affirmative." I think otherwise; but must not trespass on the reader's patience, by assigning my reasons. I shall only ask, in what manner the following sentence would be rendered, "How can a life, devoid of prudence, be a happy one?" unless in Cicero's words? And, if we turn the sentence into a negative proposition, *Nulla vita potest esse jucunda, a qua absit prudentia*, it is evident, that the relative clause is attached to the subject, restricting its general import, and that the verb is in the subjunctive mood, opposing the theory of Mr. Greenlaw.

guity, and to distinguish general from particular propositions. Thus, “Nihil est turpius, quam cum eo bellum gerere, qui cum familiariter vixeris.” *Cic. de Am.* Here the pronoun *eo* refers to no particular individual, but means “one,” “any one,” “a person,” indefinitely. “Otio fruor non illo, quo *debeat* is, qui quondam *peperisset* otium civitati.” *Cic. Off.* iii. 1. “I enjoy ease, but not that, which *one*, or *a person*, ought to enjoy, who had once procured tranquillity to the state.” The pronoun *eo*, though indirectly pointing to Cicero, is here indefinite, and the position in the relative clauses general. In the following example, on the contrary, the reference is particular, “Quid sperem ab eo, qui mihi amicus nunquam fuit?” *Cic. Att.* xi. 9. “From him,” namely Antony. “Ludos facere illi honestum est, cui non necesse est spectare.” *Cic. Att.* xv. 25. *Illi* refers to Brutus. If he had intended to express a general truth, *ei cui non necesse sit* would have denoted it. The distinction, however, as has been remarked, is not always observed. Thus, Cicero says, “Ac mihi quidem videntur huc omnia esse referenda iis, qui *præsunt* aliis, ut ii, qui erunt eorum in imperio, sint quam beatissimi.” *Ep. ad Q. Frat.* i. 1., and in the very next sentence, “Est autem non modo ejus, qui sociis et civibus, sed etiam ejus, qui servis, qui mutis pecudibus *præsit*, eorum, quibus *præsit*, commodis utilitatique servire.”

When, however, by means of a restrictive term,

such as *Solus*, *Unus**, the antecedent is so limited, as not to express simply one of the class specified in

* In the two first editions of this work, misled by an error in Mair's Introduction, I specified *unicus* as a restrictive term, which, like *solus* or *unus*, might limit the antecedent to the modification expressed in the relative clause. For the correction of this inadvertence, I am indebted to the learned author of an excellent little work on the construction of the relative pronoun. It is justly observed, by that acute and ingenious critic, that *unicus* implying the only one existing cannot require any modifying clause, in order to distinguish its subject from others. It is evident, that a *unique* belongs to no class, and needs no mark of discrimination.

But this is not the only obligation to the learned author, which I feel it my duty to acknowledge. He has illustrated, and confirmed the rules, delivered in the "Gymnasium," for the construction of *Qui*, with a clearness of conception, a correctness of judgment, and a nicety of discrimination, which evince, at once, the acuteness of the metaphysician, and the acquirements of the accomplished classical scholar. (See "Rules for the construction of the Relative *Qui*, by A. R. Carson, LL.D. F.A.S. F.R.S.E. and Rector of the High School of Edinburgh.")

But while I cheerfully pay this tribute of respect to the critical sagacity of the learned author, I must, in justice to myself, take the liberty to remark, that the rules delivered in the "Gymnasium," for the construction of *Qui*, were not, as he apprehends, collected "from the cursory and widely scattered observations of commentators," but the result solely of the author's own investigation. Nor does he yet know, in what work, antecedent to his own, is any distinct rule to be found, and its principle unfolded. At a very early period of his life, he became a teacher, and two of the great difficulties, which daily presented themselves, were these; 1st, to ascertain what verbs should be accompanied by an infinitive mood, and what should

the relative clause, but the only one of that class, in other words, when the antecedent clause, logically considered, denotes the subject with its modifications and the relative clause the predicate, the relative is almost universally joined with the subjunctive mood. Perspicuity requires this construction of the relative: Thus, "Vah! Solus hic homo est, qui sciat divinitus." *Plaut. Curc.* ii. 1. 33. "This is the only man, that knows," equivalent to *Hic solus scit*. "Quæ gens

be followed by *ut*; the 2d, to determine, when the relative pronoun should be joined to the indicative, and when to the subjunctive mood. To conquer the first of these difficulties, he consulted the few grammatical works, to which he had access, particularly Ruddiman's larger Grammar, and Johnson's Commentaries; but in none of them, did he find any precise or satisfactory information. The rules offered on this subject, in the first volume, are the result of his own reading and observation. The second difficulty appeared, for a long time, absolutely insurmountable. But being daily called upon, to assign some reason, to his pupils, why the relative should at one time be joined with the indicative, and at another time with the subjunctive mood, he felt himself compelled to prosecute the inquiry.

It is impossible to read the Latin classics with attention, and not perceive, that almost all their deviations from general rules are adopted for the sake of perspicuity. It occurred to him, therefore, that this principle might probably furnish a guide to the solution of the difficulty. The author accordingly applied it to the subject, and found, to his no small satisfaction, that it served to explain what had hitherto appeared to him almost an impenetrable mystery, and had been regarded as the *opprobrium* of Latin critics and grammarians. A reference to the rules will clearly show, that they are all resolvable into a principle of perspicuity, and that the neglect of them would lead to doubt, or misconception.

una restat, quæ populo Romano bellum facere et posse, et non nolle, videatur." *Cic. 3 in Cat. cap. 9.*

" Nil admirari prope res est una, Numici
Solaque, quæ possit facere et servare beatum."

Hor. Ep. i. 6. 1.

" Sapiencia est una, quæ moestitiam pellat ex animis." *Cic. de Fin. lib. 1. cap. 13.* " Voluptas autem est sola, quæ nos vocet ad se, et alliciat suapte natura." *Cic. de Fin. lib. i. cap. 16.* " Ex tanta provincia soli sunt, qui te salvum velint."—" Unum se esse ex omni civitate Æduorum, qui adduci non potuerit, ut juraret." *Cæs. B. G. i. 31.* " Quod si vitam omnem videmus perturbari errore et inscientia, sapientiamque esse solam, quæ nos a libidinum impetu et formidinum terrore vindicet." *Cic. de Fin. lib. i. cap. 14.* In the last two examples, the relative is joined to the subjunctive mood, agreeably to the rule now under consideration, and also to the first rule, here given for its government. Thus, *Dixit se esse unum, quem dixit, non potuisse.—Si videmus sapientiam esse solam, quam videmus vindicare.*—"Xenophanes unus, qui Deos esse diceret." *Cic. de Div.*

The deviations from this rule are few, and confined chiefly to inferior writers. An observance of it is essential to perspicuity. Thus, if we say, "Xenophon solus erat Socratis discipulus, qui magistri ipsius disciplinam recte exposuerit," we express precisely, "Xenophon was the only disciple of Socrates, who correctly explained the doctrines of his master." But,

if we say, “Xenophon solus erat Socratis discipulus, *qui—exposuit*,” it may mean, “Xenophon, who correctly explained—was the only disciple of Socrates.”

8thly. *Qui*, taken for *Quis*, is generally joined with the subjunctive mood, as “Sentiet, *qui vir siem*.” *Ter. Eun.* i. 1. 21. Great care should be taken, as Linacer observes, not to mistake the interrogative for the relative pronoun. In this sentence, “*Audivi, quæ legisti*,” he remarks, that, if *Qui* be intended as the relative pronoun, the expression is correct; but if meant, as the interrogative taken indefinitely, the expression should be *Quæ legeris*; for, whenever an accusative goes before, which receives the action of the verb, the pronoun is the relative; but when the subsequent clause forms the subject, and receives the action of the verb, the pronoun is the interrogative. The rule here given, though not perfectly correct, deserves attention; we shall, therefore, proceed to illustrate it. If we say, “I know not, what arts he was taught,” the latter clause expresses the subject, and receives the action of the verb. *Nescio, quibus artibus sit eruditus*. Here we evidently express our ignorance, to which of the arts his studies were directed, whether poetry, or painting, or music, &c. The pronoun, therefore, is the interrogative, and being indefinitely taken, is joined with the subjunctive. But if we say, “I know not the arts, in which he was instructed,” it is not the latter clause which receives the action of the

verb, but the word *Arts*. *Artes haud novi, quibus ille est eruditus*. Here we express our ignorance of those arts, in which he was instructed; in other words, we mean to say, that he was taught certain arts, which we have never studied. The pronoun here is the relative, and joined with the indicative mood. When Livy says, “Cur enim quæritis, quod scitis?” vi. 15.—and Cicero, “Expone, quod quærimus.” *Brut.* the meaning is, “Why do ye inquire into that, which you already know?” “Explain to us that which we inquire into.” *Quid sciatis, Quid quæramus*, would convey a very different meaning.

Having said thus much in explanation of the distinction here recommended to the reader's attention, it may be necessary to caution him against an error, into which this rule of Linacer may very naturally lead him. He is not then to conceive, as the words of this learned critic imply, that, when the preceding verb has its subject expressed by an accusative, the subsequent pronoun must be the relative, and, therefore, joined with the indicative mood. In this respect, the rule of Linacer is chargeable with inaccuracy. But the reader is to remember, that when the subject of the verb is expressed chiefly by the clause following it, whether there be, or be not, an antecedent word, receiving the action of the verb, the pronoun is to be considered as indefinite, and joined with the subjunctive mood. Thus, “I know not, who he was,” *Nescio quis fuerit*; or, as Terence has it, “I know

him not, who he was," "Ego illum nescio, qui fuerit." *Ter. Eun.* iv. 3. 15. The subject unknown is not *He*, but *Who he was*.

The preceding observations and examples will serve to shew, that *qui* is joined with the subjunctive mood: 1st. When the relative clause is oblique, referring the sentiment, or observation, not to the writer, but to the person, of whom he is speaking. 2dly. When the relative clause expresses a circumstance, which serves to account for the principal fact, or expresses the cause, or reason of its existence. 3dly. When *qui* is used for *quanquam is*, *si is*, *dummodo is*. 4thly. When *qui* follows an interrogative, a hypothetical, or a negative clause, there being logically only one subject, and one predicate. 5thly. When, instead of the subject and its verb, a periphrasis with the verb *sum*, or any other verb is employed. 6thly. When *qui* is taken for *ut ego*, *ut tu*, *ut ille*. 7thly. When by *solus*, *unus*, or any equivalent word, the attribute implied in the relative, is confined to the subject in the antecedent clause: in other words, when the antecedent clause is not the predicate, but confines the attribute, expressed in the relative clause, to the subject. 8thly. *Qui* taken for *quis*, is joined with the subjunctive mood. The principle, which pervades these rules, is evidently a regard to precision and perspicuity. Two different sentiments cannot, without ambiguity, be expressed by one and the same phraseology. To note the distinction, *qui* is

sometimes joined with the indicative, and at other times with the subjunctive mood.

Having now explained, in what cases the relative is uniformly, and in what cases generally joined with the subjunctive mood, we dismiss the subject with admonishing the reader, when he finds *qui* joined with the second form of the verb, to ascertain, whether the mood be potential or subjunctive; that is, whether the sense requires that form, or whether it be under the government of the relative pronoun*. Unless he attend to this distinction, he will involve himself in perplexity and error.—“*Responsum est, qui primus matri osculum dedisset, principatum Romæ habiturum.*” *Aur. Vict.* Here the verb *Dedisset* is not under the government of the relative. The sense requires this form; for the meaning is, “That he, who *should first* kiss his mother, would have the sovereignty at Rome.” So likewise in the following

* It has been already observed, that Ruddiman has, in one of his examples, erroneously considered the verb to be in the subjunctive mood, the sense evidently requiring the potential form of the verb. Scheller has committed a similar mistake in the following examples, representing the verbs to be severally under the government of *qui* or the preceding particle. “*Rex imperavit, ut, quæ bello opus essent, pararentur.*” *Cic.* The meaning is, “What things might be needful.” “*Quod te a Scævola petiisse dicit, ut, dum tu abesses, . . . provinciae præesset.*” *Cic.* “While you should be absent.” “*Ut, dum tempus anni esset idoneum, aliquid negotii gerere possem.*” *Cic. Ep. iii. 6.* “While the season of the year should be.” See *Scheller's Præcepta, Part i. cap. 2.*


examples: “Fertur pronunciasse militi præmia, *qui* primus, qui secundus, castra hostium *intrasset*.” *Liv.* ii. 20. “Ut omnes, *qui* arma ferre *possent*, in unum locum convenirent.” *Cæs. B. G.* iv. 17. “Nam cum ex duodecim tabulis satis esset ea præstari, quæ *qui inficiatus esset*, dupli poenam subiret.” *Cic. Off.* lib. iii. cap. 16.

The reader also must be reminded, that what is, in truth, contingent, is often expressed by the English indicative, as absolutely certain.—In Latin, however, the potential must be used.—“She might choose, whom she *liked*,” “*Ipsa quos vellet*, legeret.” *Liv.* ii. 13. “Whom she might like.” “The ambassadors promise to do, what he ordered,” “*Legati, quæ imperaret, facturos pollicentur*.” *Cæs. B. G.* vii. 83. “*Uti ea, quæ polliceantur, facturos intelligat*.” *Cæs. B. G.* i. 12.—that is, “What they should promise.” “That the victory should be given to him, who dissected the entrails of that victim,” “*Qui ejus hostiæ exta prosecuisset, ei victoriam dari*.” *Liv.* v. 21.—that is, “Who should dissect,” or “should have dissected.” “They passed a decree, that he who wished to ease his conscience, and ensure the safety of his family, should bring a tenth part of the spoil into the public treasury,” “*Ut, qui se domumque religione exsolvere vellet, decumæ pretium partis in publicum deferret*.” *Liv.* v. 24.—that is, “He who should wish.”


EXERCISE.

While Philip was preparing war against the Ætolians, Demetrius, king of Illyria, who had been lately conquered by Paulus, the consul, addressed him in the most suppliant terms, complaining of the injustice of the Romans, who, not contented with the possession of Italy, were grasping at the sovereignty of the world, and waging war with every king. “Aspiring,” said he, “to the government of Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain, they have attacked the Carthaginians; nor have they any other cause for their hostility against me, than that my territories are adjacent to their own.”—He added, in order to induce Philip to resist the ambition of the Romans, that he surrendered to him his right to the kingdom, which they had injuriously seized, better pleased, he said, should he see it in the hands of an ally, than under the dominion of an enemy.

END OF VOL. I.



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